

The authority of Jesus and its foundation :

226.06 W883a

10047



Woolf, Bertram Lee,
Life Pacific College Alumni Library

DATE DUE

MAR 26 1998

DEC 18 1998

226.06

W883a

Woolf, Bertram Lee

The authority of Jesus

The authority of Jesus and its foundation
226.06 W883a 10047



Woolf, Bertram Lee,
LIFE Alumni Library



THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS
AND ITS FOUNDATION

THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AND ITS FOUNDATION

A STUDY IN THE FOUR
GOSPELS & THE
ACTS

BY

Bertram Lee Woolf

Ph.D., M.A., B.Sc., B.D.

*Professor of New Testament Exegesis, History and Criticism
Hackney and New College, Divinity School:
University of London*



RICHARD R. SMITH INC.
NEW YORK

FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE U.S.A. IN 1930

TO
MY WIFE

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
UNWIN BROTHERS LTD., WOKING

THE present study contains the substance of a thesis accepted by the University of Edinburgh for the degree of Ph.D. in Theology. It is confined to the Canonical Gospels and the Book of Acts, and attempts to deal mainly with the foundations of the authority which Jesus came to exercise over the people who heard His living voice. The earlier chapters are concerned with the historical material implicit in the sources of the relevant documents. Though still strictly confined to the point of view of His authority, the later chapters deal with more general considerations, in regard to the person and character of Jesus, but little attempt is made to draw out the implications for systematic theology. The general positions adopted in modern scholarship are assumed, the attitude to the miracles being indicated in its place.

While the greater portion of the documentary material is laid under contribution, not all of it is immediately relevant to the present purpose. Thus many passages, of great intrinsic interest, are passed over without comment. It is not pretended, of course, even in the passages dealt with in detail, that the general questions raised by them have been considered, but only those that seem to bear on the present issue.

The Literary references are indicated by the author's name, and the year of the publication of the edition used, fuller particulars being given in the Bibliography. This latter does not pretend to be complete, but only to indicate the works found most useful in the course of prosecuting the present study.

For the convenience mainly of collating what is said about passages dealt with from several points of view, Indexes of Scriptural Passages and of Principal Subjects have been drawn up. The Table of Contents will probably be found sufficiently detailed to give any further indications required.

The English versions of the scriptural references in both Testaments usually follow the translation of Dr. James Moffatt.

I am under great obligation to my friend, Rev. P. G. S.

Hopwood, B.D., B.Litt., for his careful work in preparing the indexes, and in verifying the numerous scriptural references throughout the text, and also to my friend, Rev. A. E. Chesman, B.D., for his painstaking labour in reading the proofs throughout; in conclusion, I wish to express deep gratitude to my father, to Mr. H. Mandley, of Liverpool, whose kind liberality made it possible for me to do the work; to Mr. J. W. K. Maile, of London, whose great generosity made it possible to publish the results; and to my wife, for her patience and courage in the many hours of loneliness thrown upon her by the circumstances.

BERTRAM LEE WOOLF

THE MANSE, 3 ROSEMONT ROAD,
ACTON, W.3

March 1929

CONTENTS

PREFACE

PAGE

5

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY

SECTION

i. Definition	15
ii. Authority as Unconditional and Universal	16
iii. Authority of Conscience	16
iv. Authority and Sanction	17
v. Authority as External and Internal	18
vi. Authority and Subjectivism	19
vii. Authority is <i>a posteriori</i>	20
viii. <i>A priori</i> Universals not of Absolute Authority	21
ix. Authority of Experience as illustrated by Schleiermacher	21
x. Authority of Experience as in New Testament	22
xi. Authority and the Life Process	23
xii. Authority of the Instincts	24
xiii. Authority of the Processes of Thought	24
xiv. Authority in Mathematical Thought	25
xv. Is Really Experimental	26
xvi. Degrees in Authority as illustrated in Ethical Judgment	28
xvii. Ethical and Mathematical Judgments compared	30
xviii. Authority in Religion	31
xix. Authority of Religion as illustrated in People of Lower Culture	32
xx. Authority and Truth	34
xxi. Authority and Freedom	35
xxii. Authority of Heroes	37
xxiii. Authority of the Christian Faith	38

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

i. The Political Conditions	40
ii. The Literary Records	46
iii. Jesus of Nazareth—Who is He?	50

PART I

ANALYTICAL

CHAPTER III

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCE "Q"

SECTION	PAGE
i. The Authority of Jesus as Son of God	57
ii. The Authority of Jesus as Lord	61
(a) Direct References	61
(b) Passages offering Difficulty to the Idea	61
iii. The Authority of Jesus as Son of Man	62
(a) The Use of the Term	62
(b) The Earlier References	65
(c) The Later References	66
iv. The Messiahship of Jesus as related to His Authority	68
(a) The Meaning of the Term	68
(b) Jesus as Messiah according to Q	69
(c) Summary	70
v. The Authority of Jesus as sanctioned by Scripture	70
(a) According to Q	71
(b) Summary	72
vi. The Authority of Jesus as sanctioned by Miraculous Phenomena	72
(a) The Question of Miracles	73
(b) Miracles performed by Jesus	74
(i) Affirmative References	74
(ii) Passages refusing Value	76
(iii) Summary	77
(c) Other Supernatural Phenomena in Q	77
(d) Summary	78
vii. The Authority of Jesus as a Prophet	78
(a) Meaning of the Term	79
(b) Jesus as a Prophet in Q	80
viii. The Personal Authority of Jesus	83
(a) The Witness of Q	84
(b) Summary	87

CHAPTER IV

THE WITNESS OF MARK

SECTION	PAGE
i. The Authority of Jesus as the Son of God	92
(<i>a</i>) Explicit and Affirmative References	92
(<i>b</i>) Secondary and Indirect References	94
(<i>c</i>) Passages offering Difficulty or Negative Evidence	96
(<i>d</i>) Summary	99
ii. The Authority of Jesus as Lord	100
(<i>a</i>) Positive References	100
(<i>b</i>) Negative References	101
(<i>c</i>) Summary	102
iii. The Authority of Jesus as Son of Man	102
(<i>a</i>) Before the Confession of Peter	102
(<i>b</i>) The Confession and Afterwards	103
(<i>c</i>) Summary	106
iv. Jesus as Messiah according to Mark	106
(<i>a</i>) Detailed References	110
(<i>b</i>) Summary	110
v. Miraculous Sanctions according to Mark	111
(<i>a</i>) Miracles performed by Jesus	111
(i) More Affirmative References	111
(ii) Passages Mainly Negative	113
(iii) Summary	115
(<i>b</i>) Other Supernatural Phenomena in Mark	115
(<i>c</i>) Summary	116
vi. Scriptural Sanctions	117
(<i>a</i>) Passages adduced by the Evangelist	117
(<i>b</i>) Passages Original to Jesus and His Times	117
(i) Exegetical	117
(ii) Where the People quote Scripture	117
(iii) Where Jesus used Scripture in Various Ways	118
(<i>c</i>) Summary	120
vii. Jesus as a Prophet	121
Summary	125

SECTION	PAGE
viii. The Personal Authority of Jesus	125
(a) Passages exhibiting the Sources of, or the Sanctions for, His Conduct	125
(b) Passages exhibiting His Personal Reaction upon the People	126
(i) Axiomatic Utterances, and the Like	126
(ii) Validity on the Basis of His Personality	126
(iii) More Esoteric Teaching	126
(c) Passages dealing with the Effect of the Teaching of Jesus	126
(d) Summary	141

CHAPTER V

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCES PECULIAR TO
MATTHEW

i. Jesus as the Son of God	143
ii. Jesus as Lord	146
(a) Affirmative Passages	146
(b) Passages offering Difficulty	147
(c) Summary	147
iii. Jesus as Son of Man	148
iv. Jesus as Messiah	149
v. Scriptural Sanctions	150
(a) Those adduced by the Evangelist	150
(b) Those belonging to the Time of Jesus	150
vi. Miraculous Sanctions	151
vii. Jesus as a Prophet	151
viii. The Personal Authority of Jesus	152
ix. Summary	153

CHAPTER VI

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCES PECULIAR TO
LUKE

i. Jesus as Son of God	156
ii. Summary of the Witness of the Synoptic Sources to Jesus as Son of God	158

CONTENTS

11

SECTION	PAGE
iii. Jesus as Lord	159
(a) Affirmative Passages	159
(b) Passages offering Difficulty to the Doctrine	160
iv. Summary of the Witness of the Synoptic Sources to Jesus as Lord	161
v. Jesus as Son of Man	162
vi. Jesus as Messiah	162
vii. Scriptural Sanctions	163
(a) In the Sections Historically Doubtful	163
(b) In the Historical Material	164
viii. Miraculous Sanctions	165
ix. Jesus as a Prophet	166
x. Summary of the Synoptic Sources <i>re</i> Jesus as a Prophet	167
xi. The Personal Authority of Jesus	167
xii. The Parables, especially in Matthew and Luke	171
xiii. The Summary of the Witness of Luke's Special Sources	175

CHAPTER VII

THE WITNESS OF JOHN

i. Jesus as the Son of God	178
ii. Summary of Jesus as Son of God in the Main Sources	179
iii. Jesus as Lord	180
Summary of John's Witness	180
iv. Summary of Jesus as Lord as found in the Main Sources	181
v. Jesus as Son of Man	181
vi. Summary of Jesus as Son of Man as found in the Main Sources	183
vii. Jesus as Messiah	184
viii. Summary of Results of Jesus as Messiah	185
ix. Scriptural Sanctions	185
x. Summary of Results of Scriptural Sanctions	185
xi. Miraculous Sanctions	186
(a) Passages Mainly Positive	186
(b) Passages Mainly Negative	187

SECTION	PAGE
xii. Summary of Results of Miraculous Sanctions	188
xiii. Jesus as a Prophet	189
xiv. Summary of Results of Jesus as a Prophet	190
xv. Personal Authority of Jesus	191
(<i>a</i>) The Sources of the Authority	192
(<i>b</i>) The claims of Jesus	192
(<i>c</i>) Summary	194
xvi. Summary of the Verdicts of the Sources	196

PART II

SYNTHETICAL

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSONALITY OF JESUS

i. His Character	201
ii. His Relation with the People	203
iii. His Personal Force	206

CHAPTER IX

THE MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS AND
ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR HIS AUTHORITY

i. The Significance of the Messianic Hope	209
ii. The Relation of Jesus to the Messianic Hope	210
iii. His Messianic Consciousness	211
iv. Its Significance to Jesus	212

CHAPTER X

THE AUTHORITY OF THE RISEN LORD

i. The Identity of the Risen Lord with Jesus of Nazareth	220
ii. The Spiritual Character of the Risen Lord and His Authority	222
iii. The Historical Sources—and the Value of the Events	224
iv. The Significance of the Glossolalia	227
v. The Nature of the Authority of the Risen Lord	229

CHAPTER XI

THE MEANING OF THE SONSHIP OF JESUS AND OF HIS DIVINE AUTHORITY

SECTION	PAGE
i. The Idea of Divinity in Antiquity	232
ii. The Metaphorical Character of Divine Sonship	234
iii. Jesus' Conception of God as a Father	235
iv. And of Himself as Son	237
v. The Value of the Term "Son"	239
vi. Sonship as related to Messiahship	241
vii. The Authority of Sonship	242
viii. Redemption and Sonship	243

CHAPTER XII

THE MEANING OF THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS AND THE AUTHORITY FLOWING FROM HIS PERFECTION

i. The Antiquity of the Dogma	245
ii. The Relation of Sinlessness to Deity	246
iii. Analysis of Passages in John	248
iv. Analysis of Passages in Synoptic Gospels	248
v. Jesus' Consciousness of Sinlessness	252
vi. Passages held to imply Sin	255
vii. The Meaning of His Baptism	257
viii. The Jewish Standpoint	260
ix. The Perfection of Jesus as related to the Greek Ideals	263
x. The Personal Equation in the Teaching of Jesus	266
xi. The Nature of the Kingdom of God	267
xii. The Redemptive and Ultimate Ethic	274
xiii. The Identity of Person with Teaching	277
xiv. The Permanent Source of Ethical Inspiration	278
xv. The Adequate Ideal	279

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION

i. The Authority of Jesus and the Response of Faith	282
ii. The Ultimate Spiritual Authority	283

	PAGE
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF MORE IMPORTANT WORKS	287
INDEX of Scriptural Passages	291
Old Testament	291
New Testament	291

THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AND ITS FOUNDATION

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION: THE CONCEPTION OF AUTHORITY

Section i.—DEFINITION.

AUTHORITY is commonly regarded as what exercises some degree of compulsion over thought, judgment, choice, decision, or conduct, either with or without our consent. Examination of this view, however, shows that in the last analysis our consent is always given in some form before authority can function. This fact leads to a new definition, somewhat in these terms: Authority is what gives one of the possible objects of our choice the power to occupy the field of our interest. It enables us to do what we might have done upon our own initiative if we had only been of the type of mind that we now choose to be. It is something, a fact or a quality or a power which both conditions and induces certain decisions.

But what is it that finally determines choice or action? What is it that gives an inclination or an argument the power to condition and induce conduct even in spite of weighty and contrary arguments? It begs the question to say it was the more reasonable thing. For (1) there are many occasions when this is not the case, and (2) the question may be pressed. We may ask, "Why should reason be authoritative over inclination?" Reasoning is but one of the functions of personality alongside of feeling, and if it be placed on a superior footing sufficient explanation should be forthcoming. Is there something divine about the reasoning function that has no equivalent in feeling? Is mathematics or logic more God-like than music or worship? On the basis of the broad service to mankind, he would be a bold man who would give the palm to either in despite of the other. Even if the supremacy of reason were proved in the syllogistic sense, we should have cause to question the verdict, for the counsel for the defence is identical

with the jury. And for reason to decide in the favour of feeling is to negate reason itself, and thus to render the decision valueless.

Section ii.—AUTHORITY AS UNCONDITIONAL AND UNIVERSAL.

In dealing with this question we may begin by noting that, strictly, authority cannot be questioned. One authority can be replaced by another, but the fact of authority itself is beyond criticism. The whole controversy between "religion of authority and religion of the spirit" is not an issue between authority and no-authority, but between two forms of authority, between a form which ultimately is uncriticised, and therefore in a sense external, and a form which is assimilated and more or less completely grafted into, and which now forms part of an organic whole with, the individual activity. Thus the authority of the Church may be replaced by that of "reason", or the Bible or some other more or less complex conception, but in no case is there left a mere vacuum. We are still under the sway of some form of authority either within or without.

Section iii.—AUTHORITY AND CONSCIENCE.

But there is another sense in which authority cannot be questioned. If a person experiences authority flowing to him from any object, that authority cannot be denied by another. It may be irrational or inexplicable or foolish, but if a person feels it, there is no more to be said. His experience must be accepted as a fact. The majesty of conscience is the majesty, not of the purity or the elevation or possibly of the loneliness of the conviction itself, but of some invisible king promulgating laws from an invisible throne.

From this point of view conscience is not so much a self-subsisting entity, but rather the form in which we express our experience of the power of a sovereign who himself lives beyond the confines of our conscious field. This is true even where apparently the object of reverence is within our consciousness, as when we acknowledge the validity of some ethical principle, e.g. "Thou shalt speak the truth". A moment's inspection reveals that the principle is rather a vice-regent, a tangible and therefore partial expression of an ineffable somewhat existing beyond it, and

using it as a channel for the flow of its power. The utmost we can do in the matter is to propose another effective principle.

But in spite of all we may propose, the man may still declare he feels himself under the same authority, and we are then silenced. It thus becomes clear that authority is somehow part and parcel of the man himself. He cannot recognise or obey some other authority without his own self becoming in some degree another person. A change in our experience of authority is in some way closely connected with a change in one's personality. It is impossible finally to divorce the conception of authority from that of personality.

Section iv.—AUTHORITY AND SANCTION.

The terms authority and sanction are often used synonymously, but it may be an advantage if we were to draw a distinction between them. By the term "authority" we shall understand more particularly the exercise of power to influence a decision, and to affect the course of life in some way. It may be an intellectual proposition, or it may be something of a purely affective character as in the suggestions exercised by the presence of a crowd, or it may be more of a conative nature as in the order of a superior officer to a soldier. More frequently, however, it is a mixture of all three types in all variety of proportions, as in the general questions of ethics and religion. An intellectual proposition need not be true, though it must be conceived as true in some sense. In the case where the authority is that of an affective or a conative nature, the question of its truth is not strictly relevant. But the authority may be exercised apart from the analogous question of its right to influence the stream of life. When, however, the question of the truth of a proposition, or the right of an exercise of authority is raised, we are dealing with the case in some degree from the ethical standpoint. We then approach the question of the nature of sanction. By "sanction" we understand not what actually exercises power over life, but what justifies that exercise. A sanction is the justification of our holding a certain proposition or adopting a certain attitude of mind or following a certain line of conduct.

The question of sanction is thus of the very first importance

in ethics and in religion. It enters to a greater or less extent into all their ramifications. It is an important factor in their worth. The authority behind a mathematical proposition is just what causes us actually to hold it, but we may have no sanction for holding it. We have a sanction when it is also true. The authority for following a certain line of conduct may be the impulse of the crowd. But our conduct may be without any ethical sanction from our own conception or the moral good. It would then have a purely psychological character. Or our authority may be simply the order of the superior officer or the tradition of the church, and this may be extremely powerful and leave us little alternative of action or thought, but the sanctions may be of the weakest description. Authority and sanction thus raise two independent questions in the last analysis, the former dealing with the psychological basis of conduct and the latter with the ethical. While it must be admitted that the terms are frequently used indiscriminately, and can often be used synonymously without much confusion of thought, still it is desirable that we should have some terminology appropriate to the two aspects of the subject. We therefore propose to use the term authority for such entities as actually do influence conduct, and whether or not they be ethically justifiable, and the term sanction for such as should influence conduct whether or not they actually do so.

Section v.—AUTHORITY AS EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL TO THE SUBJECT.

We may now turn to the fact that authority must be experienced as coming from without. This raises various difficulties. We may state them as follows. If it comes entirely from without, then how is it possible for it to exercise any authority? We must have some relation between the authority and the mind experiencing it. If it comes entirely from within, it is surely impossible to distinguish it from a merely subjectively dominant idea, and we are compelled to ask whether a subjective idea *can* be authoritative. Leaving this corollary for the time, we may ask, if the authority is in some way both within and without, how is the relation to be conceived? Moreover, does not authority as thus conceived encroach upon the question of personal freedom?

Section vi.—AUTHORITY AND SUBJECTIVISM.

We may begin by granting that it is impossible for any authority to function at all if it be entirely without the mind. But as this statement of the case may be open to objection on the ground that the mind is not a spatial entity and an authority as such has no location, it is perhaps better to say that nothing can exercise authority which has no existence for that particular mind, or that anything that does exist for the mind is an idea in the broadest sense of the term. But an idea is no idea unless it be in some sense within the mind, i.e. unless it be one of the ideas upon which the mind is engaged more or less closely. Thus we grant that the authority must be within the mind. This at once raises the issue of the subjectivism, and we seem driven to the conclusion that all authority is subjective, which is apparently little better than a contradiction in terms. It may be authority, but it implies social anarchy. Each man is his own court of appeal, and each "doeth what is right in his own eyes".

On the other hand, all we can mean by an idea that is partly within and partly without, is an idea that is not clearly grasped. And, in so far as this is the case, the idea exercises a weaker authority. We are thus driven to the conclusion once more that the idea must be wholly within the mind for its proper exercise of authority. The question of subjectivism is now raised in its acutest form, and we are compelled to ask whether such an idea is necessarily subjective, or ultimately whether subjectivism is fatal to authority. Both assumptions are usually made, but both are possibly fallacious. There is a sense in which every idea is subjective, i.e. what is in my consciousness is in mine and not in another's. He may have a similar idea which may function similarly upon him, but my idea is in my mind and mine only. It may be questioned how far this line of argument can be followed, and how far its assumptions are *a priori*. Some degree of experience seems implied, and we should state our reasons for holding that the idea in my mind is not the same and identical idea as is in his. In any case it should be clear just what it is we are doing. We are comparing an idea (a person) in a certain relation to another idea (what is in his mind) with another system of ideas (myself, plus what is in my mind). The whole is still subjective,

but it assumes a certain amount of experience. This is, indeed, true of all comparisons, while thorough-going *a priori* reasoning makes comparison impossible.

But on the *a posteriori* grounds to which we are now driven, the whole aspect of affairs changes. As a matter of experience we do compare. The process of mental operation is inseparable from it. The validity of our thought is bound up with it. The stream of consciousness itself demands it. We must accept this condition of mental activity or withdraw from life. Let us then accept it quite frankly. Let us not call it subjectivism in the sense of arbitrariness or of mere caprice, but rather a necessary outcome of our personal relation with the ultimate constitution of things, and with the conditions inseparable from mental activity. Or, if it be insisted that "subjective" is still the correct term, then let us submit that this form of it is not vicious, for it is inevitable. Every valid idea is significant of reality. As thus significant, it is therefore both subjective (psychological) and objective (logical) at the same moment.

Section vii.—AUTHORITY IS *A POSTERIORI*.

These considerations force upon our attention the inadequacy of authority conceived of in some *a priori* fashion. The categorical methodology of Kant and the rhythm of the Hegelian systems mean nothing at all to us except on the basis of a certain amount of experience. All general principles are secondary, however extensive their field of operation. We live immediately in a world of particulars, and we experience particulars as such, and not as instances of universals. In one way universals are a special kind of particulars which we are only capable of experiencing as conceptions at a certain stage of our experiences of more concrete particulars. But universals lie in our mind alongside of one another, visualisable and unvisualisable, each as a form of a particular concept. It is doubtful whether the conclusion of a syllogism is not logically prior to the major premiss. And those who agree that the conclusion is psychologically prior to the major premiss appear to have a yet stronger case.

Section viii.—*A PRIORI* UNIVERSALS NOT OF ABSOLUTE AUTHORITY.

Further, one may point out that with every change in experience *a priori* universals become subject to criticism. It is therefore questionable whether any truly *a priori* universals are possible. Were they possible, then they would surely lie beyond criticism, and exercise authority of a character perhaps best described as axiomatic. An authority which needs to be explained is one which depends for its value upon something external to itself. If those "explanations" should prove invalid the *a priori* universal falls to the ground. But it will hardly be claimed that the Kantian categories are truly *a priori* and axiomatic, or that the Hegelian system is not built upon a huge assumption itself of an *a posteriori* character. All *a priori* principles are tentative and provisional. A change in the fashion of philosophical thinking bows them out of court.

Section ix.—AUTHORITY OF EXPERIENCE AS ILLUSTRATED BY SCHLEIERMACHER'S POSITION.

Schleiermacher illustrates this proposition from the other pole. Here the place of authority is entirely experimental, and is therefore absolute. It is a theology not so much of feeling as of experience, which is feeling assimilated to personality. It begins in an experience of dependence rather than a feeling of dependence. One may doubt whether a feeling of dependence is a pure feeling, for an element of judgment seems implicit. The feeling is judged to be one of dependence. But probably the root of the criticism lies in a slight ambiguity in the use of the term feeling, which may have (i) a broader use in the sense of our experience of a situation, (ii) a narrow use in the sense of feeling as distinct from reasoning or volition. Schleiermacher's use is in the broad sense, whereas the criticism above noticed is based on the narrow sense. Schleiermacher begins not with an assumption of dependence, but rather with the experience itself, i.e. with what he himself has felt and assimilated. The underlying assumption at this stage is that other Christian men share the experience; nay, rather that they have a similar experience of their own. If they deny this,

Schleiermacher has nothing more to say to them. His words carry weight only on the basis indicated. And even for those who deny the experience as far as they themselves are concerned, they cannot deny it to Schleiermacher. His position is impregnable thus far.

It is a mistake, moreover, to say he founds religion on a feeling of dependence upon God. Rather it is that he reaches the idea of God from his experience of dependence regarded primarily as a thing in itself. His experience of dependence immediately grows into an experience of God. It is not an arbitrary connection between a primary assumption of God, on the one hand, and a postulated feeling of dependence on the other, but rather an experience of dependence which is in itself, by the nature of the case as it were, an incomplete experience. The self and this experience are the premisses of a kind of syllogism which is not complete until the conclusion is drawn. The whole forms a peculiar experience carrying its own authority. As far as Schleiermacher is concerned, and for all others who have the experience, its authority is absolute. It is individual, and therefore it is universal. It is *a posteriori*, and therefore it is final. Those not having the experience cannot deny its authority, for in their case the issue simply does not arise.

The same general considerations hold in regard to Schleiermacher's position as to the experience of redemption or justification through Christ. He has the experience of redemption first, and this in itself is an incomplete experience. Then there is his own personality which is the same as before, and yet now different; and there is the sense of power exercised from without, and yet operating within. These are the premisses to which the person of the Redeemer is the conclusion. As in all syllogisms, it is impossible to deny that this conclusion may be in some sense really prior. The fact is, once more, that the whole constitutes a single and complete experience bound together by its own cohesion. For Schleiermacher and those who have enjoyed it, this experience is authoritative and impregnable.

Section x.—AUTHORITY OF EXPERIENCE IN NEW TESTAMENT.

The New Testament is based both as a whole and in considerable detail upon this principle. "One thing I know, whereas

I was blind, now I see." "Last of all He appeared unto me, also." "We preach that what we have seen, and we testify that which we know." And it is this constant and ever-renewed appeal to experience which constitutes the active authority of the Christian religion, where all authority is real in proportion to the vividness and transforming power of the experience.

Section xi.—AUTHORITY AND THE LIFE-PROCESS.

The experience of authority is closely connected with the life process, and is possibly an aspect of the vital dynamic itself. For we are sooner or later compelled to ask what it is that gives the *elan* to the life-process, or what constitutes its power, or why should it possess its unique qualities as distinct from, say, the attraction of two opposite electrodes, or the reaction between two or more chemical reagents. Electrical, chemical, and possibly other forms of physical reactions may be present in any and every living organism, but there is a characteristic plus which combines both causative and teleological qualities into a whole which ultimately can be analysed into its constituent elements only for logical purposes. For purely biological purposes doubtless living matter can be adequately defined as irritable, capable of feeling, and of reproduction and subject to death. But these are a mere summary of external observations. It can equally well be defined as matter capable of response to a power external to itself, and of exerting some degree of control over its own body, to a smaller degree over other individuals especially of the same species, and over its environment. This is seen right through the biological scale down to the lowly *Amœba*, and even the germination of the unicellular ovum. Few can observe the movements of the simplest of the Protozoa without a feeling of awe. The creature appears to live in a world of its own and to be actuated by a power of its own from which not only we, but all other individuals, are ultimately excluded. There is a system of life which, as far as it goes, is rounded off and complete, which we may destroy, or, in some degree, facilitate, but not otherwise control. Already we observe the operation of some measure of authority. Similarly in the germination of an ovum, the process is neither blind nor capricious. It is neither simply mechanical, nor purely self-con-

tained, nor a mere acceptance of the line of least resistance. The dynamic of life is under some kind of control, and again some kind of control issues from the organism.

Section xii.—AUTHORITY OF THE INSTINCTS.

This point is of course vividly illustrated in the operation of instinct, and particularly in those extraordinary phenomena popularly known as animal civilisations, e.g. a colony of bees. To prevent misconception, it may be said that of course the queen exercises no authority analogous to a human potentate. But the spirit of the hive is a powerful fact. The bees care for their young, clean and ventilate the hive. They gather pollen and nectar, and elaborate honey and wax. In due season they deal with the drones, and with their enemies, or with other colonies. They prepare for winter. They respond to the call of spring, or the needs of the over-crowded hive. A definite end is pursued, and there is a definite organisation. And where there is organisation there is authority. The method of its operation may be remote from our understanding, but the fact itself cannot be gainsaid. The experience is there, and in the last analysis it is indistinguishable in its nature from any experience of authority with which we ourselves are personally acquainted.

Authority as such, then, is indissolubly connected with the life process itself, and is found even in regions where we cannot predicate thought, or volition, or even sensation as conscious awareness. This is characteristic of all authority. It comes from the abysmal deeps, and operates upon the unfathomable bottoms of all rational or sentient life. Those who claim that it operates, and can operate, nowhere else have a strong case.

Section xiii.—AUTHORITY AND THE PROCESSES OF THOUGHT.

To illustrate the point, we may inquire how we actually do come to a decision in regard to a proposed line of conduct or to a judgment in a matter of taste. We make a more or less adequate selection of the various considerations, and hold them before our attention for a brief period, during which their values change kaleidoscope fashion. Then our mind becomes blank, or we even

notice other things. The considerations we are supposed to be reviewing have all vanished. In a moment or two, or when we feel "prepared", up pops our decision, and spreads itself dominantly over our consciousness. We speak or act, and the incident is over. We may or may not be able to give the reason for our decision. It is well known that the explanation we give is quite often not our real motivation. The "reason", indeed, lies deeper than anything we can express. After all, it is neither thought nor feeling nor the like, that decides us, but something belonging to the deeps of the self, something ultimately not to be dissociated from what we ourselves are. It formed an harmonious part of the system with which we are dealing. Our decision "appealed" to us, and that is all that can be said. We are under authority. The whole matter has been linked up in some way with our vital self. A channel has been cut between it and the main river of our life. The little stream of energy presented by the problem has become a tributary of the main drift, and its waters have mingled with the great current and taken its direction, its space, and its colour. It is a process analogous to a military column marching through an unexplored country, and joined from time to time by smaller and larger contingents who take on the formation of the whole, and whose accession brings in other considerations determining, to some extent, the process of the whole. The point is that it is not some consideration connected merely with the presented proposition that determines our decision in matters of conduct and taste, but rather its deeper consonance with the hidden foundations of our self. The authority for our decision is indissolubly connected with the nature of our life-process itself (cf. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, 1902, pp. 232 ff.)

Section xiv.—AUTHORITY IN MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT.

But there is a special type of difficulty that faces our theory of authority. I refer to the question of mathematical or logical judgments. Here, apparently, the life-stream has nothing to do with the matter. We reach our conclusions by the processes of pure reason, and the incidence of any further considerations can only serve to vitiate whatever conclusions we come to. The progress of science is surely only possible in complete detachment

from the personal equation. Authority here is confined to the logic of the case, to the nature of the reasoning process itself. Such is the objection with which we shall now have to deal.

Let us take a very simple and seemingly irrefragable case, e.g. $2 + 2 = 4$. What is the nature of the process that compels us to agree to the validity of the equation? It is either obvious and axiomatic or, if we push the question farther home, it is extremely abstruse. By calling it axiomatic probably all we mean is that the mental processes involved in passing from one side of the equation to the other are so rapid and irresistible that they escape attention. The mind tends to grasp them together, and therefore to regard them as a unity. This "regarding as a unity" is what constitutes the obviousness or axiom. And the authority or sanction for so regarding them is to be found, not in the things themselves considered objectively, nor in their relation to the observer, so much as in the nature of the mental processes. We *must*, i.e. we feel we have no alternative to do other than, accept this equation. If we refuse to accept it we can proceed no further. We are blocked not only in making progress along this line, but also in reasoning generally. The whole weight of the universe begins to accumulate against us as we hang back. The compulsion to accept, then, is not merely in the nature of the incident $2 + 2$, but in the fact of its representative character. It is not solitary, but exemplary. Our hesitation to accept it immediately and without question seems to call up a silent, but ever growing posse of instances psychologically associated with it, which assumes a hostile attitude. Hence we are compelled to agree that $2 + 2 = 4$. The authority is in the necessity for living rather than in the "reason" of the transaction.

Section xv.—AND IS REALLY EXPERIENTIAL.

That this is so is seen from the fact, moreover, that we have actually to learn what $2 + 2$ do make. It is not *a priori* for all its seductive immediacy. We have to think it out and test it by experience. We find that possible alternatives are fallacious in the sense that, sooner or later, they hinder the smooth working of our life. We are thus sent back to review our experience till we discover that only if we equate " $2 + 2$ " = " 4 " we shall not

have to meet difficulties later on. This discovery sanctions our equating the two quantities, and adds to the sense of the compulsion or authority. We accumulate through association a series of similar processes. At length the mind is completely hemmed in. Thus we learn there is only one road to be taken along which the difficulties do not accumulate. We find we can make this equation, and this only. That is ultimately our *authority* for doing it. It is difficult to see here how there is any other, or that any other is necessary.

In a negative fashion it is further seen that $2 + 2 = 4$ is not *a priori*, or due to some necessary working of the mind, for after all we do make mistakes. It is possible for a sane man to say $2 + 2 = 5$. The carelessness in so doing might be gross, but such is not the case if one were to use two high numbers and make some error in adding them, e.g. $425 + 623 = 1,058$. That an error has been made here might well pass the scrutiny of an expert mathematician. One has to give close attention and follow the processes critically. But our sanction for denying the validity of the equation is ultimately the same as before. We can only assert that it is not so, that indeed something else is valid, and if the something else is not valid, we simply cannot proceed. We are thus compelled to accept a certain simple process in the interest of life itself. That is our authority for doing so. It is not the *rationality* of the process, for that is a thing which we are not able to fathom. Nay, rather, it is the rationality that we are discussing. What makes it rational is the irrationality of the alternatives, i.e. that the alternatives hinder life, and that this alone permits the free process of living. The rationality consists in the fact that it is reasonable for us to go on living, but to do so involves our accepting certain conditions which are thus authoritative.

Let us now study a case somewhat similar in nature, that of the familiar geometrical proposition that three angles of a triangle = two right angles. To the geometrician there is the same immediacy and inevitability about it as there is for the equation $2 + 2 = 4$. We do not need to revise the steps which he takes in proving his case. But let us inquire what is the nature of the sanction for holding that the conclusion is sound. It depends ultimately upon the soundness of the axiom that things equal to

the same thing are equal to one another. Now what is our authority for accepting that axiom as true? Why, indeed, do we accept it with a special instance of a geometrical nature before our mind, and yet apply it to any instances geometrical or otherwise even before particular experience of them? Our authority is just the same as before. It is rational to accept this axiom and to deny any alternative because it enables our life to proceed, whereas the alternatives hinder it.

Perhaps the above argument may be put from another standpoint. In mathematics generally the whole of the data relevant to any issue are simple concepts, and mathematical judgments have to do merely with the inter-relations of these concepts. The authority for any conclusion is in the unity and the harmony of the concepts both with the conclusion, and among themselves now that the conclusion is admitted as a new concept. And mathematical argument is felt to be so compelling and authoritative, and the sanction for its conclusion so strong, just because the mind has all the data beneath its attention at once. If any conclusions are impugned, it is readily perceived that the system is attacked in its entirety. We are compelled either to accept all or none. Our sanction is ultimately in the needs of consciousness itself at this point.

Section xvi.—DEGREES IN AUTHORITY AS ILLUSTRATED BY ETHICAL JUDGMENTS.

These considerations enable us to study in other applications the nature of authority. Thus, we are able to understand why it is that there are degrees in authority, such that certain judgments cannot practically be questioned and others, quite on the contrary, must be criticised with scrupulous care. The more abstract the system with which we are dealing, the more categorical is the authority of its judgments, and the more completely is the mind driven to the conclusions put forward by the system. On the other hand, the more concrete is the system of thought, the less categorical are its judgments. For in actual experience in dealing with concrete things, e.g. in ethical judgments, our difficulty is in bringing together all the factors relevant to the issue, and in appraising their worth both in general and in reference to the

precise instance in hand at the moment. In so far as we have all the data, and also are able accurately to appraise them, our judgments assume an authority comparable with those in mathematics. But in so far as some data may be absent and other falsely appraised, the mind experiences less compulsion. The authority of an ethical decision is either strengthened or weakened by certain personal experiences in which neglected factors were later found to be of importance. Here authority depends upon an innate tendency to obey a certain dynamic which is brought to bear in an *a posteriori* manner.

From one point of view ethical judgments exercise less authority, and from another point of view greater authority, than e.g. those of mathematics. They exercise less authority in the sense that it is possible in most cases to argue an alternative, whereas in mathematics in most cases an alternative is unthinkable, the judgment being all or nothing and admitting of no degree. Mathematical judgments are in the majority of cases simple and purely categorical. Ethical judgments, on the other hand, almost always admit of graduation. While graduation barely experienced as such does not necessarily diminish the sanction for a judgment, still the compulsion rests not so much upon the nature of the judgment itself as upon confidence in the type of persons pronouncing it, or in the further bearing of the circumstances. But taken in itself, a judgment which is admitted to be subject to amendment exercises little or no authority until the concrete circumstances have arisen, and the amendment of greater or less value has been made. Then it receives a sanction due to the nature of the concrete case. But now, it must be noted, the judgment is not one of greater or less, but is of a precise and definite character. Thus it would appear that, strictly, an ethical judgment either admits of graduation into more or less, in which case it may be regarded as a judgment which is still incomplete; or else that it is not one simple judgment, but a group of judgments which have been brought together for logical and practical convenience and subsumed under one head. In the last analysis such a case is very similar to mathematical generalisation, where, from a single instance where the authority of a judgment has been recognised, a universal principle is accepted

Section xvii.—AUTHORITY IN ETHICAL AND MATHEMATICAL JUDGMENTS COMPARED.

But apart from the question of degree, and taking both the mathematical type and the ethical type at their respective normal values, the sanction for the first is complete, but that for the second is not complete. In the second, as a type, we feel that the very premisses, being of an *a posteriori* character, are subject to revision, and the conclusion loses correspondingly in its authority. The ethical judgment thus in practice never can have the same kind of categorical sanction as the mathematical judgment with its *a priori* premiss.

On the other hand, however, the authority of an ethical judgment may go far beyond the mathematical. For ethics embraces a larger sphere of mental life. It touches us at more numerous points. While it is absurd to think of such widely diverse and disparate disciplines as ever hostile to each other, or ranged so that one could test the superior sanction of the one over the other in any particular instance, still we can recognise that ethical judgments as such exercise a greater influence over practical life. To question their authority does indeed involve a greater disturbance in the harmony of life. Thus while at the bottom the nature of the sanction for any judgment whether in mathematics or ethics is the same, there is a great difference in tone. The mathematical category is, so to speak, of small range but precise operation. The ethical category is of large range but less precise operation. The sanction in ethics depends upon (i) the precision of the data themselves, and (ii) upon the firmness with which they are grasped. As the data are usually extremely numerous and their relations complex, it is easy to estimate them in many different ways according to the force with which the individual data are attended to. But the ethical judgment, *per se*, is a matter of ratiocination issuing in a conclusion or series of conclusions more or less closely approximated to each other, but affecting the operation of conscious impulses in wide regions. The sanction for the ethical judgments as for mathematical judgment depends upon the freedom or the hindrance which is given to the conscious life-process, but in ethics the processes, being of wider range, exhibit greater compelling power.

Section xviii.—AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.

In religion we have a sphere exhibiting a further development, and thus giving opportunity for stronger authority. This is due to the fact that religion is not merely an intellectual activity, but is also emotional and volitional. In a word, it has a practical as well as a theoretic character. The unique authority which religion frequently exercises is based here. But this authority is not ultimately to be differentiated from any that we have analysed hitherto. Nay, rather it is the best and clearest instance in which to study the subject.

Authority in religion is based upon the conviction that the life-process issues in a certain direction, and that any other direction sooner or later offers a hindrance. This conviction is more than a feeling. For the particular person and the particular instance at the particular time it is a fact of experience. Religion may cover the entire field of conscious life. It can bring certain concepts and precepts to bear upon each issue. In each case there are impulses, feelings, and reactions involuntary and voluntary. These are held together and directed. The religious sanction is derived from the precise manner in which all these factors march with one another.

And that is recognised as the higher authority which gives the experience of greater satisfaction due to the more complete and harmonious mobilisation of all the factors which contribute directly or indirectly to the richness of the impulse of life. The dominance of religious authority, when it is dominant, is due to the extent of the inner field which it covers, to the sharpness of the impression made by some of the factors, and also to a third component of a somewhat different nature which derives from the person as a voluntary agent, rather than as intellectual and sentient. The authority of religion is not truly analogous to that of an engineer over a machine, or of a potter over the clay, or a driver over a horse. It covers these cases more or less completely, but the analogy is not perfect. For the engineer never identifies himself with the machine, nor the potter with the clay, nor the driver with the horse. In ethics we *recognise* authority in so far as we decide in a rational manner the line of conduct enjoined, and identify ourselves in a certain degree with the circumstances that

arise. But there is the dominance of logical reasoning. An ethical judgment is a rational judgment. But a moral philosopher need not be a "moral" man.

In religion, however, the authority experienced is more far-reaching. Intellectual assent alone is not enough. That we agree to the truth of a proposition is not sufficient. We may take it for granted that in any particular case subsumed under the general title of a religious judgment we may be dealing with a purely ethical issue, and often with factors that could be decided upon purely ethical grounds. This is because religion is ethical. But the sanction of religion goes beyond that of ethics, in so far as it is not content with assent but requires adhesion. It is this factor of personal adhesion to the judgment which gives the final authority in the sphere we are now considering. While it may be true that we find the factor of personal adhesion also in other regions, e.g. Art, still it remains true that we cannot hold a religious principle or judgment to be sound and escape reproach as religious people if we withhold our personal adhesion to it. Nay, we find, such is the nature of the authority of religion, that there arises much more than a question of our not withholding personal adhesion. We are required to give a certain strength to the adhesion. It may be impossible to command a man to like any thing (cf. Seeley, 1895, pp. 176 ff.), but it belongs to the very nature of religion in the last analysis that we "love the Lord our God, with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and and strength". We must practise what we believe, otherwise we repudiate our authority.

Section xix.—AUTHORITY OF RELIGION AS ILLUSTRATED IN PEOPLE OF LOWER CULTURE.

Here we have a fact without which the authority of the religious sanction over the mind of the ignorant or the uncivilised cannot be fully explained. And here is also an essential feature in what at times appears as the very opposite, viz. the impossibility of the religious sanction in this class of persons, or at least in the debased. Ethics as such obtains its sanction only after processes of thought of a preponderatingly abstract nature. It becomes less authoritative as the reference becomes more concrete. But the ignorant and the

uncivilised man functions only with difficulty, if at all, from the purely rational reference, but with relative ease as a concrete person with fairly definite emotions recognising but limited rational control. In such circumstances, ethics is uncomfortable.

But religion functions with equal facility through the particular references to which the individual concerned is most accustomed. He has, by hypothesis, already given personal adhesion to religion if he has any religion at all, and it is this fact of adhesion that enables religion to function and exercise authority, whose quality and degree depend upon the character of the individual. If he function rationally and ethically, his religion will require to function rationally and ethically to the same degree in addition to any other type of activity it may exercise. The attempt to refuse this function to religion accounts then for two things, (i) the frequent breakdown of religious authority over the individuals concerned, (ii) the frequent divorce between religion and ethics. This is often to be observed even among the more cultured members of society. But in the ignorant, religion will function equally well, as far as the particular individual is concerned, through his customary channels of self-expression. And as rational control in him is weak the rise of mere emotion is easily experienced as a rise of religious authority.

From this point of view also we can understand why, in the case of debased persons, religion seems incapable of exercising authority. For by debased, we mean an individual with a divided personality in the sense that it is precisely not the whole self which functions when he feels, or thinks, or even possibly when he wills. In addition there is lack of balance between the activities of the person. It is usual to think of the over-activity of the emotional side of personality, and to regard the coldly rational individual as the very opposite of debased. But callousness is an instance in which the dominating feature may be some adherence to a system considered apart from emotion, and yet is quite evidently debased. The same may be said for the merely impulsive and fickle person who is otherwise normal. But in all these types it is easy to see how religion may be unable to exercise any authority. It requires personal adhesion. Its authority is personal and unified. But here we are considering individuals of incoherent and non-unified personality. There is thus a hiatus. The single authority which

normally functions through the entire man, though dominantly through his accustomed channel, is divided and so broken. What such a person experiences when "converted" is not merely some form of reconstruction of life. He experiences a definite unification. He becomes aware of a kind of neatness in place of the mental chaos, a certain mental balance in place of the distortion. Religion serves him as a bearing rein. It exercises authority as of a master-mind over that of a junior apprentice.

Section XX.—AUTHORITY AND TRUTH.

From what has been said, it is evident that experience of authority is not necessarily dependent upon a prior intellectual conviction, nor upon a moral assent. It may indeed depend upon a subconscious reaction similar to the case of hypnotised persons, or to suggestion, as in the psychology of a crowd. In particular it is clear that truth as such, in whatever way truth may be regarded, is not an essential element in the functioning of authority. Authority may be exercised or experienced without ever the question arising as to its truth or falsity. The question of truth may arise later, and may largely affect the final outcome, but it may have little or nothing to do with the immediate experience of authority.

When we assert that an intellectual conviction is not necessarily previous to the experience of authority we are only describing a psychological fact. But when we say that authority and "truth" are in no necessary interconnection, we may require to justify ourselves from the ethical standpoint and ask: "Ought there not to be some essential connection between truth and authority? Surely what is true should carry authority, and what exercises authority should be true?" This may be granted without further discussion as a general proposition, provided our definitions of truth can be agreed upon as meaning that which completely harmonises with the total of the universe as comprehended in human experience. If by truth, however, we are to understand a mere intellectual or logical consistency of one idea with an arbitrarily chosen system of ideas, then there seems no possibility of granting the proposition as a universal judgment.

A proposition of an intellectual character is received as true

when it is able to exercise authority, and the discovery of its falsity would mean that we have come to feel the authority of some other proposition logically inconsistent with it. It is a purpose of education in the widest use of the term so to train and inform the mind that inconsistency with the relevant system is immediately apparent. There is thus a necessary connection between truth and authority within the limits here laid down. Indeed, from a slightly different point of view we may say that is precisely what we mean by calling a certain intellectual judgment true. We mean that it has received an assent which we could not withhold from it. From this point of view a judgment is true if it is conducive to our dominant purpose for the time being.

But there is also a certain constancy and permanency and unchangeableness in the term truth which derive from the self-consistency and self-identity of personality. It is what is felt to stand in a constant relation to our stream of life. It is something like the point in a surd, where the point retains its own value no matter to what extent the surd is worked out. So also truth is relative to us and our life with its irreducible, unknown, but not quite unappraisable residuum, and yet it is a criterion by which the value of life itself is judged.

Section xxi.—AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM.

But we now come to deal with the question of personal freedom in relation to authority. Cases that can be subsumed under mere physical compliance with natural law are of course beyond the scope of the discussion. We may thus take it for granted that in certain senses we have no freedom, i.e. we cannot criticise and then accept. We must simply accept. We cannot but adopt certain lines of conduct if we would walk or swim or fly, although we may be free to choose whether we will walk or swim or fly. Instances of nervous reactions to certain stimuli are also to be placed in the same category though they are near the border line, e.g. reactions to fear; the sex impulse and the like. Leaving these on one side we come to the questions of intellectual and ethical action where authority functions *par excellence*. It is evident that from one point of view when we obey an authority, our freedom is limited. We say we are compelled, that we have no choice, and

so forth. It is probable, however, that a further analysis will reveal that this is mere popular language. For if we probe deeply enough we find we obey because we feel an inner urgency. All the factors influencing us apparently externally must be assimilated by the mind conscious and unconscious. In so far as they have not been assimilated they exercise no influence. It is the inner self as thus enabled to expand that finally determines the course of action (cf. Croce, 1913, p. 474).

From this point of view the authority is simply one of the options open to us, and it is the one which in the specific circumstances best harmonises with the total self. It may seem to shut out some options, but it does so by attracting a strong attention to another. It is thus not necessarily a question of damming up the life stream as it were, but of opening a channel which was before inadequate or inexistent. Thus authority may even be a means of enlarging the range of our freedom, e.g. we may be baffled by a mathematical problem, and our freedom of intellectual activity thereby be hindered. But, if an expert mathematician joins us in breaking down the obstacle, he does not further encroach upon our freedom. Rather he enlarges it, and, by his authority, i.e. by his breaking down the barriers to our intellectual activity, we are soon out in the open country. Again, the village clown lives within a narrow mental radius, but let him come under the authority of Shakespeare or Gibbon, and he is freed from the village. He becomes a citizen of the world. Further, we observe that, morally, the merely commercial mind lives in a groove. But let that mind come under the authority of Darwin or Kepler or Jesus, and the universe is his parish. Now, however arguable these specific applications may be in detail from certain points of view, they show that authority in its actual functioning does not necessarily imply the negation of freedom. It forces upon the mind an option which was formerly negligible or even positively ignored. The stress of authority does not come in the something that denies our power of choice. It is doubtful whether the power of choice can be taken away from us without destroying the constitution of human personality. The stress of an authority consists rather in enlarging the area of contact of certain ideas with our personality until their aim and that of the person become identical. At this point the choice is made, or the person wills. But authority then immediately ceases to

function. It has become a historical fact, and no longer a present dynamic. It is analogous to a case of double decomposition in a chemical action where authority plus subject becomes free act plus historical fact. There is a new relation of constituents without any having enjoyed a separate existence. And in the new relations the constituents have become other. Authority and freedom thus stand on opposite sides of the human equation, and each is there by its own right. Neither could be present without the other. It is precisely because we are free that authority is authority, and not mechanical control or something in the nature of a logical premiss. We could not experience authority unless we were free.

This conclusion is supported by the further consideration, that we experience authority most strongly when we feel it leads to a larger life. It not only exercises power over us, but it increases power within us. Even where we are "compelled against our will", this is true. For here our choice is between destruction and the act to which we are driven. We are "compelled against our will" in so far as what we really had willed is now beyond our reach, and we are faced with another option of things, some or all of which were undesired, but one of which is now the least undesirable. We choose therefore what is, for the moment, least inhibitive to, or most in harmony with, our stream of life. Thus authority is not measured merely by the control it exercises. When there is mere control, we have tyranny with its accompanying defects of weakened and perverted character. Tyranny is a form of authority which we recognise as of a lower order, and which is constantly threatened with subversion. An authority of a higher order is measured by the power it confers upon or arouses in the mind of the person under it. He obeys, but he is enlarged by so doing. He is actually helped in some measure towards self-realisation. He that was servant has become master.

Section xxii.—AUTHORITY OF HEROES.

Here we touch upon the secret of the authority attached to the names of the great leaders of the human race. They lead not because they dominate so much as because they inspire. Inspiration is at once dominance and new power. This is the basis of the authority of the poets, the sages, the prophets, the apostles, the

saints, and the seers. It is measured by the increase of range of life and the increase of inner power which it confers. In the end this is also the basis of the authority of Jesus. He is an abiding authority because He is found to retain in century after century, and in nation after nation, in tribe after tribe, in person after person, the power, not merely to control conduct by negation, but to enlarge its horizon and give a greater range to actions and choice. If He be the supreme authority, that supremacy will be based upon the superiority not merely of the ethical standard implied, nor of the tone involved, but of the power and range conferred.

Section xxiii.—AUTHORITY OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH.

Thus it is also that we recognise and claim that there is a higher ethic in the Christian faith. It is an ethic which goes beyond any conception, however ennobled, of mere equity, justice or truth, or any ideal of a static good. The higher ethic is redemptive. It goes beyond the person exercising ethical judgment, or what can be justified by a merely ethical logic, i.e. beyond what could *demand* to be treated as a universal imperative. It finds its sanction rather in a certain immediacy of recognition. This is rendered possible when the mind is stirred, and when a new power is experienced which so enlarges the constitution of personality as to make it in a sense another. And its rightness is recognised, again, by its reflex action upon the practical morals of the ordinary man. It is, so to speak, the leaven which transforms the lump. All this is in harmony with the sayings of St. Paul, "The love of Christ constraineth us". It emphasises the important aspect of the apostle's meaning in calling himself a bond-slave of Christ, while yet speaking of the freedom he has gained through Him. Far from being cramped by his obedience to the authority of Christ, St. Paul enjoyed a liberty exceeding anything he before knew or that could be readily paralleled. He revels in his liberty in Jesus till it forms a paradox after his calling himself a bond-slave. But both expressions are true to the experience of the authority of Christ. Here we have the greatest conceivable authority, an authority experienced as dominating the whole of the inner man, until he can no longer call himself his own, and yet experienced as compatible with the

greatest conceivable liberty. Nay, indeed, the completeness of the authority is the very condition of the perfect liberty. He no longer does the things he would not, nor leaves undone the things he would. He can now fully realise all that is implied by the possession of personality.

Thus the discovery of the ultimate authority is the discovery of final freedom really to live our lives. But as there be gods many and lords many, the task is one of considerable difficulty, and the history of the human race may be regarded as the history of trial and error in attempting it. The discovery depends ultimately upon an intuitive recognition of the superiority of some forms over others when viewed in the light of personal experience. We feel the closing in of the path as we adopt some and the opening out as we adopt others. The Christian certainty of the supremacy of Christ is based upon the superior quality of the experience which believers enjoy. We believe that this is God's world, because, when we regard it as such, we feel we are on the open road, and His way is the only way which can bring us into the fulness of life. Because we live in society, and not each man to himself, the full realisation of our life is dependent upon that of others. The whole missionary enterprise is bound up with this fact and its implications. Those who have had the experience of the authority of Christ recognise that they have touched finality, and they believe that others enjoying the same experience will share the conviction. But whether this faith is finally justified can only be decided when the course of human life is over. Meantime, we can do no other than stake souls upon it.

CHAPTER II

PRELIMINARY HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Section i.—THE POLITICAL CONDITIONS.

"Nothing is more perverse than the modern distinction between the Christ-idea, or the Christ-principle, and the person of the Redeemer. The Christian religion depends on the fact that in the historical person we have the perfect revelation of God. But if so, then the start must be made from what is given us in history. There is no value in emphasising the historical and then starting from the dogmatic construction which cannot be brought into harmony with history. That means simply giving water to the mills of those who despise history altogether and find value only in the idea or principle" (Kaftan, 1909, S. 429).

"During the nineteenth century, attempts have been made to explain away Jesus as a myth. The truth consists in the exact opposite. Christ is the only non-mythical element in Christianity. Through Jesus, through the cosmic greatness of this phenomenon (to which was added the influence of Jewish thought with its tendency to materialise history) myth just became history" (H. S. Chamberlain, 1909, vol. ii. S. 661).

"Christianity had a unique advantage over all its competitors, including Judaism, in having an historic person as founder, whose person was greater than His teachings. Herein lay its greatest originality and the main secret of its power. Christian enthusiasm was awakened and sustained not by an ideal but by a person" (Angus, 1925, p. 309).

"Why do men seek a Superman? It is because they yearn for Authority, not for Popes or Synods, not for Bishops or Creeds, but for souls which are strong and pure enough to draw us to themselves as the sun draws the planets and illuminates them. . . . Whoever finds such a soul would say to him, 'To love you is more than to be the discoverer of a continent, for you are vital'" (F. Naumann, 1907, vol. i. S. 9).

Thus from four different angles the case is submitted that it is impossible to understand the strength of the Christian religion apart from an appreciation of the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Unfortunately one frequently finds Christ and Christianity used

almost as if they were synonymous terms. The Authority of the Church and of its ministers, of its traditions and formulas, is all subsumed under the one general group idea of which the Christ of history forms just a part. Indeed, His part appears often a minor one, for which can be readily substituted that of one of the institutions connected with the religion. But this is not unattended with the danger, in days of religious decline, that dissatisfaction with Christianity will lead to impatience with Jesus.

We shall, therefore, attempt to eliminate from consideration many of the elements usually connected with the subject of the Authority of Jesus, even if at a later stage they must be examined. Our inquiry will be to discover exactly what He said, what He meant, what His motives and intentions were. We shall go past all the accretions of history to the records of the New Testament.

Before, however, we are in a position rightly to understand what we find there, it is important to recognise that there were highly significant differences between the circumstances of those times and of our own. In the midst of an astonishing political and artistic maturity, and with a culture which in some respects still towers above anything to which mankind has since attained, there was a certain widespread grossness and naïveté which appear almost incredible. The political achievement reached in the fact of the Roman Empire, with its tempering of nationalism and its blessing of *pax romana*, can scarcely be over-valued. But there was a heavy contra account of matters of first importance to human welfare, which were untouched by the statecraft of the Empire.

Probably the chief amongst these was the universal and debasing institution of slavery; a phenomenon of such magnitude that the greater portions of whole populations were deprived of liberty. Nor was the mere lack of personal freedom the worst feature. A vicious distinction was drawn in such a way that the majority were not regarded as fully human. They were there for the convenience and the pleasure of their owners. But still worse was the fact that in addition, the slaves readily regarded themselves in the same manner. It was difficult to do other. For much in their lives they could feel no real moral responsibility, a state of affairs which reacted unfavourably upon their already deplorable level of grossness and superstition (cf. W. E. H. Lecky, 1877, vol. ii. pp. 63 ff.; C. L. Brace, 1890, pp. 41-71). This, again, was not

without a regrettable further reaction upon the opinions and habits of the coarser grades of free-men in every land, and at length upon the more powerful and leisured classes. As a consequence the basest superstitions were widespread even amongst the most cultured, and occurred frequently, if sporadically, even amongst the most honoured and refined. The account of the incident of Paulina in the temple of Isis as recorded by Josephus (*Ant.*, xviii. 3) is too significant to be overlooked.

Nor can the naïveté of the age be dismissed with a word. It was not merely a pre-scientific age. Indeed, such a description is more false than true. The mathematical sciences had reached a fair level, but the natural sciences were still at the magical stage. Far from any formulation, there was no suspicion of the generalisation of cause and effect. It might be said with fair accuracy that imagination ran rife and the healthful criticism of the sceptics was of rare occurrence and relative insignificance. Signs and wonders, miracles and portents were found everywhere. The marvellous reports of common events were only rivalled by the credulity of the hearers. Nothing was too strange to be conceivable and nothing too sublime, too ridiculous, or too barbarous to be believed. As a consequence effects were assigned to many causes, and immediate causal connections were found between very disparate events. How otherwise could auspices have avoided laughing at one another when they passed in the street? But in spite of Cicero's sneer, it is impossible to doubt the immense earnestness of the priests, who often endured self-inflicted agonies in virtue of their office. But this can only mean that the strangest of connections between material and spiritual phenomena were taken in real earnest. Religion indeed gained much of its sanction from its pseudo-scientific powers over nature and men. A religious leader must be a wonder-worker. Even the Rabbis of Judaism were such (cf. Matt. xii. 27). And further, the greatness of the leader and the value of his teaching were inevitably popularly estimated by the greatness of the wonders he performed. Signs and wonders were the credentials of the teacher, and occupied a place in general estimation analogous to a university degree to-day. These facts constituted at once an advantage and a disadvantage. Their advantage was that the "sign" made an opening for any stranger, without prejudice of nationality. The disadvantage was that a

new teaching was too readily accepted for its supposed concomitant therapeutic or theurgic qualities, while its real meaning was slightly appreciated or even completely misunderstood.

It was an age, also, of ferment. There was the liveliest of intercourse between the East and the West, and between each and all of the different lands. Rome, Alexandria, Corinth, Damascus, and many another centre could easily reproduce the cosmopolitanism recorded in Acts ii in the somewhat "difficult" and inhospitable city of Jerusalem. Traders and travellers, soldiers and messengers were ubiquitous. The interchange of goods was paralleled by the interchange of ideas. The world was in the melting-pot, and the common lord and the common language kept all in solution.

It was also a religious age. The gods of the East soon came to stand alongside of the gods of the West. While the major deities were worshipped under various names throughout the Empire, the lesser added to their number almost every day in different localities. Merchants became missionaries of their local *numen*, and were as zealous and successful in the spread of their cult as in the sale of their goods. The restlessness of the times drove men to seek peace from whosoever might offer the slightest hope of it. With every new tale of some local godhead the flame was fanned. Dissatisfaction with the present state of life increased. The prevailing tone became pessimistic. This *Weltanschauung* was confirmed by the ultimately despairing tone of the various philosophic schools. Many a soul must have echoed the sentiment of Plato, "We will wait for one, be it a god or a god-inspired man, to teach us our religious duties and to take away the darkness from our eyes" (quoted Ballard, 1902, p. 220).

But this deep note had an over-tone. If humanity is incurably religious, it is also incurably optimistic. Despair, if it be deep enough and sufficiently widespread, is often a hopeful sign. Plato's saying may be despairing in tone, but it expresses a hope. It was an age worshipping strange gods in the ardent hope that they would deliver. The gods were re-interpreted or their cults were spread because they were reported as saviours. While it may be too much to say that there was a profound sense of sin, there was a widespread longing for salvation. A deliverer was looked for not only in Judea and Galilee but also in every other land, if with less confidence or prophetic authentication. The deliverer anticipated was

one who would release suffering mankind from its physical ills even more than from its moral insufficiency, but most of all from the terror of death and what lay beyond (cf. Glover, 1922, p. 271). Men were afraid to die lest death meant annihilation or worse. But the deliverer sought for would give life so glorious that death would be but a gateway from an antechamber to a hall. This eager hope has left its mark upon the New Testament in both Gospel (e.g. Matt. xi. 3) and Epistle (e.g. Phil. i. 21), and upon Christian traditions to the present date.

It is important that the general historical situation as it affects the religious outlook should be understood, for it gives us the *milieu* in which the New Testament was written. Very little of the New Testament was actually written in Galilee or Judea. Even of the Gospels themselves as they stand, not one can be traced to any purely Jewish city. The Fourth Gospel is well authenticated as born in Ephesus. There is much to be said for locating the birth-place of the First at Antioch (B. H. Streeter, 1924, pp. 500 ff.), the Second at Rome (*op. cit.*, pp. 488 ff), and the Third possibly at Corinth (*op. cit.*, p. 12, cf. 150). If we may accept the theory of Streeter, only small portions of the immediate sources of the Synoptics can be traced to Jerusalem or to any of the scenes of our Lord's ministry (cf. Streeter, *op. cit.*, chapter ix). The significance of these observations is in the influence exercised by the Churches for which the Gospels were primarily written, and by the people who must have watched the MS. growing under the eye of the evangelist and who possibly listened to his dictation, if they did not witness his actual autography. They must have determined in some degree the emphasis to be placed upon and the value attaching to certain recollections. They must have given a definite nuance to the vocabularies.

When we come to the actual incidents in the life of Jesus the case is somewhat different. The period was a full generation earlier. This is a fact worthy of note as, during this time, the growth of religious activity was rapid and far spreading. Then also the *milieu* was Jewish. But it was not a Judaism simply of the Pentateuch, of the Prophets, and the Psalms. It was also a Judaism of the Maccabees, of Enoch, of Esdras, of the Psalms of Solomon. It was not a people unitedly loyal to a purely Mosaic priesthood. On the one hand distinct Hellenising tendencies were already

old and well-established in the ruling sects. And on the other hand the nation itself was divided into a multitude of minor religious sympathies, of which the Sadducees and Pharisees, the Essenes and the Zealots represented but the major phases. Galilee was the home of the prophets and the mystics, Jerusalem the meeting-ground of great numbers of Hellenists from all parts of the Diaspora. These Hellenists represented both the hope of the Jews in the spread of their faith, and the problem of the leaders in the wealth of new phases and extraneous conceptions they must have continually brought forward. When a religion is a book-religion and is legalistically conceived, such phenomena must be causes of great anxiety to the chief authorities. This fact goes far to explain the ardour with which the Jewish priests sought to suppress any promising innovations.

Nevertheless, the far-reaching religious interest and the prevalent syncretistic spirit must have profoundly influenced the outlook of all classes. The Roman governors kept a close hand upon all sections and guaranteed a tolerance which gave proselytisers sufficient personal security. Thus protected, if they really had a message, they had a rare opportunity of giving the impression, however faint, that there might be some truth in their novelties.

In particular it must be noted that the greater part of the life of Jesus was spent in Galilee and the North, with its more pastoral life, its simpler and more mystical Judaism, and probably its greater susceptibility to Gentile influences. Here also were seen more of the foreign-built cities and foreign citizens, traders, soldiers, messengers.

Taken altogether, these facts constitute important data for understanding much not only in the Gospel narrative, but also in the influence and finally the authority of Jesus. They mean that there was a rich growth of religious speculation and a keen appreciation of religious experience. Tolerance was naturally both the wise policy of the Empire, and, within certain limits, the liberal practice of the people. Provided his preaching was constructive, i.e. did not attack the veneration attaching to the locally accepted creed, any wandering missionary could get an eager hearing either in the market-place, or on a hill near the city. Only when the itinerant threatened the destruction of a shrine, the abrogation of a cultus, the prosperity of a religious craft, or

the stability of the State, did fanaticism raise its head, and, according to temperament, scoff at, stone, or crucify the impious intruder. This state of affairs, however, was most propitious to the rise of a cult with a gentle spirit and a genial outlook, and especially to one whose fundamental ideas were both clear and well-knit. Almost any man could get an eager hearing if he could shed some light upon the worth of man or the friendliness of nature, or the idea of God, for these were the widely felt needs of the age. From this point of view it might well be said that Jesus came in the fulness of time.

Section ii.—THE LITERARY RECORDS.

The earliest literary records of the authority of Jesus are among the Pauline Epistles. But in them we see the authority in one of its later, well-developed phases. They show mainly the reaction of believers and especially of St. Paul to the power of the Lord. "The love of Christ constrained" them, and we see its effect. The authority which Jesus actually exercised, and especially that which He must have exercised upon His Galilean disciples and hearers, can only be reached from this starting-point by more or less hazardous inference.

To a certain extent the same is true of the Gospels. Taken as a whole, each Gospel records, doubtless quite unconsciously, the reaction of the evangelist to the tradition of Jesus. By the phrase "tradition of Jesus" is not meant the mere report handed down *about Him*, but rather also the heritage of the impression which He made upon His various hearers and particularly upon His personal disciples. The personal equation naturally operates throughout each Gospel. In the Fourth it dominates the author to an extent that obscures the historicity of the record. The writer understands everything in the light of certain fundamental and far-reaching doctrines from which indeed he cannot escape. He lives in a different world from that of mere sight and touch, and the side of Jesus which he portrays is the supernatural, benign, but somewhat etherial and passionless Visitor to Earth, whose true home was elsewhere.

But it is certain that there lie a common experience and faith behind the Synoptic Gospels on the one hand, and the Pauline

Epistles on the other, which experience and faith are common also to the Fourth Evangelist. Inference which would perhaps be impossible on the basis of St. John alone can be at least suggested by features in the other traditions of Jesus.

If the personality of the Fourth Evangelist is the remarkable feature of that Gospel as a literary datum, and if such a phenomenon is nothing like so striking in the Synoptics, it must nevertheless be recognized that even here we do not possess dispassionate records. Each is historical matter plus an interpretation, and is indeed as much of the latter as the former. St. Mark reveals himself as well as his Saviour. A vigorous and practical personality, the evangelist is more impressed with the things that Jesus did, even than by what He said. In spite of the minute and brilliant pleading of J. Weiss (*Das Älteste Evangelium*, Göttingen, 1903), it appears at least probable that our Second Gospel is to all intents and purposes a copy of the original autograph of the evangelist (cf. Streeter, 1924, pp. 305, 313, and especially 331) as far as it goes. But it is fragmentary as we have it. The ending is lost, and the chronological sequence of events is almost certainly different in detail from the order here. In spite of these facts, however, it is evident that the author was either unaware of, or not vitally interested in some features in the life and labours of Jesus which all succeeding ages have felt to be striking and indispensable. Thus, in particular, the wonderful parabolic method could scarcely be suspected, on the basis of St. Mark, as characteristic of Jesus. From what Mark records, one cannot comprehend the intense enthusiasm with which, as he says, the people listened to Jesus (cf. iv. 1; xii. 37, etc.). But the evangelist is deeply impressed with the greatness of the accomplishment of Jesus on behalf of the people, with the vigour and strength of His personality. Above all, he is concerned to show how such a one came to die and how He bore Himself in the face of the supreme tragedy. He dedicates no less than one-third of his Gospel to the Passion week. Mark is interested primarily in the conduct of Jesus, and the special characteristic of His portrait as compared with that of other sources is due largely to his omissions whether they were intentional or otherwise.

In the other Synoptics, the case is somewhat different. Here, as the Gospels stand, it is rather to the additions to the bare historical facts, or to the interpretations of those facts that they owe most of

their characteristic qualities. In the First Gospel the evangelist himself is concerned to show the place of Jesus in the march of the divine governance of history. Jesus does not merely fulfil the ancient prophecies, but step by step He works out the fore-ordained plan. The prophecies seem to be adduced as much for illustrations as for proof that Jesus all along both fulfilled the law, realised the dreams of the national seers and prophets, and also was Himself integral to the providential purposes of God. With less of a philosophic interest than the Fourth Evangelist, nevertheless, the first, in his own naïve and semitic manner, feels that Jesus is part of the world-system, without whom that system would be uncomprehensible. In a quite unhellenistic fashion, he shows how Jesus occupies an allotted place in the generations of mankind from the beginning of human history (Matt. i. 17), how He really did fill the place and do the work preordained in a plan to which the prophets were to some extent privy, and finally ascended to the supreme control of human affairs here and hereafter (Matt. xxviii. 18). In St. Matthew, in the last analysis, Jesus is only in a secondary sense human, real though His human nature was. The primary purpose of the evangelist is to show Jesus as the Lord of all, and it is doubtless the success of the evangelist in this particular that makes his Gospel "the best loved book in the world".

Before touching upon the question of the composition and the sources of our Matthew, it may be well to pass on briefly to summarise the qualities of the personal equation in the Third Gospel. Professedly an historical effort (Luke i. 1-4), it is not "detached". Luke is concerned to do more than "to write in order" the substance of the teaching about the life of Jesus which was current in Corinth, Antioch, or elsewhere. Consciously or unconsciously he is concerned to portray Jesus in the grandeur of His personality and in the sweetness of His human relationships. The great parables of chapters x and xv reveal the sympathies of the evangelist as well as the religious aim of Jesus. The conversation with Peter in xxii. 13 ff. and the vividly told incident on the road to Emmaus in xxiv. 13 ff. tell us of the tenderness of the historian as well as of the Master. These facts, and many others of a similar kind, serve to illustrate the point that this Gospel also is an interpretation as well as an historical record, showing a distinct side of the

power that Jesus exercised "in the days of His flesh". It is impossible, therefore, in our examination of the nature and foundation of the authority of Jesus, to treat it as it stands as a primary source.

This conclusion is supported by other widely different considerations. While Mark, if fragmentary and incomplete, is nevertheless on the whole historically fundamental as far as it goes, Matthew and Luke are, to a large extent, conflateions of earlier materials drawn from different written and oral sources. One of the solid results of modern critical analysis is to have proved that both Matthew and Luke had our Mark in front of them and that both used it almost in its entirety though in different ways. Matthew, indeed, may probably be best regarded as "a new edition of Mark" (F. C. Burkitt, 1910, p. 97) with large additions of matter drawn from another written source, Q, and smaller amounts from a further source peculiar to Matthew (Jülicher, 1901, S. 274-285) which Streeter proposes to call "M" (Streeter, 1924, p. 231), together with a still smaller amount almost certainly of an oral and legendary character principally in chapters i and ii (*E.B.*, col. 1778 ff.). Luke, on the other hand, is an independent composition of a still more complex kind of which our present Gospel may possibly be an enlarged edition (cf. Streeter, 1924, p. 231). He reproduces Mark with fair completeness usually in large blocks though with running verbal changes probably in the nature of stylistic emendations. He omits completely a whole section of Mark (vi. 45 to viii. 26), as also his last paragraphs. He draws very largely upon Q, which he reproduces, probably in its entirety or nearly so, with an accuracy exceeding that of Matthew and closely enough to warrant our holding that here, apart from stylistic emendations, we have the *ipsissima verba* of the source itself (cf. Harnack, 1907, S. 78, 80). He employs to some extent a third source peculiar to himself which Streeter and others propose to call "L" (Streeter, 1924, pp. 205 and 222; Klostermann, 1919, S. 412), and which contains some of the most beautiful and characteristic passages in the Gospel, e.g. the parables of the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal Son, etc. There is almost certainly, in this Gospel also, a relatively small amount of material of an oral and legendary character, principally in chapters i and ii. It is not within the scope of the present thesis to examine these positions, and

little or nothing in our inquiry will depend upon their finality in detail. We propose, however, to accept them as the best interpretation of the literary problems offered by the Synoptic Gospels.

But the object of the above outline is to maintain that the Gospels as they stand are not fundamental sources from the point of view of either literature or history. What historical inquiry we shall have to attempt must be based in the first instance (i) mainly upon Mark and Q taken side by side and as of approximately equal and mutually supplementary value, and then (ii) upon the authentic and historical sources, M. and L. peculiar to Matthew and Luke respectively; or rather upon the whole of each of these Gospels apart from Mark and Q and from any legendary or editorial elements that can be distinctly recognised as such.

Section iii.—JESUS OF NAZARETH—WHO IS HE?

We begin our inquiry by frankly accepting the fact of the life of Jesus. The position taken and defended with varying ability in recent years by, e.g., Drews and others in Germany, and J. M. Robertson and others in England, seems to raise more problems than it solves (cf. A. Schweitzer, 1921, chapter xxiii; H. von Soden, 1910, *passim*). For, apart from any other aspects of the question raised, few would pretend that the Epistles of St. Paul, or the material in their background, but apart from an historical Jesus of Nazareth, are sufficient to explain the foundation, and still less the survival, of the Pauline churches. Indeed, the Gospels themselves, even in their final form, as we have them, seem quite insufficient alone to account for the facts of Christian history in the first century of the Church. Only scattered pages of the New Testament have much value as literature, indubitably true though it is, that, to this day, there is not one passage in the Gospels that we can neglect without peril. There is but little in the Epistles that could have had any meaning or any conceivable value to the primitive Pauline churches, apart from the fact of an historical Jesus. Those little communities, composed predominantly of the poorest and most ignorant classes (A. Deissmann, 1908) could otherwise have had but small suspicion of St. Paul's meaning, even granting the personal character of the Epistles' often colloquial

language, and complete contact with a familiar environment and social usage (Deissmann, 1909, S. 168 f.; 1925, S. 125 f.).

The Gospels, again, with all their charm and their spiritual power, presuppose an historical Christ if only for the reason that they are so fragmentary, and so nearly without a real chronology, that, in the opinion of an eminent scholar (Harnack, *Lectures in Berlin*, 1909), a biography of Jesus is now impossible. If this be true, and the contentions of the destructive critics who deny the historicity of Jesus is directed to maintain this position, then it is impossible to understand how they gained currency, not as a body, but in isolation, and thus in their most fragmentary and least satisfying form, in different cities of the Empire. What gives the Gospel its final value is something in addition to the bare record. As a bare record it is insufficient to explain the rise, not to mention the survival, of the Christian Church. When the Epistles are read merely as "a passage for the day" divorced from their historic background and without any vivid conception of their author himself, they lose power. Indeed, in modern times their authority was never lower than to-day. Such studies as Deissmann's are indicative of a new era. They may be inadequate theologically, or from the point of view of many of the literary problems raised by the discussions of the last fifty years (Schweitzer, 1911, S. 135 f., footnote), but they do reveal new power in the Epistles themselves. We read them on the background of a living personality, of which, as far as they go, they are genuine and plastic expressions.

The same general position is valid in regard to the Gospels. As books of devotion, or as ethical records, their value, though unrivalled, was probably never lower than to-day. But so also never was the person of Jesus in lower personal esteem in the Christian community. When the Gospels are read, they are commonly read without a background in some vital conception of the person of Jesus. This means that their ethical and religious value is undermined. But if they are read as the records of the words and doings of a person whose every authentic utterance was in full earnest, and every vital action the clear expression of a decision freely reached and firmly grasped, the Gospels stand out in an entirely different manner. We can then immediately understand how these few rough pages are the most significant in all the

world; how from age to age they have served "to keep the soul of the Church alive".

Their power and authority always and everywhere, in short, presuppose an historical personality of immense force, whose living tradition has been handed down in the successive generations of Christian souls. The tradition is as necessary to the Gospels as the Gospels to the tradition, and both alike to the survival and propagation of Christianity. The supreme value of the Gospels is not in the record, but in the revelation, i.e. not in the bare words, nor in the ethics, nor in the "higher morality", nor in the attitude to life, but in vision of the personality of Jesus which their study affords. This vision not only corrects the aberrations of a traditional interpretation, but inspires it to a renewed vitality (cf. W. Herrmann, English trans., 1906, pp. 225 ff.). The personality of Jesus as He was, and of the Risen Lord as He is, gives the key to our understanding of the Gospel treasures of truth and life. We shall, therefore, assume the full historicity of Jesus of Nazareth as a fundamental datum in the discussion of the nature of His authority, i.e. we shall begin, not with the assumption of the *a priori* validity of certain universal principles, but with the phenomenon of an individual life.

Of the birth of Jesus we have two accounts differing much in detail and more in atmosphere. Neither of these accounts occurs in our two oldest sources, viz. Q and Mark, but in sections of Matthew and Luke respectively, which are held for other reasons to contain a large admixture of unhistorical elements. As a consequence we know nothing for certain about the infancy and early youth of Jesus. It has recently been maintained that the incident of Jesus in the Temple is based upon an authentic event (cf. Berguer, English trans., 1923, pp. 142 ff.), though it is too uncertain to bear any weight (cf. Headlam, 1923, p. 77 and footnote), whereas the Egyptian journey (Matt. ii, 13-23) (cf. Grieve in Peake, 1920, and F. W. Schmeidel in *E.B.*, col. 1780), is undoubtedly legendary. This means that when the authentic record really begins He is already in the full flush of His manhood. His first appearance upon the page of history is in connection with the striking figure of John the Baptist (Mark i. 9). John's preaching was characterised by two principal moments: (i) Repentance and baptism for the remission of sins (Mark i. 4 and parallels), and

(ii) the near advent of "Him who was to come" with the Holy Spirit (Mark i. 7 f. and parallels) and with fire (Matt. iii. 11, Luke iii. 16). A close comparison of the parallel passages suggests the conclusion that in Q two traditions about John the Baptist are conflated, the first arising outside of the early Church, and proclaiming a Messiah who would act as a judge of Israel and thoroughly purge the people with fire; the second, a Christian tradition which interprets this preaching of John as pointing directly to Jesus, who baptised with the Holy Spirit. This second is the one which Mark reproduces (cf. Wellhausen, 1914, S. 6). Whether this view be accepted or not, it remains certain that the oldest record of the preaching of John does not point directly to the person of Jesus, and it is only by a *tour de force* that it can be made to fit Him exactly. John expected the Messianic Kingdom, but on fairly conventional lines. He looked for a Messiah who would not only judge Israel but execute terrible sentence. What gave his preaching its tremendous power was the earnest and ethical way in which he took the nearness of the Kingdom, and the awful judgment which he believed it would bring.

All this means that when Jesus came to John, He came as an ordinary man, though the Baptist may have well appreciated His outstanding quality (John i. 27, 29). He was a Nazarene among other Nazarenes, a Jew among other Jews, possibly a Pharisee among others who took their ancestral faith seriously and longed for the coming of the day of the Lord (cf. Stapfer, 1896, vol. i. pp. 122 ff.). Nothing was known either of His infancy or of His youth to cause any to look towards Him with special hopes. Jesus had, in fact, to win His way.

But while all this may be true, we must nevertheless repeat our question and ask, "Who was He?" For very soon we find that various opinions are recorded and expressed about Him. Was He the Messiah long expected by the Jews? Was He the Son of David and King of Israel? Was He in a unique sense the Son of God, or was He in the line of the great prophets, the last and, if the greatest of them, yet nothing more? Finally, what did He claim He was, and what was the reason for this? Here we have a question which is somewhat different from the others, for it by no means follows that He actually was what He might have claimed Himself to be. But what He claimed will be of great

importance in helping us to determine what He really was, and also to understand His character, His personality, and His purpose.

To attempt to answer these questions we must examine our sources. The method we propose is to take each of the main questions *seriatim* and inquire what is the bearing of our records upon their answer

PART I
ANALYTICAL

CHAPTER III

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCE "Q"

Q is simple and naïve. It is the most nearly impersonal of any of our sources. The portrait it presents of Jesus is characterised by certain features. On the negative side we may note that it omits all reference to several matters of outstanding importance either in other sources or in subsequent Christian history. Thus it contains no version of the Lord's prayer, no reference to the Confession of Peter, the Transfiguration, or the Last Supper, all of which we might well have expected to find there. Nothing in Q would seem either to be incongruous with them or to render them superfluous. Moreover, as Q is possibly the earliest of our great sources, these omissions have a value different from similar omissions from (say) the Fourth Gospel, which was written in all probability with a full knowledge of the contents of all the Synoptics. Therefore it seems either that Q did not attach first-rank importance to the things omitted, or else that common knowledge then current rendered it unnecessary to record them. At least in his special circumstances the writer felt he could make a worthy record without them.

The fact that Q does not mention the Crucifixion or the Resurrection is not on the same footing, as it is within the bounds of possibility that the ending of the original document was lost, or for some other reason was not incorporated. No inference can therefore be safely drawn from the fact of this omission from Q.

Section i.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS SON OF GOD

We now turn to examine the document itself, on whose extent and identity there is sufficient scholarly agreement to warrant our following Q as reproduced in the elaborate study of Harnack (Leipzig, 1907, p. 88 f.) with some reference to the findings of Moffatt (1911, pp. 194 ff.), Stanton (vol. ii. 1910, app. ii), Hawkins (1909, p. 108 f.), and of Streeter (1924, p. 291). We may begin with the verdict of Q on the authority exercised by Jesus as the Son of God. This conception is the commonest, the most widespread, and the most characteristic of all the interpretations of the place of Jesus which are to be found in Christian

history. There can be no doubt of the immense weight of the doctrine. The authority of Jesus over men is, in the moral elevation and its spiritual power, simply that of God Himself. In all that concerns the influence over the believing soul, Jesus is God. In the impression of holiness, of grace, and of love, He and the Father are one—such is the verdict of the central experience of all types of Christian faith, Protestant and Roman Catholic, Western and Eastern, modern, mediæval, and primitive. No other doctrine is fully adequate to Christian experience. What then is the witness of Q? Let us consider the principal passages contained in the document.

Luke x. 22 (Matt. xi. 27). "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father; and no one knoweth (who the Son is, save the Father; and) who the Father is, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him."

The passage in brackets is the crux of the citation, but it is also the one which offers the greatest difficulty. If it be placed after the phrase "No one knows the Father, save the Son", instead of before, it immediately appears to be a corollary of that phrase, and is readily understandable as such. It is interesting to notice that this is actually the order to be found in certain very ancient authorities. The occurrence of a variation is itself very significant. Is "No one knoweth the Son, save the Father", an ancient marginal note? It is in the Johannine mood rather than that of Q, and out of harmony with the rest of the document. This alone would raise the question of its authenticity.

But accepting it to the full for the sake of argument, what does it mean? Jesus claims a special status, and a special intimacy with God. At the same time the point is expressly made that no one else knows either the nature of the Son or His identity, or His unique relationship with the Father. Now, while His nature and relationship are of immense importance in themselves, they are obviously of no importance whatsoever in the eyes of the people ignorant of them. Jesus, therefore, can have gained no authority thereby. The authority must have been entirely confined to what He Himself felt, and it increased His sense of mission, of inner certainty, and of power. Only indirectly, therefore, could it have made any difference to the people. For

our purpose the passage, therefore, is of far less positive value than at first appears.

Apart from the above, the term "Son of God" occurs in Q only in the address used by the Tempter in the Temptation, as recorded in Luke iv. 1-13; Matt. iv. 1-11: *εἰ υἱὸς εἶ τοῦ θεοῦ*. . .

The omission of the article before *υἱὸς* is noteworthy, especially if the passage is held to mean something more than Son of God in a general sense. It is difficult to see why the article was omitted.

But the main difficulty is twofold.

(a) *Historical*.—While it is too radical and negative to dismiss the temptation as unhistorical altogether, it may be well submitted that it did not take place in this form. The whole is enveloped in a supernatural and allegorical atmosphere more closely allied to pictorial fantasy than to sober history.

(b) Granting an historical kernel of a definite spiritual crisis in the inner life of Jesus, which is the real point of the temptation narrative, then we are at once faced with the fact that such a crisis is inconsistent with the very idea of "Son of God" in the unique sense. A real temptation, especially in the form described, is impossible to a Being of the moral quality of a Christian God.

This passage is therefore either unhistorical, and thus negligible for our purpose, or else it is directly negative.

Q itself believes in Jesus as the Son of God, but in the fact of an historical kernel to the temptation story it reproduces material which shows no such belief or ascription in the lifetime of Jesus, and up to the first formation of the definite tradition of Jesus.

The last passage in Q that need be examined is:

Luke xii. 7 ff.; Matt. x. 31 ff. Cf. also Mark viii. 38.

This passage occurs in different contexts in Matthew and Luke. In the First Gospel it is in the midst of the very difficult eschatological chapter which is certainly a conflation (cf. Streeter, 1924, pp. 263 ff.). In the Third Gospel there is no trace of the eschatological element, but the passage deals with the Son of Man, and not with the Son of God. Indeed, the person of the Son of Man seems to be set in parallel rather than to be explicitly identified with the person of Jesus:

"acknowledge Me . . . the Son of Man will acknowledge"

"disown Me . . . the Son of Man will disown."

In Matthew Jesus speaks in the first person and with reference to the Son of Man. As the passage stands it does not in fact imply the special sonship of Jesus. The "My Father" of verses 32 and 33 has no more claim to special emphasis and meaning than has "your Father" in verse 29. The point of the passage is the personal nature of the relation with God, and this is emphasised in both cases. The phrase *μή φοβείσθε* of verse 31 bears out this view. Wellhausen (1914, S. 48) says strikingly: "In this passage the assumption is that Jesus Himself remained fairly unknown during His lifetime, and that His influence grew only after His death. But the disciples must not be afraid to proclaim in front of the world what He had said and done in obscurity."

Further, in Mark viii. 38 is a passage which in all probability goes back to the same historical incident, but from which the term "my Father" is absent.

The value of the passage, then, depends upon (a) the meaning and the identity of the term "Son of Man" as used by Luke, and (b) Matthew's use of the term "My Father", which seems either parallel with "your father", or else to be unhistorical. Whatever "My Father" may mean, it is less direct than "the Son", and is obviously Matthew's own interpretation of his record. Thus we are safe in assuming that in this passage Jesus did not make any special and unique claims as Son of God, otherwise the historical records could scarcely have been so dubious. The authority flowing from the claim is obviously negligible, since the very records are confused witnesses. He is shown exercising authority, not on account of what He is, but on account of what He proclaims. The disciples are exhorted to be courageous lest at the last judgment they be put to shame for their cowardice.

Luke xi. 14-23. The question of alliance with Beelzebul (assigned to Q, though Harnack omits verse 15).

Here Jesus makes no explicit claim to special Sonship. He merely points out that if He does God's work, it is evident whence He gains His power and authority. But this is precisely what any prophet or apostle can claim. It is only by a *tour de force* that this passage can be adduced to support the special Sonship of Jesus.

There appears to be no other passages in Q which bear on the authority of Jesus as the Son of God. Of those cited, only

one is quite explicit in its phraseology, but its significance is obscure. We safely say that while Q itself may possibly, and indeed does probably, accept Jesus as the Son, it knows nothing of such a view in the lifetime of Jesus. Further, it would appear that any authority felt or exercised by Jesus throughout the source is independent of this status. The result is not so surprising if one remembers that we are dealing with a record practically confined to the words of Jesus, i.e. to His ethical and religious teaching. On the other hand, it does tend to show, at least as far as our earliest substantial source goes, that Jesus said very little about Himself, and was not much concerned with what attitude people took up towards Him. To a much larger extent He let His teaching, as understood by those who heard His living voice, carry its own influence apart from the consideration of any unique relation between Himself and God.

Section ii.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS LORD.

If we now turn to the allied conception of the religious Lordship of Jesus, we shall find very much the same result. The testimony of Q to the entire conception is almost lacking. There is in this source only one explicit reference to Jesus as Lord, occurring in two different recensions in Luke and Matthew:

(a) *Direct references*

Luke vi. 46; Matt. vii. 21.

The form in Luke is probably the more authentic, as it seems easier to conceive that Matthew is an expansion of the original than that the term "My Father in heaven", or the reference to the Kingdom, would have been passed over if original.

But the form in Luke carries the meaning of "Master" only. This meaning is perfectly good in Matthew, and is therefore probably authentic. In this case the passage drops out of consideration for our purpose. It is not a witness for the Lordship of Jesus, but rather is against the ascription.

No other direct references to the Lordship of Jesus occur in Q.

(b) On the other hand, there are certain passages not easily reconcilable with the idea.

Luke xiii. 35; Matt. xxiii. 39.

Here Jesus differentiates Himself from God as Lord. He hopes to come in the *name* of the Lord, i.e. as the agent of God.

This prophecy was not fulfilled in any positive sense.

Luke iv. 1-13; Matt. iv. 1-11.—*The Temptation of Jesus.*

The explicit reference of the term "Lord" is to God, from whom Jesus is distinguished, and to whom He owes a duty.

Again, the very idea of temptation is against the conception of the Lordship of Jesus in a religious sense.

There are many other passages in Q in which the term "Lord" occurs, but either the reference is directly to God (Matt. ix. 38; xi. 25), or else the meaning is plainly the equivalent of sir, master, or teacher (Matt. vi. 24; viii. 6, 8; x. 24 f.; xxiv. 45, 46, 49, 50).

Thus the term "Lord" is quite current, but its use speaks against the conception of the Lordship of Jesus in a religious sense in this source.

Section iii.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS SON OF MAN

(a) *The use of the term.*

So far, the categories have been familiar, belonging closely to the idiom of our own thought. Our next category is closely related to the former in the ancient Jewish mind, but is really remote in our own.

The question of the bare meaning of the term "Son of Man" is one of the most disputed questions in New Testament study. In what sense or senses did Jesus employ it? It is difficult to see how Jesus can have used it without Messianic implications, and yet if He frequently used it as a self-designation, how were the people in general and the disciples in particular in any doubt that He made distinct Messianic pretensions? Perhaps the explanation is that the term "Son of Man" was not a current Jewish name for the Messiah (Dalman, English trans., 1902, pp. 241 ff.). But in this case it becomes doubtful whether Jesus used the term at all, as it would have no meaning to His usual hearers (cf. Wernle, *Beginnings*, 1903, vol. i. p. 52). In the Book of Daniel, vii. 13, by general consent we have a personification of the people (Dalman, *op. cit.*, Charles, 1914, p. 60; Burkitt, 1910, p. 64 f.),

but in the Book of Enoch "it is not to be denied that the author, though in this part of the Similitudes he avoids every other Messianic title, really imputes to 'the Son of Man' a Messianic significance" (Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 243; cf. Bousset, 1906, English trans., p. 186). R. H. Charles holds that Jesus adopted the title from 1 Enoch, and thereby made supernatural claims for Himself (*op. cit.*, p. 91). But it is worth noting that the Psalms of Solomon, even in the finely conceived and detailed description of the Messiah contained in xvii. 23 ff. and xviii. 1 ff., make no use of the term. This fact suggests once more that "Son of Man" was not indissolubly bound up with the "Messiah", that it was probably not a common, and possibly a rather unusual, term in Jewish circles, and that its meaning would not be immediately apparent to the average man of the time.

Why then, and in what sense, if at all, did Jesus employ the phrase? Did He always use it in the same sense, and did He use it equally throughout His ministry? The views on these points are various. Some hold there is no problem, as it is a mere substitute for the personal pronoun (cf. *E.B.*, col. 4716). Martineau thinks Jesus used it to express "the trustful self-surrender, the blended fearlessness and tenderness before men, the shrinking from words of praise, 'Why callest thou Me good'? . . . which speak in all the features of His portraiture. . . . It by no means implied any Messianic claim. It might, on the contrary, be intended to emphasise the very features of His life and love which are least congenial with the national idea" (Martineau, 1898, p. 338). According to Moffatt, "The Messianic connotations of the title, on the lips of Jesus, includes humanity and apocalyptic triumph in the future. It expressed, as one critic has said, the Messianic consciousness of Jesus in three distinct directions. It announced a Messiah appointed to suffer, richly endowed with human sympathy, and destined to pass through suffering to glory. All theories that Jesus used it to denote some other than Himself . . . some future agent of God . . . or that it merely expressed His consciousness of personal humanity, may be set aside without hesitation" (1912, p. 153). But we shall have some grounds for regarding this question as not yet closed (e.g. pp. 65 ff., *infra*). Harnack holds that it is certain Jesus used the phrase, but that no single case is trustworthy (1907, S. 169). Denney regards this

as an overstatement, but he does so on the ground that "in the vast majority of cases where one evangelist has 'the Son of Man', so has the other" (Denney, 1908, p. 287). But this view is somewhat misleading, as both Gospels in most of these cases represent one source. Boussett declares "the title 'Son of Man' cannot have been used as a regular and constant self-designation by Jesus. Not until the end of His life, and then only briefly and sparingly, did He adopt the name". "The stereotyped way in which the Synoptics represent Jesus as using the title 'Son of Man' is not historical. . . . Yet this constantly repeated use of the title by tradition is best explained on the supposition that it is based on a few genuine words of Jesus, because the fact that the mysterious title never appears in the narrative part of the Gospels, but always in the sayings of Jesus, would otherwise have no explanation" (Boussett, 1906, p. 193). Wernle's view is in agreement with this (*loc. cit.*, *op. cit.*).

In a classification of the passages in which the term occurs Garvie says that it is not one of the recognised titles for the Messiah, as is proved by Jesus' question which called forth Peter's confession (Matt. xvi. 13), but he has to admit that here we have the possibility that Matthew used this title where Jesus only used the first personal pronoun. Garvie evidently feels it is going too far to say that it only occurs on the lips of Jesus, as certain passages in the Fourth Gospel are ambiguous. He sums up by declaring, "It is therefore impossible to define the conception from one exclusive point of view. The predicates assigned to the Son of Man do not give to the term any distinctive meaning" (Garvie, 1907, p. 305 f.).

Stapfer, on the other hand, finds no difficulty in understanding the meaning which Jesus gave the term. After a perspicacious discussion of its earlier use, concluding that the people generally retained the older meaning, whereas Jesus adopted a transformed sense, He says: "The title at once revealed and concealed Him. It did not say everything, and this, indeed, is really what He wished. His aim was, without openly proclaiming Himself the Messiah, to do the work of the Messiah, and to let people discover and recognise Him" (Stapfer, 1897, vol. ii. pp. 305 ff.; cf. also Berguer, 1923, p. 242).

The summary of this discussion seems to be that the term "Son of Man" was possibly used by Jesus in four different senses.

(i) For the first personal pronoun, in which case the authority of Jesus as Son of Man is simply that of His living personality.

(ii) For man in general—and was at first commonly so understood by the people. In this case it falls out of consideration for our purpose.

(iii) Jesus as the representative and ideal man. This seems to some extent a modernised conception.

(iv) As a mode of reference to the Messiah either as such or as Messiah *designatus*.

(b) *The earlier references.*

Let us now examine our sources, beginning with Q. The relevant passages in this document fall into two distinct classes: (a) the earlier, i.e. before Matt. xiii and Luke xii, and (b) the later.

- (a) (i) Matt. viii. 20 ; Luke ix. 58. "But the Son of Man hath not where to lay His head."
- (ii) Matt. x. 32 ; Luke xii. 8. "Everyone therefore who shall confess me before men, him will the Son of Man (Matthew says "I") also confess before the angels of God."
- (iii) Matt. xii. 32 ; Luke xii. 10. "And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it will be forgiven him, but whosoever will speak a word against the Holy Spirit, it will not be forgiven him."
- (iv) (Matt. xxiv. 44) Luke xii. 40. "So be ready yourselves, for the Son of Man is coming at an hour you do not expect."
- (v) Matt. xi. 19 ; Luke vii. 35. "The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners."
- (vi) Matt. xii. 39 ff. ; Luke xi. 29 ff. "For as Jonah became a sign to the Ninevites, so shall the Son of Man be to this generation . . . behold here is more than Jonah . . . to hear the wisdom of Solomon . . . here is a greater than Solomon."

It is immediately evident that in (i) and (v) "Son of Man" is simply a substitute for the first personal pronoun singular, and thus no authority attaches to Jesus as Son of Man in any special sense; (vi) evidently refers to the powerful preaching of Jonah

and to the wise counsels of Solomon, which are at least outdone, if not superseded, by the preaching and teaching of Jesus. There is no comparison of person with person. Hence it would seem to follow that "Son of Man" is a substitute for the first personal pronoun. In (iii) the case is somewhat different. As it stands it admits of the interpretation of the Son of Man in an apocalyptic sense. But even if this be allowed, then the context would permit of no special status, which is our point. He can be spoken against without grievous sin; indeed, probably the meaning is that there is no wrong in speaking against the Son of Man. This is to give Him little or no authority on account of His status. Certainly it is not to add to the place of Jesus because Son of Man. In (iv) the reference is very obscure, though the apocalyptic sense is prominent in the use of the term. It is probable that Q understands Jesus to be referred to, but the passage really falls under the second half of the present section (see p. 67 *infra*).

There remains only (ii) which can be readily interpreted in an apocalyptic sense as it stands. But there are certain considerations which make us pause. (a) Matthew does not use the term, but retains the first person singular. (b) The passage appears to have a double in Mark viii. 38, Luke ix. 26, in which both the first singular and also the term "Son of Man" occur and are identified, and where both the Father and the angels are mentioned. (c) This doublet in Mark is followed only by Luke, who alone used the term "Son of Man" in the passage we are discussing. It would, therefore, appear that in Luke we have the possibility of some conflation of texts, and that Matthew retains the purer form. We should, therefore, be justified in regarding this use of "Son of Man" as merely an equivalent for "I", and the eschatological sense as imported from other doubled passages.

Klostermann (1919, p. 496, *a.l.*) apparently agrees with this conclusion. He finds here only a further motive for fearless confession.

(c) *The later references.*

- (i) Matt. xxiv. 27 (cf. Luke xvii. 24). "For as the lightning . . . so will be the coming of the Son of Man."
- (ii) Matt. xxiv. 37, 39 (cf. Luke xvii. 26 ff.). "As were the days of Noah, so will be the coming of the Son of Man."

- (iii) Matt. xxiv. 44 (cf. Luke xii. 39 f.). "Be ye also ready, for at the hour that ye think not, the Son of Man cometh."

In all these passages the use of the term is somewhat different from that in the preceding group. Here we are really dealing with the apocalyptic Messiah who is to come unexpectedly in the future. The term "Son of Man" still seems to bear some of its connotation as the equivalent of the first personal pronoun singular. It is, therefore, best regarded as the link between the person of Jesus as He appeared among men and His conception of the Parousia. But it is to be noted that in this passage, where all three instances occur, the Son of Man need not refer to Jesus at all, but may be a discussion of the current ideas of the Son of Man as in 1 Enoch, etc.

Indeed, this consideration brings before us the real object of this entire passage. While Matthew lays special stress on the fact that the date of the Parousia is unknown, and Luke emphasises the unpreparedness of the people (Klostermann, *op. cit.*, *a.l.*, p. 538 f.), both alike imply that when it does come everyone will know it plainly—the lightning will shine from one end of the sky to the other (Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, *a.l.*, S.S. 954 *et seq.*). Jesus is not speaking of His Parousia, but of false ideas prevalent among the people and the mistaken grounds upon which they will look for their fulfilment. In effect Jesus says that whenever it does take place there will be no room for anyone to doubt it, but the main thing is that men should be faithful to their duties and to their Lord, and then it will not matter when it comes (cf. Matt. xxiv. 36–44).

But on this understanding of the passage, the apocalyptic interpretation of the Son of Man as applied to Jesus fades into the background even if it is not entirely dismissed. Jesus is speaking on His personal authority directly to His disciples, and the close reference of the term to Himself is rendered nugatory. This passage is then seen to be in general harmony with the usage in group (A). The broad conclusion is that Q knows nothing of the apocalyptic sense of the Son of Man as applied to our Lord in His earthly ministry

Section iv.—THE MESSIAHSHIP OF JESUS AS RELATED TO HIS AUTHORITY.

(a) *The meaning of the term.*

Closely allied with the term "Son of Man" is that of the Messiah. Indeed, the ascriptions are to some extent mutually dependent, though the latter endured longer, and has been preserved as a title.

The essence of the Messianic conception is that of a deliverer divinely chosen and appointed. As commonly understood among the Jews, he was to effect mainly a political deliverance, though not always by the ordinary political means of force.

Psalms of Solomon, xvii. 37, 39, 42. "For he shall not put his trust in horse, rider or bow, nor shall he multiply unto himself gold, silver for war, nor by ships shall he gather confidence for the day of battle. . . . (verse 37). For he shall smite the earth with the words of his mouth . . . (verse 39), for God shall cause him to be mighty through the spirit of holiness, etc." (verse 42).

Among the Gentiles, on the other hand, the kind of deliverer looked for was mainly personal, and salvation would come by means of an inner preparedness leading to and consisting in a mystic union with the Saviour God who then makes the devotee free from the bonds of this life, and especially enfranchises the soul into eternal life (Angus, 1925, p. 137 f., and *passim*). The usual title for such a deliverer was Lord (cf. 1 Cor. viii. 5 f.). There can be little doubt that both these conceptions have operated in the history of the doctrine of the Messiahship of Jesus. It may be doubtful to what extent the Gentile conception had penetrated Palestine in the time of Jesus, or even in the time of the Apostles, but it was widespread in the world into which the gospel was carried in the first generation. This fact can scarcely have done other than influence the thought of the evangelists, and it may have affected their primary sources to some extent. At any rate, in the Acts and in the Epistles, Jesus is regarded as Saviour and as Lord more frequently and more correctly than as Messiah. "The retreat of the Messianic categories in favour of the Logos Christology corresponded to the universal necessity for a religion with a cosmic outlook" (Angus, *op. cit.*, p. 74, so also Mackintosh, *Originality of the Christian Message*, pp. 25-6, quoted

ibid.). The term "Messiah", even when translated as Christos, had no meaning to the great masses of the Gentile world. It very quickly became a mere cognomen, e.g. Matt. i. 16 ff., Rom. xv. 3, etc. In itself the term was Jewish, and therefore limited by all the traditional and racial prejudices of that people. If Jesus indeed possessed the conception, are we to assume that He was entirely unaware of the yearnings of the Gentiles for a deliverer? Did His outlook, in any case, even supposing the religious unrest of the larger world were beyond His ken, remain confined to the horizon of Judea, Samaria, and Galilee? It is difficult in that case to understand either the greatness of His impact upon the Gentile world when the gospel spread to them, or the urgency with which St. Paul sought to preach the gospel to the Greek and the Barbarian. It is common knowledge that Jesus did not accept the prevailing or any other purely Jewish notion of the Messiah. What then was His conception, and in what way, if at all, did He relate it to Himself? To answer these questions we turn to our sources. We shall begin with Q.

(b) *Jesus as Messiah according to Q*

Matt. xi. 2 ff. (cf. Luke vii. 18 ff.).

The exact wording of the entire passage must always remain subject to some doubt, as the parallel in Luke varies considerably, and especially in points that immediately affect our present inquiry. Harnack, after elaborate discussion, decides in favour of the more primitive character of Matthew's version (Harnack, 1907, S.S. 14 ff., 64 ff.), which he eventually accepts as a reproduction of Q (*ibid.*, p. 91 f.).

That John should have put this question at all is fully in accord with the fact that his prediction of the character of the Coming One does not correspond to the Jesus of history.

The term *χριστός* is evidently employed from the point of view either of the author of Q or of the first evangelist, and not from that of the Baptist. Indeed, otherwise it begs the question.

Since Matthew and Luke agree verbatim on the point in a passage containing divergencies elsewhere, there can be little doubt as to John's exact question. He seems almost consciously to avoid the term "Messiah". He asks: "Are you He that is coming, or

must we look for another?" The question may thus imply either Messiah, or Son of Man, or some other, e.g. Elias or Jeremiah, or one of the Prophets (cf. Matt. xvi. 13 ff. and parallels). It is true that "In the period of Messianic salvation a healing from all evils was expected" (Strack-Billerback, 1922, S. 593), and that John had already heard of the deeds of Jesus and yet was dubious. After all, there were others who healed, even among the Jews, and it has been maintained that "it is utterly unthinkable that John, previous to his imprisonment, could ever have entertained the idea of a connection between Jesus and the Messianic hope" (Scott, 1911, p. 84).

Similarly there can be little doubt that Jesus Himself avoided a direct answer, but left the matter practically where it was. He allowed the question of His status to rest upon the witness of His conduct and aims and personality. As far as His authority went, whatever He may have felt in Himself, He desired to add nothing to what men saw and experienced for themselves (see further p. 88 *infra*).

(c) *Summary.*

This is the only passage in Q where the Messiahship of Jesus is touched upon. There is no reference even of a secondary character to the subject—nothing of Him as Son of David, King of Israel, and the like. That the question itself was present to the author of Q is probable from the passage under discussion, though it may possibly have been only in the mind of Matthew. This strongly concurs with the conclusion to which we were driven in regard to the term "Son of Man" in this source. Certainly we are justified in holding that the Messiahship of Jesus was not an urgent question to Q, and that the authority Jesus exercised over the author, or more certainly over His own disciples and hearers, was probably entirely independent of this issue. The Jesus of Q is simply not vitally concerned with it.

Section v.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURE.

The question of the Messiahship of Jesus depends to a large extent upon our reading of the bearing of Scriptural prophecy in general, and on the way Jesus fulfilled it in particular.

AUTHORITY SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURE 71

Let us then ask to what extent Jesus regarded Himself, or possibly the people regarded Him, as fulfilling the Scripture, and what was the value attached by His contemporaries during His lifetime, to any such fulfilment?

(a) *Jesus as sanctioned by Scripture, according to Q.*

There are no direct references in this source, and the indirect are both few and remote.

- (i) Matt. x. 7; Luke ix. 2; x. 9, 11. "Go, preach, saying that the Kingdom of God is at hand."

The sanction lies not so much in the Scriptures as in the widespread interest in and desire for the day of salvation (so also Matt. x. 15=Luke x. 12).

- (ii) Matt. xi. 2-11; Luke vii. 18-28. (See page 69 *supra*.)

The passage is reminiscent of Isa. xxxv. 5 f. and lxi. 1 ff., but Jesus does not claim that He is fulfilling Scripture. As recorded in Matthew, Q explicitly refers to the miracles as works of *the Christ* (verse 2), but this reading cannot be original as it renders the Baptist's inquiry superfluous. There is some possibility that the opening of the eyes and the like were meant metaphorically (Wellhausen, 1914, S. 51), but in view of the last word of verse 5 this is scarcely probable. There is, however, sufficient variation in the readings to warrant our leaving the question open. The intention of Jesus in giving this enigmatic answer is merely to maintain that such actions are a result or a proof of the presence of the Spirit of God in the man, whoever it was, that did them. It is not a testimony to the status of Jesus beyond that, and He is content to leave the matter there. His attitude is thus quite in harmony with His general practice (see further p. 72 *infra*)

Matt. iii. 10-12; Luke iii. 16, 17.

This passage is not strictly applicable to our present category, but the testimony of John may be regarded as that of one of the prophets.

John refers only to "One mightier than I" whom he expected, but his description of that one is not readily applicable to Jesus

(. . . baptise with fire . . . burn the straw with fire unquenchable), even allowing the greatest latitude of prophetic imagery.

At a later stage John appears not to have recognised Jesus as fulfilling His preaching and expectations, as we have already seen. This is quite in harmony with the fact that the Baptist's prediction of the character of the Coming One as seen in Q does not accord with the Jesus of history (cf. p. 69 *supra*). Nor does anything in Q depend upon this identification.

Luke iv. 1-13; Matt. iv. 1-11.—*The Temptation Narrative.*

The remarks already made upon the unhistorical nature of the temptation narrative in Q (p. 59 *supra*) carry the Scripture references there out of relation to our present inquiry. We simply cannot say whether Jesus ever used them or not. But even if He did use them, they are of general application, and have no special reference to Jesus as distinct from any other person undergoing temptation. Jesus fulfilled them morally, and not prophetically.

(b) *The Summary* is therefore that the Jesus of Q did not regard Himself, and was not regarded by His hearers as fulfilling Scripture in any direct prophetic and unique sense. The general bearing of Jesus as depicted in this source is very independent of the ordinary Jewish method of approaching Scripture or tradition generally. He has an outlook widely different from one which finds vital support in mechanical or coincidental fulfilment of the written Word. He finds elsewhere the signs of the providential order and the fulfilment of God's purposes. They are inner rather than outer, in nature rather than in ancient records, in the growth of the soul and the satisfaction of its needs rather than in a correspondence of particular events with the expectations of the past. In presenting such a picture Q could hardly have regarded the fulfilment of Scripture as vital to understanding Jesus and His message. Q would lose nothing of importance if the few and bare references to Scripture had never been preserved there.

Section vi.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS SANCTIONED BY MIRACULOUS PHENOMENA.

The fulfilment of Scriptural prophecy is, or would be, a miracle of the first order, but we have dealt with this issue independently

on account of its special nature. We are now led, however, to the question of miracles as such.

(a) *The Question of Miracles.*

But before examining the records let it be said that the whole problem of miracles is very complex and raises many questions, some of which lie beyond the scope of our present inquiry. It is impossible here to discuss the validity of such phenomena in principle or even exactly to define the meaning of the term, further perhaps than to state that definition and validity seem to be mutually dependent categories (cf. F. R. Tennant, 1925, especially Lecture II). But it will be sufficient for our purpose to take those phenomena which were regarded as miracles by the people who witnessed them, whether we ourselves to-day would so designate them or not. Our point, therefore, is not primarily to demonstrate or to deny that Jesus "performed miracles" as a matter of history and as scientifically demonstrable phenomena, but what authority accrued to Him from the miracles He was rightly or wrongly deemed to have performed. The question of their historical or "scientific" validity may be of great importance for the modern mind, but it does not necessarily affect the inquiry into the authority which Jesus exerted over His contemporaries.

The question may be stated thus: Did the people believe that Jesus performed miracles? Did Jesus believe He could perform miracles? What was the value both they and He placed upon them? Were they a help or a hindrance in His life's work? Do they help us to understand His personality and the influence He was able to exercise then, or immediately after His crucifixion? A later faith was doubtless prone to regard the miracles as the sign *par excellence* of His divinity. Recently the miracles were regarded as the chief difficulty to a rational faith. But in the present study we are concerned with their significance during the times of Jesus' public ministry, and up to the date of the Gospel records.

The same general principle holds true in regard to other supernatural phenomena, e.g. angelic voices, recorded in the Gospels. We are not concerned with either their historicity or their nature so much as the value attached by Jesus and the people to the event behind the record. We may thus usefully deal with both classes

of phenomena under one category, though in separate sections. (a) Miracles performed by Jesus, and (b) other supernatural phenomena related to His ministry.

(b) *Miracles performed by Jesus.*

There are very few references in Q to phenomena of either class, and in still fewer instances are we able to discover their practical significance. Beginning with the miracles of Jesus, the references are of two classes, (i) those affirmative on the whole, (ii) negative.

Luke vii. 1-10; Matt. viii. 5-13.—*The Centurion's Servant.*

Jesus performed this miracle on the basis of a faith already active, and an authority already gained and not *vice versa*. We have no means of estimating any increase of authority He exercised as a consequence. It seems to have been assumed that He could perform this miracle because of what He was deemed to be—though no hint is given as to opinion on this point. His authority aided the miracles rather than *vice versa*.

Luke vii. 22 ff.; Matt. xi. 4 ff.

This question of the Baptist's is of the greatest moment from our point of view. It gives the nearest approach in Q to the problem of the authority of Jesus as He Himself conceived it. In a certain sense it is a Messianic passage for "healing of all ills" was expected in the Messianic period of salvation. Indeed, to Jewish thought this expectation contained nothing exorbitant, for thereby the days of the Messiah would only attain to the level of the time of the law-giving on Sinai (Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S. 593). Thus it would imply little either of an apologetic or Danielic nature, but rather a return to the glorious days of the full Mosaic dispensation.

Therefore the answer returned by Jesus is at best enigmatic, and seems to imply that Jesus wished John to draw his own conclusions (so also *E.B.*, col. 2501). But it is the miracles which appear to have first raised doubt in John's mind (cf. Luke vii. 18 f.; Matt. xi. 2 f.). Indeed, Wellhausen (*op. cit.*, S. 51) tellingly says that this is why Matthew is explicit that they are the works of the Christ. Certain it is that John expected very different "signs"

from those shown by Jesus (cf. Matt. iii. 11, 12). Or rather, what John wanted was a direct and explicit *pronouncement* from Jesus, as the miracles could be read in different ways, and were not sufficient in themselves.

But the point is that the miracles, *per se*, do not appear to be decisive factors, and might easily be the cause of Jesus' losing all authority (cf. Luke xi. 14 ff.), as some heroic persons have discovered in the course of history. Miracles, like Scripture, are thus double-edged, depending upon the mind of the interpreter.

Nevertheless, Jesus no doubt did regard His own powers as signs that the Kingdom of Heaven was near at hand to whose coming He Himself was a forerunner (cf. Matt. xii. 28; Luke xi. 19, 20).

Luke x. 9 (cf. Matt. x. 7).—*Instructions to the Disciples.*

The message about the near approach of the Kingdom is addressed to the inhabitants in general (so Klostermann, 1919, S. 478).

The healing work seems to be incidental to their mission as preachers of a new faith and not their authentication.

The disciples apparently stand upon the same footing as Jesus, both in the preaching and in the healing. The miracles therefore would lend no special authority to Jesus as distinct from the disciples.

Luke x. 17 is in all probability not in Q. It is omitted by Harnack and queried by both Stanton and Streeter, and in any case adds nothing to our knowledge of the effect of the miracles on the people, although Jesus' own confidence and that of the disciples in Him seem to have been greatly increased as a consequence of the experience of the preachers.

Luke x. 13 f. (cf. Matt. xi. 21 f.). "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! Had the miracles performed in you been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have been sitting penitent in sackcloth and ashes."

In this passage, as in the reply to the inquiry of the Baptist (Luke vii. 22 ff.; Matt. xi. 4 ff., see p. 74 *supra*), the exact import attached by Jesus to the miracles is obscure. But their significance appears to be attached to their effect upon the minds

of the people as predisposing them to a new faith, and not as a testimony to the personal authority of the person performing the miracles, i.e. they are held to authenticate the operation and co-operation of God, and the preaching of His Kingdom rather than the personality of the preacher (so also are to be understood Mark ii. 9 ff.; Luke xi. 14 ff.).

(ii) *The passages refusing value to the miracles are:*

Luke ix. 51-56.—*Fire from heaven refused.*

This passage probably does not belong to Q. Of our authorities, neither Harnack nor Stanton find it in the document. Even Streeter regards it as suspect.

But the effect of the passage is that Jesus refuses to base His authority upon at least this kind of miracle.

Luke xi. 14 ff.—*Beelzebul—a sign from heaven sought.*

The passage is possibly a conflation of Q and Mark (Klostermann, 1919, S. 488. Harnack omits only verses 15 and 18 as not in Q. Stanton and Streeter regard the whole passage as from Q).

Jesus recognises that even the Jews are able to cast out demons (verse 19), and therefore any *special* significance attaching to such miracles lies outside the miracles themselves, perhaps in their object, or the nature of their occasion. As far as these miracles are concerned, Jesus places Himself on a similar footing to others who could do the same things.

Of much more importance is it to note that in this passage the main point is not a question of what authority the miracles give, but the diametrical opposite, viz. what authority has Jesus to perform the miracles. Jesus has to explain both how He is able to do, and why He has done these things (verse. 20), and He elaborates His position at some length (verse 21 f.).

It is further to be noticed that the onlookers, demanding a sign from heaven, evidently did not regard exorcism, and possibly other miracles, as such signs, but possibly even as difficulties. The authority of Jesus by its very association with this kind of work was thus placed in a most precarious position (cf. also Acts xiv. 8 ff.—the experience of Paul and Barnabas at Lystra).

Luke xi. 16, 29-32; Matt. xii. 38 f., 41 f. "We would see a sign . . . no sign except that of . . . Jonah . . . Solomon."

This passage probably follows immediately upon that dealt with in the preceding paragraph.

The special point is, however, that Jesus explicitly refuses to rest His authority upon anything outside His preaching and what He Himself is, as interpreting personally what He says. He finds its roots in the inherent justice and wisdom of His words. This is surely the basis of His charge against the Pharisees in verses 39 ff. (cf. also Matt. xxiii. 16 ff., Blind Pharisee).

(iii) *Summary.*

According to the records of this source the miracles of Jesus added a very doubtful quantity to the authority of Jesus, and on occasion even detracted from it and formed a difficulty in His general work. Personally He shrank from resting any weight upon them.

Q itself seems unconscious of the apologetic significance of miracles either an authenticating the teaching of Jesus in itself or any unique claims for Him personally. As we shall see, this is strongly contrasted with, if not contradictory to, the attitude of the Fourth Gospel (see pp. 186 ff. *infra*).

(c) *Other Supernatural Phenomena in Q.*

Luke iii. 21 f.—*The voice at the Baptism* is probably not in Q, though Streeter assigns it to this source.

Luke iv. 1-13; Matt. iv. 1-11.—*The Temptation.*

Harnack's elaborate discussion of this passage is invaluable for the understanding of the text (Harnack, 1907, S.S. 33-37). The chief point for our purpose is the complete omission of all references to angels in the original document, which reference is an addition to Q from Mark.

The fact of the Temptation is against any special authority of Jesus as a heavenly being, and yet the graphic description of the presence and words of the Devil present in his own person bears testimony to the uniqueness of the circumstances in the opinion of the Prince of Darkness. The import is that Jesus must have been more than an ordinary man.

But by the nature of the case the historical temptation, whether with or without the personal Devil, was a most private experience of Jesus, and could not have influenced any other person in any way.

The presence of a personal Devil, or, indeed, merely a very insistent inner consciousness of temptation, would serve rather to undermine Jesus' confidence in Himself and in His mission.

(d) *Summary.*

Q contains no reference to the Transfiguration and no account of the Crucifixion, and we may therefore summarise Q's record of the outer sanctions to the authority of Jesus as meagre, and on the whole negative. This source certainly does not present us with the portrait of a Being living as if aware that the heavens were watching Him. He is placed before us standing upon His own feet as a simple man among men, guided in no supernatural fashion, but purely by His own spiritual insight and experience, and above all by the closeness of His personal communion with God.

Q uniformly presents Jesus as shrinking from the publicity and notoriety which miracles inevitably involve and from the consequent misconception of His own life's work. It knows of miracles only as incidental to His real ministry, and as occasioned only by sympathy, pity, or other humanitarian motives. Q must have felt that the picture he had to present, or the record he was making, was indelible, indubitable, and sufficient apart from any apologetic value in miracles.

Section vii.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS A PROPHET.

At the date when Q was first written, many people must have still been alive who had seen and heard Jesus Himself. Therefore we may perhaps be permitted to conjecture, not very hazardously, that a fair proportion of the acquaintances of Q within the Christian community were such eye-witnesses. This fact, however, need not be understood to mean that they would supply tacitly and out of their own knowledge what they felt was missing from Q, especially in regard to the more theological matters such as Jesus' Sonship, or Messiahship and the like. If there had been

in its own circle any serious consciousness of Q as thus gravely defective, we should have real difficulty in understanding why it came to be incorporated practically in its entirety first by Matthew and then by Luke. Q must surely have been held in great repute in some important community, or it would have been more neglected.

What the fact of many living eye-witnesses does imply is rather that Christian opinion was still in a disingenuous stage. The implications of their own impressions and experiences, and of the records in Q, were relatively undeveloped. The simple but glowing memory, and the bare but graphic record, were in themselves sufficient for their needs.

We are not able to analyse at this stage the positive content of their memory or experience apart from what may be gathered from New Testament records, and it is no part of our immediate task to attempt to do even this. But the positive content of Q lies open to our inspection.

(a) *The meaning of the term.*

Jesus is presented to us as a prophet, and as such in His own right. Now a prophet though illumined, actuated, and inspired by God is a purely human figure. "The possession of a single true thought, not derived from current religious teaching, but springing up in the soul as a word from Jehovah Himself, is enough to constitute a prophet" (Robertson Smith, quoted T. R. Glover, 1922, p. 130). At the noblest he belongs to the succession of Amos, Isaiah, and Jeremiah. He speaks the word of the Lord in the name of the Lord. He carries weight by the moral and religious urgency of what he says. His political utterances may be arguable, but never when he says, "Thus saith the Lord". What he foretells may be unfulfilled, but not what he preaches. He is what he is, not by birth or by official designation (Amos vii. 14 f.), but by the sense of an inner call and by the verdict of the religious intuition and experience of his hearers or readers, who feel the inevitability of the prophecy which he utters, and this feeling of inevitability which they experience is their clue to his identity as a prophet. He is known for what he is as a consequence of his discharging his function, which he does not merely because he has been as it were appointed to an office. "The characteristic mark of a true

prophet is that he has stood in the secret counsel of Jehovah, and speaks the words which he has heard from His mouth. . . . They (the prophets) are in sympathy with Jehovah's heart and will, their knowledge of His counsel is no mere intellectual gift, but a moral thing (Robertson Smith, 1881, p. 274). . . . The word is within his heart like a burning fire shut in his bones (Jer. xx. 9) so that he cannot remain silent (*ibid.*, p. 281).

As a rule a prophet makes no personal claim to be heard. He speaks, he acts, and leaves the matter there. The word or the aim is the important thing, and not the vehicle. It makes no difference, if, like Isaiah, the prophet himself is unknown and unrecognised. His prophecy may nevertheless reach the greatest heights and be of paramount value. The prophet gains authority from his utterances and not *vice versa*. His personality is of account, but, as far as his hearers are concerned, in and through his words and deeds, and its special quality is seen in them and through them, but not before them. And if Jesus is in any sense in the succession of the prophets, we may look for things of the highest importance to our understanding of His personality and His authority.

(b) *Jesus as a Prophet in Q.*

This being the case, the substance of the record becomes far more important than the use of any particular expressions. And in fact we find that the term is never applied to Jesus or claimed by Jesus in the whole of Q. Such a silence would be of immense significance in regard to the Messiahship, the Lordship or the Sonship of Jesus, but in the matter of His being a prophet one can say *si monumentum quæris, circumspice*. It is impossible to read Q as a continuous document (e.g. in Harnack, 1907, pp. 88-102) without the deep impression that here we are dealing with prophecy in its purest form. It is not merely the almost complete absence of incident, and the almost exclusive interest in the words of Jesus, that create this impression, but much more the nature of the utterances and the incidents. The utterances are almost all direct, intuitive, speaking from soul to soul. No reference is made to the support of tradition or custom or logical reasonableness. The epigrammatic style, with all its picturesque vividness and unforgettable, clear phrases, is but the vehicle of spiritual

perspicacity which probes each subject to the bottom and exhausts it. There is in actual fact nothing left for succeeding students of the same question except to expound or to apply what has already been brought to the surface. Now this is the supreme test of prophecy.

The question may thus be enunciated. What further moral secret remains to be won from the issue? What richer spiritual discovery still lies hidden? The reply is that Jesus exhausts the issues that He joins. There is nothing more to be said. Further, no man can neglect what Jesus has said without peril to his spiritual health, nor can he attain complete inner satisfaction and peace along any path contrary to that indicated.

Those beatitudes and the large portions of the Sermon on the Mount, which belong to Q (Matt. v. 1-4; v. 6, 11, 12, 25 f, 39 f, 42, 44-48; vi. 25-33; vii. 1, 2, 1-5, 7-11, 13 f., 16-18, 21, 24-27 f.), together with many another section (e.g. Matt. x. 26-33 and portions of Matt. xxiii) exhibit these qualities clearly and irrefragably. Jesus is shown speaking, acting, feeling as a prophet, and the effect of the written record upon the reader is of the same order as, though of different quality from, that of the great figures of the Old Testament and of the great historic preachers. The effect of the living presence of Jesus and of His living voice set in their native surroundings can be now only distantly and vaguely felt, but there is no doubt that here we are on the firm ground and on the open road. Whatever else Jesus was, whether as *der Kommen Sollender*, or as The Son, He was a prophet, and the earliest source we possess—a source held by certain people of a later generation to be of equal importance with the gospel as received in Rome—is content to deal with Jesus as a prophet and almost to ignore other issues.

It may be going somewhat beyond our present reference, but it is true to say that the scope and attitude of Q seem to reproduce very faithfully the method of our Lord Himself in His public ministry. He appears to have regarded practically what was later gathered as the material we find in Q, as the indispensable, but sufficient, foundation of His ministry and of His hearers' faith. Anything further could only come after a larger Christian experience and a more intimate insight into His mind and pro-

gramme. In the nature of the case this could take place during His lifetime only in the circle of His disciples, or after His death by His presence as the Risen Lord with those who live "in Him".

During His ministry He was the object of love and respect by what He was in Himself as a man, and by the intrinsic merit of what He said and did. Far from having any sense of lack in this presentation, or any feeling that the foundation for His authority was too restricted and frail, Q exhibits an almost explicit joy and an abundant eloquence in making the record. When we refer to this source on other matters, it speaks at least with a halting accent, but on this issue it is at home. Now it breaks forth, as it were, into song. It presents Jesus with astonishing ease and graphic power. It reveals Him speaking with unexampled ethical insight and with unique creative force. He has power not only to enunciate new truth, but also to awaken immediate response in the dead or sluggish souls of those who read Him to this day. The record of such portions of the Sermon on the Mount as Q presents is a sufficient example.

Nor must it be thought that Q portrays Jesus as merely an ethical teacher. He is a prophet preaching the gloriousness of a God Whose goodness, love, righteousness, and patience exceed the limits of human thought. And His personality is such that it authenticates His message. He thus awakens a responsive love toward God, and calls to a sense of stewardship which is of the last majesty and exaltation. There is simply nothing else to say on these matters. The subjects are exhausted. Anything further can only be in the nature of commentary or practical applications.

And yet Q does not present Jesus as speaking merely out of the fulness of His own heart or the richness of His own blessed intuitions. Jesus has His eyes upon both history and nature (cf. Luke x. 13 ff.; xii. 22 ff.; xiii. 18 ff.). He bases Himself equally upon the proper expression of human instincts, and upon events common to the constitution of society and family (cf. Luke xi. 9 ff.; xii. 34 ff.; xvi. 13). He is a prophet to whose sympathetic insight there is no bounds, to whose joy in God there is no limit, of whose power of appeal and inspiration there is no measure. He makes life, the world, and God appear as a simple

unity in which a man can feel that it is really worth living. And that is salvation. And in salvation is the *raison d'être* of a prophet.

Section viii.—THE PERSONAL AUTHORITY OF JESUS.

The common people heard Him gladly not because He appealed to their self-interest, or merely tickled their palate, but because of the gracious words that proceeded out of His mouth. The secret of His power is to be found quite as much in His person as in His programme. Apart from a peculiar force of personality, which perhaps cannot be conveyed in written words, it is difficult to understand fully the effect produced by some of His words and deeds (Luke v. 8). This is particularly the case in several passages in St. John's Gospel (i. 49; iv. 42, etc.), a fact at once apparent when we read them with a detached mind (see further p. 191 *infra*).

Fortunately the utterances of every originative religious teacher have a twofold value. In the first place they are oracular and inspirational. They shed light on obscure issues, and give an impetus to a higher type of life. In the second place they are consciously and unconsciously a self-revelation of the teacher himself. And the more nearly we can restore to them their original significance, the better the understanding we obtain of him, and, by reaction, of his own words and influence. There is unavoidably a logical circle, but in practical life it is not so much a circle as a spiral. We may be constantly returning to the same point of the compass, but we do so at different levels. This is the reason why a continually repeated study of the Gospels, and the prolonged practice of the presence and the service of God enable the student to understand ever more truly the person of Jesus. And also, this is why the truer understanding of that person leads to a greater delight both in Biblical studies and in practical service. If it be true that "he that doeth the will shall know the doctrine", it is also true that he who *knoweth* the Master will do the will.

The point is, however, that it is all important for us to understand the personality of our Lord if we are to understand His authority, while conversely the authority He actually exercised will be of great help in our gaining an understanding of His personality,

(a) The personal authority of Jesus as found in Q.

Thus we are led to the final category, that of the immediate personal influence and power of Jesus upon His hearers apart from any ascription of status or office or analogue whatsoever.

Practically the whole of *Q* (cf. Harnack, 1907, S.S. 88 ff.) is a witness to the personal Authority of Jesus. It shows Jesus speaking mainly from the force of His own convictions, with fresh insight, great independence of judgment, amazing moral elevation, a communicating faith in God, and with a genial attitude to mankind. What He says He says for Himself, and it stands by its own inherent worth. There is little or no claim to support from either tradition or miracle or law or ratiocination. It is the immediacy of the truth He declares that constitutes His defence and His power.

In the first place He has an immense confidence in the right ordering of the world, and He feels the reality of a personal God "less than a handbreadth off". "Your heavenly Father knoweth" (Matt. vi. 32). He finds in the order of nature support for His own actions. God's sun shines and God's rain descends upon good and evil. The Father is both patient and forgiving. He Himself, therefore, cannot be other.

He sees limitless possibilities in ordinary men, whom He exhorts to "become children of the heavenly Father", as if it lay in their personal choice.

He gives a new content to the conception of brotherliness (Matt. v. 39 ff.) which is sufficiently exalted for us to feel that, though lovely, "it is so high that we can scarce attain unto it". Nevertheless, we cannot but admit it would make men more winsome and life more liveable if we practised it. And winsomeness and "liveableness" are sound tests of spiritual truth. Further, one feels that suggestions alternative to the ideals of Jesus in this connection would be on a lower plane. Jesus has said the last word.

The same is substantially true on the allied matter of forgiveness (cf. Matt. xviii. 21; Luke xvii. 3, 4). "Lord, how often is my brother to sin against me and be forgiven? Up to seven times?" Jesus said to him, "Seven times? I say seventy times seven". Notice the emphasis on the pronoun. Now these are words

that live, and they live largely in proportion as we are able to visualise and appreciate the personality of Him who uttered them. If we read them hurriedly and pass on to the next, half their value is undiscovered. Let us remember that the question of offences between friends and their forgiveness was a subject for discussion in the schools. There is a fairly extensive literature of this discussion leading up on the whole to the general conclusion, based on Amos ii. 4, that after the third offence forgiveness was out of the question (cf. Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, vol. i. S.S. 795 f.). The reply of Jesus lifts the whole matter on to another plane, and this by what was probably a daring antithetic allusion to Genesis iv. 24. "If Cain shall be avenged seven-fold, truly Lamech seventy and seven-fold." One cannot help recognising that Jesus has left breathless both the rabbinic argumentation and the mind of even so great a prophet as Amos. If one further realises that this position reflects the regular practice of Jesus, one gets a glimpse of an extraordinarily convincing personality whose winsome forcefulness must have carried everything with Him. His words bring conviction by their own weight, and it is the conviction of the existence of a new spiritual world waiting for men to inherit. But that effect is multiplied when it is realised that the words are uttered by a man who Himself always took them at their own full value, and yet in the most natural and unrestrained manner.

It would be possible to take the beatitudes *seriatim* and come to the same conclusion. Some of them indeed will stand out for ever as among the greatest creative sayings which have graced human speech. Note especially, among those in Q, "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for goodness! They will be satisfied" (Matt. v. 6). "Blessed are those who feel poor in spirit! The realm of Heaven is theirs!" (Matt. v. 3). While, from Matthew's special source, the beatitudes on purity and peace-making, stand in the same rank (Matt. v. 8, 9), especially if one understands "pure in heart" to be contrasted with ceremonial purity.

The depth of meaning Jesus gives to lust, anger, and whatever else is a hindrance, reveals not only another facet of, but also gives another focus for, the personal power of our Lord. These sayings burst in upon us. They come with their own self-evidencing power as of a new and more exalted spiritual sphere, especially when

understood as the personal convictions of an eager but naturally clear-sighted and balanced personality. Indeed, then, it is their balance and finality that come home to us as inevitably as their ethical altitude.

Now this is personal authority. It is individual, but it is universal. The subject is exhausted. Whatever alternative we propose is less and lower.

If Q gave us nothing else than large portions of the Sermon on the Mount, we should have sufficient for us to conclude that whatever influence Jesus may have otherwise exerted, or whatever authority He may have otherwise exercised, He spoke and acted with the maximum personal power. The action and reaction between Himself and His contemporaries must have been of the most plastic, intimate, suggestive, and transformative type. Men's minds conformed to Him. Their ideas and ideals vanish in His. Their personal habits, interests, judgments, prejudices, aims, hopes are all recast in a nobler mould. He Himself is untouched or rather unspoiled by either native environment or changing circumstances. He makes all things work together for good, i.e. to enable Him to do the will of Him that sent Him. Because He lived, men began really to live their lives.

That is the nature of the personal authority He exercised. It was not constraint exercised over others but liberation, the opening of the prison to them that were bound. It was not a new set of regulations, but a new inspiration enabling men to get the last ounce out of life. The common people heard Him gladly. For as Mark says, "He spoke with authority, and not as the scribes" (Mark i. 22).

The sense of the personal authority of Jesus which dominates the mind of Q is borne out by certain important general considerations. These are of both a negative and a positive character. Q seems almost unaware that any other position has ever been held than that Jesus gained His influence by His own personal authority. As we have seen, he presents Him neither as the Son of God (cf. pp. 61 ff. *supra*), nor as Lord in the religious sense (cf. pp. 61 ff. *supra*), nor as Apocalyptic Son of Man (cf. p. 67 *supra*) nor, with any urgency, as Messiah (cf. p. 70 *supra*). He avails Himself of no external proof of the uniqueness of Jesus (pp. 72 ff. 77 ff. *supra*). Q's record of the testimony of

the Baptist is the least direct of any of the surviving traditions (pp. 74 f. *supra*). The sense of the urgency of the preaching of the gospel on the ground of the catastrophic imminence of the Kingdom, whether conceived eschatologically or spiritually, is less marked than in any other source (Matt. x. 7; Luke ix. 2; x. 9, 11; Matt. x. 15; Luke x. 12 (Luke xvii. 1 ff., and parallels, is scarcely in point), cf. especially xvii. 21). No appeal is made to testimony of Scripture, none to the support of ancient prophecies or their fulfilment. The question of the value of miracles as signs of His personal status simply does not arise. They are, however, clear indications of the near advent of the Kingdom (pp. 67, 75 *supra*). The answer to John's inquiry (Luke vii. 18-28; Matt. xi. 2-11) seems intended to place all the different sides of Jesus' labours on one level, the value of each being left to the untrammelled judgment of the observer. There is a significant silence in this reply to John either in reference to the Baptism or Temptation experiences of our Lord, with which one might well surmise the Baptist must have had some acquaintance, and which could have been recalled with telling effect. But either we have an unhistorical account of those experiences, or else Jesus apparently prefers to stand entirely upon His own self-witnessing life.

Moreover, Q contains nothing of the transfiguration, nor of the confession of Peter (and nothing of the final tragedy and triumph).

All these facts constitute something more than negative evidence from which no definite conclusion can be drawn. What it amounts to is that at the time Q was written it was sufficient barely to record some of the sayings and speeches of Jesus. The memory of the living person was so vivid, the personal impression He left was so nearly all-compelling, that there was simply no need then felt for any other support for the faith and the authority which were found in Jesus. Thus Q is a testimony of the first rank for the personal and prophetic authority of Jesus as the foundation of whatever doctrine might be later elaborated, and of whatever worship a later generation might be impelled to offer.

(b) *Summary.*

In conclusion we may say that Q gives us a fairly complete and life-like description of the personality of Jesus. He has a

definite answer to the questions, "Who is He"? and "What is the source of His influence"? and "What is the nature of His authority"? The answers are: He is a prophet, and His authority is purely personal. His significance is primarily in His profound insight into the nature of God and the world, and His equally profound understanding of and sympathy with both the individual souls and the meaning of society. His authority depends upon His power of awakening an ethical response to the challenge of life, and of passing on to others the flame of love to both God and man which burnt in His own soul. And in the end it is doubtful whether there is anything in heaven, or earth, or human thought which goes beyond that priceless gift.

CHAPTER IV

THE WITNESS OF MARK

IN our second main source we have a literary and historical advantage in so far as the original autograph has been preserved substantially in its entirety, and in so far as we know with fair certainty that it was published in Rome about A.D. 60-70. Thus we have some knowledge of the general conditions under which it was written, and of the demands it might well have been designed to meet.

The capital of the Roman Empire enjoyed an atmosphere widely different from that of Galilee, Judea, Jerusalem, or of any of the neighbouring cities with varying though large proportions of Jewish inhabitants. In Rome religion was strongly syncretistic. Judaism was at best only one of many minor faiths; at worst it was a hateful and impious creed. The sanctions of its peculiar tradition and its sacred books were simply unknown to the vast majority of the people, and must have been considerably ameliorated or liberalised among the Jewish community itself (cf. Müller, *Kirchengeschichte*, 1892, Band I, S.S. 18 f.; Harnack, *Expansion*, English trans., 1904, vol. i. p. 17).

The Christian Church in Rome would be a mixed group of Jews and Gentiles of various nationalities, mostly of the poorest classes. It would consist of the more open-minded Jews and of the more earnest-minded Gentiles. The Pauline influence must have been profound, and, if the tradition can be trusted, the Petrine influence must have been of equal or even greater moment. For our purpose the main significance of these factors is in the demand that would be made implicitly or explicitly for an apologetic for the faith. This apologetic would be of a more external character than would be felt necessary in a region where, as in Palestine, a strongly ethicised and refined spiritual standpoint in religion was widely appreciated. On the other hand, the simple community as a whole would be content with a fairly dogmatic presentation of the new truths.

In addition, the well-known Roman interest in biography might be expected to operate to some extent, especially when large numbers of converts and "inquirers" were totally unacquainted beforehand with the historical figure of Jesus.

Thus in approaching our second source we are in an advantageous position from many points of view, as compared with our relation to Q. What then are the characteristics of Mark taken as a whole? It is ostensibly biographical, but it is not a biography, for there is no real chronology of events before the last week in our Lord's ministry, and when He first appears on the scene He is already in the full flush of His manhood. Nor is there any analysis of persons or circumstances. It is rather an account, in more or less of a biographical form, of some important features of the ministry of Jesus (Wendland, 1912, S.S. 261 f.). The outstanding interest is in the last week of His life and particularly in the story of His trial and crucifixion. Sketchy, if graphic, meagre though vivid, chronologically confused yet historically authentic up to this point, Mark now becomes detailed, fairly chronological and more definite. His account from this point forward is as full as that of John, which is the only other independent record extant.

Whatever may have been the reason for this proportioning, there can be no doubt that it well served a certain apologetic interest. It can scarcely have been that Mark noted down everything that Peter knew about the earlier ministry of Jesus, but rather that the important thing was to know how this Jesus whom they preached was brought to a criminal's death; how He met it; and what took place immediately afterwards. Practically one-half of the entire document as extant is occupied with this interest, and it is not to be forgotten that a portion, of unknown extent, of that very section has been lost. Thus it is well within the compass of our data to say that the chief purpose of our second main source is to show how Jesus met His death. But this is practical apologetic of the most cogent kind. And taken as a whole its effect inevitably is to sharpen the contour in the delineation of the personality of Jesus. After all, meeting one's death, especially if, as in Mark, much of the path that will lead to it is perceived beforehand, is the greatest test and the clearest revelation of the character of the sufferer; nor is there anything else which in fact can yield a fuller sympathetic conviction in the observers. That "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church" is but an illustration of the experience involved. The record is in effect therefore distinctly apologetic.

But the point to be noted is that such a story would enhance

above all else, especially at the time and place of its publication, the personality and the personal influence of Jesus. All deductions or theological superstructures are secondary and subsequent. The Divinity, the Lordship, the Messiahship, the fulfilment of prophecy are each and all valueless, and indeed worse than valueless doctrines, except as they are built upon the over-awing and supreme qualities in the personality of Jesus. Assured that Jesus was the biggest and the best man in human history, our Christological speculations are on the firmest of foundations. The personality of Jesus is primary to the right understanding of all the rest, and not *vice versa*.

Substantially this is the case which Mark presents. What first of all strikes us in the detail of the Gospel as compared with Q is that the writer has a view-point or a doctrine of Jesus which is distinct from that of the historical material he is presenting. He presents his story in the matrix of his Christology, though the two elements are kept distinct and not fused together as in the Fourth Gospel.

Thus he opens his record with the words, "The beginning of the gospel of Jesus Christ", and it is just possible that the Authorised Version additional reading, "The Son of God", may be correct. But in any case, Mark himself presents Jesus as the Christ or the Messiah. That is his primary assumption. Once or twice only in the course of his narrative does he venture a personal remark. It is not always clear what is in his mind when he does so, but something of the fact that his own understanding of the significance of Jesus was absent from the onlookers seems implied in the observation, "For they had not understood the lesson of the loaves; their minds were dull" (vi. 52). The parenthetic remark in vii. 19 ("Thus He pronounced all food clean") accords Jesus an authority of an *ex cathedra* quality as over against the divinely sanctioned Mosaic regulations, and implies something of the dogmatic position of the evangelist himself (see Wendland, 1912, S. 267).

As far as it concerns the question of authority, the material presented by Mark shows Jesus in a light very similar to that in Q. Let us examine the evidence in the same way in order to make this point clearer.

Section i.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS THE SON OF GOD.

(a) Explicit and affirmative references.

In dealing with this consideration, we have a good deal of material, and for the sake of simplicity I propose to take first those passages that are quite explicit, and in the order of their occurrence; then those that seem to imply the doctrine, and finally those that occasion difficulty. We therefore begin with:

(i) Mark i. 11 (cf. Matt. iii. 17; Luke iii. 22). "Then said a voice from heaven (at the baptism) Thou art my Son, the Beloved, in thee is my delight."

This symbolism was natural to a Jewish Christian teacher. Probably this was "an objectively real miraculous sign to the evangelists, divinely authenticating the Divine Sonship of Jesus; as originally told, the story may well have been the expression in symbolical form of an experience which came personally to our Lord" (Rawlinson, 1925, p. 10, note).

The experience meant that Jesus became conscious at this time of a special personal acceptance with God, a certainty or assurance that He was in complete union with God's will and love (see further, p. 127 *infra*).

(ii) Mark iii. 11 f. "And whenever the unclean spirits saw Him, they fell down before Him, screaming, 'You are the Son of God'. But He charged them strictly and severely not to make Him known."

The evangelist holds the theory that the demons have a supernatural knowledge, and so immediately recognised Jesus as a divine person. The people either do not share the theory, or else the event is not narrated as it actually occurred, for there is no sensational change of attitude to Jesus on the part of anyone. In any case Jesus gains no additional authority from the outburst. The evangelist explains this by saying that Jesus wished the fact to remain a secret, and he betrays himself into the false position of representing the people as taking no notice of the declaration.

(iii) Mark v. 7 (cf. Matt. viii. 29; Luke viii. 28).—*The demoniac at Gerasa.*

Jesus here tacitly accepts the title. It is to be noted that He does not enjoin silence in this instance. Demoniac utterances

being regarded as of supernatural weight, one would have expected that all Judaism would have been immediately afire with the news. We are compelled to suppose that the events did not take place exactly as narrated. Certainly Jesus does not afterwards exercise any new form or degree of authority as a consequence of the confession.

(iv) Mark ix. 7 (cf. Matt. xvii. 5, Luke ix. 35). At the Transfiguration a voice (*scil.* of God) says: "This is my Beloved Son (Matthew and Mark), chosen Son (Luke), hear Him."

The historical kernel of this incident is probably a form of psychological projection which has recently been keenly studied by psychologists, and which expresses the conscious and subconscious belief of the subjects. Many commentators reject the incident altogether, but in so doing probably go too far. Nothing, however, is added to our knowledge of the basis of our Lord's authority.

(v) Mark xiii. 32 (cf. Matt. xxiv. 36).—*Only the Father knows.*

This passage occurs in the midst of the "Little Apocalypse", which is often regarded as an interpolation and which even Streeter (*op. cit.*, pp. 491 ff.) regards as only *based upon* authentic sayings of Jesus. It is not in itself a unity (Klostermann, 1907, p. 111), but Mark xiii. 32 is "apparently an authentic word of the Lord, which could scarcely have been invented by a later period" (*ibid.*, pp. 116 f.).

Jesus here claims rank as Son superior to that of the other divine beings. He places Himself next to the Father and as if subject only to Him.

Note the limitation of His knowledge and therefore of His authority which Jesus Himself confesses. This is very significant for our inquiry. It is equally significant that Luke omits the passage.

(vi) Mark xv. 39 (cf. Matt. xxvii. 54). The remark of the Centurion, "Truly this is the Son of God." (Luke xxiii. 47 says, "This man was really innocent.")

The variation of reading makes the historicity obscure, but even in the form given in our present source, the Centurion's remark cannot be taken as a complete Christian expression of faith, nor can Revised Version margin "a Son of God" be entirely

ignored. It recognises a certain nobility of character or bearing, but nothing is certain (but cf. pp. 232 ff. *infra*).

This completes the list of explicit references in Mark which occasion no literary difficulty. There are six, of which two are the utterances of voices from heaven (at the baptism and at the Transfiguration), two are on the lips of demoniacs, one by a Roman soldier. None of these has any of the value which we are seeking. But one (v) is on the lips of Jesus. This last is in the middle of an extremely obscure chapter, but it is authentic. Its value is great as a self-testimony of Jesus to His special status, and it is a foundation pillar not only for the historicity of our Lord but also for His self-consciousness. It cannot be explained away. It must be accepted just as it stands. These facts are of great importance because, in spite of all the unique status and consciousness claimed in the passage, Jesus places Himself outside the sphere of special knowledge. He takes His stand explicitly alongside other men. As far as times and seasons are concerned, and indeed of the supreme event which Jesus lived to realise, for which He laboured and suffered, i.e. the realisation of the Kingdom of Heaven, or, on the eschatological theory, the descent of the Kingdom of Heaven from above, He has no better standing than anyone else. He has no special information, and no special authority.

The result of our examination as regards the explicit records is that Mark contains only one authentic passage where Jesus is the Son, but the writer avails himself of such ancillary testimonies as the heavenly voices and the second sight of demoniacs to support his case. To the evangelist these were miraculous and sufficient, but their historicity is very obscure. In any event the authority of Jesus gains nothing from these passages.

(b) *Secondary and Indirect Passages.*

Let us now examine those of secondary importance which bear upon the doctrine indirectly and by inference. There are three main passages as follows:

(vii) Mark vi. 10 f.; Luke ix. 5 (cf. Matt. x. 14).—*Sending out the Twelve as Preachers.*

The passages should be read in their context, which sketches a picture very familiar in the Hellenistic age. Many preachers

did the same thing without claiming special status for themselves.

As they stand, the words mean nothing more than, "Have nothing more to do with such places".

But they can be read as if Jesus felt Himself pronouncing a divine judgment against the obstinate, much as if they were guilty of the unpardonable sin. Perhaps, however, this is only by forcing the meaning of the passage.

(viii) Mark xiv. 22-25 (Matt. xxvi. 26-29; Luke xxii. 15-20).

Much depends upon the exact interpretation which Jesus put upon this incident and especially whether He intended to found an institution. On the "eschatological theory" quite plainly He had no such intention. On other views the matter is obscure. If the decision is in the affirmative, He undoubtedly took a place as a divine being. If negative, nevertheless, Jesus places Himself in a religious (not merely human) relation with His disciples. In Jesus' case and with His conception of things, this amounts to a claim to be the Son of God. Otherwise, too, even in an ordinary meal as opposed to an institution, to call bread His flesh and the wine His blood is offensive. Yet nothing seems better founded than that He did so. It is to be noted, however, that He must have meant something different from His actual flesh and His actual blood, for there He stood pointing to the elements of the bread and the wine. His words cannot have carried merely the natural meaning. His relation to His disciples is therefore remarkable. His authority over them is at once human and religious. This is the side of things which the historical Church soon developed. It early emphasized the doctrine that it was a *καινή διαθήκη*. This is the actual reading of Luke; it has *great* support from Matthew and *much* from Mark.

(ix) Mark xvi. 1-6 (cf. Matt. xxviii. 1-10; Luke xxiv. 1-11 (12).)

—*The Empty Grave*.

Matthew reports an earthquake and an angel, where Mark reports a young man (two in Luke), who, however, has an intimate acquaintance with Jesus (entrusted with message).

The account is broken off, so that no definite result can be reached.

The general feeling in Matthew and Luke is that the unseen world was interested in the empty grave, but this cannot be found in the fragmentary passage of Mark.

The bearing of the Secondary Passages.

The result of the examination of the secondary passages does not greatly help. The exact bearing of (vii) is a matter of difficulty, and, as it stands, one seems unduly to stretch its meaning by calling in its aid. (viii) and (ix) are closely connected respectively with the greatest and oldest institution in the Christian Church and with the crucial point of the earliest preaching and experience, the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper and the Resurrection. Both offer the most searching problems, and both are used as historical foundations for the most important Christological doctrines. All we can say is that (a) after all they are not explicit. Whatever is got out of them is in some sense first read into them. (b) Already at the time when this record was made there had been 30-40 years of Christian history, with all its fervour and preaching and its action and reaction with the surrounding world. In these often-repeated matters it is difficult to imagine that there was no change of phraseology, or no adaptation of presentation to puzzled or offended understandings, i.e. it is difficult to think that we have the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus or a complete and unquestionable historical record of the events. That we have doctrine as well as history is undoubted. Thus the authority of Jesus does not receive much historical elucidation from these secondary passages.

(c) *Passages offering difficulty or negative evidence.*

Let us now go on to consider those that offer difficulty to the doctrine, whether their reference to it be explicit or implicit.

(x) Mark i. 12 f. (cf. Matt. iv. 1-11; Luke iv. 1-13).—*The Temptation.*

Only Matthew and Luke give the temptations in detail, or report the term, Son of God. That Mark should have omitted any such reference would not be significant if Mark were alone in reporting the Temptation. But it looks as if Mark rather than Q has here preserved the older tradition which knew nothing of the implication. For it is difficult to imagine the doctrine dropping

out once it had been elaborated. But this view can only be tentatively stated.

(xi) Mark vi. 51 f.; Matt. xiv. 32 f.—*After the walking on the sea.*

The historical basis of the narrative is lost. As it stands it deals with a miracle such as is predicted of God in Job ix. 8; xxxviii. 16. It is worth noting that this narrative is the opening incident of the whole section, Mark vi. 45–viii. 26, which Luke omits.

The wide difference between the records in Mark and Matthew is also noteworthy. Matthew alone mentions Peter's part in the story.

No less remarkable is the variation in the concluding verse. Mark expressly notes that they did not understand. Their minds were dull. Matthew says they worshipped Jesus and called Him *υἱὸς θεοῦ*. The contrast between the two records makes Matthew's version seem like a dogmatic *Erfindung* (i.e. he records what they would have said had they understood). But this confession would emasculate Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi, or else it would show Jesus to be very anxious about His status. He (Mark) was doubtless correct, but the Markan form makes it appear as if Jesus was to the disciples just a man among men. Mark himself accepts the miracle fully, but he cannot conceal this awkward historical datum, which is indeed incomprehensible in such a connection unless there were a historical basis, of which this attitude forms an indubitable part.

But if the disciples did not understand, then Jesus exercised no authority over them as Son of God.

(xii) Mark viii. 27–33; Matt. xvi. 13–23; Luke ix. 18–22.—*Peter's Confession.*

This passage is of prime importance in all the Gospels, for it is quite explicit, and is intentionally so, on the question of the identity of Jesus. The evangelists and especially Mark are aware of this. Mark makes this confession the crucial point of his narrative. Henceforward in this Gospel Jesus is not quite what He was before. What, then, do we find?

The whole incident is omitted from Q.

Mark and Luke record a simple confession of Messiahship which, of course, implies a special divine commission, but not a

divine status. No Jew, longing for the Hope of Israel, looked for a second God or for the second person of the Trinity.

Matthew records that Peter confesses Jesus not only as Messiah but also as divine, and it is only in this Gospel that the special promises are made to Peter. It is thus the acknowledgment of the divinity (*vs.* the Messiahship) of Jesus that is specially connected with the promises to Peter and with a special revelation of the prerogatives of Jesus.

According to Matthew, Jesus thus claims to be divine, and as such to have an *ex cathedra* authority (v. 18 f.). All this means that a distinct development had taken place in Christian tradition and in the honours paid to Jesus. The development may at the time have been local. At least, Luke appears to know nothing of it, though he probably wrote at a later date.

The passage gains its whole weight from the connection between the giving of the keys and the fact of divinity, and was of immense significance in the later history of the Roman Church. But Mark was written in Rome, a circumstance which makes his silence upon this point a great difficulty to our accepting the historicity of the record as in Matthew.

The result appears almost inevitable that the disciples were never aware of any unique divine consciousness or claim of Jesus. Moreover, the incident as a whole implies that Jesus had not hitherto revealed or spoken of Himself as Messiah, much less as Son of God. All this means that, throughout His life and labour hitherto, Jesus' influence and His authority had been gained apart from the consideration of these questions. Indeed, if they weighed at all, it is because of what influence Jesus otherwise exercised and not *vice versa*.

Another important passage tending to confirm the same general result is to be found in the narrative of Jesus in Gethsemane. Mark xiv, 32-42 (cf. Matt. xxvi. 36-46; Luke xxii. 39-46). Note especially Mark xiv. 35 f.

Jesus speaks of God "as a man talketh with his friend". But it is nevertheless to His God that He speaks, for: (a) He does not know God's counsels. (b) He still hopes for a happy issue or a supernatural intervention. (c) He distinguishes His will from God's, though finally submitting to the mysterious purpose of Providence.

Further, Jesus has no pride of person or office, none of the self-consciousness of a person who thought He was about to do a great service to His country or to mankind. He is certainly not "posing as if the world were watching". He appears to have had no special feeling that the course He was taking had been selected *for* Him in particular. It was rather that He felt, from the inner moral necessity of the circumstances, that the facts needed to be faced right out. And He felt a special need of God's help in His task. This places Him very near us and removes Him from the circle of experience which we should have expected in "the Son".

The result is that in this important secondary passage the argument is against the exercise of any authority on the basis of His special status as Son of God in His own mind or in that of His disciples right up to the night of the betrayal.

Mark xii. 35 ff.—*David's seat*.

The significance of this discussion is obscure, but since it may well be regarded as quite impersonal (so also Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S.S. 107 f.), it cannot be made to bear weight as a self-testimony of Jesus to His own authority. We therefore omit this passage from further consideration at this juncture.

(d) *Summarising the Witness of Mark—we may say:*

(i) There are very few references to Jesus as *υἱὸς θεοῦ* before Peter's confession. They are all on the lips of demoniacs or by special supernatural voices. Striking is the incident of the walking on the sea when Matthew *only* makes Peter use the title which, though near at hand, Mark almost consciously avoids.

(ii) The secondary passages, as bearing unconscious witness to the issue, are important, but on the whole are negative.

(iii) And there are several important passages which are directly or indirectly decidedly negative.

(iv) Mark and indeed all the Synoptics, are very sketchy up to the confession of Peter. The writers seem either not to have been strongly impressed with the importance of the earlier days, or not to have full information. After the confession, however, all the narratives become detailed, but even then there is strong evidence against the historicity of the doctrine in the teaching of Jesus.

(v) The authority of Jesus as found in Mark certainly owes

nothing to any special status of Jesus as Son of God right up to the time of the Last Supper, if one omits the difficult and probably *pseudepigraphic* apocalyptic chapter xiii. Even in the Last Supper everything depends upon the difficult historical interpretation of the intention of Jesus. The passage supports Jesus' claim to exercise special authority as Son of God only if it be understood in the extreme sacramental sense—the sense which receives the least support from most scholars to-day.

(vi) The existence of a considerable body of unquestionable evidence inconsistent with the exercise of authority by Jesus as Son of God entirely destroys the value of the few passages which might be regarded as favourable witnesses.

(vii) The exact type of authority that Jesus exercised cannot be determined at this stage of our inquiry, but we can say that *qua* Son of God He exercised none during His ministry.

Section ii.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS LORD.

(a) *Positive references.*

Turning now to examine the passages bearing upon the authority exercised by Jesus as Lord, we find that they are surprisingly few. In Mark i. 3 we have a quotation from Isaiah which includes the words, "make ready for the Lord", which doubtless Mark applies to Jesus, but which represents the view of the evangelist Mark himself. It reveals the dogmatic matrix or bias in which he presents his record. We must therefore be prepared to allow for his tendency.

Mark v. 18 f.

As applied to Jesus, the full religious meaning might have been in the mind of the evangelist, but it cannot have been present in the mind of the sufferer or his attitude, especially in the circumstances, would have been one of worship.

"Lord" here *may* mean God (cf. Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S. 42), but the order to go and tell all is so contrary to the usual habit of Jesus (as in i. 44; v. 43, etc.) that the whole verse must be under some suspicion as to its verbal authenticity.

Mark xi. 3. If anyone asks you "Why are you doing that?" say, "The Lord needs it, and He will send it back immediately."

On the face of it, Lord here = Master, although one cannot help feeling that possibly Mark himself read more into it.

Mark xii. 35-37.—*Discussion on David's Son.*

The phrase is quoted by Jesus as referring to the Messiah, but the discussion is enigmatic. It is impossible to determine exactly whether it was a mere discussion, or possibly whether Jesus took advantage of a rare opportunity of teaching something about His own person, or whether indeed the whole matter is unhistorical. "Bousset and others find it difficult to believe that 'this argument with the Scribes' goes back to our Lord Himself" (Rawlinson, 1925, p. 173), though Rawlinson finds no such difficulty. But even if we accept the passage as authentic, its testimony to the authority of Jesus as Lord is obscure and uncertain.

(b) *Negative references.*

As against the Lordship of Jesus in a religious sense as found in Mark, we observe the following:

(i) ix. 5 (cf. Matt. xvii. 4; Luke ix. 33).—*The Transfiguration.*

This is a very favourable opportunity, especially on the part of Peter, for the religious use of *κύριος* and for ascribing Lordship to Jesus. For, according to Mark, the Transfiguration took place six days after his confession. But so far is the question from being even in doubt, that Mark expressly uses the term *rabbi*, which explicitly excludes the religious sense of *κύριος*. Matthew translates and uses *κύριος*, but otherwise he reproduces Mark verbatim. Luke uses the term *ἐπιστάτης*, but otherwise changes nothing. *ἐπιστάτης* again has no religious significance, and as *κύριος* was a synonym immediately at Luke's hand, it would appear that he felt that *κύριος* less exactly reproduced the connotation of the original, which he felt implied nothing of religious Lordship.

(ii) viii. 29.—*Peter's Confession.*

It is highly significant that in Mark nothing is said about the Lordship of Jesus, though parallels exhibit different attitudes. Thus Matt. xvi. 18 f. presupposes the doctrine, as also Luke ix. 20, though in a somewhat different and secondary reference.

(iii) Mark i. 13.—*The Temptation.*

The conception *per se* is not consistent with the Lordship of Jesus, though the ministration of angels implies a certain special status in the mind of the evangelist.

(c) *Summary.*

This concludes the references, direct and indirect to the subject as found in Mark. The inference is:

- (i) Mark himself holds Jesus to be Lord (cf. i. 3).
- (ii) Jesus (in the Second Gospel) never referred to Himself in that way, nor did anyone else so think of Him.
- (iii) Jesus regards God as His own Lord as well as of all others.
- (iv) If Jesus had regarded Himself as *Lord*, it is difficult to see how or why some of the passages in Mark, while using the actual term, are totally indifferent to its possible religious significance. Even though Mark himself, like the Church when he wrote, worshipped Jesus as Lord, yet he does not make the attitude seem the natural and inevitable thing in the Gospel apart from i. 3 (and the spurious xvi. 19).
- (v) The passages in some sense favourable to the doctrine are completely nullified by those inconsistent with it, whose survival is impossible to understand had they not been historical.

Section iii.—JESUS AS SON OF MAN IN MARK'S GOSPEL.

In entering upon the examination of the passages bearing upon the authority of Jesus as Son of Man, reference should be made to our earlier discussion of the general meaning of the term (see pp. 62 ff. *supra*). It will further help our discussion if we bear clearly in mind that there are two distinct periods in Mark: (a) Before the confession of Peter; (b) the confession, and afterwards.

(a) *Before the confession of Peter.*

There are only two instances of the use of the term before the confession, viz. Mark ii. 10 and 28, where the weight of opinion seems to be that Son of Man here means mankind or men in general. While this opinion may be subject to doubt, the two passages are much too disputable to support by themselves any argument for the special authority of Jesus as Son of Man either to forgive sins or to re-order Sabbath observance, or in other ways.

(b) *The confession, and afterwards.*

We therefore pass on immediately to the confession of Peter. We shall divide our consideration into three parts:

- (i) The question of Jesus.
- (ii) The reply of Peter.
- (iii) The further words of Jesus.

Mark viii. 27-33 (cf. Matt. xvi. 13-23; Luke ix. 18-22).

- (i) According to Mark viii. 27, Jesus said, "Who do people say I am?"
According to Matt. xvi. 13, Jesus said, "Who do people say the Son of Man is?"
According to Luke ix. 18, Jesus said, "Who do the crowds say I am?"
- (ii) According to Mark viii. 29, Peter said, "You are the Christ."
According to Matt. xvi. 16, Peter said, "You are the Christ, the Son of the Living God."
According to Luke ix. 20, Peter said, "The Christ of God."

Thus Mark does not employ the term "Son of Man." In this he is followed by Luke. Where Matthew employs the term it is not in the technical sense at all, but only as a synonym for first personal pronoun singular.

- (iii) According to Mark viii. 31, Jesus said, "The Son of Man had to endure great suffering," etc.
According to Matt. xvi. 21, Jesus said, "He had to leave for Jerusalem and endure great suffering."
According to Luke ix. 22, Jesus said, "The Son of Man has to endure great suffering."

Here again Mark is followed by Luke and abandoned by Matthew, but in the alternative direction; Mark and Luke use the term "Son of Man" and Matthew avoids it. But even from Mark alone it is apparent that the term is not used in the technical sense, but only as a synonym for the personal pronoun, for the apocalyptic Son of Man is certainly not connected with personal suffering. It is true that Jesus is probably thinking of Himself as

of a special status, but scarcely as Son of Man in any historical or technical sense, i.e. He is not speaking of Himself or of His future as the apocalyptic Son of Man as in 1 Enoch. Indeed, to emphasise any technical meaning of the term "Son of Man," and make it other than a mere substitute for the personal pronoun, is to obscure the real point of the passage, which is in the teaching immediately following. The whole force of the incident lies in the connection between the person of Jesus and suffering or even death. (Peter felt it to be unmerited in the Jesus he loved, but the compatibility of the noblest life with suffering is of the essence of the gospel of redemption, though it is a hard saying even yet. But for this reason Jesus rebukes Peter, and then immediately begins to teach the doctrine with great power to both the crowds and His disciples (see also Rawlinson, 1925, pp. 112 f.).

Thus this important key passage is unaware of any special sense attaching to the term either as representative man, or as a sign of His humility or His supernatural powers, or the like. The sense of the passage either as a whole or in part would be in no way altered if the term were altogether absent and its place were taken by the first personal pronoun singular.

Mark viii. 38 to ix. 1. (cf. Matt. xvi. 27 f.; Luke ix. 26 f.).

This passage is really inseparable from the preceding. But if it be taken by itself, we may possibly regard Jesus and the Son of Man as two distinct persons or even look on Jesus as Son of Man in some technical sense. When read in connection with the preceding, this interpretation is impossible. Further, if we substitute the personal pronoun, we get no significant change in the sense of the passage. There is foreshadowed a parousia, but scarcely that of the Son of Man in the technical sense of the Apocalypics.

Even if this be disputed, the sense is that Jesus is not Son of Man now, but that He will be so when He comes in the glory of His Father. Thus in no way can this passage be employed to show the authority of Jesus as Son of Man *during His ministry*.

It should be remarked that verse 38 is parallel to verse 35, and the real purpose of the passage is to exhort to firm and faithful witness for Jesus personally, until the end in the near future.

In Matt. xvi. 28 the term is a mere alternative to the first personal pronoun singular, as is shown by the parallels.

Mark ix. 9 (cf. Matt. xvii. 9).

Here again, even granting the full historicity of the narrative, the substitution of first person singular makes no difference to the sense. This is not a technical use of the Son of Man. But it is extremely doubtful how far there is an historical basis to the record, so that in any case nothing can be built upon it for our purpose (cf. Rawlinson, 1925, pp. 120 ff.; Klostermann, 1907, S.S. 71 f.).

So also Mark ix. 31; x. 33, where the same subject is dealt with in a similar manner. Jesus' authority is quite external and arbitrary, but not as Son of Man.

Mark ix. 12 f. (cf. Matt. xvii. 10 ff.).

The immediate identification is between Son of Man and the Messiah (see p. 106 *infra*), but then Jesus has just been confessed as Messiah. Thus we have another case of a substitution for the personal pronoun, but in that case Jesus must have held that some Scripture did refer directly to himself. It is to be noted that there is no scriptural support for a suffering Son of Man in the technical sense. Thus the term Son of Man here can have no technical meaning, and is almost conclusive proof that Jesus never used the term with such a meaning. The scriptural support has to do with the Suffering Servant of Isaiah (see p. 108 *infra*).

Mark x. 45.

The synonym for the first personal pronoun is manifest. Jesus feels a definite purpose in life and a definite value in His ministry.

The latter half shows the influence of the Apostolic Church and of St. Paul, whose faith it reproduces. It is lacking in Luke, it goes far beyond its context, and looks out upon the total value of Jesus' life. It may well be a hyperbole for "render the completest service". Still, it *may* be authentic. But in any case authority here is not external but intuitive and personal, and due to a sense of unity of purpose with God.

Mark xiii. 24-27.—*The day and the return of the Son of Man.* (See *sub* Matt. xxiv. 27-37 in Q, pp. 66 f. *supra*.)

Mark xiv. 21. "The Son of Man goes the road that the scripture has described for Him, but woe to that man by whom the Son of Man is betrayed!"

No other meaning than that of the personal pronoun is possible here. The reference to Jesus himself is apparent, and the Scripture

says nothing of such a lot for the Son of Man, nor even of the Messiah, but only in general terms of the "Servant" (cf. Isa. liii; cf. Ps. xxii). Jesus feels it is not mere chance but the will of God.

Mark xiv. 62.

Here Jesus explicitly identifies himself with the Messiah and indeed quotes an apocalyptic passage in Dan. vii. 13, in a manner which threatens the speedy parousia of the Son of Man in support of His claims. The passage was held by the Jews to be of Messianic significance. But the appeal feels almost like a last despairing attempt to awe the authorities by claiming a higher identity and sanction than their own, and one indeed which they must recognise as final if they recognise it at all. This is far away from the usual mood of the Jesus of Mark, and makes one think of Pauline influence on the Markan tradition, cf. 1 Thess. iv. 16 f.; 2 Thess. i. 7, which were written in the same decade as Mark.

(c) *Summary.*

Mark exhibits the term "Son of Man" really in two senses only: (i) Referring to mankind generally (in the earlier half of the Gospel), (ii) as a colourless synonym for *ἐγώ* when referring to Jesus. Towards the end of the Gospel some amount of the apocalyptic tradition is felt, but the value is slight and the influence of Paul on the faith of the early Church is discernible. Throughout His active ministry it would appear that Jesus never claimed any status as Son of Man in the apocalyptic sense, though it is occasionally used in connection with His Messianic consciousness. The people never conceded any authority to Him on this basis, and on the one occasion when Jesus appears to have made distinct claims to be identified with the traditional conception, it was instrumental in bringing about the final tragedy. In other words, the apocalyptic conception of the Son of Man is of negligible and even negative importance in the Gospel of Mark.

Section iv.—JESUS AS MESSIAH ACCORDING TO MARK.

(a) *Detailed references.*

The baptismal experience of our Lord is closely connected with His sense of a divine vocation, but seems more germane to the

sense of Sonship than of Messiahship, and thus has been dealt with to some extent under the former heading (see p. 92 *supra*). As it has much to do with the inner certainty of Jesus, its bearings in this connection will be dealt with later (see p. 259 *infra*).

So also the exorcism related in i. 21–28 may have been introduced by Mark to illustrate the Messianic authority of Jesus, but the ascription is probably unauthentic as the demoniac makes use of a later Christian term, ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ θεοῦ (cf. Rawlinson, p. 15 f. and footnote 6 on p. 16). In any case, the reference to Messiahship is indirect and was not understood at the time.

There is no direct and explicit reference to Jesus as Messiah till the confession of Peter, Mark viii. 27–33; Matt. xvi. 13–23; Luke ix. 18–22, in which Matthew and Luke substantially, though not verbally, agree.

It is historically certain that Peter did ascribe Messiahship to Jesus, although it must remain doubtful whether the other disciples had previously agreed on this point. "No stress is here laid as in Matthew, on St. Peter's confession as such" (Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 112).

Jesus tacitly accepts the designation but regards it as a secret doctrine and of no value to the public generally, possibly indeed as inimical to His work and purpose.

The designation seems to accord with Jesus' own inner consciousness. He appears satisfied because the disciples have reached this point, i.e. that they have so appreciated His life and work and personality that they apply to Him the highest title available in their Jewish vocabulary, even if in many points it is not applicable to Him.

Why then did Jesus seek this acknowledgment or "confession" from them? This is one of the most disputed questions. It is to be noted that Jesus immediately goes on to speak (*a*) about Himself while avoiding the title He had just accepted, and (*b*) about the question of suffering. Indeed, He did more than merely speak about the matter (Luke = εἰπών). He took it up earnestly and seriously and taught (Mark = διδάσκειν, Matthew = δεικνύειν).

There must, therefore, have been some important connection between the Messianic status and the question of His lot. The idea of suffering was foreign to the conception of the Messiah, but not more so than the lowliness and the general character of the life

which Jesus lived, or, indeed, than His birth, boyhood, youth, and manhood.

The difficulty, then, in the new connotation of "Messiah" was in the significance of the suffering. Jesus dealt with the subject of the Messiah quite explicitly and fully, not for itself or Himself, but in order that the value of any future humiliation and suffering, and His own personal attitude towards it, might be appreciated at its full worth. The actual confession of Peter, and the complete and explicit acceptance of the ascription by Jesus, could scarcely have meant anything more to the disciples than the confirmation of an identification previously somewhat vaguely and tentatively held. This confirmation must have reinforced the moral impression, already created, upon their minds, but it would not qualitatively change its nature. But the reinforcement was a great advantage in view of the ominous situation which Jesus felt looming up, whose significance He alone perfectly understood. The close connection in history between religious faithfulness and personal suffering was well known to Him (cf. Matt. xxiii. 30 ff., 37). Much of the power of Jeremiah depends upon this fact, while the Servant Songs of Isaiah, especially chapter liii, elaborate the whole conception till it is almost idealised.

These points are scarcely subject to dispute, and they cause no difficulty to us. But there is the perennial psychological reluctance to connect suffering and virtue. This is seen in the common use of the terms "vicarious" and "unmerited" and the like. Only if there is an essential ethical connection between suffering and sin on the one hand, and between virtue and reward on the other, are such terms possible in the last analysis. But experience would seem to suggest that, if there be any essential connection, it is between virtue and suffering, on the one hand, and between sin and pleasure on the other. Virtue is often most virtuous when it is virtue through suffering, whereas it is difficult to account for sin except for its vital connection with pleasure. Without an element of suffering virtue loses an essential quality, viz. that of victory (cf. Temple, 1924, p. 268 f.). Jesus did not face His work immediately out of the feeling that His life was required as a price to ransom many, however ready He may have been to pay that price when the dire event demanded it. Or at least such a consciousness does not readily appear in Jesus' bearing or words. Rather He came to

"seek and to save that which was lost" and "to do the will of Him that sent Him".

The suffering was entailed in that He was misunderstood but that nevertheless He must finish the work. Jesus would not have betrayed mankind any more than He would have betrayed Himself if He had not set His face steadfastly to go to Jerusalem. By drawing the confession from Peter, Jesus not only confirmed His own status, but also added immediately to the dignity of the road He was to take. He showed that though He was conscious of Himself as Messiah, and though He was aware that His disciples knew it, nevertheless there was no alternative to the lowly and risky path. If Jesus had done anything else He would have been not victor but vanquished. As it was, He greatly increased His authority.

If this view of the confession and its relation to the teaching concerning Jesus' suffering is correct, we are able to relate the incident harmoniously with other features in the conduct of our Lord. For an immediate and important consequence of the new situation was that Jesus had forestalled any possibility of the disciples ascribing external authority to Jesus or expecting it from Him by the use of non-spiritual means (e.g. miraculous interventions and the like), to establish the Kingdom He had so vividly proclaimed.

The Messiahship was, without doubt, an immensely important datum, but it was easily misunderstood. Jesus said little or nothing of it in His usual teaching, as is proved by its entire absence from Q and by the fact that our other main primitive source knows nothing of it until the last and briefest period of the ministry, i.e. in the few weeks remaining after the confession of Peter. But that Jesus should now bring it forward, especially in such circumstances and yet maintain it as a secret reserved for the inner circle only, must have added immensely to the power of His personal influence over His disciples and to the authority of His words. The gain is due, however, not to an external addition, but rather to the revelation of the larger scope and the higher significance of Jesus' character and conduct, which now appear in their full majesty and personal grandeur. The crucifixion of such a person, as thus understood, was what made the birth pangs of the Christian faith. And it is precisely here that we touch upon the power found, age after age, in the preaching of Jesus and Him crucified.

(a) Detailed references.

Mark ix. 41. *χριστός* without article is very rare in the Synoptics.

There is a strong Pauline colouring present (cf. Rom. viii. 9).

"Perhaps *ὅτι χριστοῦ ἐστε* is an exegetical addition to *ἐν ὀνόματι μου*, or else *εἰς ὄνομα μαθητοῦ*, as found in Matthew, is non-original" (Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S. 78; *a.l.* v. 37).

Both Matthew and Luke omit this verse in their parallels, though Matt. x. 42 seems to be another recension of it in a different context.

This passage, therefore, gives no further light upon our problem.

Mark xi. 1-11; Matt. xxi. 1-11; Luke xix, 28-38.—*The Triumphal Entry.*

The greeting of Hosanna and the riding on the ass are in the closest connection with the Messianic hope (Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S. 849), but the significance of the records in Matt. xxi. 11 and 46 is incomprehensible, if we have in Mark an authentic account and interpretation of the incident. If the crowds had greeted Jesus as Messiah, and especially if with such enthusiasm, how could they possibly have held Him only to be a prophet? The striking character of this last record shows it to be authentic, and thus renders the Markan account of the triumphal entry dubious. It is possible indeed that *ὁ ἐρχόμενος* was used in the sense of the original reference to any pilgrim attending the feast (cf. Klostermann, 1907, S. 94), and was felt specially applicable to Jesus on account of His being a prophet.

This passage, therefore, falls out of observation as a Messianic reference, but is a witness to Jesus as a prophet (see further p. 123 *infra*).

Mark xiv. 62 (see p. 106 *supra*).

There are no other references in Mark's Gospel to the Messiahship of Jesus except the satirical use by the priests in xv. 32. The whole matter thus far rests in the position reached in our discussion of Mark viii. 27 ff. (p. 104 *supra*).

(b) Summary.

Mark knows Jesus as Messiah and that He made the claim. But nothing is explicit until late in the ministry, and after the confession which Jesus drew from Peter. Even then it is an esoteric

doctrine not to be communicated to the people at large, who would not have been able to appreciate it. Even the disciples require repeated instruction in its real nature, which, as conceived by Jesus, was very different from any of the accepted views. In fact, we may say that Messiahship, as Jesus understands it in the Markan records (apart from the unauthentic "Little Apocalypse" in chapter xiii) is the same term as was in common use, but its connotation was radically other. This can only mean that, from the standpoint of the Jews, Jesus was decidedly not the Messiah. His Messiahship was valid only from the standpoint of an opinion formed under the direct influence of Jesus Himself and no other. Jesus conceived and created this type of Messiah, and therefore He stands or falls by what He Himself was and thought and said. The question is, "Was He, in fact, adequate to such an exalted term?" Our reply is not hesitant. We say He was. Nay, rather, that it is questionable whether the term was adequate to Him. As a matter of fact, it makes little difference to our understanding of Him or to His authority over His hearers whether we call Him Messiah or not. For us it would seem to be an advantage on the whole if we in our day were to dispense with the term.

Section v.—MIRACULOUS SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO MARK.

We shall follow the same procedure as in our examination of Q and shall therefore begin with:

(a) *Miracles performed by Jesus.*

The principal references are as follows:

(i) *More affirmative.*

Mark i. 27 f.; Luke iv. 36 f.

The terms *δύναμις* and *ἐξουσία* are closely related. According to Meyer the latter means the power which one possesses (Meyer, 1880, vol. ii. p. 32). Klostermann urges after Mark i. 22 that *ἐξουσία* refers and is limited to the *διδαχή* (1907 *a.l.*), a view found also in Meyer (*ibid.*), who thinks that Luke introduced the term *δύναμις* in order to refer principally to the miracles.

But if Jesus brought power into the operation, then the miracle bears witness to the power residing in Him.

The historicity of the demoniac's ascription is doubtful, as he makes use of a later Christian term in describing Jesus (Rawlinson, 1925, p. 16 and footnote).

On the other hand, it is to be noted that Jesus explicitly refused the help of such sanction or rather to receive the aid of an enhanced status from a person who could not have understood His previous teaching, but who might be held by the crowds to speak with supernatural insight. Thus this passage might well have been classed with those of mainly a negative character.

Mark iv. 41 ; Matt. viii. 27 ; Luke viii. 25.

The miracle is very difficult to accept as historical on *prima facie* grounds. If it be suggested that it was the result of a fortunate coincidence, that coincidence would be of tremendous effect upon the disciples or "the men" (Matt.), but the precise historical basis is now irrecoverable (Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 60).

In any case the effect of the miracle as it stands recorded is to make Jesus a wonder-worker of the order of the medicine-men of Africa. It adds nothing to our appreciation of Him as a moral or religious force, and may even detract from His personal authority as it removes Him farther from the plane of our own experiences (Mark v. 20 ; Luke viii. 29). The demoniac cured at Gerasa proclaims throughout Decapolis "all that Jesus had done for him, it made everyone astonished".

And the effect was to increase interest in Jesus, producing a type of mentality more open to receive influence, but it did not lead to any definite conclusion. Jesus' power in teaching would be magnified, but nothing more.

Mark vii. 37.—Jesus heals the deaf and enjoins silence about it.

The people feel intense admiration and say, "How splendidly He does everything! He actually makes the deaf hear and the dumb speak".

The people recognise great superiority in Jesus on account of His miracles. His popularity increases, but we cannot say more.

Jesus will not willingly extend the tidings of His cures merely to increase His fame. He Himself therefore does not wish to lay any weight upon the authority thus gained. This passage might, therefore, be regarded quite well as of a negative character.

This seems to complete the list of the principal passages recording miracles whose effect was to increase the authority of Jesus over the people. Yet even here, Jesus seems to shrink from the notoriety occasioned by His cures. He builds nothing upon them. He does not even regard them as giving a favourable opportunity for a little evangelisation. His method is rather to preach first and heal afterwards (cf. Matt., chaps. v-vii, followed by chap. viii, which is a passage confined to miracles. This arrangement may be to some extent accidental, but it is not entirely without significance).

(ii) *Passages mainly negative.*

Cf. Mark i. 27 f.; Luke iv. 36 f.; and Mark vii. 37, in the foregoing discussion.

Mark i. 40-45; Matt. viii. 1-4; Luke v. 12-16.—*Cleansing the leper and enjoining obedience to the Mosaic law.*

Jesus' authority seems personal and also prior to the miracle (ἐὰν θέλῃς).

Matthew, in common with Mark and Luke, presents Jesus in a fashion that shows Him as requiring no justification beyond Himself. Although this is the first miracle that Matthew records, there is no appeal to God, none to tradition or Scripture.

It is notable that Jesus enjoins obedience to the requirements of the Mosaic regulations dealing with such cases. This would have the effect of bringing the sufferer under the immediate authority of God.

Jesus claims no respect for Himself, nor does He build anything upon the cure. Here is simply the authority of a noble, humanitarian spirit over one hitherto weak and at a disadvantage.

The miracle gains moral significance from Jesus and not *vice versa*.

Mark ii. 12; Matt. ix. 8; Luke v. 26.—After the healing of the man sick with palsy—

“And he rose, lifted his pallet at once, and went off before them all: at this they were all amazed and glorified God, saying, ‘We never saw the like of it’.”

The historical element in the passage is not altogether clear, but in any case the record shows that popular opinion, differing

widely from that of the Scribes, was sensitive to the beneficial and humanitarian element in the work of Jesus.

The incident as a whole would not appear to have given Jesus any additional status in the eyes of the religious leaders, rather the reverse (Mark ii. 7).

But it is immensely significant that the people glorified God rather than Jesus. The addition "for giving such power (*ἐχουσία*) to men" found in Matthew alone only serves to sharpen the point. The effect of the miracle was either to point men to God or else to lead them into unfriendliness to Jesus. They do not enhance His real authority to any measurable degree.

Mark viii. 22-26.—*Healing of the blind man at Bethsaida.*

This miracle recorded by Mark alone is very similar to that recorded in vii. 31-37, of which it may be a doublet (cf. p. 112 *supra*).

Jesus bids the man go straight home, i.e. keep the matter private.

But it is noteworthy that Jesus makes a second attempt to heal, the first having been only imperfectly successful. This is exceptional in our records. It leaves open the possibility, however, that on more than one occasion the same thing occurred, and in this sense one may well understand the parable of the returning devil with seven others worse than himself (Matt. xii. 45 ff.). Moreover, there were times when Jesus found it impossible to perform a miracle (e.g. Mark vi. 5, "He there could do no mighty work, except, etc."). Thus there must have been an element of uncertainty in any specific case. One could not altogether take the cure for granted. Both He and the people must have been aware of this. But the uncertainty, however slight, must imply that Jesus could find in miracles no permanent or secure basis for His inner sense of rightness or authority. They must have been to some extent outer and incidental, and not of the essence of His position or witness. It is a distinct tribute to His greatness of character and to the fundamental truth of His point of view that He should have refused even to attempt to work miracles as signs from heaven, or to regard them as of more than ancillary value to His specific work of preaching the Kingdom of God.

Mark ix. 29. "Nothing can make this kind come out but by prayer and fasting."

Jesus does not specifically claim that He would have been able to do what the disciples had failed to do, but if He can succeed, it is because of His own self-discipline in fasting and prayer.

A technique is implied, which the disciples had imperfectly grasped, explaining their success in some cases but their failure in this.

But the fact of a technique places Jesus as a miracle-worker on the same basis, in the last analysis, as both His disciples and others, and does not allow any special unique authority to Jesus beyond that of the insight and personality of the expert physician whose qualities can be far too easily underestimated.

There is a sense of immediate dependence upon God (and prayer) as the ultimate source of the healing power: Jesus in any case being but the vehicle of its virtue.

(iii) *Summary.*

Thus the verdict of the Markan records of the value of miracles accords completely with what we have found in Q (see pp. 74 ff. *supra*). They add nothing to our appreciation of the authority Jesus felt and exercised, although doubtless they psychologically predisposed certain people to favour His teaching. Menzies trenchantly says the Jesus of Mark "does not wield divine powers, nor is He equipped with superhuman insight. His cures are achieved with labour and effort, so that it is a question if it is not breaking the Sabbath to do them on that day, and they are connected with a simple method of practice, not unknown in the country. The idea of a being who can order anything He likes to happen in an instant, is not found in Mark. Jesus here secures His results by urgent effort and prayer, and sometimes cannot accomplish them at all" (Menzies, 1901, p. 52).

(b) *Other Supernatural Phenomena in Mark.*

Mark i. 11; Matt. iii. 17; Luke iii. 22.—*The Baptism.*

Sons of God were not unknown to the majority of ancient peoples, and the idea is not foreign to the Psalms. In a certain sense, indeed, all Jews claimed to be sons of God. But in what

sense Sonship is meant in this passage, or what were its metaphysical consequences in the mind of Jesus, we cannot say. Here opens out a rich field of Christological speculation into which the Church fully entered in due time (see Klostermann, 1907, S. 9).

The voice was for Jesus only according to Mark and Luke, but possibly not so for Matthew. But in any case, we may best understand the phenomenon as an inner experience of Jesus graphically recorded by the evangelists. Its authority is, therefore, that of such an experience and not of some external supernatural phenomenon. It is fundamentally a problem of His personal religion (see p. 257 *infra*).

Mark i. 13; Matt. iv. 11 (Luke iv. 13). After the Temptation . . . "He was in the company of wild beasts, but angels ministered to Him."

The usual sense of *διακονεῖν* is "supply food" or nourishment (so Klostermann, 1907, S. 10). In 1 Kings xix. 5 Elijah is similarly cared for. Jesus is, therefore, on the same basis as the great ancient prophet of Israel.

There does not appear to be any other similar phenomenon recorded in Mark.

From the above we may gather what was the moment of Jesus' self-dedication to God and how intense was His feeling of a divine commission. The second case, however, places Him in the succession of the great tradition of the authentic prophets of Israel. Any further inference from the records seems precarious.

(c) *Summary.*

Thus on the whole we may say that Jesus places no apologetic value on miracles. Those He performs are works of mercy pure and simple. Mark himself retains the view-point of his material. There are occasional hints that he is acquainted with the view that they have apologetic value, but he knows that is not the view of Jesus Himself (cf. Mark vi. 52, and especially ii. 10. Here the whole incident as reported is clear evidence of Mark's own attitude, in spite of the dubious historicity of the record as it stands, cf. Rawlinson, 1925, pp. 24 f.). In general, however, Mark's attitude to them is that they served to predispose the sympathy of the people, and so to produce a favourable *milieu* in which Jesus might preach and teach

Section vi.—SCRIPTURAL SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO MARK.

Passages under this head fall into two main sections.

(a) *Those adduced by the evangelist himself at the time of writing and regarded by him as fulfilled or confirmed by Jesus* (no instances in Mark).

(b) *Those original to Jesus and His times.* This section again may be divided into three groups:

- (i) Where the main purpose of Jesus is exegetical.
- (ii) Where the people quote Scripture.
- (iii) Where Jesus uses Scripture in various ways.

Under (i) we have the following passages:

Mark vii. 6 f.—“This people honours me, etc.”

Jesus uses quotations from Isa. xxix. 13; Exod. xx. 12; Deut. v. 16, in support of His personal attack upon prevailing practices and strengthens His own personal authority in so doing.

But His attack is based upon the falseness of what He is criticising and not upon Scripture, and He goes on, far beyond the Scriptures, to give positive teaching of the highest value and based entirely upon His personal authority (vii. 4-16).

Mark x. 17 (Matt. xix. 16; Luke xviii. 18). “Good teacher,” he asked, “what must I do to inherit life eternal?”

Jesus resolves the question first of all by an appeal to Scripture and in particular to the decalogue. But the real pressure of His authority is only felt when He goes beyond and says, “There is one thing more you want, etc.” (verses 21 ff.), but here His authority is purely personal and depends upon His own convincing power (see p. 206 *infra*).

(ii) Where the people quote Scripture and apply it to Jesus, whom they deem to fulfil it. Only one instance occurs in this source.

Mark xi. 1-11; Matt. xxi. 1-11; Luke xix, 28-38.—*The Triumphal Entry.*

The people evidently greeted Jesus as a prophet (see pp. 123 f. *infra*), which added greatly to His purely personal dignity, but it is a testimony to what the people had otherwise experienced,

rather than a status giving Him a special authority. They adduce Scripture customary on such occasions, and which is in general appropriate to the person of Jesus.

(iii) Where Jesus used Scripture as a personal support in various ways.

Mark iv. 12; Matt. xiii. 13; Luke viii. 10—*re speaking in parables*.

Jesus appeals generally, but not in exact quotation, to Isa. vi. 9, 10. Some hold this to be impossible in the mouth of Jesus (Baur, quoted with approval by Menzies, 1901, *ad loc.*; Klostermann, 1907, S. 12, 34). But it is nevertheless founded upon a true quotation used by Jesus in support of the enigmatic character of His method (see p. 133 *infra*).

N.B.—This is the only instance up to the Transfiguration where Jesus adduces Scripture in His support, and this case is doubtful on critical grounds.

Mark ix. 12 (cf. Matt. xvii. 10 ff.). “. . . What is written about the Son of Man as well? This, that he is to endure great suffering, and be rejected.”

The broad meaning of the passage is that a suffering and dying Elijah corresponds to a suffering and a dying Messiah, for which term “Son of Man” here is a substitute. There is no scriptural support for the latter, but some for the former in the general terms of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah (cf. Is. 53).

Jesus regards Scripture as an authentic account of what is to take place. It must be fulfilled, and He gains support from Scripture both for His action, His reception, and His lot in life. He appears to regard it as foretelling His lot as the Suffering Servant. But the identification is as general as the prediction. Besides, which is the Scripture to which reference is made?

Mark xi. 15-19; Matt. xxi. 12 f; Luke xix, 45-48.—*Cleansing the Temple*.

Jesus quotes Isa. lvi. 7 and Jer. vii. 11 for apology, but His action is not founded upon Scripture so much as upon His own personal indignation at sacrilege. The Scripture is a sanction *post eventum* (see further, p. 185 *infra*).

Mark xiii. 26; Matt. xxiv. 30 f.; Luke xxi. 27.—*The Return of the Son of Man.*

Jesus links Himself up quite definitely with the apocalyptic of Dan. vii. 13 f.

The passage belongs to the "Little Apocalypse" and on critical grounds bears little or no authenticity (Streeter, 1924, p. 491; Klostermann, 1907, S. 111) and so falls out of observation for our purpose.

Mark xiv. 26 f.; Matt. xxvi. 30 f. "It is written, 'I will strike at the shepherd and the sheep will be scattered'."

This is the second occasion where Jesus definitely adduces Scripture as an independent authority to be accepted as it stands as the expression of an inscrutably pre-ordained plan. His lot is therefore not accidental but part of the observed method of God.

Mark xiv. 49; Matt. xxvi. 56.—*Jesus taken prisoner.*

This is one of the few occasions where Jesus quotes scripture as of *ex cathedra* authority, but nevertheless He does not act merely in order to fulfil it. Rather, His own lot coincides with the prediction of Scripture, because both express God's will. But possibly apostolic preaching has influenced the expression to some extent (Acts xxvi. 23).

Mark xiv. 62 f.—*The Son of Man coming with the clouds of heaven.*

Here Jesus quotes Dan. vii. 13 as proving His own claims, or rather in threatening the immediate parousia of the Son of Man. Ought we to trace here the influence of the apostolic exegesis of Scripture and of the eschatological expectation? It is not easy to reconcile this threatening quotation with an identification between Jesus and the Son of Man, but Jesus lets the Scripture carry its own weight which He Himself seems to accept to the full. He feels Himself in the full current of the divine purpose, as laid down in Scripture, and soon to reach its consummation.

Mark xv. 16–38.—*The narrative of the Crucifixion.*

An important but distinct question confronts us in regard to the fulfilment of Scripture in this passage, with its frequent reference to Ps. xxii. Apart from the cry of Jesus, "Eloi! Eloi! lama sabachthani", it reveals the standpoint of the evangelist.

He is convinced that Jesus really is the person foreseen by the psalmist-prophet, and that His experiences and sufferings did actually fulfil the Scripture (cf. Klostermann, 1907, *a.l.*, S. 141). Exactly what the words of Jesus were, or even the language that He used, is not quite certain (cf. Dalman, 1902, pp. 53 f.), but more is not necessarily implied than that the words of Scripture came very naturally to His lips in His great suffering. Without being forced, the passage can scarcely be regarded as indicating that He felt He was fulfilling Scripture in a technical sense, and there are readings extant which weaken their force. "Even if they are genuine, it is still impossible to determine how much Jesus intended to express by them" (Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S. 141).

(c) *Summary.*

Thus in Mark, Scripture is used to some extent to throw light upon or add weight to the authority which Jesus exercised. How much this is due to the influence of Pauline and apostolic exegesis is a difficult question. But Jesus occasionally adduced it in support of His line of action, and He often gained much peace from the light it shed upon the ominous future. He sometimes expounded it and then in a penetrating fashion. But all this seems to lie well within the scope of any original religious teacher. There is some material, although relatively little, to make one think that the people thought all Scripture culminated in Him, or that He felt Himself to be mechanically walking in the path foretold by the prophets. He is glad of the support of Scripture, but it never or rarely determines His conduct. He masters Scripture more than it masters Him. After all, the general impression was that He talked with authority and not as the scribes, a position which seems quite congruous with what we have found.

Section vii.—JESUS AS A PROPHET IN MARK'S GOSPEL.

We now approach the question of the Authority of Jesus as a prophet. The principal relevant passages are:

Mark i. 7, 8, 14, 15.

As compared with Q (cf. Matt. iii. 5, 7-12; Luke iii. 3, 7-9, 16, 17, cf. pp. 71 f. *supra*) we find Mark's record of John's

preaching of the coming Heir of the Promises much more closely applicable to Jesus. Indeed, one may say that Q, as seen in Luke iii. 16 f., exhibits John preaching the coming of One who would be much more vehement than himself. He will baptise with fire. His winnowing fan will beat out the wheat from the chaff thoroughly and he will burn the straw in an unquenchable fire. According to Q, John can scarcely have been thinking of the Jesus we know, and this fully accords with the doubt in John's mind when he sent to inquire whether Jesus was indeed the Coming One (Matt. xi. 2 ff.; Luke vii. 18 ff.). But in Mark these severer tones are not reproduced, and it is evident of whom the evangelist is thinking as he writes down the words of John. It is to be noticed, however, that Mark does not make the Baptist refer explicitly to Jesus, which, in the circumstances, is very significant (cf. E. F. Scott, 1911, p. 82 f.). Further, we see that Mark finds the occasion of the commencement of the public ministry of Jesus to be the silencing of John by arrest (i. 14 f.). Jesus quietly takes up the work which John had been compelled to relinquish. This connection, while not lost, is obscured in Matthew (iv. 12 ff.), and is entirely gone in Luke (cf. iii. 19 ff.). But in Mark the connection is immediate. Indeed, the first words Jesus utters in public are more characteristic of what we know of John than of the rest of Jesus' preaching: "The time is now come, God's reign is near; repent and believe the gospel" (or, better, "repent and believe the good news"). In any case it is evident that, according to Mark, Jesus first appears in His ministry as a prophet in direct succession to the prophet John.

Mark vi. 4; Matt. xiii. 57. "A prophet never goes without honour except in his native place and among his kinsfolk and in his home."

This is in the nature of a proverbial saying and it may possibly be nothing more. On the other hand, the fact that it occurs also in the Fourth Gospel shows it must have created a great impression when uttered. We should understand it in a plastic manner fully to appreciate it. But it is not without significance that this is Jesus' first appearance in Nazareth after the commencement of His ministry. He classes Himself among the prophets and does not actually claim to be even a prophet, but only implies that if

such things had happened to the prophets, he is not surprised if they happen to Himself. Indeed, His ineffectiveness seems due to the fact that the people were at that time and place dubious about His being a prophet or even a true teacher.

Mark vi. 14 f. (cf. Matt. xiv. 1 f.; Luke ix. 7 ff.).

On all hands it was felt that Jesus was in the prophetic succession. He reminded them most closely of the Baptist, so much so that some thought He was the same man. "Jesus of Nazareth is a prophet"—that was the verdict upon which many were agreed. And the suggestion is that to call Him a prophet was a tremendous acknowledgment.

Mark viii. 11-12 (cf. Matt. xii. 38-42; xvi. 1-4; Luke xi. 29-32).
 "Jesus said, 'Why does this generation demand a sign?' I tell you truly, no sign shall be given this generation."

The parallel in Luke and the doubleted parallel in Matthew are illuminative. They make the exact words doubtful, but the sense is clear. "Why no sign? . . . The real explanation of this reference to Jonah is given by Luke xi. 32. . . . Nineveh instinctively recognised the inherent truth of Jonah's message and repented. Truth is its own evidence. . . . God is known that way" (Glover, 1920, p. 102). Jesus takes His stand purely as a prophet. Nothing else gives any light upon Mark's version, and Luke confirms it. To have come forward as the Son of Man, or as the Messiah, or as the Son of God, would have been a "sign" indeed!

Mark viii. 27 f. (cf. Matt. xvi. 14; Luke ix. 19). "On the road He inquired of His disciples, 'Who do people say I am?' 'John the Baptist,' they told Him, 'though some say Elijah, and others say you are one of the prophets' . . . (leading up to the confession of Peter that He is the Messiah)."

In substance, verse 28 is a doublet of Mark vi. (14 f.) and parallels, and to that extent confirms the record that He was regarded as a reincarnation of one of the great historical prophets. It must have been strongly felt that He belonged to their *genre*.

As far as the mere wording goes, the inquiry of Jesus would have been adequately met if the reply had been (in modern terminology), "You are quite different from Elijah or any of the old

prophets. You abrogate them. You are your own glorious self" Any further identification leads to as many problems as it solves. If He were the Messiah, then the sort of Messiah He was must be clearly understood and must be kept secret, till there could be no remaining confusion as to its significance in His connection.

One may possibly venture to say that it would have served Jesus' object equally well if the disciples had said He was a veritable Son of God, and had meant it not in the general physical sense so much as in the usual Semitic meaning. That this was not far away is shown by the version in Matthew and to some extent by that in Luke. Indeed, this grew to be the attitude of the Church as soon as it became a universal, and no longer merely a national institution. Thereupon the question of the Messiahship became of secondary importance, and has probably survived, mainly on account of the human interest in the fulfilment of prophecy. Such an interest is, however, of value only as it indicates the existence of an over-ruling Providence in whose love and care for men we can obtain deep satisfaction in our inquiry why Jesus really came at all. But the interest is baneful in so far as it introduces a certain externality and necessitarianism both into Jesus Himself and into His relation with the world. At the same time it makes prophecy almost a form of necromancy and clairvoyance.

But the point for the moment is that in whatever manner one or perhaps more of His closest disciples may have regarded Him, His hold on the mass of the people was that of a prophet, and it was as a prophet that He did His work.

Mark xi. 1-10, especially verses 9 f. (cf. Matt. xxi. 1-11; Luke xix. 28-38, cf. Ps. cxviii. 26).—*The Triumphal Entry.*

That this is a quotation from the Old Testament in no way endangers its historicity, or its applicability to Jesus. Neither can there be any question that Jesus had now reached the very height of His popularity. The escort, whether very numerous or not, and whether mostly Galileans or not, were evidently in the state of highest exultation, and the Messianic thought could not have been incongruous with their temper.

The exact passage quoted was only part of one of the Temple hymns sung antiphonally by priests and people. It belongs to the period of the Maccabean victories (C. A. Briggs, 1909, vol ii.

p. 404), and carries with it that atmosphere. It is in a Messianic context, but "the person of the Messiah bears the same relation to a Kingdom of living persons that Zion, the capital of the Kingdom, does to the kingdom". The metaphor (cf. Ps. cxviii. 22, "The stone that the builders rejected, has become the head of the corner"), stands equally well for both relations (*op. cit.*, p. 407). The Messiahship of the passage must, therefore, be understood in a very strict Jewish sense, and indeed in the old sense of a material deliverer especially chosen and anointed by God. But this is on a different plane from what was present in Peter's confession or developed at a later date, e.g. in John's Gospel.

For confirmation of this view we may notice the extreme tameness of Mark's next record:

"Then He entered Jerusalem, entered the Temple, and looked round at everything; but as it was late He went away with the twelve to Bethany" (xi. 11).

But this corresponds exactly in temper with the verse in Matthew alone, where in xxi. 10 f. we read:

"When He entered Jerusalem, the whole city was in excitement over Him. 'Who is this?' they asked, and the crowds replied, 'This is the prophet Jesus of Nazareth in Galilee'."

(historically confirmed by xxi. 46, "The crowds held Him to be a prophet".) If the crowds made that reply, it was in the nature of an anticlimax, unless all along they had been greeting Him as a mighty prophet indeed, but a prophet, an Elias or Jeremias, who was at last "coming to His own". Nothing more is needed to explain the ovation of the people, and anything beyond raises difficulties. The context of the passage in Mark disappoints higher expectations. Matthew offers splendid opportunities for making Messianic claims with which the evangelist was thoroughly in sympathy. But the internal evidence of the passage points to a different conception altogether.

The crowd greeted Jesus either as a prophet or as Messiah in the special sense outlined above. Any other sense only increased the contrast between the two terms. The people cannot have greeted Him in both ways. As the term "prophet" could only have survived if it were a hard fact of history, it must be held authentic. In that case the passage loses all value as a Messianic witness.

There is less difficulty in accepting this conclusion if we recognise that the Hallel was used as a greeting, originally, to every pilgrim ascending to the Holy City at the festive season (Klostermann, 1907, S. 94). The only conclusion to which we can come, therefore, is that this passage is of no value in support of the Messiahship of Jesus, but it does constitute a witness of the highest value to Him as a prophet and indeed to the people's joyful recognition of Him as such.

Mark xi. 27-33; Matt. xxi. 23-27; Luke xx. 1-8.—*Cleansing the Temple.*

A passage closely linked with—

Mark xii. 1-12; Matt. xxi. 33-46; Luke xx. 9-19.—*The Parable of the Wicked Vinedressers.*

Both passages could have been adduced in this place, but are somewhat more appropriate under the heading of the Personal Authority of Jesus. They are, therefore, dealt with *infra*, pp. 128 f.

Summary.

The above discussion exhausts the references of our present source to this subject, and the result may be summarised as follows: Mark is not primarily interested in Jesus as a prophet, but rather in what Jesus did and especially in the way He bore Himself in the face of the fatal tragedy. But in contrast with the indefiniteness or poverty of the material he offered us in our inquiries under previous categories, he is quite clear in exhibiting Jesus as a prophet, conscious of being such, recognised as such, claiming the status and exercising its prerogatives and its functions. However inadequate the term may be felt on other grounds, the broad outline of the portrait given in this source is that of Jesus living and labouring as a mighty prophet and in the noblest sense of the term.

Section viii.—THE PERSONAL AUTHORITY OF JESUS.

Here, as in Q, we find ourselves with "our feet set in a broad room". The passages fall fairly well into certain classes.

(a) *Those exhibiting mainly the sources of, or the sanctions for, His conduct.*

(b) *Those exhibiting mainly the immediate personal relation between Jesus and the people as seen in:*

- (i) His axiomatic utterances or self-authenticating acts.
- (ii) What carries convictions when seen in relation with His own personality.
- (iii) More esoteric teaching whose meaning becomes clear at a later stage.

(c) *Those dealing mainly with the effect of Jesus and His words upon the people.*

Under (a) we have the following:

Mark 1. 10 f. (cf. Matt. iii. 17; Luke iii. 22).

Mark accepts the full historical truth of the events, the gaping skies, the dove-like shape of the Holy Spirit, and the audible voice articulated from above, and in so doing he takes his stand alongside other ancient writers. But his belief presupposes a cosmogony we can no longer accept.

While the dove is usually a symbol for Israel, an occasional reference in rabbinic literature shows that it was used as a symbol of the Spirit of God (Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S.S. 123 ff.). Somewhat similarly, though with very numerous literary references, the "voice from heaven" occurs under the symbolism of an echo (*op. cit.*, S.S. 125 ff.).

On the other hand, many of the prophets had visions which constituted a call to their life's work (e.g. Isa. vi. 1; Jer. i. 4 ff.; Ezek. i. 1), nor should we forget that of Peter at the commencement of his Gentile mission (Acts. x. 10). And as Klostermann points out, "the Old Testament analogies were known not only to the evangelists, but also to Jesus" (Klostermann, 1907, S. 8).

It would seem, therefore, both on material and historical grounds, that the narrative in Mark gives in graphic form an account of the inner and personal experience of Jesus at the time when He felt His "call" to His life's work. Jesus Himself may have used the familiar symbolism in describing the events at a later time to His disciples.

But, for our purpose, the point is that the whole force of the narrative and the incident depends upon the inner experience of Jesus. His Sonship is based upon an inner certainty of complete

acceptance with God (see p. 92 *supra*). He came to a certainty at that moment. He dated His ministry from His Baptism. It was then that He received His divine mission. Henceforth He was under the authority of God in a definite and explicit way. He could do no other, either in faithfulness to Himself or to His Heavenly Father, than labour while it was day and finish the work. But what constituted the "call" was neither the dove nor the voice, but the inner experience and that alone. Apart from that inner certainty and that personal self-dedication, the narrative has no meaning. It is simply a graphic account of a purely personal experience. But taken as such, it illuminates the ministry of Jesus from beginning to end.

Mark i. 35; Luke iv. 42. "In the early morning, long before daylight, He got up and went to a lonely spot. He was praying there, etc. . . ."

Jesus' sense of power and of a mission was intimately connected with His sense of dependence upon God. Cf. also the next passage:

Mark vi. 50. Jesus walking on the sea says, "Courage, it is I, have no fear".

He feels at home with the powers of nature. Cf. also Matt. v. 45, where He finds instruction upon God's character from the working of nature.

Mark x. 13-16; Matt. xix. 13 f.; Luke xviii. 15-17.—*Blessing the children.*

Jesus here appeals to a natural instinct and from its force gains His authority. The saying itself, and the position implied, is very striking.

But it was an innovation based upon the independence and force of a truly sunny character (cf. Deissmann, *Licht vom Osten*, 2te Aufl., S. 111).

Mark xi. 15-19 (Matt. xxi. 12 f.); Luke xix. 45-48.—*Cleansing the Temple.*

In spite of the appeal to Scripture, the mainspring was Jesus' own zeal for the dignity of the Temple as the house of God. We see operative the energy of a mind sanctioned by a true reverence

for the association of a hallowed place of worship. But this passage is incomplete from the following:

Mark xi. 27-33; Matt. xxi. 23-27; Luke xx. 1-8.—*The Baptist's authority.*

The direct question, ἐν ποίᾳ ἐξουσίᾳ ταῦτα ποιεῖς, must be dealt with. It has to do explicitly with our inquiry in one of its aspects. What would the Jews have accepted as a satisfactory answer? (a) A reference to an accepted scriptural passage, or (b) a claim to an evident and manifest equality with the acknowledged prophets, or what?

It can scarcely be submitted that Jesus cited John in order to lead to a mere dialectical triumph of some sort. Suppose the Jews had given some definite answer, how could Jesus have proceeded? If the answer had been "from God", would Jesus have said, "So am I"? If it had been "from men", would Jesus have said, "So am I"? His authority was from God in so far as He spoke as a prophet would speak, and in that when the people witnessed His deeds they glorified not Jesus but God. His authority was from men at least to this extent, that they listened to Him gladly and had recently hailed Him as a prophet coming authentically in the name of the Lord.

But in any case (i) Jesus seems to place His authority on the same footing as John's, and (ii) He accepts the position that He did act upon some authority beyond Himself, and yet operative only through His own willing acceptance of, and glad co-operation, indeed self-identification, with it.

Again, it is to be noted that when His opponents said they did not know, Jesus may have been completely frustrated in going farther, if He held, as in all probability He did, that His authority and even His relation and acceptance with God were, on the whole, either self-evidencing, or nothing at all. John's right to speak lay in the nature of his message and the universal respect and assent it commanded as an authentic message from God. Jesus, in this passage at least, seems to be content to stand on the same footing, or rather, to hold that any other claim He might make could not be made unless this first position were admitted. This interpretation harmonises closely with the stages of the development of the authority of Jesus as we have traced it throughout Mark.

But this passage again is incomplete and cannot be fully understood apart from the following:

Mark xii. 1-12; Matt. xxi. 33-46; Luke xx. 9-19.—*The Parable of the Vinedressers.*

Jülicher, on the whole, doubts the authenticity of this parable and thinks it a tame *vaticinium ex eventu* of a first-century Christian (1899, vol. ii. S. 406). Particularly does he doubt the original connection between verses 1-9, and 10 f. He regards verse 10 f. as a rather unfortunate gloss (*op. cit.*, S. 405).

On the other hand, Fiebig not only regards Jülicher's general position as hypercritical, and the parable, therefore, as authentic, but also the connection of verses 10 f. as indubitable and quite clear to Jewish hearers (Paul Fiebig, 1912, S.S. 200 ff.). In a very fine discussion of the whole position Bugge holds the parable both as fully authentic, of the utmost value, in close connection with, and indeed the completion of, the preceding section *re* the Baptist's status and the authority of Jesus Himself. He brings out points which incidentally show its special significance for our purpose (Chr. A. Bugge, 1903, S.S. 286 ff.).

Therefore, we are surely justified in holding that the point of the parable is that Jesus claims to be chosen by God, though rejected by the leaders of the people. He draws His authority from the whole history of the prophets of Israel up to and including John the Baptist, whom the Jewish authorities have in effect just refused to recognise. That He Himself should be unrecognised is thus put forward as a sign of His true prophetic authority, for He is in noble company.

That Jesus was right is seen not only from Jewish history up to the time of Jesus, but by the course of Christian history since that time. The vineyard has, in fact, been taken from the Jews and given to others and Jesus has become the chief corner-stone. Jesus found confirmation for His claim in a consciously true insight into religious history. He is a prophet, and He gains His authority, like all prophets, from a personal but right view of things, undisturbed by traditional opinion or recognised authority.

Mark xiv. 32-42; Matt. xxvi. 36-46; Luke xxii. 39-46.—*Jesus in Gethsemane.*

There is a close and intimate relation with God. Jesus speaks

to God "as a man talketh with his friend". But it is nevertheless to God that He speaks, for:

(a) He does not know God's counsels (εἰ δυνατόν).

(b) He still hopes for a happy issue, or possibly, a divine miraculous intervention.

(c) He distinguishes His own will from God's, though finally submitting to the mysterious plan of Providence.

(d) He derives His personal confidence from His faith in God's goodness.

Jesus' authority is rooted in a full and vital faith in God, in spite of the dread coming of the unknown future. It is His vivid, real, plastic, and personal faith in the immediate presence, the personal care, and the absolutely unfailing trustworthiness of the goodness and love of God that forms His ultimate strength and gives Him the sense of power to meet the future whatever it may contain. This comes out strongly in the most awful hour of Jesus' inner experience, and we should not be justified in overlooking its fundamental significance throughout His ministry.

It is to be noted that there is no sign or suggestion of His claiming or possessing a special status. He appears before us as entirely human, on precisely the same footing as the great prophets of history. He rises above them in power and personal authority, because He experienced God more fully, more earnestly, and more truly, and was thus more surely able to understand the true proportions of all things both within His own soul and in the whole of His outer circumstances. What stands out is the splendid force of His personality founded on a living faith, which was itself born of a full, earnest, and happy communion with and understanding of God.

Thus, in brief, it may be said that, according to Mark, the sources of the authority which Jesus was able to exercise are of a threefold character. It is founded upon an "instinct for" self-evidencing truth and a peculiarly forceful earnestness in faith in God. This is nourished by an intimate personal *Verkehr* with Him which must have been an hourly experience, and also by special and solemn seasons of prayer and worship. He also recognised the true place of certain instincts, whose force thus sanctions His own position and increases His hold over His hearers. It is

very remarkable and quite characteristic that He calls in no adventitious support, either from Scripture or miracles or elsewhere, in order to lend a special *ex cathedra* quality to His authority. He finds it sufficient to stand alone, confident in His experience of God and in His own attitude to life and the world.

Under (b) (i) we find the following passages:

Mark i. 22. "And the people were astounded at His teaching, for He taught like an authority, not like the Scribes" (cf. also Matt. vii. 28; Luke iv. 31 f.).

And yet in one sense it was the Scribes who taught with authority, i.e. with the consensus of tradition, Scripture, and the approval of public opinion. But this is explicitly contrasted with the authority which Jesus exercised.

Strack-Billerbeck (*op. cit.*, i. 470) cite Talmudic literature on the parallel passage in Matt. vii. 28 f., and conclude: "Therefore the sense of the passage is: Jesus taught not for Himself, according to a sort of capricious choice, but as a prophet who speaks the very word of God." In which case this passage is a witness to Jesus as a prophet. But if we ask further how the people came to recognise Him as a mouthpiece of God, especially at this early stage of His ministry, one is driven to that conjecture it could only have been because of the extreme force of His personality and the self-evident and inspiring truth of what He said. His authority was that of any man who can convince, convict, and stir the hearts and consciences of people to a higher life, and particularly to a new grasp of the great truths by which men can really live as they feel they ought, and gain close fellowship with God.

Mark i. 40 f. "A leper came to Him beseeching Him on bended knee, saying, 'If you only choose, you can cleanse me', so He stretched His hand out in pity and touched him, saying, 'I do choose, be cleansed'."

This passage bears immediate witness to the validity of our present category. Comment upon it is quite superfluous.

Mark ii. 1-12 (cf. Matt. ix. 1-8; Luke v. 17-26).—*Healing the paralytic.*

The passage offers many historical difficulties as it stands, including the open identification of Jesus with the Son of Man

and the working of a miracle for the sake of its apologetic value. One may avoid the difficulty by suggesting that originally all we had was a simple story of healing, but this view ignores the main point of the passage, which has to do with forgiveness. No fully satisfactory reading of the passage has yet been put forward (but cf. Rawlinson, 1925, p. 24 f.).

The term Son of Man in this instance means man in a generic sense (see p. 102 *supra*).

Jesus, therefore, forgives the sins as a man. The scandalous thing possibly was that He did so without ensuring the payment of the ceremonial sacrifices, and thus broke the customary religious sanctions. This is not usual with Jesus, who is careful to observe the traditional forms in other respects (cf. Mark i. 44, also Montefiore, *Synoptic Gospels*, p. 78). But, after all, sin cannot be got rid of by payment without a new inner attitude. Here a word can do what a sacrifice cannot. It can give the feeling to the sinner that he is not out of fellowship with other men.

The authority of Jesus lies in His independent judgment and His fearless insight into the needs of the case.

Mark ii. 23-28 (Matt. xii. 1-8; Luke vi. 1-5).—*Rubbing ears of corn on the Sabbath.*

Mark iii. 1-6 (Matt. xii. 9-14; Luke vi. 6-11).—*Healing a withered hand on the Sabbath.*

Jesus bases Himself upon the inherent rightness of the attitude He adopts in both instances. He feels fully the value of men as against institutions. He expresses this with a certain energy of conviction which carries its own truth. The authority which the people feel is not of the sort that cramps but that liberates. It gives broader horizons and a new sense of power.

Mark ii. 15-17, 18-22 support these general conclusions.

Mark iii. 20-30 (cf. Matt. xii. 22-37; Luke xi. 14-23; xii. 10; vi. 43-45).—*The alliance with Beelzebul.*

Jesus founds His authority not upon the type of work He is doing, for, as the parallels show, the rabbis do the same sort of thing, but explicitly upon the humanitarianism of the action itself, and doubtless also upon the *milieu* He created in so acting.

Again the power of Beelzebul is, naturally, to increase evil, but Jesus decreases it. Refusal to recognise the actual facts by prejudice

of any kind cannot be too strongly condemned. He insists upon the right of private judgment and attaches great penalty to its misuse (verse 28 f.).

Quite evidently Jesus wants no slavish uncritical acceptance of what He says (Luke xii. 10). He would have everything depend upon the inner judgment of men (Mark iv. 9) whom Jesus bids always to be alert (cf. Luke xii. 37.).

Mark iv. 11-12 (cf. Matt. xiii. 10-13; Luke viii. 9 f.).—*The object of speaking in parables.*

The passage offers many difficulties both in itself and in its context. It is evidently not a direct reply to the question of the disciples, as it sounds as if they had been asking about the object of speaking in parables and not merely about their meaning. It is thus scarcely possible that the passage is in its original context (see p. 118 *supra*). This is borne out further by the observation that Jesus had only uttered one parable, whereas the disciples ask Him about the parables (cf. also Klostermann, 1907, S.S. 34 f.).

That being so, we can easily understand (in spite of Baur and Menzies) that Jesus may well have quoted Isa. vi. 9 f. in support of His method, but that we have not the original context, and, therefore, not the original meaning. The quotation itself is quite in accordance with Jesus' vivid and provocative style.

Jesus gained much power from His gift of making things live—so that the common people heard Him gladly. Thus He begot a fertile mind in His hearers, who were previously listless (cf. Mark iv. 33).

Mark vi. 5 f. (Matt. xiii. 58; Luke iv. 40).

Faith here connotes more than a mere acceptance of a supernatural authority. It means personal *rapprochement* and a certain immediacy of perception of spiritual values.

It is explicitly stated that Jesus depended upon such for His effective work, i.e. His authority was of a personal nature.

Mark vi. 6-13 (cf. Matt. ix. 35; x. 1, 9-11, 14; also Luke ix. 1-6).—*Sending out the Twelve in pairs.*

The meaning of ἐξουσία (to which Luke adds δύναμις) is doubtful. It can mean merely the *right* to exorcise, but probably

means the *power* to exorcise evil spirits. It is difficult to say which is the prior thought in the term. Was there held to be a prerogative of exorcism in certain classes, e.g. the rabbis? If so, does it mean that Jesus raised the disciples to the rank of exorcists as well as preachers? But, in any case, Jesus probably imparted to them both a certain amount of methodological instruction (cf. Mark vi. 13) as well as initial personal confidence.

He gives His evangelists no external status, and no means of independent subsistence. They must, therefore, *win* their way among the people. On the other hand, they must maintain strict independence and self-mastery (vi. 8 f.).

All this exhibits a vigorous but restrained personal authority over His disciples.

Mark vii. 1-13; Matt. xv. 1-20.—*On Ceremonial and Ethical Purity.*

Jesus is quite fresh in His thought, very independent in attitude, and fundamentally right. We feel His power to-day and have nothing to add or diminish. He still grips us and reveals the horizon.

His use of Scripture is fearless and yet reverent. He makes it search out the hidden places of the heart and its message live again. This is typical of Jesus' profound and exalted authority. As Luther says, "All was full of life and sounded as if it had hands and feet" (quoted Meyer, 1877, p. 243).

Mark viii. 11 ff.; Matt. xvi. 1-4 (cf. Luke xi. 32; xii. 54).—*The Pharisees ask a sign.*

Jesus takes His stand entirely upon the inherent truth of what He says and the native rightness of what He does. According to Matthew He adduces Jonah as a parallel case. Jesus was never finer or stronger than in this incident, never more convincing nor more authoritative. No nature miracle can guarantee the truth of any other word or deed. Each must carry its own validity in itself, though part of what it is in itself is to be found in the personality of the doer.

Nineveh recognised the truth by itself alone, why not Jerusalem?

Mark x. 17-31; Matt. xix. 16-30 (cf. Luke xviii. 18-30).—*Of the danger of riches.*

This is one of the finest passages revealing Jesus' personal power and insight. It is not rational nor conventional nor supernatural in the ordinary sense. But it is penetrating and final (see further p. 172 *infra*).

Mark xii. 13-17; Matt. xxii. 15-22; Luke xx. 20-26.—*Tribute to Cæsar.*

This is another illustration of the same quality. Jesus settles the point, not by refined rabbinic argument but by sheer human sense. At the same time,

- (i) He preserves reverence for God.
- (ii) He recognises that earthly authorities have a place.
- (iii) He makes it a matter for personal judgment to proportion the tribute.

Mark xii. 28-34; Matt. xxii. 34-40 (Luke x. 25-28).—*The greatest commandment.*

A further illustration. Jesus deals with the matter from the standpoint of "sanctified" common sense. The Jews would probably have answered the question differently. For, by the common saying of the Gemara, the 613 commandments of the law could be reduced to 11, Isaiah compressed them to 6, Micah to 3, and finally Amos and Habakkuk to 1 (quoted cf. Briggs, *International Crit. Commentary, Psalms*, vol. i. p. 113). Jesus was probably familiar with all this, but His own summary is finer, and carries a superior weight by its own self-evidence. This is typical of Jesus' authority.

(b) (ii) Of a somewhat different quality is the personal authority exhibited in the following passages. Here the truth is not quite self-evident when taken alone, but only when closely linked up with the personality of Jesus as in full earnest and moving on the highest spiritual level. But then these passages become some of the most important and effective in the whole of the Gospels. It is a form of dogmatic teaching, which gradually leads to deepened insight and a profounder faith till it touches the last problems of man's relations with God.

Mark viii. 31 and parallels.

After the confession of Peter the disciples are psychologically prepared for dogmatic and exegetic teaching of the highest spiritual importance, especially at a time when goodness was so closely connected with bliss here as well as hereafter.

The point of the passage is not so much in the details of the future as in the connection between the highest personal merit with the greatest personal woe and suffering. But the passage is conceived as if Jesus were aware that the heavens were watching, which is a most unusual attitude in Him. Is it a *vaticinium ex eventu*? We cannot say. But it is very different from what we read elsewhere.

Mark x. 33 f.—*The third prophecy of the Cross* is to be understood in the same way in general.

Mark viii. 34-37; Matt. xvi. 24-26; Luke ix. 23-25.—*Saving life and losing the soul*.

Here is some of the finest personal teaching of the Gospels. It is quite undreamt of apart from Jesus, but crystal-clear and powerfully cogent *as uttered by Him*. The impression created by the words, "What could a man offer as an equivalent for his soul" must have been superb.

But the appeal is mainly to the sense of the religious values which He had developed in His disciples. One may ask what the Athenians would have thought of it if St. Paul had first asked the question on the Areopagus.

Thus it could then and can now carry full conviction only on the basis of an awakened personal Christian faith and energy of character. Once said, doubtless confirmation would fall in from history (cf. Maccabees).

The cross here means the scaffold. The proleptic sense is entirely absent (so also Klostermann, 1907, S. 70). It means, "We must be prepared to follow Jesus to the very scaffold and bear all the preceding agony and shame—and still go on".

The challenge of the personal authority of Jesus is very great, but to the educated Christian conscience it is both unavoidable and very inspiring.

Mark ix. 1; Matt. xvi. 28; Luke ix. 27. "I tell you truly there are some of those standing here who will not taste death till they see the coming of God's reign with power. (Matt. = till they see the Son of Man Himself coming to reign. Luke = till they see the reign of God.)

The emphatic word in Mark is *with power*, and this is significant. Matthew seems to have read this passage in a personal sense and Luke to have read it impersonally. Matthew's version alone is capable of an eschatological rendering, but this is not necessary, nor, in view of his source and of Luke's version, is it natural. For if Jesus could speak of His Kingdom as not of this world, and of bearing the cross in a figurative sense, as in a preceding verse (Mark viii. 34), it is probable that He could also think of the Kingdom as later Christendom has come to understand it, i.e. as the sphere of the actual reign of Himself, of His very spirit or mentality, in the hearts and over the lives of His disciples and others. Surely a man of profound spiritual insight and rare mental balance could scarcely conceive anything else. Moreover, this kind of sovereignty did actually begin within a few weeks after the above words were uttered, a period much shorter than the limits set by Jesus. For it is nothing less than sheer fact to hold that His Kingdom was inaugurated in the upper room at Pentecost two months after this very date. If this kind of Kingdom is not what Jesus actually meant, then quite evidently He did not understand the nature of His own mission, and much of the Church's later experience of the Risen Lord loses historical connection with the Jesus of Nazareth. But if it be true that Jesus did understand all this, what refreshing insight it gives into the power of His personality!

Mark ix. 33-37; Matt. xviii. 1-5; Luke ix. 46-48.—*The dispute about rank.*

The position presupposes the Christian view of life at its purest. Otherwise it is sheer nonsense. It gets its force from the person of Jesus, and the construction He places upon life and the world. It is, however, axiomatic to the sensitive and educated Christian conscience, and reveals something more of the special features and the unique force of Jesus' personal authority.

The same holds for Mark ix. 42-48; Matthew xviii. 6-9 (also cf. Luke xvii. 1-2,) "If your right hand offend, etc."

Mark x. 1-12; Matt. xix. 1-12.—*The question of divorce.*

Jesus bases Himself, most unusually, upon a rabbinic reading of Scripture, to which He adds His own interpretation quite against the views of His time or ours.

His interpretation seems antiquated to us, and it is doubtful if it carried any weight then. Its truth is only apparent on the basis of His own teaching about purity of heart (Matt. v. 27 ff.) and shows a character capable of carrying His own teaching to its logical conclusion.

But Jesus speaks as if He were expounding the logic of the early Scriptural position as found in the story of Adam and Eve. What He says is really nothing more than what Scripture says. He is content to leave it at that, as sufficient.

(b) (iii) Of a somewhat different nature are the next two references. They are without much ethical value in themselves, but reveal other facets of the character of our Lord and His concern for His disciples. He appears anxious to make the way easier for them.

Mark xiv. 18-21; Matt. xxvi. 21-25 (Luke xxii. 21 ff.).—*Foretelling His betrayal.*

This was not necessarily due to some supernatural revelation, but rather to private but penetrating personal observation and insight. Judas' absence (on his fell errand) could not have been entirely unnoticed in the last tense days before the Passover.

Mark xiv. 22-25; Matt. xxvi. 26-29; Luke xxii. 15-20.—*The Last Supper.*

Mark reads like an account of a simple meal under very solemn circumstances.

Matthew reads as if Jesus intended to institute a ceremonial (*καὶνή* is read in many MSS. and widely accepted).

Luke reads as if Jesus were inaugurating a new dispensation, (cf. especially verse 20, *ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη*).

Much will depend upon our understanding of what Jesus really intended to do. But it is to be noted that Jesus somehow places Himself in a religious relation to His disciples rather than a merely friendly and human relation.

This understanding seems inevitable, unless the accounts are to lose all historical value in detail.

The sense of the passages we have adduced thus far from this source exhibit the personal authority of Jesus in its three stages of (a) axiomatic character of His utterance; (b) the self-evidence of others when viewed on the basis of a developed Christian teaching, none of which type occurs in the records of the earlier period of His ministry; (c) teaching which is largely without intrinsic ethical value but prepares the way for His disciples to stand fast in the faith.

Now we pass on to

(c) *The effect of the Personal authority of Jesus.*

This is one of the more difficult aspects of the present section of our inquiry, and only a few illustrative passages can be selected.

Mark viii. 27-33; Matt. xvi. 13-23; Luke ix. 18-22.—*The Confession of Peter.*

Jesus is clearly unwilling to exercise any authority over His disciples on the basis of general rumour, but only on that of personal conviction (Mark viii. 30 and parallels).

The effects of the catechism must have been to define and quicken the opinion of the disciples till it became a true conviction.

The confession was psychologically a part of the process in coming to a full understanding of Him. Peter really understood Jesus personally only after he had confessed Him as Lord.

The effect of forbidding reports of the conversation would be that no converts were made on the basis of an experience peculiar to the disciples even though they were eye-witnesses, but only on the grounds of personal experience perhaps reinforced by personal confession.

Mark ix. 14-29; Matt. xvii. 14-21; Luke ix. 37-43a.—*Healing the Epileptic Boy.*

Jesus' faith in the power of a right trust in God is as energetic as ever (Matt. xvii. 20).

Luke ix. 43 records that they gave thanks to God. This is significant. In an age when cures were normally regarded as miraculous and as sometimes due to the agency of demons (Mark iii. 22), there is reason for special notice here. It must have been more than a mere healing act. The scribes do not

ascribe praise to God. The people do it frequently (cf. Mark ii. 12; Matt. ix. 8; Luke v. 26; Matt. xv. 31; Luke vii. 16; xiii. 13; xvii. 15; xxiii. 47). So that the effect of the operation of the personality of Jesus was to make the people more conscious of God and to increase their faith in Him.

It is interesting to notice that this cannot have been merely accidental, but was quite certainly Jesus' purpose, as is seen from Matt. v. 16, where He bids His hearers so to act that men may see the good they do but glorify their heavenly Father. And what He enjoins He also practises (cf. Matt. xi. 25; Luke x. 21).

Mark xi. 1-11; Matt. xxi. 1-11; Luke xix. 28-38.—*The Triumphal Entry.*

(See p. 123 *supra*, Jesus as a prophet.)

Mark xv. 39.—*The Remark of the Centurion.*

The testimony is, of course, not on the same footing as the same words on the lips of demoniacs (Mark iii. 11 f.), or of the disciples (Matt. xiv. 33), or Peter (Mark viii. 27), or at the Transfiguration (Mark ix. 7), even if all these be authentic.

But the question is, "How came Jesus to exercise that kind of influence upon a pagan centurion who had possibly crucified a score of criminals? Why did Jesus make a different impression from either of the other two victims crucified at the same time?" It must have been something in the personal bearing of Jesus, which *in principle* is the same as His authority over His disciples. The centurion, if the record is authentic and whatever may have been the precise connotation of his terms in his own mind, felt himself in close contact with some deity either in or just beyond the crucified Jesus.

There are also several passages where Jesus refuses to recognise the authority with which some wished to invest Him, e.g. Mark i. 25, "You are God's Holy One".

Jesus does not specifically refuse the title, but He prohibits its use. We may similarly understand Mark iii. 11 f., a passage which has no parallels in Matthew or Luke, but which professes to describe the custom of Jesus to "forbid them strictly and severely not to make Him known" (cf. also v. 43). But if Jesus refused to allow avoidable publicity, it can only mean that He Himself pre-

ferred to exercise influence purely on the authority of what people personally realised about Him. It must be experimental or none.

This view is borne out on the positive side by the all but uniform interpretation put on the word "faith" in this source as personal *rapport* either with Himself (x. 52 and v. 25 ff.) or with God (ix. 14-29). There is an element of a somewhat different kind in Mark xi. 22, where faith to some extent implies absence of questioning, but the dominant note is still that of positive, joyful, personal *rapport*.

(d) *Summary.*

Thus, in the main, while the general and important features of the personality and the authority of Jesus remain almost identical with those of Q, the outline is not quite so clear and self-consistent, and there is a certain "tendency" distinctly noticeable in the way the material is presented. One may perhaps summarise the whole by saying that the sources behind Mark present us with a Jesus who was a prophet of the highest conceivable quality, whose power and authority could not be fully comprehended by the people nor even the disciples, and whose real significance the Church itself was only just beginning to realise.

CHAPTER V

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW

As these sources do not form a literary or historical unity, it is impossible to consider their verdict as one, though it is convenient to discuss them together in the present section.

There are three classes of passages in these special sources.

(A) Those historical records giving important parts of the Sermon on the Mount and of the woes against the Pharisees, many parables, some miracles, and other important details of the ministry, and particularly of the Passion. The exact contents of the authentic document must always be uncertain so long as we have no second extant form with which it may be compared as in the case of Q.¹

Moreover, it seems possible that there may have been overlapping with Q, as much of the material, e.g. in the Sermon of the Mount, is in the same vein. Something will depend on (a) the passages assigned to Q, and (b) those held to be derived from Mark.

(B) The more or less unhistorical or even legendary material consisting of chapters i and ii, and of xxviii, 8 ff.

(C) What might perhaps be best termed editorial material consisting mainly of sporadic verses linking passages from different sources, or introducing a passage after a hiatus in the narrative.²

¹ We may perhaps say tentatively that the record consists of the following passages: iii. 14, 15; iv. 13-16, 23-25; v. 5, 7-10, 14, 16, 17, 19-24, 27-31, 33, 38, 41, 43; vi. 1-8, 14-18, 34; vii. 6, 15, 19, 20; viii. 1, 17, 18 (ix. passages very doubtful); x. 2-6, 8, 17-23, 41; xi. 1, 28-30; xii. 5, 6, 7, 34, 36, 37; xiii. 14, 15, 24-30, 36-52; xiv. 28-31; xv. 12-13, 29-31; xvi. 17-19; xvii. 24-27; xviii. 3, 4, 10, 16-19, 20, 23-35; xix. 10-12; xx. 1-16; xxi. 14, 16, 17, 28-31, 43; xxii. 12-14, 46; xxiii. 1-3, 5, 8-11, 15-22, 24; xxv. 1, 2 (3, 4), 5-10 (11-13), 31-46; xxvi. 1-3; xxvii. 3-10, 19, 24-25, 62-66.

The above list of passages, when combined with those given under (ii) and (iii) *infra*, varies a little from that given by Streeter (1924, p. 198) and Hawkins (1909, p. 3), a difference which is to a large extent accounted for by the passages where they differ from Harnack as to their sources in Q or elsewhere. But the differences do not appear to affect the argument of the present study.

² Much will depend upon the sympathies of the student, but hesitatingly it may be regarded as, e.g. v. 1; xi. 14 f.; (?) xv. 23 f.; xvii. 6 f.; xix. 15; xxiv. 11-13, 42; xxvi. 52-54; (?) xxvii. 52 f.; xxviii. 2-4. Possibly some others, but the matter is very tentative.

It is remarkable that, as might have perhaps been anticipated, the general trend of the editorial glosses, and of the stylistic and other minor variations from Q as in Luke, or from Mark, harmonise fairly well with that included in group (B). This implies that the final redactor of Matthew was probably the one to choose the material of (B) if it were not actually first written down by him from its oral form. The date of the manuscript of Matt. i and ii is therefore about that of the Gospel as a whole, i.e. *circa* A.D. 80.

Thus the main material as in (A) *supra* does not rank on a level with Mark, nor even with Q. It is too fragmentary. But, as far as it goes, its historical value and its primitive character bear all the marks of trustworthiness equally with the two main sources.

The characteristics of the historical materials.

What, then, are the main characteristics for our purpose of this document in its present fragmentary form? Like Q, it is concerned mainly with the words and teachings of Jesus, but with a new, and, what has since come to be naturally regarded as, a characteristic quality. Mark on two or three occasions refers to the parables of Jesus (cf. Mark iv. 2; xii. 1), but gives only one example in each case. He is elsewhere quite explicit, and says, "In many a parable like this He spoke the word to them, so far as they could listen to it" (Mark iv. 33).

In contrast, this source is rich in parables, and it is their presence which so largely helps to make this source of peculiar value in understanding much of the authority Jesus came to exercise over His hearers (see p. 172 *infra*). Here we have also a large number of epigrammatic sayings of peculiar value, stylistically and spiritually the same as those in Q. We are surely almost bound to believe that even in the gospels, as a whole, there has been preserved only a selection of an exceedingly great treasure.

Section i.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS CHRIST AS SON OF GOD IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

The result of an examination of Q and Mark under this heading is surprising, for if we read any of the complete gospels straight through in a naïve fashion, or most isolated passages from the purely devotional standpoint, we gain a very different impression.

Everywhere we are face to face with a Being whose feet are indeed upon the earth, but whose mind is in heaven. He is scarcely of this hard and practical world. How, then, do we account for the fact when the historic view-point reflected in our earliest substantial records, Q and Mark, knows little or nothing of this matter?

The answer to this important question is to be found largely in the matter peculiar to Matthew and Luke respectively, and in the Johannine and Pauline Gospels. But let us confine ourselves to the Synoptics and John. The new edition of Mark as edited by Matthew (see *supra*, p. 49) was put forth with a prologue and an epilogue. All the clear, decisive, and unmistakable passages dealing with the special divine Sonship of Jesus are to be found in these sections exclusively, thus:

Matt. i. 17.—“Thus all the generations from Abraham to David number 14, from David to the Babylonian captivity number 14, from the Babylonian captivity to Christ 14.”

The Messianic Sonship of Jesus is the tacit assumption. It is accepted as an established fact. It colours, of course, both the writing and the devout reading of the entire narrative of the Gospel.

One gains the impression that Jesus had to come just then, or the scheme based upon the holy numbers three and seven would break down.

It is an ancient version of the Hegelian system of history. The whole thing took place under the grip of *ἀνάγκη* set in motion by Jehovah ordering things together for the coming of the Divine One.

Matt. i. 18-24; ii. 1 ff.—*The Birth of Jesus Christ.*

Jesus was not only begotten of a virgin by a special activity of the Holy Spirit, but the angels in heaven were watchful that nothing untoward took place, i.e. they were keenly interested in the events now preparing (cf. also ii. 13 ff.).

God had planned the whole long ago in detail (i. 22). And everybody knew He had done so—it had been proclaimed (i. 23). It was not an obscure affair. The birth of Jesus was of world-wide interest and importance.

The ancient science of astrology is invoked to support His royal claims (ii. 2-10).

God takes special steps for His preservation, and, later, to bring the child back to His own people.

All this is very cogent to the ancient mind. Jesus is presented as a king, but not in the ordinary sense of the term. He has more of the outer sanctions. His commission depends upon a heavenly descent and a supernatural birth. He is, indeed, in every way, physically and spiritually, *the* Son of God who is the ruler of theocratic Israel.

This is the character of the prologue. There is nothing quite like it in this source until we come to the epilogue in xxviii. 8 ff., where we immediately meet the same attitude. The psychological orientation has quite changed from what it was before the Cross. The style of the narrative is distinctly more mythological, the sorrow of the bereaved is not the dominating feature so much as the beginnings of a theology. The strange other-worldly atmosphere is not dispelled by the moonbeams of the reflexion-like reality of the reappearance of Jesus. For, we may ask, why should the disciples now worship Him? (verses 9, 17). Worship presupposes a dogmatic change which was not psychologically vouched for by the history of the previous eight days. But the account leads up to the concluding verses which constitute the epilogue proper. Here Jesus is portrayed as the Son, indeed, as the Second Person of the Trinity. Everything becomes clear when we look back from this point, which was evidently the writer's lodestar.

The prologue and the epilogue together determine the kind of emphasis which the reader customarily lays upon passages otherwise inconclusive, e.g.:

Matt. xii. 5 f. "A greater than the temple is here."

Matt. xii. 8. "The Son of Man (in Matthew's special sense, *infra*, p. 149) is Lord of the Sabbath."

Matt. xviii. 10. "My Father in heaven, etc."

All these, and doubtless several others, owe the special divine significance which we commonly find in them, not to their context, or their simple meaning, but to the fact that we have carried over to them the atmosphere of the prologue and epilogue. Of *ὁ πατήρ μου* in particular is this the case.

Section ii.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS CHRIST AS LORD IN
PASSAGES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

The matter is not quite simple, as on many occasions, here and throughout the Gospel as it stands, the reference of the term "Son of Man" is uncertain (cf. Son of Man, p. 65 *supra*).

(a) *Passages favouring the doctrine in some sense.*

Matt. xviii. 20. "Where two or three have gathered in my name, I am there among them."

This is a clear case, especially as it follows closely upon verse 19 (*παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς μου* where *ὑμῶν* would have been natural, so also in xviii. 35). There the reference to Lordship is reached by inference.

Matt. xxiv. 42. "Keep on the watch therefore, for you never know at what time your Lord will come."

Jesus is probably referring to Himself in an eschatological sense, but *κύριος* need not mean more than "master". Certainly in similar passages in Mark xiii. 33, 35 no other sense is appropriate.

Jesus may have been expounding the Messianic idea. If he had meant Himself to be clearly understood as the subject of His teaching, it is difficult to understand why the reference should have been left so oblique.

There is the question whether these are the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus or an interpretation of Matthew. If neither, then what?

Matt. xxviii. 6.

The words of the angel to the women on the resurrection morning. But the reading is doubtful, and nothing can be safely built upon the passage.

xi. 28. "Come unto Me, all ye that labour, and I will give you rest. Take My yoke . . . etc."

A position is claimed which is premonitory to and strongly suggestive of Lordship. But it suggests the view-point of the editor writing after the experience of many years of the Christian life and of Christian believers, rather than the view-point of the actual times of Jesus and the immediate experience of His hearers.

xii. 1 ff. (especially verse 6). "One is here who is greater than the temple," (and verse 8) "For the Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath."

Jesus sets Himself superior to Sabbath regulations, and also gives His disciples rights such as only the temple priests enjoy. This can only mean Lordship in the religious sense. The meaning carries over to Son of Man in verse 8, and makes the reading then quite different from the parallel in Mark ii. 28 and Luke vi. 5, where Son of Man probably means men generally. In Matt. xii. 8 Son of Man means Jesus as the Lord.

But the passage looks like a compound of the idea found in Mark and of the eschatological conception of the Son of Man as in Mark xiii. and Matt. x. All turns upon how we understand the Son of man, and how closely Jesus is to be identified with him (Matt. xvi. 18 f.). The passage is peculiar to Matthew, and implies Lordship, but its witness is not clear, as it contains unhistorical elements.

(b) *Passages offering difficulty to the doctrine.*

On the other hand, there are certain passages in the matter peculiar to Matthew which are difficult to reconcile with any real tradition of the Lordship of Jesus.

Matt. xvi. 22.—*Peter's reproof.*

This violent language seems quite inconsistent with the idea of Lordship, and it is evident, therefore, that Peter did not regard Jesus as Lord in the religious sense at this period.

iv. 7-10.—*The Temptation.*

Both passages imply that Jesus places Himself in a totally different category from God.

xxi. 11.—*The Triumphal Entry.* "This is the prophet of Nazareth."

This is a very tame thing for people to say, and is quite an anticlimax after the immense enthusiasm described by Matthew. We would have expected far more.

(c) *Summary.*

(i) Passages in which Jesus is regarded as Lord are confined in Matthew to his peculiar sections.

(ii) Matthew shows the use only in a relatively undeveloped

form. We get most by inference. But he sometimes re-interprets Mark in the general direction of this sense.

(iii) The doctrine of Lordship is incipient in this source, but is scarcely to be found in the historical events behind the records. Jesus is not exhibited as actually exercising authority in virtue of His Lordship, and the passages inconsistent with the doctrine could not have survived had they not been authentic. They therefore nullify the value of the favourable witnesses. This source, therefore, in spite of itself, testifies to a time when Jesus was not regarded as Lord, and can scarcely be said to exhibit any authority following upon this status.

Section iii.—JESUS AS SON OF MAN IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

These are three in number.

(i) Matt. x. 23. "When they persecute you in one town, flee to the next; truly I tell you, you will not have covered the towns of Israel before the Son of Man arrives."

This verse derives much of its significance from our view-point. It is clearly, however, connected with the preceding six verses, which appear to refer to the Christian community generally, and not merely to the disciples. If this be true, the eschatological sense is not so urgent as Schweitzer would make out (1901, S. 16, 81 ff.; 1921, S.S. 405 f., etc.), but the question of the identity of the Son of Man remains substantially unaltered. The passage is from Matthew's version of the "Little Apocalypse" as seen otherwise in Mark xiii, and its historicity is doubtful

(ii) Matt. xiii. 37, 41.

It is to be noted that the allegorical interpretation of a parable is not usual in the practice of Jesus.

(iii) Matt. xxv. 31.—*Parable of the Sheep and Goats.*

(Matt. xvi. 28. See under Mark ix. 1, p. 104 *supra*.)

(Matt. xviii. 11 is omitted on critical grounds.)

The points to be noted are as follows:

All these three passages are strongly eschatological.

Whereas in the other sources examined thus far the identification

of Son of Man with Jesus, or the use of the term as a substitute for the first personal pronoun was unmistakable, except where the term might have meant men in general, here the identity of the Son of Man is quite uncertain. If these passages be taken in their immediate context, but apart from the rest of the Gospel, there is no certainty in identifying Jesus as Son of Man. They seem, indeed, to be rather expositions of the general conception with evaluation of its validity, in this respect similar to the reference to Jonah in Matt. xii. 40 (*vide supra* pp. 65 f.).

The exact identity of the Son of Man is in no case the point at issue, and makes no difference to the value of what is said in any of the three passages. In (i) the real point is an exhortation to "seeing it through," as persecution will not last for ever. In (ii) and (iii) righteousness, though hidden now, will eventually be readily distinguishable, and have its appropriate blessing. But this will be the case independently of the identity of the judge. In (ii) indeed, it is the angels who do the actual judging, even if at the orders of the Son of Man. The Son of Man is thus only the agent for completing the plan upon which life is built. But Jesus Himself gains no authority thereby. If He be conceived as identical with the Son of Man in these verses, nothing is added to their urgency. On the other hand, if the Son of Man be regarded as entirely another person, nothing is taken from them. If they be literally authentic, and if Jesus did really intend to refer to Himself, the connection cannot have been inevitable, nor can it have been forced upon or even present in the minds of His hearers. It certainly was not the important thing to them, nor what gave weight to His words.

The conclusion, therefore, is that while in the writer's mind Jesus was possibly the apocalyptic Son of Man, nothing in the present source itself regarding the Son of Man as such helps us to understand the authority which Jesus exercised or felt in His intercourse with the people or His disciples.

Section iv.—JESUS AS MESSIAH IN SPECIAL SOURCE OF MATTHEW.

We are at once met by a striking fact. Neither Matthew nor Luke (as we shall see), when taken alone, either for their special sources or as editors, adds one iota to our understanding of the

Messianic doctrine or to our appreciation of the personality and authority of Jesus from this standpoint.

Apart from the genealogy, Matthew never refers to the subject, his independent material being entirely silent. The term occurs four times in the genealogy (i. 1, 16, 17, 18), but in each case it is used purely as a cognomen or a title. This can only mean that by the time and in the circumstances in which this passage was written the problem was solved, Jesus and the Messiah are completely identified, and the issue is dead. But placed at the forefront of the Gospel, it colours the significance of all the other passages later in the Gospels with a meaning not to be found in the original sources, and gives Jesus an external authority corresponding to the conception of the title.

Section v.—JESUS AS SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURE IN SOURCES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

Adopting the same classification as in our examination of the records under the category in previous sections, we find:

α. There are numerous passages in this source adduced by the evangelist showing how in his view Jesus actually was fulfilling the Scripture, e.g. Matt. ii. 15; xii. 18 ff.; xxi. 5, which are interesting as illustrating how certain minds must have regarded Jesus by the time the Gospel came to be written. But they give no certain knowledge of the attitude of Jesus or the people, and are therefore better omitted from consideration either way for our present purpose.

β. (*a*) There are no instances in this source of Jesus expounding Scripture.

(*b*) No passages quoted by people as applying to Jesus are to be found in Matthew's special sources.

(*c*) No instances in this source of passages from which He drew personal authority.

The result is surprising. Matthew is by common consent the Gospel of Scripture proof, but an examination of its peculiar source shows us that that proof is brought to bear entirely by the evangelist. The Gospel adds nothing to what we already know from Q and Mark (see further 175 f., 185 f., *infra*).

Section vi.—MIRACULOUS SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO THE SOURCES
PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

There are no references apart from the historically doubtful material in chapters i and ii, but here we have much that has bulked largely in Christian history. We note the following points:

(i) Jesus came at the end of the third series of periods of fourteen generations each, and thus in a specially appointed place in the whole cosmogony (i. 17).

(ii) The Virgin Birth (i. 18 ff.).

(iii) The visit of the magi guided by a moving star. (ii. 1 ff.).

(iv) The Egyptian exile miraculously ordered, and the divine guidance on the return to Nazareth. (ii. 13 ff.).

(v) The remarkable series of events exactly fulfilling the suggested reading of Scripture. (ii. 6, 15, 18, 23).

This material placed right at the forefront not only of this Gospel, but of the four Gospels, has a very wide effect upon our mental attitude towards the rest of the Gospel narratives. The concatenation of supernatural phenomena of all kinds serves to put Jesus from the beginning in a different category from ordinary men. Thus the impression gained from reading the First Gospel as a whole in its present form is very different from that gained if we read its separate sources in their chronological order. The older sources, Q and Mark, know nothing of the apologetic value of miracles, and little, if any, attaching to the supernatural phenomena. Chapters i and ii know nothing else. The entire outlook is supernatural, and this serves completely to shroud the plain message of the older sources.

Section vii.—JESUS AS A PROPHET ACCORDING TO SOURCES
PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

The above discussion exhausts the references to the subject found in the passages peculiar to Matthew. In other words, the first evangelist, in publishing what Streeter calls a new edition of Mark, was satisfied with what he found in his two main sources as far as they touched upon this issue, and as far as it was present explicitly in his mind. The only note he adds is the highly sig-

nificant one in xxi. 11 (after the triumphant entry the people say nothing more than that "This is the prophet, Jesus of Nazareth", confirmed by xxi. 46) which comes in as a severe anticlimax, as we have already seen (cf. p. 124 *supra*), and which, from the point of view of the evangelist and his gospel as a whole, would more appropriately have been omitted. No further proof than this is required for its entire historicity and the far-reaching significance of Jesus as a prophet.

Section viii.—PERSONAL AUTHORITY OF JESUS IN SOURCES PECULIAR TO MATTHEW.

There are very few references.

Matt. vii. 29. "He taught them like an authority, not like their own scribes."

While this passage doubtless comes from Matthew's special source, it adds nothing to what we have already said on this subject under Mark i. 22 (p. 131 *supra*). The contrast appears to be between the prophetic type of utterance flowing from an inner conviction and the Scribes who taught on the ground of tradition (cf. Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S. 470, *a.l.*, note 2).

"The ἐξουσία of Jesus was felt, not in the novelty of all that He said, but in His inborn knowledge of right and wrong. The Scribes rested mainly on the authority of antiquity and precedent. The apocalyptic writers claimed to give out something new, learned by immediate inspiration, but their speculations did not touch the life of the masses; the Lord dealt not merely with the future, but also with the living present as a preparation for it" (McNeile, 1915, p. 99, *a.l.*)

Matt. xxviii. 16-20.—*The conclusion to Matthew's Gospel* (see p. 145 *supra*).

The further material in this source which bears upon the present category is mostly in the form of parables. This is an highly important subject, and is common to the special source of Luke. It will, therefore, be considered in detail under a special section (pp. 171 ff. *infra*).

Section ix.—SUMMARY.

Meantime, in summary we may say that this source knows nothing of Jesus as Son of God, though it is so conscious of His pre-eminence that it regards Him as Lord in almost, but still not quite, a religious sense. There are references to the Son of Man, all of which are of the eschatological character which the term conveyed to the common thought of the time, but no one *from this source alone* could identify their references. If it is to Jesus Himself, the connection is vague to a high degree, and is incapable of carrying weight, nor does it help us in any way to understand the historical authority of Jesus.

This source does not add anything to our knowledge of Jesus as Messiah, nor to our understanding of His Messianic consciousness.

There are numerous miracles either described or referred to, but if they are all incidental to the work of Jesus as a preacher and teacher of Israel, He builds nothing upon them for Himself, nor do the people regard them in any apologetic fashion.

The fact is that Jesus stands before us here pre-eminently as a prophet, and the authority He carries is that of His own personal insight and knowledge. He is exceedingly strong and vigorous in His dealing with life's problems. He finds in Himself and in His experience of God and the world all that is needed for Him to speak with final authority. The words, "But I say unto you", are frequent. They give a peculiar vigour to His utterances, and are by no means confined to the familiar passage in Matt. v. (cf. also xiii. 17; xviii. 10; xxi. 31, 43, etc.).

His attitude towards Scripture is striking. He discussed it, claims to have come in order to see it fulfilled, but, with the utmost vigour and with a personal vehemence that carries great weight, He goes far beyond it and exhausts the subject. The sayings in the great passage beginning, "Ye have heard that it hath been said. . . . But I say unto you . . ." stand out with the greatest prominence. They, with His comments, represent the highest peak to which human thought has ever attained. If it can be claimed that some passages are more characteristic of Jesus and more exalted, and yet at the same time more truly human than others in all the incomparable epigrammatic utterances of Jesus, it is surely to these simple but powerful words that we must look

But throughout Jesus rides loose to Scripture. He treats it with all reverence, but He displays, as no one else, its limitation. He fulfils "what was said by them of old time" as they themselves could not have conceived, and then He goes on beyond. He fulfils it in no mechanical sense of falling into a place in a time-table or of a lever in a machine. He fulfils its intention, i.e. brings men into a true harmony with God. Any other form of fulfilment of Scripture is, by comparison, unspiritual, or even necromantic. But this is ethical, inspiring, and ultimate. There is nothing beyond possible to the human soul. Now this is prophecy and revelation. It is the voice of God. Here is the kind of man for which the ages and the nations had yearned and sought, but had not found.

Characteristic equally with these immensely significant, but brief and pithy utterances is the parabolic speech displayed at length in this source. It is here that we find the parable of the Tares, the Treasure in the Field, the Pearl, the Net, the Ten Thousand Talents, the Vinedressers, the Two Perverse Sons, the Ten Virgins, and the Sheep and the Goats. The writer is apparently as conscious of their value as he is of the prophetic quality of the utterances we have just been studying. They reveal Jesus more distinctly as a teacher with a vital message and as a master of didactic method. They enable us to understand why the people crowded after Him. He spoke like one who could handle His subject. He could bring out the indispensable essence of things, and link it up closely with the familiar events of everyday life. He made religion a concrete matter, till He found it expressed on occasions where men were themselves face to face with the sorrows, the burdens, the fears, and the hopes of the common round and the daily task. He interpreted the battle of life in spiritual terms, and, indeed, in terms of the highest spiritual significance. He showed God concerned with, His will woven into, His love part of, the very fibre of human life. Thereby He linked up His didactic with His prophetic quality, and thus the personality of Jesus at once suffuses all things with sympathy, gives them a plastic interpretation, and kindles them with a flame communicating itself from heart to heart.

Such is the characteristic contribution of this source, and it speaks highly for the spiritual perspicacity of the first evangelist that he should have felt that it was valuable alongside the glorious

contributions of Mark and Q. The broad outline of the portrait of Jesus is the same. The position He takes to His life's task is identical. The authority of Jesus is purely personal and prophetic as in them, but by its additional material it puts in a better position to appreciate Him all of us who have never had the great joy of meeting our Lord face to face. One inclines, indeed, to the conjecture that it was because the number of eye-witnesses was growing steadily fewer, and the number of the proselytes without personal acquaintance steadily greater that Matthew's gospel came to be written, particularly in its present form. However that may be, from Q and Mark, and this source as combined in the first gospel, we are well placed to understand how that the birth of Jesus was the greatest event in the history of mankind.

The striking thing is not the presence of unhistorical elements, but the reverence and restraint found in these passages no less than their harmony with the spiritual life of Christian people generally. They do not jar upon us; rather they elevate us and make us feel something of the mystic music playing behind the providential order. They add their indispensable contribution to making this gospel "the best loved book in all the world".

CHAPTER VI

THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCES PECULIAR TO LUKE

HERE again we have three groups of material which are not in themselves a literary or historical unity, but which, however, may be conveniently discussed in one section.

(i) The first group consists of a large amount of material, possibly not a literary unity, but broadly of a character and authenticity similar to the material contained in the main body of Matthew's special sources.¹

(ii) Material of a lesser historical quality, and probably of a later date, to be found in chapters i and ii and also in xxiv. 13 ff. It does not follow that this material is a literary unity.

(iii) Editorial additions, some of which are very brief and others of which are of greater length.² It is noteworthy where there is any trend or tendency in these presumed additions that they are in substantial harmony with the cosmogony and the religious outlook of chapters i and ii, etc.

Section i.—JESUS AS SON OF GOD IN MATERIAL PECULIAR TO LUKE.

When we examine the material peculiar to Luke for its testi-

¹ Its passages may be tentatively and in general denoted as follows, though, probably owing to Luke's skill as historian and editor, it is even more difficult to estimate the precise scope of his additions: iii. 1-2, 5, 10-15, 18-20, 28-38; iv. 16-30; v. 1-11, 17, 39; vi. 12, 24-26, 34, 45; vii. 11-17, 36-50; viii. 1-3, 22, 43a, 45, 51-56; ix. 61-62; x. 1, 16-20, 25-42; xi. 1, 5-8, 15, 18, 21, 27-32, 36-38, 40, 45, 53; xii. 1, 11-21, 36-38, 41, 47-50, 52, 54-57; xiii. 1-17, 22-23, 25-27, 30-33; xiv. 1-10, 12-15, 25, 28-33; xv. 1, 8-32; xvi. 1-12, 14-15, 19-31; xvii. 2, 5, 7-22, 25, 28-32; xviii. 1-14; xix. 1-11, 41-44, 48; xxi. 34-36; xxii. 4, 6, 8, 15-17, 31-32, 35-38, 51b-52a; xxiii. 2, 4-16, 27-31, 40-43, 46, 48, 56.

Hawkins (1909, p. 194) includes several of the above verses in his list of "smaller additions in St. Luke's Gospel", but in total he (*ibid.*, p. 15), Moffatt (1911, p. 276 f.), and Streeter (1924, p. 198) give lists similar to the above. Much depends here as in the analogous case in Matthew (see pp. 142 f. *supra*) upon the precise scope given to Q and to Mark, as well as to the evangelist himself. But none of the differences between the views of the different authorities, on the general basis of whose opinions the present list has been drawn up, affects our conclusions as to the authority of Jesus as recorded in this source.

² Of these the principal may be very tentatively suggested as iv. 41b; xv. 3; xx. 16; xxi. 25b, 26a; xxii. 43 f., and possibly many more. (But cf. Hawkins, 1909, p. 194.)

mony to the Sonship of Jesus, our conclusions are very similar to those already reached. There is nothing that even remotely suggests the Sonship of Jesus or any authority exercised by Him as such outside of the first two chapters and the last one.

Luke i. 32 f. We read: "He will be great, He will be called the Son of the Most High, and the Lord God will give Him the throne of David His father; He will reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and to His reign there will be no end."

Not one of these prophecies was fulfilled, but the right atmosphere was given to the readers.

Luke i. 35. "The angel answered here, 'The Holy Spirit will come upon you, the power of the Most High will overshadow you; hence what is born will be called holy, Son of God'."

This prophecy was not fulfilled till after the resurrection, nor does Luke's gospel attempt to show that it was fulfilled. But the two passages together make it appear that Jesus, from His birth, was not only supernaturally appointed to high office, but also His parents were supernaturally informed of it and knew with certainty that from His birth and throughout His life He was Incarnate God.

Such a meaning placed at the forefront of the Gospel tends to give a special construction to all subsequent acts and words of Jesus, to read a special meaning into everything the people say in praise of Him, and to find a special perversity in the minds of His enemies. His authority also is affected with extraneous elements and is made to rest primarily upon supernatural sanctions. How far this has operated in the history of Christology seems a fit subject for inquiry.

In the material peculiar to Luke there is no other direct reference to the Sonship of Jesus until we reach the closing chapter.

Luke xxiv. 36-49.—*The appearance of the Risen Lord in Jerusalem.*

The spiritual Jesus speaks of τοῦ πατρός μου (e.g. verse 49), and in the special circumstances gives it a meaning necessarily quite different from what would well content us earlier.

He promises a power from on high—in the sense that He

Himself will send power (cf. John xiv. 1 ff.), although this is not quite explicit.

This account of the Risen Lord is very detailed and "physical".

Jesus as Risen Lord is now made to base Himself and to authenticate His presence, etc., not upon the personal experience of the disciples and others who were with Him and upon the irresistibility of that experience, but rather upon the external authority of the Old Testament scriptures regarded as describing a cosmic order fixed apart from and antecedently to the earthly life and death of Jesus.

The authority of Jesus in this passage is thus widely different from that of the greater part of the Gospel.

(a) It is external to Jesus. He is a mere channel for it.

(b) His own exercise of it is founded in His power of appealing to certain assumptions as to the place of prophecy and of the Old Testament generally as already accepted by believers.

(c) Jesus is far from being life-like, and His faith is not of the energetic personal kind which has been characteristic before. It is now of a passive order, making Jesus almost appear as the first of the Order of Jesuits.

Section ii.—SUMMARY OF WITNESS OF SYNOPTIC GOSPELS TO JESUS AS SON OF GOD.

Thus we are driven to the conclusion in regard to the unique divine Sonship of Jesus that, as far as the Synoptic Gospels are concerned, the relevant authority is to be found prominently in the historically doubtful but theologically comprehensible material at the beginning and the end of the First and Third Gospels, and equally in the theological approach of the evangelists in presenting their material as editors. But this point of view and this presentation are such as to cause a complete transformation of the plain understanding of the present form of the Gospel narrative. It should perhaps be added that in Luke's case, as we shall see later, there are frequent additions of little phrases, e.g. "the Lord said", which serve fully to maintain the atmosphere of the supernatural divine presence in the form created by the first two chapters.

Section iii.—JESUS AS LORD IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

(a) *Those in some sense favourable to the doctrine.*

In Luke's Gospel we find a complete change of atmosphere and a further stage of development of the use of the term "Lord". It has become, indeed, the usual mode of reference employed by the evangelist (e.g. xix. 8; x. 1; vii. 13; xxii. 61). He uses it almost exclusively when introducing passages from Q (e.g. Luke xii. 42; xiii. 15; xvii. 5, 6, etc.), and elsewhere (e.g. xviii. 6). He seems to think of Jesus not in terms of "Messiah" as perhaps Matthew or "Son of God" as in John, but of "The Lord". As this point of view is not found in any of the sources hitherto, these passages, or most of them, must therefore be gravely questioned as evidence of the primitive attitude of Jesus. Indeed, they tend to give to others a construction which is not inherent in them (e.g. in Luke v. 8).

vi. 5. "The Son of man is Lord even over the Sabbath."

The meaning of Son of man here is Jesus. This is gained by omitting Mark's passage, "The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath". Here Luke agrees with Matthew.

"Lord" then means Master of the Sabbath, with the implication of the Lord of worship, or Son of man means Jesus or Lord.

x. 1. "After that the Lord commissioned other seventy disciples."

This use of "Lord" seems on the whole invested with a religious significance, but it springs from the evangelist's habit. It is in rather striking contrast with the next verse, "Pray ye the Lord of the Harvest, etc.", where "Lord" certainly means "God."

xix. 31 is not a case in point Lord means Master, employer (where Jesus instructs His disciples what to say when borrowing the ass).

xxii. 31. The reading "Lord" is to be rejected on critical grounds.

xxii. 61. Luke reads, "And Peter remembered the word of the Lord."

xiv. 72. Mark reads, "And Peter remembered the word which Jesus spoke to him."

xxvi. 75. Matthew reads, "And Peter remembered the word spoken by Jesus."

Thus Luke gives the distinct meaning of "Lord" in a religious

sense to the passage as against the tradition preserved by Mark and Matthew.

There remain the passages in the first two chapters and in the last chapter, which by universal consent stand on a different literary basis from the rest of the Gospel.

i. 31-33 (especially verse 33).

The Lordship here is not of a purely religious but of a partly political character.

i. 43 ff. "What have I done to have the mother of my Lord come to me . . . and blessed is she who believed that the Lord's words to her would be fulfilled."

Here "Lord" is used in similar sense both of Jehovah and Jesus, and shows the standpoint of apostolic Christology.

ii. 11; ii. 26 (there are many references in chapter ii to God as "Lord", and the word is used in the same sense of the Messiah); xxiv. 3; xxiv. 34.

(The use of the term in the last instances is practically that of a proper name.)

From these passages it is not possible to come to the conclusion that anyone regarded Jesus as "Lord" during His lifetime, though the attitude of the evangelist is quite clear. On the other hand, the following passages of a negative character point to a definite conclusion against the Lordship of Jesus.

(b) *Passages inconsistent with the doctrine.*

iv. 18-22. Jesus reads Isa. lxi. 1 f.; lviii. 6: "The spirit of the Lord has come upon me, etc.", and in verse 22 applies this prophecy to Himself.

But this is quite inconsistent with a consciousness that He Himself is the Lord. Rather He feels Himself as prophet, messenger, etc., but not Lord. Only a forced reading of the passage would make it otherwise. The whole sense of the chapter is that Jesus is a prophet.

v. 17. "And the power of the Lord was present for healing."

Here is meant God's power, and this is sharply distinguished from that of Jesus, and also from the status of Jesus.

Luke ix. 18 ff.—*Peter's Confession.*

In this passage it is not the incident itself but the form which is peculiar to Luke, and it is very significant that nothing is said about Jesus' Lordship, though it was a good opportunity for Luke to apply his favourite term (cf. pp. 103 ff. *supra*).

ix. 33.—*The Transfiguration.*

Here also it is the form alone which is peculiar to Luke. Though the occasion was very propitious for using a favourite term, Luke seems purposely to avoid κύριος, which would have been a good rendering of רבי (as seen in Matthew). Instead he uses the rare words ἐπιστάτης, which seems chosen in order to avoid the religious connotation of κύριος. (The term occurs in Luke v. 5; viii. 24, 45; ix. 33, 49; xvii. 13, and not elsewhere in the New Testament, cf. p. 101 *supra*).

xix. 38. "Blessed be the king who comes in the Lord's name."

"King" is here used with a political rather than a religious reference.

The person of the King is contrasted with God as Lord: for He comes "in the Lord's name".

These passages enable us to reach a positive conclusion, viz. that though the third evangelist himself is completely accustomed to regard Jesus as Lord, his narrative shows that this attitude did not exist during the earthly life of Jesus on the part of either His disciples or any others. Jesus gained no authority from His Lordship.

Section iv.—SUMMARY OF SYNOPTIC SOURCES.

Thus all the Synoptics and Q are agreed. They reveal to us a Jesus who was not regarded as Lord and who had no consciousness of Lordship as an object of religious worship. But since this attitude is largely, if not entirely, absent from Mark and still more so from Q, it may have developed in certain localities between A.D. 50, when the older sources were written down, and A.D. 80, when Luke's Gospel was put together in its present form.

Section v.—JESUS AS SON OF MAN IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

They are three in number.

- (i) Luke xviii. 7, 8. "Will he (God) be tolerant to their (the elects') opponents? I tell you He will quickly see justice to His elect. And yet, when the Son of Man does come, will He find faith on earth?"
- (ii) Luke xix. 9 f. "And Jesus said of Him, 'To-day salvation has come to this house, since Zacchæus here is a Son of Abraham. For the Son of Man has come to seek and save the lost'."
- (iii) Luke xxi. 36. "From hour to hour keep awake, praying that you may succeed in escaping all these dangers to come and in standing before the Son of Man."

The following are the points to be noted:

(a) In (ii) the term "Son of man" is a mere alternative to the first personal pronoun.

(b) In (i) and (iii) practically all that was said on the passages peculiar to Matthew (pp. 148 f. *supra*) is applicable. The whole point is in the urgency of the ethico-religious life, and the coming of the Son of Man is merely the sign of the end of the effort and the vigilance required of all men.

Our conclusion is that the source peculiar to Luke's Gospel in dealing with the term "Son of man", does not help us to understand the authority which Jesus exercised or felt.

Section vi.—THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS MESSIAH IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

The only references are in the prologue (ii. 10 f., 26), which is admittedly of later date and of different historical value from the body of the Gospel, and in xxiv. 25 f., 46. There is very considerable difficulty in regarding the prologue as even substantially historical (cf. Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S.S. 363 ff.), and, in any case, the references to Jesus as Messiah presuppose that He was recognised as such from His birth and even before. This presents us with a situation which would make our earliest main sources quite incomprehensible. We have, therefore, no alternative to neglecting Luke's prologue as irrelevant to our inquiry.

In Luke xxiv, 13-53, we are doubtless presented with material based upon historical incidents, but it has been much worked over from a special point of view (Klostermann, *op. cit.*, S.S. 597, 601 ff.). The historicity of no single phrase is assured. Further, it must be noted that the standpoint is that of a generation later than the events described. Thus, the Messiahship of Jesus is presupposed, but the old difficulty has recurred. It is the suffering and not the Messiahship which is the subject of the apologetic contained in the chapter. This passage, therefore, bears witness to the faith of the local early church as to the Messiahship of our Lord, but it gives us none of the grounds upon which that faith was founded, and it adds nothing to our understanding of His authority as Messiah during His ministry. But these special passages in Luke, occurring as they do either at the beginning or in close connection with the sacred tragedy and triumph at the end, colour the reading of the whole Gospel with a tinge not to be found in Mark or Q.

Our general conclusion therefore remains untouched at the place reached by an examination of the two primary sources.

Section vii.—JESUS AS SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURE IN SOURCES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

(a) Let us deal firstly with the relevant passages confined to the historically late and doubtful material in the prologue and the epilogue.

(i) i. 46-55, 68-79.

These passages are predominantly quotations from the Old Testament and are only partly relevant to the present situation. The historicity of the first two chapters is at least doubtful, but the effect of these passages occurring in their present context is to give to the events narrated a certain scriptural and traditional authority precisely on a par with the more explicit method applied by Matthew.

(ii) Luke xxiv, 13-35.—*On the Road to Emmaus.* (Verse 27.)
 "Then He began with Moses and all the prophets and interpreted to them the passages referring to Himself throughout the Scriptures."

No passage is definitely indicated, but it is made to appear that

the Scriptures, both as a whole and in detail, if properly understood, point to Jesus as Messiah, and indeed as suffering Messiah. But the support is vague and is of little value for our purposes, especially as the historicity of the whole matter is subject to grave question. It seems to reflect the happy custom of a later time which "searched the Scriptures daily whether these things were so" (Acts xvii. 11).

Luke xxiv. 36-49 (especially verses 44 ff.).—*The Appearance of the Lord in Jerusalem.*

The same position holds good in this case (see on Luke xxiv. 13 ff. 163 *supra*).

(b) Turning now to the passages in the rest of the source, we find only two.

Luke iv. 16-30.—*Jesus' first preaching in Nazareth.*

As reported by Luke, but not as in parallels in Matthew or Mark, Jesus *founds* His right to be heard upon His fulfilling the Scriptures, but He completes and gains it by His gracious words (verse 21 f.), i.e. by His personality. He arouses opposition indeed by His further personal interpretation and application of Scripture, so that its support can scarcely have seemed clear to the people, or of much practical advantage to Himself.

Luke xxii. 37. "For I tell you, this word of scripture must be fulfilled in Me, 'He was classed among criminals'."

This quotation is from Isa. liii. 12, and was spoken under the very shadow of the betrayal by Judas (xxii. 47). Jesus undoubtedly received or rather derived much comfort from the passage, as many of his persecuted followers have done since. But he does not say, "This scripture was written about Me", but, in effect, "I am to undergo an experience like that of the suffering servant. Therefore, it is part of God's providence that these things should be" That this is the force of the passage is seen from the context, whose purpose is to hearten the disciples to face the struggle that would soon break upon them.

Further, τέλος ἔχει has nothing to do with the above, in spite of appearances, but is parallel to the λέγω γάρ. It brings in a further reason why the hard times of severe struggle must come now (see also Klostermann, following B. Weiss, 1919, S. 581 *a.l.*).

The summary is that in the strictly historical parts of Luke,

there are only two instances where Jesus adduces scriptural authority, or claims in any sense to fulfil it. Therefore, He can scarcely have laid much emphasis upon His fulfilling its prophecies.

In the passages whose historicity is doubtful on critical grounds (chaps. i and ii, xxiv.), Scripture is adduced either in an indirect fashion or in general terms in a way that does not help us to add anything to what we have found in Q or Mark.

Section viii.—MIRACULOUS SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO SOURCES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

In the main body of the sources, the references are surprisingly few. Indeed, apparently they are confined to one passage and this is strongly negative.

Luke x. 20.—“Rejoice not that the spirits are subject.”

Miracles are admitted as facts, but their apologetic use is severely deprecated. The very type of the antithesis speaks both for its authenticity and also for the energy with which Jesus pressed the point home.

The witness of Luke proper is therefore against the apologetic value of miracles.

The only other references in the sources peculiar to Luke are to be found in the historically doubtful material in chapters i and ii, and the special matter of xxiv. 13-53, dealing with Emmaus and the Ascension. We note the following points:

(i) The angelic promise of the birth of John (itself not merely natural), which promise was accompanied by miraculous punishments in the absence of implicit belief (i. 12-25).

(ii) The developed story of the Virgin Birth (i. 26-38).

(iii) The prenatal recognition (i. 39-56).

(iv) The miracles connected with the birth of the Baptist (i. 57-79).

(v) The angelic revelation to the shepherds (ii. 8-20).

(vi) The revelation to Simeon (ii. 25-35) and possibly Hannah (ii. 36-38).

The first two chapters thus appear packed with material characterised by this special view-point, which is quite different

from that of the older sources used throughout the Gospel to xxiv. 12.

At this point (xxiv. 13) a new source seems to have been employed, and we have again a strong supernatural element.

xxiv. 13-32. The disciples on the road to Emmaus.

xxiv. 33-49. The Resurrection appearance in Jerusalem.

xxiv. 50-53. The Ascension.

The first of above, the Emmaus incident, seems to be an authentic experience, but which modern writers might describe differently. The precise historical nature of the other two is a matter of keen controversy, everything depending upon the working assumptions in the mind of the critic.

The authority of Jesus as depending upon these instances will be felt as either unbounded and co-equivalent with that of the Almighty or else as entirely dubious and legendary, just according to the interpretation put upon the passages. For our purpose it is better to leave the question open, and to restrict our data to material found elsewhere. Thus the sources peculiar to Luke add nothing to our understanding of the authority of Jesus as supported by supernatural phenomena of any kind.

Section ix.—JESUS AS PROPHET IN LUKE.

There are three instances in the material peculiar to Luke, and each of them has a truly authentic ring.

(i) Luke vii. 16.

The verse records the consequence of the raising of the son of the widow of Nain. The status given is very noteworthy. This is the case even if the strict historicity of the miracle is disputed, for, at least to the evangelist, there was no question as to the miraculous nature of the event, and yet he records that the people called Him a prophet where one would have expected far more. The historicity of this record simply cannot be denied.

(ii) Luke xiii. 33. "But I must journey on to-day and to-morrow and the next day; it would never do for a prophet to perish except in Jerusalem."

There is no question of the authenticity of this passage. It is an important testimony to Jesus' self-consciousness, and is in the same key as Mark vi. 4.

But here Jesus classes Himself as a prophet.

(iii) Luke xxiv. 19. "‘What is that?’ He said to them. They replied, ‘All about Jesus of Nazareth’. To God and all the people He was a prophet strong in action and utterance."

The passage occurs in the narrative of the events on the road to Emmaus. The restraint of the passage bears strong testimony to the fact that throughout His lifetime His disciples regarded Him as a prophet and indeed that this truly indicated their general attitude.

The value of these passages is enhanced if we remember that Luke’s Gospel is dominated throughout by the conception of the Lordship of Jesus, a conception which is still further developed in Acts. Nevertheless, it is in this Gospel that we have preserved the clearest and most indubitable and explicit testimonies to Jesus as a prophet. We have the testimony from all three possible sides—people, disciples, and Jesus Himself.

Section x.—SUMMARY OF SYNOPTIC SOURCES.

There can be no question, indeed, that according to the entire synoptic tradition, or rather according to all the sources with which the Synoptics were acquainted, Jesus stands out as a prophet. If this aspect could be eliminated, Q would fall to pieces and several undoubtedly authentic passages from other sources would hang in the air.

Whatever else they may testify, all our great sources regarded Jesus in this way, and the other categories examined thus far possess nothing like the same certainty or definiteness. This category has ample testimony on its behalf, and there is nothing in any of the great sources which is inconsistent with it.

Section xi.—THE PERSONAL AUTHORITY OF JESUS IN PASSAGES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

Luke iv. 16–30.—*The first preaching in Nazareth.* (See under scriptural authority in Luke, p. 164 *supra*.)

Luke vi. 24–26, 34, 45.—*Scattered verses from the Sermon on the Plain.*

This passage is very sharp and penetrating, but not cynical. It is

based upon an insight which carries its own verity as soon as uttered. It reveals the vigour of a mind not affected by things accidental to the real values of life.

Verse 34. The ethical plus is its own sanction when once expressed.

Verse 45. The point is that the good man is prior to good actions or circumstances—a point of view which can never again be lost sight of, however often it may be obscured. The great revivals of religion, as at the Reformation, and in eighteenth century in England, gained much of their force from the earnest reiteration of this principle. The sterility, often felt in the sacerdotal forms of religion, Christian and non-Christian, no less than the futility or disappointment connected with non-religious programmes of social amelioration, is connected with the inadequate appreciation of this matter. That Jesus should have expressed Himself clearly and unmistakably as He did on this issue is of great importance for understanding the force of His personality and the nature of the authority He exercised. It is purely personal and ethico-spiritual.

Luke vii. 36–50.—*The incident of the alabaster box.*

There is tremendous personal power exhibited in this passage. Jesus is without any trace of conventionalism, or the marks of prejudice deeply rooted in conventional thought. He is seen at once strong, independent, and original-minded, yet sympathetic and winsome. The word *πίστις* here does not mean “accept statements” and the like, but rather “to take up a certain personal relationship”. It seems to include also the word *ἀγάπη*. The forgiveness depends upon a reaction of loving confidence towards another. But this is entirely personal authority of the purest type.

Luke ix. 51–62.—*Jesus sets His face to go to Jerusalem—refuses to call down fire upon a hostile Samaritan village—various followers.*

Verse 56. How easy to seek to call down fire, like Elijah, and destroy them, but Jesus prefers quietly to go to another village. It is the instinct for essentials, apart from self-glorification. Jesus will exercise no influence which is not based upon free personal recognition and inner allegiance. This is specially noteworthy after Peter's confession and the Transfiguration.

Luke x. 17-24.—*The Return of the Seventy.*

The terse and graphic brilliance of Jesus' invective is very striking, and no less if it is intended to be mainly figurative. He is fresh, forceful, and confident. The sense of a living unity with God, and of the truth and the value of His own convictions, is very marked. The tone is one of complete and overmastering rightness and personal confidence.

x. 25-28.—*The Greatest Commandment.*

Jesus bases His judgment on "sanctified common sense". His authority is in His insight (so also xi. 27 f., "Blessed is she who bore thee").

Luke xi. 29-32.—*A greater than Jonah or than Solomon.*

Jesus is content to rest upon the same basis as Jonah and Solomon for His authority, i.e. on the immediate appeal to good sense and human understanding.

Luke xiii. 1-9.—*The tower of Siloam and the parable of the Unfruitful Fig-tree.*

Jesus teaches that a natural mishap or the suffering of political injustice is not a sign of personal turpitude in the sufferers, nor of rectitude in those who escape. The right attitude is not one of blame and of self-righteousness towards the sufferers, but of thankfulness for oneself and of repentance while yet there is time. Jesus presses the teaching home in the parable whose point is that even worthless fig-trees, cumbering the ground, are sometimes spared.

The passage as a whole inspires confidence in the soundness of Jesus' judgment and must have made His hearers feel He really did understand both God and the world.

Luke xiii. 10-17.—*Healing a woman on the Sabbath.*

The vigour of Jesus' reply is very great. He places human need far above that of any institution, however sacred and important. No reply is possible, the truth is self-evident (so also xiv. 1-7).

Luke xiii. 22-30.—*Who belongs to the Kingdom of Heaven?*

Jesus refuses to make this a theoretic question. No unethical advantage like race (verse 28) or religiosity (verse 25) is real, but only personal effort (verse 24).

Luke xiv. 7-11.—*Take the lowest room.*

The actual motive to which Jesus appeals is not very high, but the point of the teaching is that rank is an external matter and is independent of inner realities. It is not to be claimed, but to be ascribed. Jesus acted upon this principle Himself. He never claimed prerogative or authority, or sinlessness (see *infra*, chap. XII), or divinity. These things are debased and impossible just to the extent that they are claimed. But when ascribed as the result of personal experience they are indisputable.

Luke xix. 1-10.—*Zacchæus.*

An example of personal influence *par excellence*, showing clearly the ethico-spiritual nature of the authority which Jesus exercised.

Luke xxii. 35-38.—*Sends out His disciples armed, etc.*

A very enigmatic passage (cf. Klostermann, 1919, S.S. 580 f. *a.l.*, also p. 164 *supra*), but at least it implies (*a*) that Jesus sees a change of method may be necessary and (*b*) that there is a future. The movement is not yet finished in spite of ominous appearances. They must press on.

Luke xxiii. 8.—*Jesus and Herod.*

Jesus could not have been a very important factor in the life of the State, for it is apparently necessary to note that Herod *had* heard of Him. This fact points away from any great claims on Jesus' part or any striking ascriptions on the people's part, which confirms the point of view we have adopted.

Thus we see how strongly marked is the personal authority of Jesus in the sources peculiar to Luke. There is ample material, and some of it belongs to the most precious of the records preserved in the Gospel. Were it to be expunged the tone of the document as a whole would be entirely changed.

But we cannot complete our survey and summarise our impressions at this juncture, as there remain to be studied certain features of even greater importance. We therefore pass on at once to the highly characteristic expression of the personal authority of Jesus as found in the parables. These occur in both Matthew and Luke,

but cannot well be studied as the independent witnesses of the two sources.

Section xii.—THE PARABLES—ESPECIALLY IN MATTHEW AND LUKE.

It is impossible to attempt here a detailed study of this striking characteristic in the ministry of Jesus.

We cannot pretend that He invented the parabolic method, nor even that all the parables recorded in the Gospels are original to Him (cf. Fiebig, *op. cit.*, S. 277 and *passim*). But taken altogether there is nothing that so illuminates the problem of the authority of Jesus. Mark reports only one or two, Matthew a great number mostly brief, Luke a still greater number including some of the largest and most perfect. Only in a relatively small number of instances is the same parable to be found in more than one of the Gospels. We receive the impression that there is recorded but a selection from a large body of material, and indeed that this was the common form of Jesus' speech. His thought is concrete and practical rather than systematic and abstract; inductive rather than deductive; intuitive rather than ratiocinative; popular rather than academic; in short, Semitic rather than Hellenic. Profound, unique, and often revolutionary though much of His thought is, the common people, the illiterate, the unschooled can readily grasp His meaning because His method is the same as theirs. The common people heard Him gladly firstly because they could understand what He meant, and secondly because He seized upon the common things of everyday experience, and linked them up indissolubly with the fundamental verities of God and man and the world, with which they thus became intimate in a new and glorious way. What had been obscure to the wise became revealed unto veritable babes. He made clear the nature of God, the nature of human duty, and the whole purpose of the world. And not only so, but He revealed them in their sublime winsomeness till religion became not an imposed task but an indispensable vehicle of glad self-expression in the spirit of sublime love. Religion became linked with romance and adventure, rather than with ecclesiasticism and the schools.

Now this is prophecy, and indeed prophecy in its noblest possible

expression. The authority here is profoundly personal and of such a character that it is final and ultimate. It is authority which at once overmasters and liberates. It compels and also inspires. It gives new conceptions, ideals, and paths of a life which, however, is immediately claimed as native to, nay indeed, of the very essence of the liberated soul. It is not too much to say that in the end it becomes impossible to distinguish between the imposed will of Jesus and the revealed will of God, and again between either of these and the will of the individual as now conscious of himself. And all this is the natural and proper consequence of the self-evidencing character of the profound teaching of our Lord in the method He chose.

The parables are the most important expressions of these principles. The great majority of them teach their own lessons and bring their own inspiration. Very few need to be expounded even to-day before simple-minded people can gain elemental religious benefit from them. Only two or three of those recorded needed to be explained to the disciples, but each of these is of a special character and is rather to be regarded as an analogy from nature illustrative of special circumstances of the times—e.g. the parable of the Sower (Matt. xiii. 1-9; Mark iv. 1-9; Luke viii. 4-8) and the Tares in the Wheat (Matt. xiii. 24-30; xiii. 36-43) (cf. Bugge, 1903, S.S. 102 f. and 125 f.)—than a piece of religious teaching.

Very few of the parables have any direct reference to Jesus Himself. He does not employ them to gain some personal authority lying beyond what is inherent in the acceptance of His teaching as intrinsically true, but He uses them freely, and, in Matthew's selection, characteristically to illustrate the nature of the real Kingdom of God, e.g.

The Sower	Matt. xiii. 1-9 (also Mark iv. 1-9)
The Pearl	Matt. xiii. 45 f.
The Salt of the Earth	Matt. v. 13
The Vinedressers	Matt. xx. 1-16
The Two Sons	Matt. xxi. 28-31
The Sheep and the Goats	Matt. xxv. 31-46

to mention only a few at random. He makes frequent use of the parabolic method to enforce a right appreciation of human duty

and of God, which is perhaps the main quality more particularly of Luke's selections, e.g.

The Good Samaritan	Luke x. 29-36
The Pharisee and the Publican	Luke xviii. 9-14
The Rich Fool	Luke xii. 16-21
The Prodigal Son	Luke xv. 12-32
The Friend at Midnight	Luke xi. 5-8.

This classification is naturally only of the most general kind, and is adopted in order to make explicit what are the principal subjects to which Jesus applied the main stress of His most characteristic teaching.

And now we must go on at once to add that in all the parables, even in those which apparently needed some special explanation from Jesus to His disciples in order to make them more fully applicable to contemporary circumstances, there is felt a certain spiritual urgency proceeding from the very nature of the truth which has been expounded. That is to say, Jesus does more than expound interesting religious ideas; somehow He challenges men. He makes the issue a live one. We must come to some decision either for or against, a decision to do nothing, amounting in actual fact to a negative. Thus, e.g. in "The House on Sand and the House on the Rock" (Matt. vii. 24-27), we have a forced option for we must build somewhere; or "The Sower" (Mark iv. 1-9), where in any case the seed is being sown, and our choice is only whether to destroy or to cultivate it; or "The Talents" (Matt. xxv. 14 ff.), God gives each of us a stewardship, and the urgent question is as to its discharge. Other instances are numerous.

Now this placing of forced options before the conscience, or rather of showing that life itself is constantly placing such options is highly characteristic of Jesus, and is one of the features making for the enduring power of His preaching and the abiding authority of His person. For what we gain from Him is more than a mere increase of ideas, religious and other. We gain a new attitude in which outer circumstances, the play and interchange of the social and other influence, act as a continual and yet varying stimulus to moral and religious endeavour in a lively realization of brotherliness. And we find that this new attitude both arises from, and produces a new, inner relationship with the personality of Jesus,

in which we recognise the sweetness, the greatness, and the grandeur of His authority.

It is no longer possible to describe what the force of the parables must have been when spoken by the living voice of Jesus, and heard in their natural surroundings with a sower, or a Samaritan actually in sight. We can only dimly feel that the effect must have been plastic, profound, and compelling beyond words.

In an age of rapid and far-reaching changes and of universal religious ferment, in a land traditionally and passionately devoted to a purely spiritual religion, men and women must have felt "everything sounded as if it had hands and feet"—to use once more a phrase of Luther's. One has only to read a sober historian's description of the effect of the Bible upon relatively cold and immovable Englishmen when it was translated into the vernacular and made accessible to whosoever could read. We are told that crowds stood for hours even in the rain listening to some man with a clear voice who could read. Strong men thronged round, tears streaming down their faces, as they heard the priceless words. "Sunday after Sunday, day after day, the crowds that gathered round Bonner's Bibles in the nave of St. Paul's, or the family groups that hung on the words of the Geneva Bible in the devotional exercises of the home, were leavened with a new literature. England became the people of a book, and that book was the Bible" (T. H. Green, *Short History of the English People*, 1909, one vol., p. 460 f.). That, or something very much like it or beyond it, must have been the effect upon those who heard Jesus in Galilee and Judea. It is reflected in the conduct of the people who crowded after Him forgetful of food (Mark vi. 35 ff. and parallels), who brought Him their sick or their children (Mark x. 14), who eagerly sought to touch if only the hem of His garments (Matt. ix. 21; xiv. 36), who shouted "Hosanna!" on the steep climb from Jordan up to Jerusalem (Mark xi. 9 f. and parallels). It is also reflected in the experience of countless men and women and children since that day who, through some special advantage, have come to a vivid personal appreciation of the character and spirit of our Lord. It is revealed in the hymns (e.g. "Jesus, the very thought of Thee") and the prayers of the Church and the home throughout the ages.

The authority of Jesus as seen in the parables is predominantly

that of the personality of Jesus. The more intimately He is understood, the greater is His power to elevate and mould other men's lives. And that seems to have been, in its place, the conviction that moved the first and third evangelists when they brought to bear the material contained in their special sources and combined it with that found to hand in Q and Mark. The world would be incalculably poorer without this special material, for not only would it suffer from lack of literary and religious matter of the highest value, but also its impression of Jesus would be at once less exalted, less lovable, and less human than that which it now enjoys. On the other hand, it may perhaps be submitted, greatly daring, that if the material contained in the sources peculiar to Matthew and Luke respectively apart from their first two chapters, had alone been preserved, then, in spite of the heavy loss of much that is vital to the Christian religion, we should still have retained both the chief characteristic of the teaching and aims of Jesus, and also sufficient to enable devout minds to perceive the glory of the loving radiance that poured from the personality of our Lord.

Section xiii.—SUMMARY OF THE VERDICT OF PASSAGES PECULIAR TO LUKE.

Summarising the witness of Luke's special source apart from chapters i, ii, and xxiv, we find in general the same characteristics as in the analogous source in Matthew. There is the same quality, but the power seems greater, possibly owing to Luke's greater literary skill. Jesus appears once more as the greatest of teachers, as the wisest and most loving of brothers. His authority is that of a man who sees both the depths and the heights and who loves and awakens love. It is the authority of one who "understands life".

His attitude to Scripture is far from that of blind acceptance of a word from the past. He lives in it and with it but not under it. He feels that Scripture is fulfilled not because He has come at a time foretold, but rather because the spirit of God is descending and giving freedom to the captives and bringing to pass the year of acceptance through the preaching of a word which redeems (Luke iv. 16 ff.). He finds support in Scripture in His disappointment at His reception by the people of Nazareth (iv. 25 ff.), when

in difficulty elsewhere (xi. 29 ff.) and on the cross (xxiii. 46). When asked about human duty He quotes it (x. 25 ff.), but when pressed further, soars far above it in sweetness and in spiritual power (e.g. in the parable of the Good Samaritan). He uses it as a man who has learned from the great souls of the past, but who now stands upon His own feet and utters the high things with which His heart is full.

Compared with that in Matthew, this source is not so strongly characterised by epigrammatic and axiomatic pithy utterance. The general tone is rather calmer and somewhat less urgent. One would scarcely guess the power of invective found elsewhere. But occasionally flashes of epigram are preserved, e.g. in the three "woes" (vi. 24-26); or (vi. 34): "If you only lend to those from whom you hope to get something, what credit is that to you? Even sinful men lend to one another, so as to get a fair return"; (vi. 45) "The good man produces good from the good stored in his heart, and the evil man from his evil"; (xi. 40). "Foolish men! did not He who made the outside make the inside of things too?" which are isolated but resplendent gems.

There are many miracles (cf. v. 17; vii. 11-17; viii. 51 ff.; xiv. 1 ff.; xvii. 11 ff.), but Jesus builds nothing for Himself on them. In each case it is recorded either that the people glorify God or else that He bids them say nothing. These works are purely humanitarian and quite incidental to His main work of proclaiming a new message. Their apologetic value is found in the new realisation of God's grace which they may bring.

The main section of the passages peculiar to Luke knows nothing of Jesus as Son of God or Messiah. Its use of the term "Son of Man" is a little doubtful, but seems best understood as a literary synonym for "ego". We are presented indeed with Jesus as a prophet, but with the more tender side of this activity rather than with that of the great preacher. His authority in speaking is mainly that of one "who knoweth our frame" and "who was tempted in all points like as we are". Jesus here is our elder brother who has opened up a way that leads to God.

But in the first two chapters of the Gospel we have a different source with an independent origin and history. There is a different level both of cosmogony and of religion. The Christology has ripened. Jesus is the Lord, the Messiah, the Fulfilment of the

Scripture, the One whom the prophets had exactly foretold. The divine powers are interested in Him before birth and even similarly in His relatives. He fulfils a place in the fore-ordained scheme of things. All this interpretation of the events corresponds with the sort of ascriptions which later generations were surely almost bound to make when they came to meditate upon the profound influence wielded by Jesus during His life and after His Crucifixion, and when they attempted to find a theory for it all.

But as this interpretation is placed as a preface to the Gospel, it colours that of the whole of what follows, whether from Q or Mark or "L". We usually read the Gospel, therefore, not in the self-luminant glow of the simple historical sources it combines, but in that of the theology of chapters i and ii, which is also that of the evangelist himself. For scattered notes that seem to come from the same hand have been inserted from elsewhere because they suited his own view-point (cf. xx. 18; xxii. 43 f.; iv. 41). And when the closing scenes of our Lord's appearance on earth are conceived in the same manner, this type of colouring becomes still deeper and more impressive. But if we keep our eyes firmly fixed upon the picture presented to us in so harmonious and mutually complementary fashion by Q, Mark, "M", and "L", gradually the grandeur of the personality and the real nature of our Lord make themselves felt in their proper majesty, and we realise that of a truth in knowledge of Him lies our peace.

CHAPTER VII

THE WITNESS OF JOHN AND SUMMARIES OF THE VERDICTS OF THE SOURCES

As is so well known, we have in the Fourth Gospel an apologetic for Jesus as the Son of God rather than the evangel of a faith. The historical datum, though present, lies deeply buried in the record. The purpose of the writer is not to present new historical facts so much as to give a right understanding of the significance of Jesus, His words, and His works (cf. Strachan, 1925, p. 32).

Section i.—SONSHIP OF JESUS IN JOHN'S GOSPEL.

The Fourth Gospel shows a further stage in the theological development beyond what is found in the other sources. The Logos prologue presupposes the full Sonship of Jesus in the Trinitarian sense. This is particularly noticeable when one fully accepts the view that the prologue is integral to the Gospel. Lütgert—among others—may be held to have made the point clear once and for all.¹

But everywhere throughout the Gospel the doctrine is already complete. The grounds that are cited as sufficient for Nathaniel (i. 49) are really totally inadequate as *proof*² of the Sonship, but they give the evangelist an opportunity of so describing Jesus. It almost seems, indeed, as if the incidents were introduced for the sake of the declaration. The ascription in this place presupposes that the doctrine was well-acknowledged. In general, the same is true of the passage viii. 21–59, recording a dispute in the temple with a futile ending. Jesus makes immense claims, but there is nothing in this paragraph spiritually exalted enough to make us concede them. Nor is there any marked moral power. The passage presupposes in the minds of the readers of the Gospel an attitude to Jesus in which everything He says is accepted, and whatever

¹ *Die Johanneische Christologie*, 2te Auf. S. 65; Streeter, 1924, p. 377, deplores the great name of Harnack as connected with the opposite view.

² John contains numerous examples of television and the like, only to be understood on a theory of the completely god-like or divinely supernatural character of Jesus. For references cf. Bauer, 1925, *a.l.* 1, 49, S. 39.

He does is right, whereas all His opponents are *ipso facto* condemned.

Further, the Gospel contains very many passages in which the Sonship of Jesus is quite explicit, in which His hearers are fully cognisant of the claim, or where what He says gains its point altogether from His status (cf. iii. 16, 35; v. 19 f.; vi. 40, 46 ff.; viii. 26; xi. 25 f.). Some of these passages are amongst the most precious in the New Testament literature, and are in full accord with Christian experience, but they exhibit a Christology rather than reproduce history.

It is noteworthy that this development of the recognition of the status of Jesus is accompanied by a similar shift in the type of authority He exercised. In John we have relatively little which can be attributed to the intrinsic spiritual or ethical merit of what Jesus says, or does, or is. It is not so much authority as meaning the impact of personality upon personality in a dynamic sense, but rather the submission and overwhelming of heart and mind under the ineffable majesty, holiness, mystery, and wonder of the enigmatic, but enrapturing phenomenon of the incarnation of the God of Ages and the Father of Souls, who, of Grace, passed a little space of time amid the sorrows, the sins, the miseries, and the yearnings of men. What we find in this Gospel is not so much the magic of the personality of Jesus, but rather the miracle of divine Grace using the Son to redeem the world from sin and judgment. It is the first great attempt to explain how or why it was that Jesus exercised the influence so wonderful in His lifetime, and so marvellous after His death. Such authority it finds rooted in the Grace of a living God and in the needs of yearning souls. It is a philosophy, rather than a history, of the authority of Jesus.

Section ii.—SUMMARY OF JESUS AS SON OF GOD AS FOUND IN THE MAIN SOURCES.

The Fourth Gospel adds nothing to our knowledge of the historical foundation of any authority exercised by Jesus as Son of God, during His earthly ministry, and the result remains the same as outlined at the conclusion of our examination of the material found in the sources of the Synoptic Gospels (see p. 158 *supra*).

Section iii.—THE LORDSHIP OF JESUS IN JOHN'S GOSPEL.

In John's Gospel we find another nuance in the use of the term "Lord."

iv. 1. "Now when the Lord heard that the Pharisees had heard of Jesus gaining and baptising more disciples than John . . ."

κύριος is a mere alternative proper name or title for Jesus, cf vi. 23; iv. 11—"sir"); so iv. 15, 19, 49; v. 7; vi. 34, 68; viii. 11; ix. 36. Chapter xi *passim*.

vi. 68. "Lord, to whom else can we go?" etc.

The title here has a fairly strong religious flavour, but it seems due rather to the atmosphere of the Gospel than to the significance of the term itself, sc ix. 38; xiii. 6, 9, 13, 14, 25, 36, 37; xiv. 5, 8, 22; xx. 18, 20, 25; xxi. 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 20 f.

xi. 2, 12, 21, 27, 32, 39—the uses of the term in connection with the raising of Lazarus—all in the same sense.

In verse 27 the sense of the term is sir, dear master, rabboni, otherwise the confession of Martha is tautologous, and would be unnecessary if lordship were implied in the term itself.

Chapters xvi, xvii, xviii, and xix never use the term.

xx. 2. κύριον = Master (so Moffatt), otherwise Mary would not have said, "They have taken", but "He is risen".

xx. 25. "Lord" is not used in religious sense here, or Thomas could not have said what he did.

xx. 28. Thomas answered Him, "My Lord and my God".

This is the first and only explicit use of the term in a religious sense.

Summary of John's witness.

The result is surprising.

A distinctly religious use of the term is absent till the very end. Its place, as in Mark, seems to be taken by ὁ υἱός in the mind of the evangelist.

Probably רבי gives the best sense when used by intimates, or "sir" when used by others.

Long passages avoid the term altogether, although it is very

frequent in others. In fact, the term is all but confined to chapters iv, xi, xiv, xx, and xxi. None in i, ii, iii, vii, x, xvi-xix.

The definitely historical and religious use is confined to the reply of Thomas which is the climax of the Resurrection story (xx. 28).

But it is to be noted that this was *after the Crucifixion*.

Not even John's sources are aware of any consciousness of Lordship in Jesus, though the doctrine is fully developed and accepted by the evangelist himself.

Section iv.—SUMMARY OF JESUS AS LORD AS FOUND IN THE MAIN SOURCES.

The general conclusion is that the authority of Jesus is not founded historically upon his Lordship, nor did He Himself make any such claim in His life and labours among the people or in His intimate intercourse with His disciples. The ascription of Lordship rises later, and is due rather to the subsequent experience of the disciples and of the early church.

Section v.—JESUS AS SON OF MAN IN JOHN.

The use of the term throughout the Gospel is comparatively simple and uniform. Always it is closely and unmistakably identified with Jesus for whom it is used as a title, though with a somewhat special flavour, e.g. vi. 53, 62; viii. 28; ix. 35 (reading *ἄνθρωπον* instead of *θεοῦ*); xii. 23; xii. 34 (where the people refer to the Son of Man, though Jesus had not used the term. The passage has meaning only when the second personal pronoun is substituted for Son of Man); xiii. 31.

It cannot be denied that the term "Son of Man" is possibly something more than a mere proper name. The old conception of the Son of Man includes that of Judge of all the earth, an element which cannot be entirely excluded from John's use of the term. The peculiar authority of Jesus rests upon the fact that He is human. He knows our flesh. Here the title "Son of Man" seems emphasised in the sense that because His human life incarnates the divine, He is our judge. God would fail as Judge if His verdict did not become ours. That is why Jesus receives the task. Only a representative man can judge imperfect men. Jesus is the Son

of Man in this general sense. But in what degree this view was present in Jesus seems doubtful. Rather it appears to the writer as one of the fruits of his own meditation upon the significance of His person. It is in the mind of the evangelist rather than of Jesus.

Three earlier passages, however, make a complete identification not only with Jesus, but also with Son of Man as a heavenly being. Thus:

i. 51. (After the Confession of Nathaniel.) "Truly, truly I tell you all, you will see heaven open wide and God's angels ascending and descending upon the Son of Man."

Jesus is linked up with the theophany at Bethel in Gen. xxviii. 10 ff., i.e. with the fundamental promises of God to the Hebrew race, and thus with Old Testament prophecy.

Jesus appears as by nature a heavenly being.

This prophecy was not fulfilled.

iii. 13 f. "And yet the Son of Man, descended from heaven, is the only one who ascended into heaven. Indeed, the Son of Man must be lifted on high, just as Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert."

But Jesus has not yet ascended. The point of view is *post crucem*.

And here we have an unmistakable instance of the use of the term "Son of Man" as applied to Jesus long after His life was over.

Again, Jesus is closely identified with the tradition of the apocalyptic Son of Man as still lingering in the Christian church. The question may arise whether this is transmuted apocalyptic of some sort.

v. 27. The Father has "granted Him authority to act as Judge since He is the Son of Man."

This is a complete identification of Jesus with the Son of Man of the apocalypics.

As Son of Man, Jesus has a place of distinct authority in the cosmos.

The above list completes the uses of the term in the Fourth Gospel. It will be noticed that the specially clear identification of

the term in the first three instances, with Jesus on the one hand and with the apocalyptic being on the other, naturally colours the usage in all the remaining instances in this source. And this Gospel, being the refuge of devotional minds, has spread its interpretation far and wide over the Synoptics when devotionally read, and has helped to transform the meaning of many a passage therein. Indeed, one may go so far as to submit that without the Fourth Gospel it is difficult to understand how there ever arose the question of the identity of Jesus with the apocalyptic Son of Man in Daniel, or Enoch, or elsewhere.

Section vi.—SUMMARY OF WITNESS OF ALL THE SOURCES TO THE
AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS SON OF MAN.

The authentic use of the term by Jesus is exceedingly obscure, and any Messianic implications have a very uncertain sound. On the whole it would appear safest to regard it when it occurs in our sources as practically a substitute for the personal pronoun without any distinct colour of meaning. It cannot be doubted that in certain localities at a later period eschatological belief influenced the form in which the Gospel of the primitive Christian evangelists was understood, and this again affected to some extent the literary form of the records current in such an area. But no particular eschatological interpretation was universally accepted at any time, and none current later can be shown to go back to Jesus Himself. The use of the term "Son of Man" only helps us to understand the authority of Jesus in so far as it makes clear that that authority was not founded upon apocalyptic expectations either in our Lord Himself, or in the people who resorted to Him.

That the term "Son of Man" should have early fallen into disuse confirms this opinion even after one has allowed full weight to the linguistic considerations adduced by Dalman (1902, p. 240), and to the probably local character of a vivid eschatological expectation. If Jesus really did identify Himself with some form of apocalyptic, it is difficult to understand why the linguistic awkwardness was not overcome. If an idea is truly vital some valid form of expression will be found for it. And, in the same way, local beliefs will spread far and wide if they are important enough.

Our general conclusion is that the term "Son of Man" in no way helps us to understand the authority of Jesus.

Section vii.—JESUS AS MESSIAH.

As is well known, the attitude of the Fourth Gospel to this issue is quite different from that of the Synoptics, and is irreconcilable with history. The disciples come to Jesus from the very first because they believe He is the Messiah (i. 41). He makes Himself known as such to casual acquaintances (iv. 25 f.), and many Samaritans frankly recognise Him (iv. 42). His Messiahship is a matter of open speculation in Jerusalem (vii. 26 f., 41 f.; ix. 22; x. 24). Jesus seeks recognition of His supernatural status from Martha (xi. 25 ff.) which is to some extent an equivalent in John for Peter's confession in Mark. The miracles are performed expressly in order that the people may believe in His Messiahship, which belief is essential to salvation (xx. 31). He possesses as a matter of course supernatural gifts of television, and almost of omniscience (cf. i. 48; xi. 4, 11-14; ii. 4, 19, 21; iii. 14; vi. 64, 70; xiii. 1, 38; xviii. 4; xix. 28; xiii. 38; xvii. 12; i. 12; ii. 25). Throughout the Gospel His personality has a strong other-worldly character, and the recognition of His Messiahship is the touchstone of divine acceptance or of simple perversity. In this Gospel the Messiahship of Jesus is represented as the most self-evident and indubitable of facts, and its recognition is of paramount importance. The authority which He exercised, He exercised not so much from the inherent superiority of His words or works or personality as from His superior status in belonging to a superior world. It is strongly *ex cathedra*.

This standpoint represents the faith of a later generation far removed from the historical material of the life of Jesus. It exhibits the reaction of a profound and deeply religious mind, of mystical tendencies, to the great tradition of the Redeemer, who not only had lived and laboured in Galilee and Jerusalem, but who, as Risen Lord, ever continues His blessed activity (xx. 30; xxi. 25). It therefore records both in its extent and its type the authority which Jesus had come to exercise in the church by about the end of the first century. It may furnish material for an analysis of the psychological basis of Jesus' authority, but none for the purpose of our present inquiry into the historical foundations.

Section viii.—SUMMARY OF RESULTS *re* THE MESSIAHSHIP OF JESUS.

What, then, are we to say of the significance of the Messiahship of Jesus? It is evident from our examination that Jesus possessed this consciousness. But how He came to that conviction, and the significance He attached to it, are further questions with which we shall attempt to deal in a later chapter (see chapter ix *infra*).

Section ix.—JESUS AS SANCTIONED BY SCRIPTURE ACCORDING TO JOHN.

There are no references in this Gospel. As we shall see in a later stage of our inquiry, the evangelist has passed on to other external sanctions. We may surmise that by the time John wrote, the connection of Jesus with Hebrew prophecy was not regarded as vital, but that it had become important to show Him linked up with certain cosmological views. This is done to some extent in the opening verses of the Gospel, and in many passages connected in thought therewith. In addition there is a more conscious effort to show that Jesus' methods were similar to those of God in nature (v. 17, 19). Miracles are, however, the predominating source of testimony to the authority of Jesus (see pp. 186 ff. *infra*).

Section x.—SUMMARY OF SCRIPTURAL SANCTION FOR AUTHORITY EXERCISED BY JESUS AS FOUND THROUGHOUT OUR SOURCES

While Jesus used Scripture like every devout Jew of His time and gained much personal comfort and strength therefrom, there is no clear and insistent record that He read it and understood it to refer to Himself in some unique fashion. Nor do the people in general seem to have interpreted Scripture in such a way. There is ample testimony in both Matthew and Luke as to the opinion of the evangelists, but this is the interpretation of a later period and not the verdict of the immediate impression. Scripture may help us to understand Him better, but so will it help us to understand any religious teacher either ancient or modern. There is thus no evidence that Jesus founded His authority upon the specific support and application of ancient Scripture.

Section xi.—MIRACULOUS SANCTIONS ACCORDING TO JOHN'S GOSPEL.

(a) *Passages mainly positive.*

The reference to miracles is more numerous than in any of the synoptic sources, and the general tendency is to use them as the irrefragable argument for the authority of our Lord. There is a special term used for them. They are "signs". It is, indeed, the function of the miracles, not merely to cure sufferers, but to exhibit the unique authority of Jesus. They are not performed as usual in the older sources out of sympathy or humanitarian feeling. Indeed, sometimes Jesus seems positively to flout such emotion. Thus, on hearing of the illness of Lazarus, instead of hurrying to his aid, He dallied where He was for a couple of days (xi. 6). His purpose was frankly to demonstrate His great powers, and that "The Son of God may be glorified thereby" (xi. 4, cf. also xi. 15). He regarded the illness and death of Lazarus as affording a desirable opportunity to deliver a telling practical apologetic. The miracles are, indeed, the apologetic *par excellence* of St. John's Gospel. The following are the main references consonant with this view.

- i. 47 ff. Television.
- ii. 11. Changing of water to wine.
- ii. 23. General reference to the witness of miracles.
- iv. 42. The woman of Samaria—miraculous knowledge leads to faith.
- iv. 46-54. Healing the dying boy of the royal household.
- vi. 2. Large following on account of miracles.
- vii. 31. "When the Christ does come, will He perform more signs than this man?"—(a somewhat enigmatic complaint, as it makes the people really deny Him Messianic status).
- ix. 1-41. The man born blind, cf. especially verse 30 f.
- xxi. 1-7. The miraculous draught of fishes. (This should perhaps be put in a somewhat different category on both historical and literary grounds, but it serves to supplement the foregoing list, with which it is in harmony).

Supporting the evidence of the miracles done by Jesus, there are also two occasions where heavenly voices are heard.

i. 32 f. At the Baptism.

xii. 28 ff. But in spite of the admission that the character of the voice was enigmatic, Jesus says, "The voice did not come for My sake but for yours, etc."

Thus Jesus Himself regards this supernatural phenomenon not as a support to His own inner consciousness, but as a public apologetic for Him. This position is supported by vi. 26, where He upbraids the people for following out of self-interest rather than as a consequence of faith in Himself on the basis of the evidence of the signs (cf. xi. 4 and xi. 15, to which reference has already been made (cf. p. 186 *supra*), reveal the same attitude). Running throughout the source, also, there are numerous references to supernatural and miraculous qualities possessed by Jesus, such as omniscience, television, etc., to which allusion has already been made (see p. 186 *supra*). And it is the assumption of these general powers which add so much to the special atmosphere of this Gospel.

(b) *Passages mainly negative.*

But on the other hand there are certain references in this Gospel which must not be overlooked, and which are the more important as they are against its general bearing on the apologetic value of miraculous events.

Thus in iv. 19 the woman of Samaria, after experience of His miraculous knowledge, says: "Sir, I see you are a *prophet*."

vi. 14. After the feeding of the five thousand.

vii. 31. Where 'this man' is explicitly contrasted with the Christ.

ix. 31. God "listens to anyone (i.e. enables Him to perform miracles) who is devout and who obeys His will."

ix. 33. Where at least no special status is recognised in Jesus.

In all these cases the miracles are accepted as "signs" or evidence, but not of the divinity of Jesus. They show He was a godly man or a prophet, but nothing more. Thus even in this Gospel where, to the writer, miracles are "signs" and indubitable proofs, there are indelible traces of an earlier attitude of mind which regarded the miracles as evidence, indeed, but for something less than the divine Sonship of Jesus.

Moreover, there are traces in the Gospel of an attitude of mind

in Jesus Himself which is really consonant with the view just demonstrated. Thus:

vi. 35, 48, 51, 55, etc. (cf. also vii. 37); vi. 68.

In all these cases, the point is that Jesus Himself or His teaching is the "sign". He comes direct from Heaven, or rather is in direct communion with God, and an intimate personal relation with Him is a guarantee of the satisfaction of all the great longings of the heart. But this point of view is in rather notable contrast with that where the miracles are the strongest signs or proofs. John seems more historical in these passages as a consequence.

Thus the evidence of miracles in the Fourth Gospel, while intended to be the signs *par excellence* of the authority of Jesus, is nevertheless insufficient in itself, and is spiritually outdistanced by the fact of what Jesus was in Himself, which is the supreme sign. Jesus quite explicitly lays no value on the signs as support to His own consciousness, but recognises their apologetic value for the people. This looks like an interpretation of history on the part of the evangelist, which he then read back into the intention of Jesus.

Section xii.—SUMMARY OF THE WITNESS OF THE SOURCES AS TO
THE VALUE OF MIRACULOUS PHENOMENA AS SANCTIONS
FOR THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS.

The earliest sources seem unconscious of their apologetic value, and even as late as the Fourth Gospel traces remain of this earlier historical standpoint. There is an undertone pitched in a different key. The full and undisturbed consciousness of their value is confined in Mark and Luke to the first two chapters respectively, but these are of little help in enabling us to understand the foundations of the authority of Jesus among His hearers and onlookers and disciples. The value of such records, even where legendary, is rather as psychological witnesses, showing the tendencies at work in attempting to account for the unique experience enjoyed in the spread of the Gospel. They enable us to recognise the "tendency" of a source.

In conclusion it should be added that few people would take the miracle records practically at face value as we have done. The

actual events behind the narratives with which we have been dealing in this chapter were almost certainly less miraculous than the value we have been content to take for our purpose. But this fact can only mean that Jesus gained less support from, and Himself rested less weight upon, miracles than we have concluded was the case.

Section xiii.—JESUS AS A PROPHET IN JOHN'S GOSPEL.

By the time this Gospel was written the church had already experienced sixty years of history, a period crowded with events of vast significance for the evolution both of the administration of the Church and for the development of its Christology. The whole atmosphere of the Gospel is dominated by the fully developed and explicit belief in the Divine Sonship of Jesus. It may be described as pre-eminently the Gospel of the Son of God. We should naturally expect, therefore, that there would be little or no trace of any reminiscence of Jesus as merely a prophet. Such a view would be swallowed up in the more majestic and satisfying conception of His eternal Sonship and divinity, even in the passages which retain an authentic historical ring. We should not be surprised if there were no reference under our present category. It is one we do not at all associate with the mystical evangelist. What we actually do find is, therefore, all the more striking. There are no fewer than six explicit references as follows: iv. 19, 44; vi. 14; vii. 40, 52; ix. 17.

iv. 19 and 44 are instances of cases which have already been sufficiently discussed (see p. 187 *supra*).

vi. 14 is remarkable as concluding a passage closely parallel to that found in Mark vi. 30–44 and parallels, which is also doubled in Mark viii. 1–10 and parallels. But in the Synoptics there is no reference to the status of Jesus at the time, although the issue arises soon afterwards (cf. Matt. xiv. 33 in a somewhat different connection). Here, however, He is confessed as ἀληθῶς θεοῦ υἱός. It is commonly held that the fourth evangelist had the Synoptics in front of him when writing. However that may be, he was probably familiar with the close concatenation between the miracle of the five thousand, followed immediately by that of the walking on the sea, the narrative closing with the confession noted

above. But in spite of that he concludes his own narrative of the miracle with the record that the people regarded Him as a *prophet*. There is a distinct Johannine ring in the phraseology, "who is to come into the world", and yet the utmost status recorded is that of prophet.

The whole passage vii. 40-52 bears out this view. An involved disputation is recorded in which the point is not the divinity or the Messiahship of Jesus, but whether He was a prophet. The dispute is closed with the words, "Search, and you will see that no prophet ever springs out of Galilee".

In ix. 17 the same point is illustrated. The blind man is roughly handled, not because he holds Jesus is the Messiah or Son of God, but a prophet.

Thus we may say that in John there is unexpected but reliable historical witness to the fact that Jesus was regarded as a prophet, and that the issue as to His credentials, even for that status, was a sharp one. The evangelist himself goes far beyond this position, but his narrative indubitably reflects a period when Jesus was regarded in this way and no other. And this seems much more historical and comprehensible than a dispute as to His divinity in an assembly of Jews.

Section xiv.—SUMMARY OF JESUS AS A PROPHET.

The general result of our inquiry may be briefly summarised as follows, that during His lifetime:

Jesus indubitably regarded Himself as a prophet.

His disciples habitually looked upon Him in that way.

The friendly people almost universally held Him to be a prophet. Any other ascription is controvertible, and would have been at best momentary and uncertain, besides being late in His career.

The question of His status as a prophet was quite sufficient to account for the hostility that gradually grew in certain sections of the people.

To understand Jesus as a prophet seems fundamental to a right comprehension of His self-consciousness, His God-consciousness, His attitude to life, the attitude of the people, the power He exercised over them, the growth of Christological doctrine, the enduring freshness of His words, and, indeed, of the whole Gospel of the Redeemer, and no other ascription is needed.

Section xv.—THE PERSONAL AUTHORITY OF JESUS AS EXHIBITED
IN JOHN'S GOSPEL.

It is not satisfactory to suppose that John was so absorbed by the doctrine of the divine Sonship, that He attributed external authority to Him indiscriminately; nor to argue that the people of the time were so eagerly on the look-out for the Messiah that they accepted with uncritical credulity any pretender who arose; nor will it do to say that John's connections between insignificant episodes and tremendous ascriptions are merely theological *Erfindungen*. Much more satisfactory both historically and psychologically is it to submit that the tradition of the powerful personality of Jesus is preserved in the Fourth Gospel with such purity and at such a potential that it frequently springs the gap in the argument, or the record, with the electric spark of its vitality (cf. e.g. John iv. 42; vi. 68).

Many of the passages in this Gospel only become clear when we read there, not the divinity of Jesus as a doctrine, but the overpowering influence of the personality of Jesus operating upon the evangelist till he writes almost mechanically the words he attributes to Jesus (e.g. vi. 52 ff., 60 ff.; viii. 21 ff., etc.). If this mystic-minded writer were so completely mastered, and at the same time elevated by the personality of Jesus, we could readily understand how his Gospel comes to be the Gospel of Jesus as the Son of God. The total impression made by Jesus had been so tremendous that any other doctrine simply proved patently inadequate. Our hope, therefore, of understanding the Fourth Gospel does not lie in the possibility of our laying bare its implicit Christology or Soteriology, or what not (cf. Lütgert, 1916, S. 1). It is doubtful whether there is any really systematically consistent theory to be found in the Gospel. Rather we must seek to penetrate into the personality which lies behind the document.

Moreover, the present inquiry is rendered difficult on literary grounds, for it is extremely doubtful in any single case whether we have the *ipsissima verba* of Jesus or an authentic account of an historical event. Both these points are of supreme importance in dealing with the personal authority of Jesus. We have no help for it but to proceed cautiously, and to a large extent by inference. In any case the relevant passages are few, though different

individuals prosecuting the same inquiry might find indications in different places. They seem, however, to be as follows:

(a) *The Sources of the Personal Authority in John's Gospel.*

v. 17-19. Jesus feels His authority is in the order of the cosmos, which He regards as expressing God's will (cf. *also* Matt. v. 38-48),

His sanction consists in His own insight into God's ways in nature and the world. This is at once highly personal and final. What we *see* the Father doing is of ultimate validity for us all, no matter what our particular religious faith.

viii. 12 ff. Though this passage is expressed in characteristic Johannine language it closely follows an authentic utterance. Jesus founds His authority upon the self-evidence of His utterances and life (verse 15), and still more upon an inner certainty (verse 14) which must always be final to the subject, and from which there can be no appeal in the last analysis.

Thus a particular examination shows us that in this passage Jesus' authority is linked up closely with the position occupied by the general synoptic tradition.

More generally, however, His authority both for His inner certainty and for His practical influence is founded upon His place in the cosmos. He is conceived as part of the providential world order, and as coming with that authority. This position is in danger on the one hand of undue abstraction from the workaday world, and on the other of a certain predestinationism. We feel ourselves lifted up above the world into that supernatural sphere where God reigns by His arbitrary will alone, and yet at the same time we are caught in the mechanism of a cosmic scheme which must press on to its foreordained ends. That the Fourth Gospel should have avoided the full force of both these dangers is due to the evangelist's profound insight into the life and spirit of our Lord. His Gospel, in spite of its numerous perplexities, will ever remain the constant refuge of the more mystically inclined, and the unfailing source of comfort and peace to all.

(b) *Jesus' Claim to Authority in John's Gospel.*

xii. 46 ff. A certain authentic personal note in the whole of this passage gives the impression that it may follow fairly closely a *verbatim* utterance of Jesus.

There are references to i. 4 f. in verse 46, but in such a fashion as makes it appear that the prologue is a development of this utterance and not *vice versa*.

Similarly the second part of verses 47 and 48 may be the historical basis of iii. 16-18, since:

Jesus rejects the idea of being Himself the judge at the last day (cf. iii. 17, also v. 24, 45; viii. 15). He is content to let His words bear their own witness (cf. viii. 40). And, finally, His confidence in God is simple and energetic.

x. 19-29.—*An apologetic for Jesus' reticence about His identity.*

The explicit question in this passage is the Messiahship of Jesus, but the real issue is as to the authority which Jesus actually exercised, what were its sources and its nature?

Jesus makes the following important points:

It is no use saying anything—owing to the perversity of opponents (verse 25)—His authority is founded on a certain *rapport* (cf. also Mark vi. 1-6).

His works are a sufficient witness (also x. 37) (cf. the reply to the Baptist's inquiry, Matt. xi. 2 ff.; Luke vii. 22 ff.).

Belief, and therefore authority, is founded only in a disposition of the heart (verse 27 f.).

The continuation of the main paragraph is found in John x. 1-18, where the important point is made that the renewed and enlarged life of His followers is a witness for His authority, which is the contrary of that of the thief, etc., who damage or restrict.

Self-sacrifice is a vital consideration (x. 10 f.).

X. 30 ff. practically repeats the main arguments of x. 19-29.

xv. 1-10.—*The parable of the Vine and the Branches.*

Jesus makes the highest claims, and the recorded words here have an authentic ring. It is noticeable that the parable gains its weight from historical and personal experience, i.e. its authority is not self-evident, but depends upon our reading it in close connection with the personality of Jesus. If we read them in the Koran or the Zend Avesta, these words would probably carry little weight. The part played by Christian experience can never be overlooked in estimating the authority of Jesus.

(c) Summary.

This concludes our study of the passages in the Fourth Gospel dealing with the personal authority of Jesus. John's method is dogmatic and theological. He tells us who and what Jesus is and adduces proofs. He is the Son of God. He is also the Son of Man, i.e. a heavenly being bearing a title which has the special connotation of a representative man. He is the Messiah, and is fully conscious of Messiahship. It is regarded as really self-evident except to the perverse, and the authority it carries is quite *ex cathedra*. There are very few explicit references to Scripture except those adduced by the evangelist himself. While only eight miracles are detailed, references are often made to them. They are regarded in a manner not historically met with in any of our other main sources. They are regarded by the writer as the express proofs of the divinity and the Messiahship of Jesus. Indeed, this is really the only interest that his Jesus has in performing them, sometimes even to the exclusion of humanitarian motives (cf. John xi. 6, 15). Quite explicitly Jesus Himself lays no personal value on them. They are done only and always predominantly for their apologetic value, and not primarily for the relief they afford to sufferers. So marked is this in the case of Lazarus that one is made to pause. The character of Jesus is presented in a manner that clashes strongly without knowledge of Him in the nobility and sweetness and courage of His sympathy.

The question, therefore, arises whether this is a true portrait of Jesus, and this His authentic attitude towards miracles. The answer is not in doubt. In view of the unanimity of the great early sources we must say "No". Rather, what we have here is a kind of *vaticinium ex eventu*. One may perhaps suggest that the evangelist is quite aware of Jesus' own attitude of indifference to any authority based upon miracles, but He is also aware of the very different attitudes among the people particularly of later times. He therefore describes Jesus quite explicitly as feeling self-sufficient without them, but as intending to support the weakness of the people by their aid. Thereby, however, the evangelist robs the miracles of their human value and Jesus of ready sympathy. History is sacrificed to apologetics.

Nevertheless, the fourth evangelist bears much involuntary

testimony to the personal authority of Jesus. His own main interest may lie elsewhere, but he hints at the great personal power of our Lord. Whether we have anywhere the *ipsissima verba* of our Lord is doubtful, but there is much here that breathes with the authentic air once blowing upon the hills of Galilee and down the valley of Jordan. The conversation with Nicodemus (iii. 1 ff.) and with the woman at the well (iv. 7 ff.), the sayings about the living bread (vi. 32 ff.) and the living water (vii. 37), the parable of the Vine (xv. 1 ff.), the door (x. 1 ff.), the faith of the passage beginning "Let not your heart be troubled" (xiv. 1 ff.), reveal an authentic note in the ministry of Jesus.

In spite of all the disputes to which John refers—and every page contains some references—the tone of this Gospel is calmer. There is depicted the serenity of the soul of Him who lived in the bosom of the Father (i. 18). It is probably the deep lying and untroubled serenity of Jesus in the face of much misunderstanding and great perversity, which makes this Gospel the refuge of the weary and the heavy laden, of the disillusioned and the hungry-hearted; in short, of those who by nature or by circumstances have been driven to seek a mystic union with Christ in God, apart from all the world beside.

The authority of Jesus as given us in the historical background of this Gospel is fundamentally the authority of a prophet. It is that of a personality, whose immense significance has been linked up with the great background and the broad sweep of things, where the single individual soul counts and feels it counts for nothing except it be in communion with the all-pervading Spirit of God. When in such communion, however, there is nought on earth which can destroy its peace. Jesus is the life and the light of men (i. 4). He gives us entry to the Father (xiv. 6), He can keep all who have been committed to Him (xvii. 12 ff.). Knowledge of Him is itself eternal life (xvii. 3). He can impart the Holy Spirit both by His very breath (xx. 22), and also by sending Him when he reaches His eternal home (xiv. 17). Salvation and peace, peace here and hereafter, are found in just believing that He is the Son, the Christ, and in finding life through His name (xx. 31). This is authority, but it is the authority which can only be rightly exercised when one has fought the good fight and finished the course. It is not the authority Jesus ever sought or felt in the

days of His flesh, but it is the authority which gradually grew as the Church lived and battled, and as saint after ageing saint found that He was indeed, "able to keep all that they had committed unto Him" (2 Tim. i. 12).

Section xvi.—SUMMARY OF THE VERDICTS OF THE SOURCES.

Having thus examined our sources, we find they differ in certain important respects, but all are agreed in holding, as a fundamental datum, that the authority of Jesus is based upon what He was in Himself. Their differences from this view are not contradictions of it but developments, all of which can be readily understood on the simple assumption that the early Christians attempted to account for the mighty experience through which they had passed. And such attempts were inevitable as the new faith and the new experience of Christian redemption spread in the Hellenic and Roman world.

For it was a true redemption, and not a mere *unio mystica* with a Godhead. It was guaranteed by the joy which believers experienced in common with many others who had received salvation in the rites attaching to one or more of the many cults with which the religious world then fermented (Wendland, 1912, S. 137). It was guaranteed also by the superior ethical power they received, by the wonderful loving "enthusiasm for humanity" which broke forth in them, and not least by the experience of harmony within and without. They felt they now understood the world. They felt they had a solution for its problems,¹ and could find a satisfying purpose in their actual life.

Under the spell of the Lord, love of the brethren drew them out beyond themselves and made them servants of the world. They could link up everyone and everything with what they might hope for in life beyond the grave. The drabness and the purposelessness, the misery and the futility of life were gone, while yet outer circumstances remained what they were. Many a one could say with the apostle Paul, "To me life means Christ, and death is gain". And that experience is the experience of redemption.

¹ Justin Martyr's *Discourse to the Greeks*, chap. v.; *Hortatory Address*, iii. seq.; *Trypho*, ii.-viii. (English trans. in Ante-Nicene Library), are worth consulting on this point.

But such experience demanded explanation, and the demand became more insistent as the first generation of Christians, a large proportion of whom had been eye-witnesses and actual hearers of Jesus, gradually died out. The developments found in the different strata of our Gospel records are just as we would expect to find in devout communities of true believers. They are marked by insight and restraint. They are sound first-attempts to state a doctrine of their faith. They assume and imply both the greatness of the experience of believers, and still more the unequalled majesty of the person of Jesus. The developments of doctrine found within the Gospels thus become perfectly understandable in themselves, and they support the truth of the position we have been compelled to adopt as a result of an examination of all the primitive sources which are authentic and independent as far as we can trace them back.

Thus everything we have discovered points in the same direction, that the authority of Jesus is rooted in the greatness and the sweetness of His personality, and in the profound depth of His immediate experience of God.

PART II

SYNTHETICAL

CHAPTER VIII

THE PERSONALITY OF JESUS

Section i.—HIS CHARACTER.

HAVING now carefully examined the historical records for their witness on the foundation of the Authority of Jesus, we may attempt to bring the whole into a systematic form. We would see Jesus as nearly as possible for ourselves as the whole combined primitive record reveals Him. And so we repeat the question propounded at the beginning of our detailed inquiry and ask, "Jesus of Nazareth, who is He, what was He like, how did he really influence the people of His time? How would He have affected us if we had been among those who were familiar with Him as he moved among the towns and villages of ancient Palestine?" We cannot presume satisfactorily to answer these questions in all their detail, nor is it to our purpose to attempt to do so. Let us consider the questions from the point of view of the power He exercised over men.

Now few people who began their acquaintance with the records of Jesus by reading the sources in the historical order of Mark, Q, M., L., John, would suspect the immense significance which has been attached to relatively isolated passages in the course of the history of dogma. While not denying the importance of miracles or of the testimony of supernatural phenomena, they would surely find it difficult to believe that upon the question of their unqualified acceptance has often hung the fate of Christian men and women.

The object of the synoptic sources is undoubtedly to keep the memory of Jesus vivid. Our difficulty in attempting an estimate of the personality of our Lord is not in drawing out the consequences from a few passages, or finding the exact metaphysical-ethico-theological implications of an incidental event or utterance, but rather in catching the original significance of each passage. We must discover their proper force and glow, their first value and weight, their originality as over against the thought background and the customs of the ancient world, especially of ancient Palestine.

It is scarcely possible to say that Jesus comes before us in the

first instance as a smiling, winsome mystic, with dreamy eyes (Renan, English trans., 1888, p. 25 f.). What strikes us is rather the extraordinary naturalness of Jesus. There seems nothing forced, nothing assumed, nothing "difficult", no *arrière-pensée*, no mere enthusiasms or points of view or faddish preferences, no obliviousness to things worth noticing, no lack of balance in judgment or taste, no affectation of personal habit. He is natural almost to the point of being unnatural. He is gentle; but the gentleness is a natural self-expression and not a calculated and habituated self-restraint. He is magnanimous, but not of policy. He has not thought it out. He is magnanimous because magnanimity expresses His nature. He feels it. He believes in God, but not as a result of merely conning His providence in history, or working out the systematic implications of the immanence of God in the universe, but because He has sought and found God in prayer and personal communion, because He knows and trusts Him as a man knows and trusts his friend, and because He can see His handiwork and His characteristic personal activity in the events of ordinary nature and in the lives of men.

He exhibits wonderful firmness of character and great personal courage, but not because He feels it beneath Him to be afraid (cf. Cynics), not because He has steeled His heart to meet whatever fate has in store (cf. Stoics), but rather because He feels there is really nothing to fear but everything to welcome when one is truly in line with God.

Thus His prayers have a certain remarkable reality in them. They are not literary, nor are they conventional. They are rather the natural expressions of a man who feels a need of taking further counsel with One whose wisdom is as loving as it is exalted. They express the need of a renewed sense of the nearness of God whose presence is both sweet and strong. His very seasons of prayer are significant. They are times of refreshment of a soul seeking rest. The great labours of the day send Him to the solitude of the night. The urgent and ominous future finds Him in prayer in the garden. If any man might have lived without prayer, surely it was Jesus. In one of His exalted personality and His sense of the immediacy of communion with God, direct intuition would seem more to be expected. But, as a matter of fact, there is nothing in the records that is so natural or so noble as His prayers. He prays, not because

it is the season of prayer, but because His "heart and flesh cry out for the living God".

There is, too, an extraordinary sympathetic element in His nature. He seems to have no particular theory of society. He carried no weight on account of His social propaganda. He seems to be quite indifferent to social distinctions. He is not even suspicious of them as such. He was not the popular spokesman of a class. His mighty works are not exhibitions of power. He seems, indeed, rather to have shrunk from doing them, and from their publicity when done. But the cry of human need never falls upon His ears in vain. He will stop a triumphal progress to help a blind man. Time and again He risks the misunderstanding and eventually the grave hostility of the leaders of the people by doing works of mercy on the Sabbath. Simple humanitarianism outrode any concern for a mere institution, however venerable and sacred. He would not seek to offend the susceptibilities of the strict sects, but doubtless many of those miracles which were performed on the Sabbath are recorded just on account of the fact that it was the Sabbath, if also because these miracles were felt to be of special significance for understanding some elements in the growth of hostility, on account of their offensiveness to Jewish sabbatarianism.

Section ii.—HIS RELATION WITH THE PEOPLE.

This general quality accounts for His attitude both to women and to children and to sinful folk. In his views, as distinct from current views, they are all children of God. The love of Jesus is His outstanding characteristic and His great revelation to the world. He can see the love of God expended upon them, the purpose of God possible in them, the service of God waiting for them. And yet not that alone. Just because of His love, He can see something valuable in their own selves just because, apart altogether from sex or age or sinfulness, they are human beings with souls. Anyone who seeks to do the will of God He regards as His brothers (Matt. xii. 50). But He does not draw the circle too distinctly. The little children still too young to know anything about these high endeavours are of the Kingdom of God (Mark x. 14), and sinful women who perform simple acts just for affection's sake are assured of an everlasting name (Mark xiv. 9).

But coupled with all this there is a certain outstanding *naïveté*,

the simplicity of a mind without prejudices. "Forbidding" or "irritable" or "annoyed" are probably the least applicable epithets in all the world. He has no personal hostilities. Right up to the last He will argue, nay, almost chaff with hostile men (Mark xi. 27-33). Whether the cry of forgiveness on the cross is historical or not, it exactly corresponds to His whole genial and generous attitude towards men.

In this connection we may notice how often and how insistently He enlarges on the duty of forgiveness. Contrary to the general impression, we may aver that He has not a great deal to say about the forgiveness of God, and still less to add to what is to be found in the Old Testament on this great subject (cf. McGiffert, 1924, pp. 7 ff.). But on forgiveness as between man and man He is emphatic. It is here, indeed, that we find some of the most characteristic utterances of the Gospels (Matt. xviii. 22; v. 23; vi. 14). And it cannot be denied that Jesus has won His case. A forgiving spirit is what is commonly meant by a Christian spirit, and nothing so readily gains the reproach of unchristian as the cherishing of a bitter and revengeful temper.

But the forgiveness Jesus enjoins is different from the balanced and calculated amendment followed by a return to the *status quo ante*, as found inculcated in much Rabbinic literature (cf. Joma Ed. Strack, viii. 9; see also Joma, edited by P. Fiebig, Tübingen, 1905, S.S. 28 f.; Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S.S. 795 f.; McGiffert, 1924, p. 9). Nor is it the supercilious indifference of Aristotle's high-minded man. There is the element of love in it (Luke vii. 47) and of reference to God (Matt. vi. 14 f.) and of ordinary human prudence (Matt. v. 23 ff.). But, above all, its characteristic is a big-minded geniality which prizes the maintenance of loving goodwill more than an artificial concern for one's personal dignity (Luke xv. 11 ff., esp. verse 20).

All these qualities and many others that could be described combine to form an outstanding winsomeness of personality, and lend a magnetic quality to every word, to every action, and to His very bearing. One must add to them the effect of His healing work, though the precise nature of this effect can be easily misunderstood if we adopt a standpoint at the bidding of some theological assumption. Rather we might well agree that their effect on the attitude of the people must have been closely analogous to that produced by

our medical missionaries in India and China at the present day. These facts give us the clue to the place of miracles in the life of Jesus. They are predominantly works of mercy, and, apart from their psychological effect on the attitude of the people, have no apologetic value. Nor are they signs of the dawn of the New Age as has of recent years been submitted,¹ or similar miracles wrought by the Jews would require a similar explanation.² That Jesus laid no apologetic value upon His miracles (cf. pp. 144 and 188 *supra*) is a witness to the outstanding power of His personal influence over the people.

We must next take into account the extraordinary power of His simple, graphic, and eloquent speech, lighting up dark places, linking up everything with blessed thoughts of God, cutting clear pathways through the jungle of traditional precepts and instinctive feelings.

Of still greater importance was the high and final quality of the content of His teaching both about God and man, life and death, the world and the hereafter; high and final and yet within reach of a simple soul hungering for salvation (Matt. xi. 28 f.). Most important of all, forming at once the basis, the background, and the key of all that He said was the energy of His own personal faith. This faith was unique. Its scope was manifold. It was founded in God, but it had far-reaching applications. It was also rooted in His own personal experience of life in all directions. It was faith in God, in Himself, in human nature, in the providential order of the universe, in the best elements of the Jewish tradition, in the future still unreached and uncreated, but within the compass of God's power and of man's consecrated soul. The vigour and the unity of His faith, His purpose, and His character are testified to in what He accomplished, not in a long life like Gautama's, but in a few brief months. "The spiritual power that broke up the old pagan world and founded a new, is here compressed into a single volcanic point" (quoted Forsyth, 1909, p. 64). If one can catch rather more than a mere glimpse of the significance of all this, then one begins to feel something of the authority which Jesus exercised upon His hearers and observers, and which was such that even the

¹ Cf. E. F. Scott, 1911, p. 113, 150, 153.

² Matt. xii. 27. Cf. also Fiebig, 1911, s. 13, 23, for details even of raising the dead, stilling a storm, etc., as wrought by Jews in the age under review.

very next generation found that a new category of nomenclature was needed adequately to describe Him.

Section iii.—HIS PERSONAL FORCE.

And yet His personality, like that of every other man, was something more than the sum of His character and His natural gifts. There is also a certain unique force. Personality is, of course, unique in every man in some sense. Even a soldier in a marching regiment is still a unique individual determined by his own volition and moving ultimately in his own peculiar way. But the uniqueness of Jesus seems more qualitative or definitive. He possesses a certain power that is not disturbed in its quiet but relentless operation by external considerations of any kind. Thus, when men question Him, before long it turns out that He is questioning them (cf. Luke x. 26 and 39). There is a certain purity and loftiness combined with a personal sympathy and directness that lead to a kind of normal arraignment (cf. Simpson, pp. 38 f., 52). It is this rather than the nature-miracle which enables us to understand the cry of Peter, "Depart from me for I am a sinful man" (Luke v. 8).

Again, the utterances of most men express an opinion largely charged with an arbitrary element. St. Paul is aware of this and is careful to guard some of his views by expressly noting they are his personal opinions and not those of the Lord (2 Cor. xi. 17; 1 Cor. vii. 25). He is not prepared to see them endowed with a false universal validity. We commonly allow for this arbitrary element in estimating the value of a person's utterances or deeds. But in the case of Jesus, the very reverse is to be observed. We never have to "allow for" the personal element, but to take it more seriously into account. Nay, His words take us beyond themselves and bring us face to face with a universal. We feel as if God Himself were speaking (cf. Inge, 1909, p. 81; Moffatt, 1912, p. 173; Weinel, 1910, S.S. 82 f.). "We do not merely come to Christ through God. It is truer to say that we find in God Himself nothing but Christ" (Herrmann, 1906, p. 32). Something of the structure of a spiritual universe is being revealed. There is a certain finality making itself felt. When Jesus speaks there is nothing to add. The subject is exhausted. *

There is this further observation, the words of Jesus identify themselves with the messages of God, and also in a wonderful

manner with our own inner selves. They bring to light not only the self that is, but the self that ought to be. He can make the ideal the real. We feel we would like to have said what He says just because He expresses what we really are at bottom and what we really can live by (cf. Berguer, 1923, p. 128). We are made conscious of being "divided, wrong, inferior, and unhappy" (James, 1902, p. 189), and we experience at the same time a sense of quickening of inner power. There is a stimulating or creative element of a positive character in Him. He is the *fons et origo* of that great succession of Christian folk whose lives made Augustine exclaim, "One loving heart sets another on fire". In this quality we find an indispensable factor in his (personal) authority. From one point of view (personal) authority is precisely this imparting of power. Merely to quell, or to inhibit, or to restrain, exhibits the same quality, but with a more negative sense. But to change, to stimulate, to give new will, to create new power, to introduce to a larger life, that is the positive and the supreme test of (personal) authority. And that is what we find, as nowhere else, in Jesus of Nazareth.

"There can be no greater developments of personality," says Forsyth (1912, p. 322 f.) "than that represented by the slow conversion of a rude fisherman to a great apostle, of the Galilean pilot to the writer of 1 Peter. And that was done entirely, not by the development of the private judgment, but by the growing subjection of every thought to the authority of Jesus Christ" (cf. also Weinel, *op. cit.*, S. 83). Forsyth's statement expresses an important truth, but it should be pointed out that "the growing subjection of every thought" was collateral with a growth of personal freedom and grace. Peter was apparently better able to exercise his private judgment after his subjection than before, as we see when we compare, e.g. the episode of Cornelius with that of Peter's reproach to Jesus in regard to His prediction of suffering. At least, as he became more subject to Jesus, he was less bound by mere tradition. He was, indeed, a new man. St. Paul insists strongly upon the same point in his frequent references to the freedom of the Gospel, or the freedom he enjoys in Christ (Rom. viii. 21; 2 Cor. iii. 17).

The person of Jesus exhibits the creation of "a new genus of humanity" (H. S. Chamberlain, 1909, vol. i. S. 239), whose platform is no longer the world though he is not a stranger there.

Jesus' citizenship is of heaven and with God, though He is not far from any one of us. There is a new empire within gained by a new independence and mastery of things without. There are new values everywhere, and with them a new sense of the meaning of life and of victory. An element of triumph takes the place of the pervading pessimism. There is a sure foundation for the struggle of life, and an inner conviction that we can work together with God whatever our circumstances. The life of Jesus "constitutes, we are convinced, the point of departure and the most powerful force that has ever been given to human individuals to assist them in affecting the sublimation towards which they aspire. What was lived here does not die" (Berguer, 1923, p. 64). It is the individual experience of passing "from darkness into God's marvellous light", which is conveyed to us in the person of Jesus. One loving heart sets multitudes aflame.

CHAPTER IX

THE MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS OF JESUS AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE FOR HIS AUTHORITY

Section i.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MESSIANIC HOPE.

THERE can be no question that the authority of Jesus during His ministry was based upon what He was in Himself, and that apart from His personality He would have exercised no valuable and abiding authority whatsoever. But we may legitimately ask how far what He was in Himself, His force of conviction, His convincing power, His elevation were due to a special consciousness that He was the Messiah long promised, though perhaps erroneously expected, by the Jewish people. The Messianic consciousness is a particular instance of the general question, "In what way was the consciousness of Jesus different from that of other men, and what was the significance of that difference?" It is not quite unimportant to realise that the problem of the Messianic consciousness is really only such a special case and that the answer to the particular does not in itself decide the answer to the general problem.

Thus an admitted Messianic consciousness may be the consciousness of a redemptive function valid within the jurisdiction of Judaism, but it leaves open the question of a universal Redeemer. For the desire or the need of the nations was not set upon the fulfilment of the specifically Jewish eschatological hope. They had both ethical and religious needs of their own in addition to any they may have had in common with the Jews. Indeed, the Jews themselves had ethical and religious needs which would scarcely have been met if the Messiah had come quite in conformity with their hope. This is to some extent confirmed by the fact that there was no single, clearly defined, and universally accepted hope which any one Messiah could possibly have fulfilled. There was doubtless a range of needs felt in one section of the people but not in another, whenever a new form of the Messianic expectation gained any currency. Few to-day pretend that the hope as expressed in the Psalms of Solomon was universally held, though it may be admitted it was the expression which can be most nearly applied to the life and aims of Jesus. The conception found in these Psalms may have made it possible for Him not to disdain the name, but, on the

other hand, "from their standpoint the Pharisees reasoned not amiss that the marks of the Messiah were conspicuously absent from Jesus of Nazareth" (*E.B.*, col. 3063).

One of the most constant features associated with the Messianic hope was found in its political bearing. While the Messianic era was universally regarded as a new order in which the wicked would cease from troubling, it was also one in which Israel would be freed from the assaults of hostile nations. Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Daniel reproduce this feature, and all look forward to a time when Israel would be established under an ideal Kingship as an ideal nation. It can scarcely be the case that this ancient and attractive picture faded away completely from the faith of any who enjoyed the hope even in its most refined forms. It must surely have been an abiding integral part of the conception as held by the people generally, as by the average Pharisee. After all, patriotism was a phase of religion to the Jew, and a phase associated with some of its characteristic expressions.

But such a political element in the Messianic hope is also its limitation. The final victory of Israel meant inevitably the final defeat of the Gentiles. Recompense to the one carried with it retribution to the other. What is nationally conceived can scarcely be universal. In short, there was a certain exclusiveness about it from which it was never entirely freed.

Section ii.—THE RELATION OF JESUS TO THE MESSIANIC HOPE.

This being the case, especially in the popular conceptions of the time, one would have little difficulty in appreciating His position if Jesus hesitated to claim the title, however truly He may have felt it was really His. Indeed, from one point of view it would speak in favour of His conception of His life and work if He positively turned aside from the Messianic hope as being both inadequate and misleading. Such an attitude on His part would not mean that He believed the part of Messiah was above Him, but rather that He clearly saw its national and other limitations, and was perfectly conscious that He came to do something far vaster, as later experience proves, than merely to fill the rôle of Jewish Messiah, however nobly conceived.

Making the above suggestion, however, is not tantamount to holding that He may have refused any commerce with the con-

ception. The point is rather that His fulfilling the rôle can scarcely be held essential to His spiritual authority among the people of His own nation, still less of the Gentiles, nor need it have been essential to His own certainty either of God or of His own mission.

It is conceivable that Jesus might well have adopted the same attitude to the Messianic hope as He did to the ethical teaching of the Law and the prophets. He came not to abrogate but to fulfil, and yet He did abrogate just in so far as He fulfilled them. At best they are a propædæutic to His Gospel. Both their ethics and their theology are, as it were, extended historical footnotes to the teaching of Jesus. Similarly in regard to the current and the ancient Messianisms of His day. It may be held that He both fulfilled and abrogated them. He emptied them of significance just because He Himself was in His own person all that they meant at their best, and also more in ways which they never conceived. To say that Jesus was the Messiah of the Jews is surely to hold that He occupied a place both different from and less significant than what Christian thought usually accords Him.

Section iii.—HIS MESSIANIC CONSCIOUSNESS.

To predicate of Him a Messianic consciousness may mean one of two things. (a) It may mean that He conceived He was Himself the very Messiah of whom the great prophets had dreamed, whom they had foreseen, or for whom the people yearned. This is to claim a very high place and to give Him a special standing in the providential order of history. In one sense, it makes him more than a mere prophet speaking and working by the force of His own inner experience and conviction. It gives Him a special divine authority which makes itself felt in the course of His life, in the nature of His utterances, and in the uniqueness of His personality. It would let Him feel that in some sense He could compel the Kingdom to come (cf. Scott, 1911, pp. 130 ff.). But at the same time it makes Him somewhat less than a free agent and somewhat different from an ordinary man. His temptations would assume a different form and have a different significance from ours. His achievements, His moral victories, His insight and understanding would be on another plane than ours. His consciousness of God and hence His faith in God would have a foundation and hence a

value all of their own. In short, His inner life would be qualitatively distinct from that of common men.

Now all this may be quite historical. If so, we must just accept it and proceed to the logical developments for Christology generally and for the authority of Jesus in particular, however well or ill it may accord with our views as hitherto elaborated. But we may note that it accords only with difficulty with the teaching that He was "in all points tempted like as we are" (Heb. iv. 15, R.V.) and it brings its own meaning to the problem of His sinless perfection (cf. chap. XII. p. 245 *infra*).

On the other hand, (b) the Messianic consciousness may mean that Jesus believed Himself to have been anointed by God to do a certain special work whose form, substance, and significance He would clearly conceive, but which was peculiarly *His* work. It was *His* because He was what He was by His own insight into and His own experience of the nature of both God and the world. Jesus would then believe that His mission may or may not have fulfilled that which the prophets (up to and including the Psalms of Solomon) foresaw would be needed to bring the people to a proper consciousness of God and His purpose. But it would mean, in any case, that His conception of His life's work was Messianic in the most significant sense possible, viz. that it was redemptive, that it offered the people not the salvation for which they yearned, but which they needed. It would be Messianic not in a national or political, but in an ethical and spiritual sense. It brought the possibility of each man's being anointed by God—a universal baptism of the Holy Spirit. It would mean not establishing a supernatural Kingdom by an overthrow of the natural order and the special cosmogonic creation and descent of a physical-superphysical Kingdom of Heaven from the skies or elsewhere, but the actual creating and perfecting of a sphere of human experience, and the initiating of an empirical order of human society in which God was truly King, where His will was truly done, and where His reign was inward and unchallenged and therefore complete.

Section iv.—ITS SIGNIFICANCE TO JESUS.

We submit that, broadly speaking, there are these two alternatives to our understanding of the term "Messianic consciousness"

as applied to Jesus, and it is now our task to decide which, if either, is historical and what was its significance for our Lord.

In the course of the examination of our sources to discover the nature of their witness to the Messiahship of Jesus in relation to His authority (see pp. 68 ff., 107 ff. *supra*), we found several important things. (a) In the first place, Q, though aware of the question, does not apparently regard it as an important issue, and the authority Jesus exercised was independent of a decision in the matter. (b) Then in Mark we have a clear and unmistakable record that He did possess consciousness of Messiahship, but He never permitted it to be publicly known. He built none of His influence among the people upon it and none of His ethical or religious teaching in the course of His public ministry was founded upon it. He does not teach because He is the Messiah, nor because the Kingdom is coming, but *vice versa*. Even among His own disciples it was only on the confession which He drew from Peter that the knowledge of His Messiahship became a possession common to the circle.

His purpose in making it explicit at that time seems to have been twofold. In the first place He wished to give a proper understanding of the term, making it very different from any conception the disciples may have held and which they may have been attempting vaguely to apply to Him. And then He wished the disciples to attain a proper understanding of the significance of the path He had decided upon and the sufferings He foresaw. At least it must be admitted that His close connection between Messiahship and suffering altered the connotation of the former and the dignity of the latter. As a matter of historical fact, His teaching on these points did much finally to remove the offence of the Cross, and to make it possible for the eleven to believe in spite of the tragedy, nay, confirmed by the tragedy, that His was the only name given among men whereby they might be saved. It was one of the important aspects of Christian truth which Paul eventually seized upon, and developed so effectually throughout his preaching. But it is to be found first of all in the teaching of our Lord as He imparted it to His disciples during the last journey to Jerusalem.

We have, then, the secure historical datum of a Messianic Consciousness in Jesus. What was the exact significance which He attached to the status? If only on literary grounds, it is difficult to believe that He came to the conviction because He had accepted

in full earnestness the doctrine of the external approach of a supernatural Kingdom of God (Strecker, *op. cit.*, p. 255). Nor is it possible that He can have said to another or even to Himself, "I am the Messiah. Let us set about the Kingdom" (Schweitzer, 1921, S. 294).

And it is well worth considering whether Jesus would have conceived His work differently if He had had no Messianic consciousness. The real value of His ministry seems independent of the Messiahship.

In any case, the Messianic consciousness has presuppositions beside those worked out in the Fourth Gospel. Jesus must first of all have reached a unique consciousness of God and His personality, and later have found Himself in a relation to God unparalleled among His contemporaries. The consciousness of Sonship is prior to that of the Messiah, and it is possible there were several psychological stages between (cf. Harnack, 1907, S. 169).

Further, it does not seem quite satisfactory to hold that the conception of the Kingdom of Heaven, or of its near approach, depended upon an aboriginal Messianic consciousness as suggested by Schweitzer's position (Schweitzer, 1901, S.S. 1-18). Nor does it fully correspond with the records to assert that the Kingdom of Heaven preached by Jesus was not of a wholly spiritual order (Schweitzer, 1921, S. 294).

But if this be true, we are driven with all the more force to find what was the dynamic experienced by Jesus in His work. If it was not merely the near approach of the supernatural Kingdom of Heaven, visibly descending fully articulated and equipped from the skies that made His message urgent, then what was it? Why did Jesus find His meat in doing the will of Him that sent Him? (John iv. 34). It may be true that Jesus was far from carrying the whole people with Him (Schweitzer, *ibid.*, S. 284), but we have to account for the facts that the common people heard Him gladly (Mark xii. 37), and that the disciples were able to set the world alight.

As we have already seen, any form of Messianic consciousness presupposes a certain amount of religious experience. It is impossible to imagine that Jesus *began* by becoming aware in some supernatural fashion that He was the Messiah, or even a Messiah. He must *first* have had an immensely vivid or far-reaching con-

sciousness of God as a living God, and as having an immediate relation with and purpose for the world. He must also have felt most clearly the power and the limitations of the preaching of the Baptist. If the records of His baptism mean anything, they mean that Jesus received the call to His ministry then. Certainly He seems to have taken up the work which the imprisonment of John shortly afterwards brought to an end (Luke iii. 23, cf. also Matt. iv. 12 f.; Mark i. 14). His power as a preacher, and especially His unique qualities as shown in His extant parables, presuppose some amount of practical experience in this difficult sphere, between the actual commencement of His ministry and the first recorded work. It was apparently in this period also that He gathered His earliest disciples Simon and Andrew, James and John (Mark i. 14 ff.).

If Luke's account of His first public visit to Nazareth be correctly placed right at the beginning of His recorded ministry (Luke iv. 16 ff.), we have more than a hint as to his self-consciousness at that date. In any case it is diagnostic of His conception of Messiahship. He comes forward as a preacher and yet not merely as a preacher, but as one who has been divinely anointed to preach. He fulfils the Scripture by preaching to the poor and also by His sense of being anointed for the purpose. The character of the Messiahship here depicted and claimed is decidedly not that of one whose main business it was to introduce the hyper-physical Kingdom of Heaven, but to proclaim the meaning of a time which God could look upon with favour. He was "consecrated and sent to proclaim or to introduce the end of imprisonment, blindness, and oppression (in an ethical-religious sense), in short, to proclaim a year of the grace of God" (Klostermann, 1919, S. 426, *a.l.*). The consciousness of Jesus was thus the consciousness of a special mission of God along the lines of a similar experience spoken of in Isa. lxi. 1 f. or lviii. 6, and "with Him and His preaching the Messianic era already begins" (Klostermann, *loc. cit.*).

Close inspection of this passage shows that it was by assuming the duty and responsibility that Jesus could claim status of Messiah. He was not Messiah prior to and apart from this task. If he had not undertaken this special work, if He had not answered this divine call to service, He would not have been Messiah at all. The function gave the title and not the title the function.

Further, the situation we are confronted with means that Jesus was conscious of God and of the urgency of God's will in a vivid manner. He had become aware of a special and deep need in the world. He felt the need for a renewed and revitalised understanding of God and His relation to men, and for a clear utterance of what His insight made Him aware of. The impulse to speak became imperative. His sense of the nearness, the love, and the faithfulness of God, His profound sympathy with the condition of the people in the poverty of their legalistic religion, His joyful understanding of life and its meaning, worked together. He felt He really had a message. This was what also the ancient prophets experienced. His message as He conceived it, and God's will as He knew it, fused into one another. The results accruing to His early ministry and the adherence of the first group of disciples must have added to the strength of the inner urgency. It became altogether supreme and irresistible. It was the will of God, and yet His own. It was His own and yet God's. He dedicated life and strength to proclaiming it. But that is Messiahship, and if Messianic consciousness means anything ethical and religious as distinct from something titular and external or the mere fulfilment of a rôle conferred, we see it exemplified in the consciousness of Jesus in this leading passage in Luke. It is the consciousness of a mission rather than an office (cf. Forsyth, 1912, p. 94 f.). It is born of an inner experience rather than an outer "call". It was indeed a new creation. Jesus was not the Messiah of the Prophets nor of the Apocalypics, nor of the Baptist, nor of contemporary Judaism. He was the Messiah born of His own soul through His own communion with God. He based Himself upon, He fulfilled, and He disappointed the dreams of prophets and preachers, of Pharisees and people in varying degrees analogously to the way in which His teaching derived from Scripture fulfilled and yet went far beyond it.

The Messianic consciousness of Jesus lent urgency to His ministry, or rather it would be more correct to say that it was the sign of its urgency. The urgency itself lay in His compassion for mankind, whom He had come to *seek* and to save and who seemed like sheep without a shepherd (Luke xix. 10; Mark vi. 34). He felt that the Kingdom would indeed be here if He could win the masses, and the crowds that often followed Him showed that a

“mass-movement” might come at any time. And what blessings it would bring to the people! There we have the ethical basis of the urgency of His labour. We cannot conceive that it would have made any intrinsic difference to Him or to His life’s work even if He had never thought of Himself in connection with the Messianic hope. But the title was there. It represented the most adequate available term for describing His life’s work and His own person, yet not without great caution in its use and a clear understanding of the line of life Jesus proposed to take. Apart from this understanding, the title is misleading and fallacious. Jesus had no consciousness of it as involving power and claims, which He could arbitrarily exercise, or that were valid apart from their own inherent authority. Only in connection with the life He lived and the ministry He exercised as it were independently of it can the Messianic consciousness be understood. Thus, in relation to the authority of Jesus, it only adds to our appreciation of the force of His inner self and the power of His personality. It is the person of Jesus which makes the doctrine of Messiahship important for us to-day and not *vice versa*. Apart from Him, it would be only of historical and literary, but not of religious value.

On the whole it must be admitted that the conclusion we have reached on this subject accords well with the other important passages revealing Jesus’ consciousness of Himself. They are to be found in the Confession of Peter, the Triumphal Entry, and, with somewhat doubtful historical value, in the Transfiguration. We have dealt with the significance of these passages in detail in our study (see pp. 93, 107 ff. *supra*), and it may be sufficient now merely to say that whatever consciousness of Messiahship may be implied in them, it scarcely influences Jesus in the line He chose. He does not set His face towards Jerusalem because He is the Messiah, but in spite of it. His Messiahship is the difficulty, and it has to be carefully explained and its real meaning as understood by Him jealously guarded, lest it lead the disciples into false ways of thought. But once properly understood by others, it served to emphasise the spiritual significance of the path Jesus had chosen. It added, as it were, a classical sanctity to the memory of His life when the disciples came to themselves after the tragedy of the Cross. It gave them additional power in their subsequent preaching among the Jews, for they went beyond the mere reiteration of the doctrines

taught by Jesus of Nazareth, or the interpretation of them in the light of what He was in Himself. They linked all up into a powerful spiritual unity with the historical and prophetic religious experience of their nation. The disciples felt themselves in an immensely strong position, for they could do far more than speak of the figure of a redeemer of whom men had dreamed, but whose precise significance was open to disputation. They were able to speak of one whom they had seen with their own eyes, heard with their own ears, who had recreated the lives of those who followed Him, and who did really fit in with and refreshingly interpret the best traditions of the great prophets. For the disciples and the first believers these dreams were no longer merely dreams. They were experienced facts of the first spiritual importance, and the proof of them was found in the sufferings their Lord endured, and in the present power they themselves experienced.

It seems to have been this difficulty of connecting the crucified Jesus with the Messianic hope which constituted the great moment in the factors contained in the conversion of St. Paul. The essence of his first preaching was that Jesus *was* the Son of God (Acts ix. 20), and he made it one of his essential points when arguing with the Jews at Thessalonica (Acts xvii. 3), "The Messiah had to suffer. . . . The Jesus I proclaim to you is the Messiah"). When defending himself before King Agrippa he brings it forward and says, "Why should you consider it incredible . . . that the Christ is capable of suffering? (Acts xxvi. 8, 23).¹

It is implied and more than implied in many of the fundamental passages of his Epistles (e.g. 1 Cor. i. 25).

But the point is that the identification of Jesus with the Messiah was of great importance in the spread of Christianity among Jews both at home and throughout the diaspora. It gradually evaporates, however, into a bygone issue as the church becomes more and more gentile in its composition. In many places in St. Paul's letters the term "Christ" has lost its Messianic significance. It is a title, nay, it is but a proper name which may well be used as an alternative to "Jesus" (e.g. 1 Pet. iv. 1). It becomes, indeed, the

¹ The reading is given by restoring verse 9 to its original position immediately before verse 23 as suggested by Nestle and quoted by H. H. Wendt, 1899, S.S. 390 f. and 397, and followed by Moffatt in *A New Translation of the New Testament*. New edition revised.

name by which the followers of the "new way" are called (Acts xi. 26; xxvi. 28), and Tacitus refers to Jesus by this name which has apparently in his locality displaced the birth-name of our Lord.

Thus it would seem that the question of the Messiahship of Jesus was properly one of local and temporary significance only. It is, however, really an aspect of a larger and a permanent issue, namely, of the place of Jesus in the providential order. The important thing is whether Jesus plays an essential part in the redemptive purpose of God. We want to know what is the authority of Jesus in the process of human salvation, in satisfying the legitimate demands of the soul, in reconciling man and God. Can we say of Jesus, "This is the ideal of man?" Does His teaching embody the final norm for human conduct? Does He give men an ultimate understanding of God? Does He confer upon men the power rightly to live their lives and to become heirs of God? These questions penetrate into the farthest recesses of our life and have vitally to do with its deepest foundations. Upon our answer to them depends the ultimate validity of the Christian faith.

CHAPTER X

THE AUTHORITY OF THE RISEN LORD

Section i.—THE IDENTITY OF THE RISEN LORD WITH JESUS OF NAZARETH.

ONE of the outstanding features of the results of our inquiry thus far, is their inadequacy. What we have gained from a close examination of the historical sources of the life and ministry of our Lord, and from the qualities of His character and His teaching, is quite unique. No such life or ministry, no such ethical purity or loftiness, nor any other personality so exalted or inspiring, in short, no other man of such tremendous significance has ever been born. Of these conclusions there can be not the slightest doubt. But it is equally undoubted that they are not fully adequate to account for Christian experience, nor do they account for the attitude of Christian faith. Both faith and experience take innumerable forms, but where there is contentment with the broad position indicated by the results we have gained, there is something less than the normal Christian consciousness. But after having examined carefully all the authentic records of the ministry of our Lord, we may well ask why there should be any inadequacy, and whether, indeed, what is claimed as normal Christian experience contains elements foreign to its real nature, and, perhaps, added syncretistically in the course of the succeeding ages.

While admitting the possibility of such additions, our reply cannot be hesitant. For, after all, in spite of all their unrivalled splendour, the Gospels do not give us all that is contained in the new dispensation. They tell us only what "Jesus began both to do and to teach" (Acts i. 1), and none has ever been more conscious than the first generation of believers that what is now contained in the Gospel records was but such a beginning. To prove this statement may be adduced two significant facts. (1) That the most important portions of the rest of the New Testament were written prior to the Gospels, and it was largely in the light of the former that the latter were written at all. This means that much vital Christian experience took place after the crucifixion of Jesus. And (2) there is a striking change of atmosphere when one passes from the Gospels to Acts, a change which cannot be explained

on the basis of external accretions, but only by the valid enrichment of a legitimate experience. And the experience implied by the record in Acts, and by the message of the Epistles, is vital to our understanding the normal Christian faith to-day and the authority which Jesus now exercises. In other words, the Christian faith depends directly, but only partly upon the Gospel records. It includes them and goes beyond. It also depends directly upon what is fundamental to the special message of first-century New Testament writings, and this completes the foundations of the authority of Jesus.

Thus it is impossible for us fully to appreciate the authority of Jesus on the basis of the Gospel records alone, but it is also impossible for us to do so without those records. The distinction sometimes drawn between the Jesus who lived among men and the Christ of experience is gravely misleading, unless it is made purely for convenience of theological discussion. The "universal Christ" or the "Christ idea", to which reference was made in our opening paragraph, is really fatuous and arbitrary when divorced from Jesus of Nazareth. It may be true that it is impossible for succeeding generations of Christians to approach the Christian faith or to attain Christian experiences apart from the operations of the Christ idea, but neither faith nor experience can come to their proper fulness and certainty unless they be firmly rooted in the Jesus of the Gospels.

What, then, is the nature and the validity of the authority of the Risen Lord? Throughout the Acts there is the consciousness that believers are in the presence of the same Jesus as before (iv. 10; ii. 32, 36), and it is the identity which St. Paul emphasises (Acts xiii. 29 ff.; 1 Cor. i. 23, etc.), equally with any other contention. And as has often been said, the Christian preachers were at a great advantage as compared with those of any of the cults which were beginning to flood the Græco-Roman world, in so far as they were able to appeal to the historical person of Jesus and the memory of eye-witnesses.

But here we come across a striking thing, viz. that though the apostles insisted upon the identity of the Lord they preached with Jesus of Nazareth, they do not appear to have frequently invoked the memory of Him. There are only one or two references to the memory of Jesus, and all of them seem to be immediately

connected with the Memorial Supper (1 Cor. xi. 23 ff.) which was related more particularly to the death He died rather than to the life He lived. The point is that the primitive believers did not deify the memory of Jesus, nor was it those whose memories were fullest and clearest that came to be held in the highest esteem. It is doubtful whether we have extant an autograph of the records of one of the disciples. It was important, indeed central, to keep the memory sacred, but the memory was not the dominant factor in the authority of Jesus after the Crucifixion.

Section ii.—THE SPIRITUAL CHARACTER OF THE RISEN LORD
AND OF HIS AUTHORITY.

Immediately we turn to the records of the post-Crucifixion experiences, we find that this Jesus, who was formerly known and loved predominantly as a prophet, and only in a narrow circle for a short time and with serious limitations of understanding as a Messiah, is *now worshipped*. He is Lord. To a smaller circle of Jewish believers He is for a short while worshipped as the Messiah, which is, however, to be regarded only as a temporary and national form of the same attitude. But the nature of the influence He exercises is certainly not that of a memory personified and revered. There is exhibited in the records little turning of the eyes towards the wonderful days of Galilee. In fact, so slight is the trace of such a reference to be found in the Epistles, that it is a matter of inference to determine to what extent St. Paul preached upon the ministry of Jesus. What we do find is rather that all the apostles of whose preaching we have any records, believe themselves in relation with a living Lord (cf. Wendland, 1912, S. 260). It is in His present power that they work miracles (Acts iv. 10, 30), that they preach (ix. 29), and that they can die (vii. 59).

And this Lord Jesus is not a lesser deity alongside Jehovah, for prayers, ascriptions, and references are made to Him as if He were God. If He were to be regarded as a living Lord at all, anything less would be impossible. For the first group of believers were entirely Jews, and some, if not all, as later history witnesses, were of a distinctly rigid and orthodox type. It was, indeed, their very intransigence that within a very short time provoked a crisis within the body of the growing church. But

these same men are found worshipping Jesus personally and preaching Him publically with the utmost fervour of conviction. They apply to Him the same name as that given by tradition to Jehovah. They call Him Lord and worship Him as Lord. It is the same name or title as that with which many of the Jewish proselytes, and especially of the Jewish diaspora were perfectly familiar in the heathen cults and mysteries. Here the name Lord meant "a deity" or "a divine Saviour", a meaning impossible to any Jew. To them He must be "the Deity", "the Saviour", or nothing at all, and, in fact, that is the type of authority which henceforth is ascribed to Jesus. There is simply no discoverable difference between the personal relation to Jesus the Risen Lord and the personal relation to God. It would be true to say that what they knew of the God whom they preached and whom they trusted, was what they found in Jesus. Apart from Him they had nothing to say about God. They seem to have no consciousness of any need of divine good which Jesus could not and did not satisfy. They found God in Jesus rather than Jesus in God.

As is well known, and as has been emphasised in the attractive researches of Adolf Deissmann, this feature predominates in the faith of St. Paul (English trans., 1923, pp. 181 ff., 1925, S.S. 107-143). The apostle lives as a new man "in Christ" (2 Cor. v. 17). Life, indeed, means Christ to him (Phil. i. 21; iv. 13). He conceives of a Christ-mysticism (Deissmann, 1923, pp. 181 ff.). He finds the Lord within and yet without (Gal. ii. 20; II Cor. i. 21). He is penetrated by Him as the sunlight penetrates and warms the flowers. He breathes in Christ as he breathes in the air. He is in Christ and Christ is in Him, as he is in the atmosphere and the atmosphere is in him. Christ is more than the world itself, and through Him ordinary men are more than conquerors over it (Rom. viii. 37). He makes known the length, the breadth, the depth, and the height of the love of God which really passeth mortal knowledge (Eph. iii. 18 f.). Indeed, there seems no term fully adequate to St. Paul's conception of the being of Christ, and no authority less than the divine is adequate, he feels, to account for either His conversion-experience or the labour and the powers of the succeeding years. He is glad of life and all that it has meant to him, but at length he will be glad to depart and die, and be with Christ which will be far better (Phil. i. 23).

But this characteristic attitude of St. Paul betokens an authority in Jesus which he experienced in common with the older apostles who, indeed, when they differ, do so not as to the divinity to be ascribed to Jesus (cf. Gal. ii. 2), but as to whether a certain form of worship is adequate (Gal. ii. 14).

Such, then, is in general terms the nature of the authority of the post-crucifixion Jesus. It is ethically indistinguishable from that of God, i.e. it is divine authority. But the question of questions is whether such authority as exercised by Jesus is valid. We want to know (i) what right had He to exercise such authority, or rather perhaps, on what grounds was such authority ascribed to Him, and (ii) on what grounds is it ascribed to Him to-day. And further (iii) is He the ultimate reference in all things concerning our spiritual life, and if so, in what way?

Our answer must be congruous with what we have determined to be the quality and attitude of the mind of Jesus in the days of His flesh, and it is *ex hypothesi* the same person and not two different persons. It is Jesus of Nazareth whom "death could not hold" (Acts ii. 24).

Section iii.—THE HISTORICAL SOURCES AND THE VALUE OF THE EVENTS.

Let us begin with the historical certainties in the events that followed the Crucifixion. In this attempt we are at once met with a problem of the first order. No one is able to determine just precisely what was the nature of the resurrection of Jesus as a historical event. The doctrine of the bodily resurrection is one that raises as many difficulties as it seems to solve. No view yet propounded has been universally received, and we are faced finally with the question of what became of the resurrection body in the end. Moreover, it is problematical whether the apostles themselves knew anything of such a form of the resurrection of Jesus. Certainly St. Paul places the appearance of the Lord to himself on precisely the same footing as that on any of the other occasions (1 Cor. xv. 4-8), and it is of importance to note that St. Paul's record of the resurrection appearances is considerably older than that found in any other of our sources. His conception of the Risen Lord formed one of the fundamental convictions in St. Paul's own ministry, and of the faith of the churches in

which he laboured. And this conception was apparently never challenged in any way whatsoever. But it is what might be called an entirely spiritual conception.

The important thing is not the form of the resurrection, but the fact that the person of Jesus was alive. He had conquered death. He was as truly as ever a living person. He was as surely as ever personally present. On occasion, He became visible or audible. The usual sense criteria are probably not fully adequate, for sometimes it would seem it was difficult to distinguish between His visibility or His audibility. At least some accounts tell us He was heard but not seen (Acts ix. 7), and others dealing with the same event say He was seen and not heard (xxii. 9) by the companions of the apostles (cf. *re* Pentecost, p. 226 *infra*). The root of the whole matter is in the powerful personal impression created by the living Lord Jesus upon the minds of the people concerned. Whatever other element may or may not have been present, of the entire historicity of this datum there can be no doubt, and it remained fundamental to the faith of St. Paul throughout his life.

The precise form of the "appearances" of Jesus is a matter for scientific inquiry, and any decision so reached will not affect the religious bearings of the resurrection life of Jesus. What alone matters here is the established fact of the personal survival and presence of the Lord in the experience of the apostles. This is in itself a "miracle" unique in its significance for the history of the Christian faith. But the point to be noted is that the doctrine of the bodily resurrection postulates a miracle of an entirely different order. It puts a religious value entirely at the mercy of a scientific or literary decision which may possibly be adverse. A religious value would depend ultimately not upon an indubitable personal experience of the apostles or of later generations, but upon the balance of the credibility of literary and other evidence which on every ground it is extremely difficult to evaluate. Most importantly such a basis for Christian experience, and for the authority of Jesus, would be completely out of harmony with the attitude and method of Jesus of Nazareth during His earthly ministry, for he assigned no apologetic value to miracles of this character. As we have seen (pp. 204 f. *supra*), He definitely declined to found any authority upon them, and for a

whole generation afterwards no such value seems to have been set upon them, as we know from the fact that our fundamental sources know nothing of any *religious* influence upon which Jesus laid any weight, and which was founded in this way. We should therefore be driven to assume that the mind of the Risen Lord was in this regard opposed to that of the earthly Jesus, if we were to posit an acceptance of such a miracle as fundamental to the authority of Jesus as Risen Lord. And we should soon be compelled to distinguish clearly between their persons to the danger, if not the end, of the authority of the earthly Jesus. In other words, it would appear that our ultimate understanding of the history of Christian experience depends upon a purely spiritual conception of the resurrection and life of Jesus after the Crucifixion. Thus the authority of Jesus is founded, as before, upon His immediate reaction upon individuals and upon the society of believers.

An examination of our records bears out this view. When we first tread firm historical ground after the Crucifixion, we find the disciples gathered in the upper room (Acts i. 13). Their mood is pensive, if not actually gloomy. As is evident from the scriptural references (cf. e.g. 1 Sam. xvi. 7; 1 Chron. xxviii. 9; Jer. xi. 20; xvii. 10) their first recorded prayers are most significantly directed not to Jesus but to God (i. 24). But what transformed the whole situation was the experience on the day of Pentecost. Henceforth they speak and labour boldly in the open. They connect themselves and their experience immediately with Scripture (ii. 17 f.), and equally with Jesus of Nazareth, who is now regarded as Lord, both by virtue of prophecy (verse 25), and of the fact that He is still alive, unconquered by death (verse 32), and by virtue of the gift of the Holy Spirit (verse 38). He is able to forgive sins (verse 38). It is He who chooses and saves believers (verse 47). Henceforth the brethren (cf. i. 15) are apostles (ii. 42 f.) not merely in name (as proleptically in i. 26), but as men with a message and a mission which they must discharge. And whatever they do, is done in the name, i.e. under the authority of Jesus as Lord (e.g. iii. 6). Nothing of all this marvellous and most significant change is comprehensible apart from the Pentecostal experience of Acts ii. 1 ff. Conviction and power came upon them and the believers, and they immediately set out upon their life's work. And not only so, but they do it in the courage and in the manner, with the sympathies

and interests that in their own way are a direct continuation of the work done by Jesus of Nazareth.

With all the changes of person and circumstances it is in the last analysis the same experience which we observe in the conversion of St. Paul. The outstanding fact is that his own personality is overmastered by that of the living Jesus. Henceforth he is His servant (Acts xxii. 10; Rom. i. 1), and his life is characterised by that ethically redemptive activity which is inherent in the gospel and ministry of Jesus (cf. 1 Cor. ix. 19 ff., cf. pp. 274 ff. *infra*).

Such instances are typical rather than normative. Though the passages dealing with the work of Stephen (Acts vi. 8 ff.) and of Philip (viii. 26 ff.) are really concerned with other matters, they reveal the same characteristic features of Jesus as Lord and as fulfilling the Scriptures. But both Stephen and Philip are His servants. They carry on His work. Their object is to serve men. They are guided or inspired by the Risen Lord (vi. 10; viii. 26) with whom they are in direct personal but religious relationship.

Section iv.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GLOSSOLALIA.

Nor is this the most striking feature of the records of the events of that period. While the Holy Spirit, often indistinguishable from the Risen Lord (x. 19, cf. verse 14; xiii. 2, 4; xvi. 6), is potent to guide and inspire believers, He speaks or makes His presence felt in ecstasy (xix. 21; xx. 22 ff.) rather than in prayer or meditation. Ecstasy and glossolalia are indeed regarded as normal signs characteristic not only of the fact that the converts have truly given themselves to "the way", but that the Lord Jesus has truly accepted them (viii. 15 ff.; x. 44 ff.; xix. 2 ff., in the light of which we can better understand the experience recorded in ii. 1 ff.). Accompaniments of glossolalial ecstasy seem to have been expected in normal cases, though nothing is said about it in the case of the Ethiopian baptised by Philip (Acts viii. 28 ff.), nor do we hear of it in immediate connection with St. Paul's conversion, though, later, he claims pre-eminence in this respect (1 Cor. xiv. 18).

The appreciation of glossolalia as determinative of a right relation towards and true acceptance by the Lord was based upon the experience of the disciples in the upper room. Pentecost was a day not merely of supernatural phenomena of noise and wind

and flames. These are but words, all too inadequate, used to transmit to others some conception of a tremendous soul-stirring inner experience (cf. *re* Acts ix. 7, and xxii. 9, p. 225 *supra*). Pentecost was above all else the day when they received power, a power which they could only attribute directly to the presence of some mighty Spirit in their midst. It conferred upon them energy, confidence, and understanding. They were lifted clear out of themselves into an elevation of mind and a simple directness of purpose, in which they were able to add to their number many devout people from among the crowds then present in the Holy City (Acts ii. 47). The only parallel to this illumination, this sense of confidence, this feeling of energy, this simplicity of purpose within their experience must have been that which they had often experienced under the magic of the personality and teaching of Jesus (cf. also Luke xxiv. 13 ff.). Such a parallel is simply unavoidable as soon as we attempt to realise vividly what we have attempted to summarise under the heading of the Personal Authority of Jesus (pp. 194 f. *supra*). The identification must have been inevitable to the disciples, as is seen in the fact that the first work of the apostles as spiritually baptised was to go out and preach the Lordship of Jesus and the identity of the Risen Lord with Jesus of Nazareth. There can, therefore, be little surprise if ecstasy assumed the normative character we find attributed to it all but uniformly throughout Acts.

Moreover, it had the advantage of being an external and objective sign, not in itself open to question, and in any case betokening a close sympathy between the preachers and their hearers. While the preachers were the disciples, or men like Stephen and Paul who would familiarise themselves completely with the content of the movement, doubtless the sufficiency of glossolalia may be granted. Certainly it appears to have been regarded as decisive throughout Acts, and its manifestations have been sought and similarly regarded within recent religious history as in the work of Wesley, the Welsh revival, and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that in itself glossolalia is not a religious phenomenon, or at least is not necessarily and, therefore, not specifically a Christian thing. It is well known in Hindu literature and even present-day experience. "Chaitanya never asked his hearers to show that they now desired to live a life of devotion

to Krishna. He waited till ecstasies of his own devotion had convinced them of the truth of his teaching, and had aroused a like spirit of *bhakti* in them. So powerfully suggestive were his methods that he rarely had to wait long before many were so carried as to imitate him in song and dance. . . . At time the *sankirtan* swept whole crowds off their feet, and they professed faith in Krishna, etc." (A. C. Underwood, 1925, pp. 216 ff.).

And if glossolalia is not specifically Christian, neither is it specifically ethical, a fact which is probably at the root of a widespread distrust of typical revivalism, and, indeed, of emotionalism in religious practices to-day. But glossolalia appears to have been discredited quite early on in the history of the Church. Thus St. Paul, already at the time of writing 1 Corinthians, plainly prefers the normal-mindedness of prayer to exercises in the spirit, which he regards as fraught with positive ethical danger (1 Cor. xiv. 1-19). When the phenomenon occurs in later generations, it is associated on the whole with heretical and undesirable forms of the faith.

Section v.—THE NATURE OF THE AUTHORITY OF THE RISEN LORD.

But if this is the case, if glossolalia is not specifically Christian, nor even ethical, what are we to make of the day of Pentecost, "a day on which the Spirit of God manifested Himself through the Disciples as a power for the conversion of others" (McGiffert, *History of Christianity in the Apostolic Age*, p. 50; quoted Underwood, *op. cit.*, p. 34)? Our reply is that the glossolalia was accidental to the conditions. It was well known in the mystery religions and other cults of the type (cf. Angus, *op. cit.*, pp. 101 f.; Underwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 209 ff.), and was even then frequently accompanied by ethical renewals as well as joy. And St. Paul was rightly driven to the decision to emphasise the truly ethical and spiritual qualities of the Christian life rather than these dubious but attractive phenomena, which could so easily be sought apart from the ethical and religious material which at first formed their basis. In other words, the essential thing was not the glossolalia, but the sense of power, ethical renewal, spiritual elevation, fearless courage, personal freedom and immediate communion with the Living Lord.

But what it all amounts to is that the authority of Jesus rests

upon the immediate personal experience of a contact of soul with soul, accompanied by ethical and spiritual renewal of a unique type tending towards an experience, the very promise of which gives an unequalled sense of personal freedom and of the sublime quality of a certain spiritual life. Once the first exuberance of Christian life was over, many things like communism and glosolalia were found to be hindrances to, rather than evidences of the faith or of the authority of Jesus, and were, therefore, quietly discarded. Everything henceforth depended upon the immediate influence of person on person as conveyed either directly by communion with the Risen Lord, or as mediated through the accumulated Christian tradition, the lives of outstanding saints and martyrs, through the ancient Scriptures or the newer writings associated with revered names. But each and all of these secondary vehicles gains its value ultimately from the way it brings the individual into a sense of immediate personal contact with the Risen Lord, who exercises His own authority personally to bless, to calm, to teach, to liberate, and to inspire. The ethico-spiritually redemptive interest was always the essential feature and foundation of Christian experience, though occasionally associated with extraneous interests of varying importance.

The type of authority revealed in the records of Acts is thus essentially similar to what we have found in the sources of the Gospels, but it was found to be supported by voices and visions, and these were regarded as *ex cathedra* authority, as commonly in the ancient world. But the authority to which St. Paul bows is rather that of his own conscience and understanding as he approaches his problems in the light of his Christian experience. He appears seldom to call upon a word of Jesus for justification of the gospel he preaches, but rather upon his experience of the Risen Lord in his own person, and as seen in the gift of the Spirit to the Gentiles. He opposes and finally defeats Peter, and gains His point with the presbyters in Jerusalem, not by adducing a word of Jesus whose authenticity and authority all would recognise, but out of the strength of the inner logic of his own immediate understanding of the problems to be dealt with (Gal. ii. 6 ff.). This is pre-eminently the very mind of Christ and the antithesis of the legalism of either Judaism, later ecclesiasticism, or any other cult. St. Paul stands for the freedom of "the Way", a freedom

which seems to spring from its own inner nature, and not to be prompted merely from without. His main external supports and sanctions are especially noteworthy. Though he preaches Christ and Him crucified, he never appeals to any eye-witness of the crucifixion, nor to any historical memories preserved by those who knew Him in the days of His flesh. Like his Lord, he goes, if anywhere at all, directly to the Old Testament scriptures, even if it is true that he usually expounds them in a rabbinic, or at least not in any unusual form or with any noticeable freshness.

In general one gains the impression from the record in Acts that the new faith is going forward by the momentum of the personalities of Peter, Paul, Barnabas, and other men like them, a momentum which is, however, derived from their immediate, plastic, mystic communion with Jesus. They feel His authority in the same way as they feel that of God Himself, from whose authority it is almost, if not quite, indistinguishable. In particular we may say that Paul feels he is working along the lines of the very nature of things, and the very purpose of life and the world. He finds his faith confirmed by Scripture, evidenced by glossolalia, and borne out by the spiritual power of His Lord. His faith is not a merely arbitrary personal conviction. It is rather part of the very make of things. And such a basis was as broad as the sum of his whole experience.

Such then is, in outline, the answer to the question of the grounds upon which Jesus first exercised authority as Risen Lord. We see that as far as the records go, and as far as we can read the minds of the apostles, it was absolute and ultimate and divine. To them He was the Son of God. Let us now ask what is the meaning that is attached to such an ascription when we are dealing with the authority of Jesus.

CHAPTER XI

THE MEANING OF THE SONSHIP OF JESUS, AND OF HIS DIVINE AUTHORITY

Section i.—THE IDEA OF DIVINITY IN ANTIQUITY.

THE idea of divine sonship is not confined to the person of Jesus. It was widespread throughout the ancient world. The Greeks were familiar with it (cf. Acts xvii. 28). Their heroes were the immediate descendants of divinities, and were intimately connected with both gods and man. At a certain stage in Greek early history it is difficult to determine whether we are dealing with human or divine persons. Similarly, the Romans were descended from gods, and, throughout their history, were perfectly familiar with men who became gods (cf. Cicero, *In Catalinam*, iii. 1). The remark of the Centurion witnessing the crucifixion of Jesus, "Truly this was the Son of God" (Mark xv. 39; Matt. xxvii. 54) must also be remembered in this connection.

Nor was the conception by any means confined to the classical peoples of antiquity, as is instanced in the New Testament records by the experience of Paul and Barnabas at Lystra (Acts xiv. 8-18), and even by the attitude of Cornelius to Peter at Cæsarea (Acts x 25 f.).

There was, further, a sense in which the Jews believed themselves to be sons of God (John viii. 41) and even divine (Ps. lxxxii. 6). The idea was not entirely foreign to the great prophets of antiquity (Hos. i. 10). It is incorporated in Jewish genealogies (cf. Luke iii. 38), and even its most extravagant form is to be found in the canonical records of the intercourse between the sons of God and the daughters of men (Gen. vi. 2).

The idea of divine sonship, of course entirely separated from a physical connotation, but as applied to the rank and file, is extremely common in the Early Church (Rom. viii. 14, 16, 19; Phil. ii. 15; 1 John iii. 1 f.; Gal. iii. 26, etc.). It is found in Athanasius (e.g. *de Incarnations*, liv. 3; Second Oration, 70, etc.), and it formed a marked feature of the literature on which Luther was nurtured.¹

¹ Meister Eckhardt: *Buch der göttlichen Tröstung.*, Ed. Strauch, 1922, S. 9, *Theologia Germanica*, chapter xli. English Trans., 1854, pp. 141, 145, etc.

Thus there are numerous instances of the idea of divine sonship widespread throughout the world, and of all degrees between a dominantly physical to a purely spiritual relationship. The fact that a man was a man did not preclude his being a god, nor that a god was divine his also being a man. These allotropisms were quite familiar to current thought in New Testament times (cf. Wendland, 1912, S.S. 123 ff., 146, 149).

And yet there was an element here which was strongly repugnant to severe Jewish monotheism. They themselves might in a sense be children of God, and yet it was nothing less than the vilest blasphemy for any man to claim to be a son of God in the sense that he himself was divine, or equal with Jehovah (cf. Matt. xxvi. 63 ff.). Any claims made by a man, which seemed to invade the prerogative of God, were regarded with great hostility and quickly produced charges of blasphemy (Mark ii. 5 ff.). This firm sense of the reverence due to God and of the impiety of making any divine claims was of course at the root of the attitude of the Jews to Emperor-worship, an attitude which was met by special legislation in the Roman Empire. And there can be no question that fundamentally the Jews were quite right, however disputable some of the inferences which they may have drawn. Nor can we afford to neglect this attitude to-day even under the teaching of the Christian faith. What, then, have we to say of the divine Sonship of Jesus of Nazareth?

The doctrine of the divine Sonship of our Lord is a doctrine which, as we have already seen, finds no direct support in the oldest records, but seems to be founded entirely upon the power of the Risen Christ as experienced by the disciples and the first Christian communities in whose ears the great words still rang, and before whose eyes there seemed still alive the Jesus whose figure, at once winsome and majestic, both simple and profound, had stamped its impress indelibly upon their souls. Whatever authority Jesus exercised during His lifetime, was exercised in spite of the fact that no one recognised His unique Sonship, and that He Himself in all probability never actually made any such claim. It would be pushing our conclusions further than the premisses warrant to say categorically that Jesus had no consciousness of a special and unique Sonship, but it is true to say that the historical material preserved in the two older sources is not

aware of any such consciousness, and none of the authority He is there shown to have exercised depends upon it.

Section ii.—THE METAPHORICAL CHARACTER OF DIVINE SONSHIP.

We are doubtless nevertheless justified in holding that Jesus was conscious of a unique Sonship, but we reach this conclusion either by inference from the general nature of Jesus' life, thought, and conduct, or by carrying over to His inner self statements found in other than the oldest sources, especially those dealing with the life and experience and basis of the Apostolic Church. Indeed, those passages in the Synoptics which make the Sonship a presupposition, and leave us no alternative to holding that Jesus was conscious of it, are all of them regarded on other grounds as of a secondary historical character. Moreover, there is no real meaning in their ascription of Sonship to Jesus. It is nothing but a title or an office. The authority flowing from it is purely impersonal and external. Content is only gained and the authority is only made real, personal, and inspiring when we have in front of us what indubitably historical material is contained in Q, in Mark, and also in the passages peculiar to Matthew and Luke. Apart from these sources, the place and authority of Jesus, as found in the Synoptics, are purely supernatural and almost magical; but combined with these sources, they become an interpretation, a theology of a religious phenomenon and of a religious experience.

It is evident in the first place that in whatever sense we take it we are dealing with a metaphor. Sonship here means something analogous to but different from the ordinary relationship connoted by the term "son". Similarly the collateral term "father" as applied to God is not the same thing exactly as what we mean by the term as usually employed. These facts are brought clearly to light if we write the word without the initial capitals, and note the change of atmosphere which is thereby produced. So familiar have we become with the terms "Father" and "Son" that they are almost the equivalent of proper names, and thus another meaning is given to them, if instead we write "father" and "son" when applying the terms to God and Jesus. The point we are trying to make is that for a proper understanding of the Sonship of Jesus, we cannot be content with the ordinary meaning of the term.

It connotes something else. It may be the best and most adequate terminology available, but it is not entirely suitable as it stands. There are certain other elements which seem vital to the right understanding of the person of Jesus, His relation with God, and His authority over us.

Ordinary sonship means "of filial origin; offspring of a father". This is essential. It may be frequently accompanied by similarity of appearance, character, talent, tastes, or will, but such similarity is not a *sine quâ non* of the paternal-filial relationship. But the position is entirely reversed when we speak of the Sonship of Jesus. The question of His paternity may be important, and in history the highest value has attached to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth on this account. Yet, few will pretend that it is of a similar importance to the nature, the will, the character, and the ideals of Jesus. The former may be regarded as not essential and even inapposite, but the latter is fundamental from every point of view. Thus we are justified in holding that in the Sonship of Jesus we are dealing with what is primarily a metaphor.

The examination of our earliest sources showed that they knew nothing of any authority exercised by Jesus during His ministry in virtue of His Sonship, but it left open the question of His consciousness of Sonship, and what that consciousness would signify to Him. Is it possible for us with all reverence, and yet with impartial minds, to enter here and record what we observe? We believe not only that we may, but that we must. Jesus Himself would surely not have it otherwise, for only the truth as personally assimilated, is congruous with a real faith in Him, and with His real authority over us.

Section iii.—JESUS' CONCEPTION OF GOD AS FATHER.

Before making the attempt let us note, however, that Jesus must first have come to a clear idea of the Fatherhood of God before He can have reached a clear view of His own Sonship. And every step He took towards a fuller view of Sonship must have been preceded by a similar step in His conception of God as Father. We may premise, therefore, that we can only hope to solve the problem of the nature of His Sonship as He conceived it and as it is significant for us, collaterally with, if not following upon, our solution of the problem of the Fatherhood of God.

How then did Jesus conceive of God as a Father? Our material is rich. He finds God active everywhere. He clothes the grass, adorns the wild irises, cares for the sparrows, orders the out-pouring of sunshine and rain; in short, the works of Nature are the works of God. But it is more than a mechanical operation of natural law merely working out what has once been ordained. It is also a providential order. God *cares* for the sparrows, He *sends* the rain and the sunshine, i.e. He is concerned in what is taking place. Nay, He is interested in the food we eat and the clothes we wear. It is appropriate to ask His blessing on a meal we are about to partake. He is so directly concerned with the satisfying of men that their anxiety in face of the violence of nature shows a lack of confidence in Him (Mark iv. 40). His relation to the world is thus quite personal, and especially so is His relation to man. He is concerned with their expressions of joy, so that if these are inhibited He can make the very stones cry out (Luke xix. 40). He is long-suffering and patient. He sends the blessed sunshine and the grateful rain, not with indifference but with compassion upon the wicked man's fields, and that is why men should love their own enemies. This long-suffering and compassion of God is indeed a sign of His perfection (Matt. v. 43 ff.).

But for all this care and solicitude, He can be resentful. Any harm done to little children will be dealt with in a manner worse than if the offender were flung helplessly into the middle of the ocean (Mark ix. 42). Any unjust attitude taken by men towards their fellows is noted by Him and will be requited in the same coin (? Mark xi. 26). On the other hand, He is active in helping every man to do good. God it is who casts out the devils in the cures Jesus effects (Matt. xii. 28), and He will supply the strength Peter will need if he is not to fail (Luke xxii, 31 f.).

Sufficient has been brought forward for us to say that God as Jesus conceives Him is not above all the God of the omnipotences and omnisciences and omnipresences and eternities and infinities, however useful these terms may be for theological speculation. He is concrete, personal, and immediate. His providential care, His patience, His concern, His faithfulness, His trustworthiness, His very resentments can all be brought together and summed up in the attitude and the thought which are expressed

in the opening words of the Lord's Prayer, "Father who art in Heaven". Thus even the word "God" is not enough to express all that Jesus means. It is inadequate. But so also the term "father" alone is not sufficient. At its best, even in prayer, it falls short. He is neither God merely, nor father merely, but, as we find it expressed elsewhere, Heavenly Father, or rather Divine Father (e.g. Matt. vi. 32; v. 48, etc.).

Section iv.—JESUS' CONCEPTION OF HIMSELF AS SON.

Thus Jesus understands the Fatherhood of God. How then does He understand Sonship? Once more there are many references, though not all of them quite so direct as those we have just been studying. He recognises a general filial relation towards God as existing in all men (cf. "your heavenly Father", etc., Matt. vi. 32), but this is by no means the full extent of the relationship possible and even desirable. There is a sense, He feels, in which in spite of this general filial relationship, men are not spiritually, i.e. metaphorically sons. But they can become such "sons". By loving their enemies and praying for their persecutors they follow in the wake of God and thus become His sons, but it is at the price of going beyond what is required in the Scriptures (Matt. v. 43 f., and also Luke vi. 35). This same sense of *becoming* children of God is found in John i. 12, and it is of the essence of Christian conversion (e.g. Gal. iii. 26; Rom. viii. 21). In Eph. v. 1 we read, "Copy God, then, as His beloved children, and lead lives of love . . ." which shows the essential vitality of the primitive phraseology as well as of the substantial idea. Another passage throwing light on this matter is found in Mark iii. 35, "Whoever does the will of God, that is my brother and sister and mother". The filial relationship is not explicitly ascribed, but it is implicit in the general phraseology. It seems to say, "There is a real kinship existing among those who do God's will, a kinship which is more exalted as well as more real than the kinship of blood. They are brothers and sisters to each other. Nay, they are the offspring of those from whom they gain inspiration (cf. 1 Cor. iv. 15), and all alike are children of God". There can be no questioning the entire historicity of this paradoxical and daring passage, and it completely bears out the position we have found elsewhere.

Sonship in relation to God is thus of two kinds. (i) It is a general,

largely unethical thing, which exists just because men are human beings. But (ii) there is also a metaphorical sense with an ethico-spiritual value. It is a condition to which men can attain by doing the will of God either as a result of their direct observations of the way in which God Himself actually does operate in nature or history, or else primarily as a consequence of their mutual help and inspiration to the same end.

Now it is to be noted in the passage just referred to, where Jesus speaks of His spiritual kin, that at the same time He makes clear the basis and the nature of His own Sonship. It is a spiritual relationship subsisting in the fact that He does God's will. "My Father worketh hitherto and I work" (John v. 17). The ethic He enjoins in the great utterances found in Q, M, and L, and so largely gathered together in the Sermon on the Mount, is based upon a wide and perspicacious observation of the ways of God as acting personally in nature. He grasps their meanings for human life, and utters them as guides for conduct. The ethic He lays down for men is the ethic upon which the divine conduct itself is founded. He declares little children are of the Kingdom of God by the very nature of the case (Matt. xviii. 4), and also by their openness to receive impressions of God (Mark x. 15). And the unquestionable impression given by the narrative is that Jesus is only laying down for others what He has already fully experienced and acted upon for Himself. He found His meat in doing the will of Him that sent Him and accomplishing His work (John iv. 34)

This wide-eyed and sympathetic observation of the ways of God in nature, understood as expressions of a personal and immediate will, seems to be the basis also of much of Jesus' attitude towards established institutions. He observed the sun shining, the rain falling, the corn growing, the cattle feeding on the Sabbath. Children are born on that day, and mother and child must needs be attended to. Sheep fall into pits, and are in danger of drowning, and men lift them out (Matt. xii. 11), in spite of generally accepted religious regulations. God breaks the Sabbath, Humanitarianism breaks the Sabbath, He Himself follows in the Father's ways completely. His will was to do the Father's will. He always did those things that pleased God or that God willed (John viii. 29). His will and the Father's were one.

Most of the textual references are to the Fourth Gospel, but they are to passages which contain an authentic note. But the same things are seen, if from a somewhat different angle, in the earlier sources. The nights of prayer after laborious days, the peaceful sleep at sea in the presence of a raging storm, the constant reference in the parables and the epigrams to the analogy of nature, His delight in children, His patience with sinners, His healing work done at the bidding of a quick sympathy, together with the general but inevitable implications of the exalted understanding of and joyful confidence in God such as we have seen He possessed, all point in one direction. They indicate an overmastering sense of a profound spiritual kinship between Himself and God. Any single word is inadequate to describe all that is contained in this relationship, but if any one term must be used, then that of "Son" does the most justice. That is the term which succeeding ages have used with various shades of meaning. In the time of the writer of the Fourth Gospel it was felt to be not quite satisfactory, and the paradoxical declaration is put into the lips of Jesus, "I and My Father are one" (x. 30).

Section v.—THE VALUE OF THE TERM "SON".

But the term "son" is more appropriate than perhaps might appear from the foregoing discussion, where stress has been laid almost entirely upon spiritual similarity and upon a complete harmony, and finally an identity of purpose. This position is open to the objection that when one no longer does the will of God, he is no longer a child of God, and that on obeying once more the divine leading, he once more becomes a child of God. The whole relationship then becomes occasional, incidental, and lacking in a certain vital permanence.

This may be granted without difficulty, however, for it will scarcely be submitted that anyone can really do the will of God, identifying his will with the divine in any true sense, if it only be a mere momentary coincidence of intention between the soul and its Maker. God's will is done from the heart, and not from what is seen in the synagogues or in the streets. And whole-heartedness is the firmest basis of a permanent relationship that exists within us. Besides which, it must be remembered, backsliding is a melancholy phenomenon of religious experience. But it presupposes that

the subject was once what he now is not. He was a child of God who has become an alien from Israel.

The term "son" gives an essential weight to the element of permanence alongside of that of similarity, but even then its appropriateness is not exhausted. It includes also the essential idea of origin. This may be the region in which the term is most strongly metaphorical when used in the spiritual sense, but it is also the region where it is the most appropriate.

Jesus had a sense of mission. He recognised God's will and personal activity in all phases of the world round about. He felt the unity of His own will with that of the Divine Father, and He preached the gospel of a realm whose King was God. But He also felt that this mission was not of His own seeking. It had been born into Him. It may have seemed at times to come like a dove from heaven as at His Baptism, or like a voice of an ancient prophet speaking directly to His heart (Luke iv. 16 ff.). At other times it may have given Him the feeling of being sent (John iv. 34, etc.), or again, that He was born for a special purpose (John xviii. 37). At any rate, this sense of a life impregnated with an aim given from without, however completely identified with what lay within, was constant in Jesus. He had come to seek and to save that which was lost (Luke xix. 10, ? L). He had come not to destroy the law but to fulfil it (Matt. v. 17, ? M), not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance (Mark ii. 17; Matt. ix. 13; Luke v. 32), not to send peace on earth but a sword (Matt. x. 34 f.; Luke xii. 51; Q). The above passages from all four primary sources bear strong witness to the sense of mission which Jesus experienced. St. John's Gospel is full of passages in the same tone, some of which are doubtless interpretations of the evangelist, e.g. iii. 17, "God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, etc.", but some of the others must indisputably be historical, e.g. ix. 4, "I must work the work of Him that sent me, etc.". The references are very numerous.

The point to be noted is that Jesus had an overmastering sense of the personal presence of God in the world, and of a complete harmony and union of His own will with the Divine, and also a powerful feeling that He has been sent. These three moments cannot be regarded as operating or even as existing separately within His consciousness. They form an organic whole. As a

religious experience each is necessarily a phase of the others. But in that case we have spiritual Sonship, and when the experience is of the greatest clearness, the highest intensity, and occupies the entire consciousness to the exclusion or rather to the inclusion of all else, then we are face to face with what Sonship meant in the consciousness of Jesus of Nazareth. It consists in His profound experience of God in nature, in men, and in His own self. It includes a joyful sense of identity between God's will and His own, so that the truths He utters with all their convincing power out of His own insight, and the deeds He does out of His own compassion, and the attitude He takes up to men out of His own love or sense of right and worth are yet truly God's own will. And, reaching into all the details of His life, spreading throughout its entire sweep, lending urgency and keen purpose to every hour, was the feeling that He had been sent by God (John xviii. 37; Matt. ix. 15; John x. 10; Matt. xx. 28; Mark ii. 17, etc.). In these experiences, unique in their scope and power, consists the uniqueness of His Sonship. Than this Sonship, there is nothing nobler or truer or holier, nor can there be. Jesus fulfils and exhausts its meaning. He is the Son *κατ' ἐξοχήν*.

Section vi.—SONSHIP AS RELATED TO MESSIAHSHIP.

Our understanding of Sonship as here discussed harmonised completely with the view of His Messianic consciousness which we reached at an earlier stage of our inquiry. It was just because He had accepted a Messianic task that Jesus reached a Messianic consciousness (see p. 215 *supra*). And now similarly He became conscious of His Sonship, because of His unique consciousness of God and the world, and because of His own accepting of a divine mission. To use a current phrase, it was a dynamic consciousness, the consciousness of a dynamic experience, all-embracing, all-pervading, all-satisfying. God was near and within. He Himself was in God, in complete harmony and unity with Him. It was enough. Fear, doubt, hesitation have gone with all the pettiness of things. A serenity, a power, a peace, and yet a "concern", a mighty faith fed daily by service, by preaching, by human intercourse, and by prayer, take complete possession of Him. He can rejoice in everything beautiful, innocent, and good. He can sym-

pathise and help wherever there is woe. He can face whatever men prepare. He is able to do all things through Him whom He loves and trusts, with whom He walks, and whom He knows better than a man knoweth his friend.

Section vii.—THE AUTHORITY OF SONSHIP.

But how does such a Sonship affect His authority? Most profoundly! In the first place the *ex cathedra* authority attaching to an office outwardly conferred is absent. It is foreign to the conception, for the authority one exercises is born out of the authority one feels. The authority of Jesus, who was conscious of His Sonship to the Heavenly Father, is founded upon the reaction of His soul on others. It has the validity of the wider experience, the truer conception, the deeper insight, the surer knowledge, the wiser interpretation, the loftier ideal, the larger unity of life, the greater sense of power, the finer type of character, the more satisfying food for the soul, the higher efficiency in moral effort, the broader freedom in the spirit, and the profounder communion with God, as these almost ineffable things make themselves known between heart and heart. And because Jesus enjoyed these great qualities to the full in the natural yet eager sympathy, and in the serene peace of a mighty soul at one with God, He was able to speak as never man spoke and to live as never man lived. Because of His consciousness of Sonship as we have described it, because of His complete personal conviction behind every word He uttered, because of His complete identification of His whole self with every act He performed, and because of the entire appropriateness to their purpose of both word and deed, there was a peculiar power in His life, and that is what constituted His unique authority. He was able to communicate in unexampled degree His outlook to His followers. He was able to confer upon them something of the courage and serenity He enjoyed, and something of the glorious freedom He had won. He set their feet upon the path which He himself trod, leading to the presence of the Heavenly Father. In short, His authority was founded upon His redemptive power over the soul. His words were spirit, and they were life. Under His inspiration men drew near to God, and through His fellowship they gained communion with a God of goodness and of love.

Section viii.—REDEMPTION AND SONSHIP.

The sense of Sonship which Jesus possessed, and which defined the terms of His relationship with God gave Him both the definiteness of aim and the personal certainty which are the preliminary foundation for gaining the confidence of other people. It also enabled Him to complete His redemptive task by imparting sooner or later the conviction to His believers that they also were children of the Heavenly Father. The sense of Sonship is thus the basis of the religious authority which Jesus exercised as distinct from that which was more purely ethical. He interpreted in Himself what He meant when He said, "Become children of your Heavenly Father", and so laid the foundation of a final redemption.

This position means two things. (i) That the authority of the Sonship of Jesus is ethical rather than metaphysical. It is founded upon His power to redeem and to bless. His practical authority is what determines His place, and not *vice versa*. We understand the doctrine in so far as we know personally that He is doing the work. The test of the dogma is in the Christian experience of salvation through Jesus Christ.

But (ii) the second thing is that if Jesus is the Son in this sense, then it is the same as that in which other men may be. The inference may cause us to pause for a moment. Nevertheless, the idea of man being divine is of the essence of Christian thought, and was indeed condensed into an aphorism by Athanasius, *αὐτὸς γὰρ ἐνθρόωνησεν, ἵνα ἡμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν* (*De Incarn.*, liv. 3). The ethical Sonship of Jesus and that of ordinary men are not two distinct entities, but we can only discover the meaning *a posteriori*. Only when we set out on the voyage of experiment ourselves, finding our meat and drink in doing God's will, ourselves giving our lives to seeking and saving that which was lost, treading the road that leads to our Calvary, and walking in it as naturally and serenely as if it led to Cana, then only are we in a position to understand what divine Sonship means. The marvellousness, the unique miracle of the achievement of Jesus, His wonderful knowledge of God, and the peerless superiority of His personality are then seen in their true setting. The Sonship of Jesus cannot be understood on the prior basis of metaphysical

speculation, but only after the experience of personal redemption, and of the meaning of outright obedience to the ensuing demands of the Christian life. In the last analysis it is because we experience through Christ the authority of God, and find in His life the very challenge of God, that we find in Him the Son of God.

CHAPTER XII

THE MEANING OF THE SINLESSNESS OF JESUS AND THE AUTHORITY FLOWING FROM HIS PERFECTION

Section i.—THE ANTIQUITY OF THE DOGMA.

FREQUENTLY in the course of our discussion we have found it essential to depart from the self-evident truth of what Jesus taught or the immediately apparent value of the conduct He exhibited and enjoined. We have been compelled to regard His teaching and His action, even when taken together, as insufficient to explain the authority which Jesus exercised over the people of His time. And we may contend that the same holds true to-day.

In other words, the authority of Jesus is more than or different from that of a teacher or an example. He appears, to those who in any degree admit His authority, as at least the ideal man, and yet such an ascription does not seem fully to exhaust the quality of the authority which He exercises over them. In an ideal there is no compelling power beyond what flows from the fact of our choice of it. Ultimately such authority seems exercised from within our own selves, and not to flow in upon us from without.

And yet there is an element in all true authority which makes it to some degree external to us. In the case of the authority exercised by Jesus, this indispensable quality comes to us not as from an ethical ideal which we accept and assimilate, nor from the religious intuitions which spring into being within our experience, but rather from the immediate reaction which takes place between the person of the Redeemer and that of the believer. The element of personal reaction, interpreting the words, illustrating the religious intuitions, and adding an individually unique sense of urgency, is essential in our experience of the authority of Jesus, and is sometimes, indeed, apparently the only operative factor. Instances are quite frequent in the course of every Christian life, for we are all faced from time to time with spiritual dilemmas. The utmost carefulness of thought seems to bring no help. Resort is then made to prayer. The believing suppliant seeks only to be led by his Lord. He submits himself completely to mystic guidance. He accepts his

subsequent intuition as the will of his Master, and thus resolves his problem.

Now these experiences are completely valid and belong to the profoundest depths of the Christian life. But why is it that there is no feeling of mere ethical subjectivism? Why is it that the soul feels, not overwhelmed by the personality of his Master, but liberated as if indeed he had been supernaturally enabled to break his bonds? In especial, why is it that he feels no arbitrariness in the choice his Master has made for him, but rather that it accords with the very nature of his own real self and with the purpose of the entire universe? Why is it that his Master's choice expresses an ultimate rightness which is completely unquestionable?

The answer has to do with the sinless perfection of Jesus, and we must now proceed to examine its significance.

The sinlessness of Jesus is a dogma of high authority, and was developed quite early in the primitive Church. It is implied in Rom. viii. 10, "If Jesus be in you, your body is dead because of sin". It is explicit in 2 Cor. v. 21, "Made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin"; in Heb. iv. 15, "He was tempted like as we are, yet without sin"; also in 1 Pet. ii. 22, "Who did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth"; and in 1 John iii. 5, "He was manifested, and in Him is no sin". There can be no question that this dogma corresponded to the entire experience of the Gentile churches. Its significance lies primarily in the difference between the Saviour Jesus and the numerous other saviours at that time being preached throughout the Mediterranean world. It emphasises the peculiar and essentially ethical quality of the religious experience of the early Church. They had received something more than a mere freedom from the chains of this world and an assurance of a serene immortality. They had received also a spiritual life of the greatest ethical loftiness and power, a life which was available in this world. Their Lord was a Lord in this sense also.

Section ii.—THE RELATION OF SINLESSNESS TO DEITY.

For it must be noted that sinlessness is not a *sine quâ non* in the conception of deity, nor is it a thing of absolute value. It is a relative idea of the same order as that of truth or beauty. Gods have been worshipped of whom it could not be predicated. Thus it is well known that the best of the Greeks regarded many of their

own gods as immoral, e.g. Athene (deceitful), Ares (cowardly, which was a vice to the Greeks), Chronos (cannibalistic), Zeus (incestuous). Euripides, among others, actually held that the gods were corruptors of youth. Xenophanes said, "Homer and Hesiod fastened upon the gods everything that is shame and blame among men—theft, adultery, and trickery" (quoted T. R. Glover, 1922, p. 91).

In India to-day much the same holds true. Many of the deities are harsh and cruel. They are actuated by pique, revenge, anger, and lust. They take advantage of mistakes of ignorance and of weakness. Many are worshipped entirely out of fear, which is a motive of questionable ethical value. Thus again we see that the idea of sinlessness is not integral to that of divinity (cf. Glover, 1922, p. 64).

One can go further. Sin is a moral conception, but only in a few cases is religion conceived of ethically. Islam is of an ethical quality as far as its teaching concerns this world, but its eschatology is of a different nature. It is doubtful to what extent other religions outside the Old Testament can be regarded as ethical. Even Buddhism, if it can be classed as a religion in its primitive form, has a fundamental unethical strain in its pessimistic attitude to life and the world, and its sense of sin readily evaporates into mere folly. It is not the weight of sin that oppresses Gautama, but the burden of living. And it is by right wisdom rather than moral regeneration that he finds the path to Nirvana, which is itself a non-spiritual ideal. One may be well excused for doubting whether he had a sense of sin in the full Christian sense of the term. But the point is that salvation from sin is not the one test even of a redemptive religion.

Thus it is impossible on merely general grounds to argue, say, from the divinity of Jesus to His sinlessness. We are bound to indicate first of all the quality of the divinity, or of His relation to God. But we are then immediately in the fallacy of the circle. Conversely it is not possible to argue merely from the dogmatic assertion of the New Testament Epistles in regard to His sinlessness, that He had, therefore, an immediate and unique relation with God. Even the lack of awareness of sin in Him, if such be historically proved, does not lead logically to conclusions of His divinity or His divine authority, which is the real point we are seeking.

The problem of the ultimate moral authority of Jesus, therefore, cannot be solved on the dogmatic grounds of His divinity, nor merely by an analysis of His own inner consciousness. The records have great value where positive in character, but the argument from silence in such a case is really entirely negligible. What, then, is the verdict of the records?

We may say that the records bear a witness of a twofold character. They bear testimony to the ethical quality of Jesus as seen both from within His own consciousness and in His general teaching and conduct. They also witness to the judgment passed upon Him by the official opinions of His nation and epoch. There are one or two explicit references.

Section iii.—ANALYSIS OF PASSAGES IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

In John viii. 46 Jesus challenges the Jews with the question, "Which of you can convict Me of sin?" and earlier in the same chapter He declares, "I always do what pleases Him" (who has sent Me, verse 29). He frequently refers to eternal life as His inalienable possession (John vi. 54; xvii. 3; cf. x. 28; vi. 68).

All these references, it is to be noticed, are in the Fourth Gospel, and we cannot build upon them as authentic words of Jesus, especially as there are no similar passages in any of the older sources.

What they do tell us is, however, that at the end of the first century the question of the sinless perfection of Jesus was of considerable importance, and His attitude to the matter was of great interest. Such a development is only natural in view of the authority which the Risen Lord exercised in the Church. His spirit was the ultimate arbiter of right and wrong, of godliness and of sin.

Section iv.—ANALYSIS OF PASSAGES IN SYNOPTIC GOSPELS.

In the Synoptic Gospels we find the following parallel passages:

Mark x. 17 f. "‘Good teacher’ (a man asked), ‘what must I do to inherit life eternal?’ Jesus said to him, ‘Why call me “good”? No one is good, no one but God’."

Matt. xix. 16 . . . "a man said to Him, ‘Teacher, what good deed must I do to gain life eternal?’ He said to him, ‘Why do you ask me about what is good? One alone is good’. . . ."

Luke xviii. 18 reproduces Mark, "‘Good teacher, what am I to do to inherit life eternal?’ Jesus said to him, ‘Why call me “good”? No one is good, no one but God’."

On the face of it this passage contains an explicit denial of goodness by Jesus, and it has, therefore, been the subject of much discussion. But it will be sufficient to quote Dalman (English trans., 1902, p. 337, whose view is closely followed by Meyer, 1880, p. 163; Klostermann, 1907, S.S. 83 f., and others, e.g. Forrest, 1903, p. 32 f.). After some discussion of current usage, he says: "Further, the address רַבִּי טוֹבָה would not lead anyone to think of moral goodness. The proper translation is 'Kind Master'. The rejection of the epithet, therefore, does not mean, as is generally supposed, that God alone is morally perfect, but that in Him alone is the quality of kindness personified," and Dalman then proceeds to support this reading from the Old Testament usage of the word טוֹב and suggests that the issue of sinlessness does not arise there.

Strack-Billerbeck (*op. cit.*, vol. ii. S. 25) fully agree and say, "In this undoubtedly correct explanation of the phrase, 'Good Master', there is naturally lacking any foundation for the question, how the sinlessness of Jesus is to be reconciled with His words: 'No one is good except God alone.'"

But it is noteworthy that Matthew's rendering is such that it seems intended to avoid the issue whether Jesus denied the applicability of the term to Himself, and thus that at least by about A.D. 80 this text may have been understood to refer to the character of Jesus.

We gain a different interpretation, however, if we understand the emphasis of the reply of Jesus in another sense. It is not perfectly obvious if one translates back into a Semitic original, that the force of the question does not lie in the word "why?" e.g. מַדּוּעַ קָרָאתָ לִי טוֹב. Jesus' position, in any reading of the word טוֹב, would then be very much the same whether as recorded by Matthew or by Mark. It might be stated as follows: "You have used the word טוֹב. Now the question of הַטוֹב is integral to that of eternal life. For what reason, then, do you call me טוֹב? By common consent only One is טוֹב, and that is God. Thou knowest the commandments, and they express His will. Keep them. That is the way to Eternal life."

In any case, even if the word ἀγαθός is in this instance to be rendered by "kind", the denial is very striking, and, in His case at least, lack of kindness would be a serious defect if not a direct sin.

From the earliest times commentators have sought a meaning in this text, which avoids the denial of sinlessness by Jesus (cf. literature cited in Meyer, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, and Klostermann, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*), and for us, in whatever form it is read, it raises the question of the moral perfection of Jesus, and still more urgently that of His consciousness of complete harmony with His own interpretation of the human ideal, and, most of all, that of His ethico-spiritual identity with God.

How, then, are we to deal with the issue joined in this passage of Mark's Gospel? The answers in recent times have been various. Most, if not all, writers admit the substantial historicity of the reply made by Jesus, but seek to explain that Jesus did not at all refer to His own character. Some have interpreted the passage as if it meant, "Only God is good, but you do not recognise me as God; therefore you ought not to call Me good". Forrest (1903, p. 32) regards this interpretation as unlikely, and suggests that Jesus rejected the epithet as applied by the ruler because "it had no moral depth or inwardness. Jesus will not have the holiest terms thus cheapened, and restores to the word its true content by reminding him that there is only one Being absolutely good and that all goodness flows from Him. He Himself as man is not good in the absolute sense, as God is, but draws His goodness from a complete dependence on the Father. Of this human perfection there is no repudiation in Jesus' words, for the ruler did not believe He possessed it. There is only a refusal to accept the designation when it was not bestowed on right grounds. But whatever view is taken, the only impossible interpretation is that which presents Jesus as on this sole occasion disowning a perfection which His entire life before and after shows He claimed."

Now while one may thoroughly agree with the opinion that any conclusion other than that which asserts the perfection of the character of Jesus will ultimately be found impossible, this is surely not the kind of argument to use. For (i) in this passage Jesus gives no hint to the young ruler that "He draws His goodness from a complete dependence on God"; nor (ii) that He will only accept a designation when offered on certain grounds. And (iii) the last remark gives the impression that whatever happens you must interpret the passage somehow in the sense that Jesus was sinless,

and you are referred for support to the nebulous generality of "the entire life before and after". All this is simply not argument.

Beyschlag understands the passage in a similar sense when he says, "the point is the concept 'good', with which the young man is so lavish. Jesus means to say that in the absolute sense it applies to God alone. In contrast with God, even the good are wicked. He Himself has nothing in the nature of evil to confess, yet even He is still subject to moral development and to temptation" (quoted Warschauer, 1908, p. 135).

Thus Jesus is good (as far as this text goes) only in a negative sense, but He is far from being perfect yet. Moreover, there is a qualitative distinction drawn between God's goodness and that of Jesus. On the basis of this type of argument, therefore, even if we could be sure of the impeccability of Jesus, we should have considerable difficulty in passing from the sinlessness of Jesus to His divine perfection.

Griffith-Jones seems to recognise the difficulty of such a position when He says, "Even He (Jesus) had not at any stage of His earthly life attained to the ultimate and absolute goodness. . . . Not till He had completed the work which had been given Him to do, not till He had gone through the awful experience of the Cross and had shown Himself obedient to death, was the last possibility of sin conquered even in His holy life" (*Faith and Verification*, p. 131).

Kaftan is quite explicit and holds that the goodness of Jesus is of a different character from that of God. God is holy, perfect, and above the struggle and temptation—beyond good and evil. But Jesus did not possess this kind of holiness. Because He was a man He had to undergo temptation. His holiness consisted in steadily winning—therein we recognise Him as God. Jesus rendered full obedience to God, not as a matter of course, but by *fighting* with temptation. "Even this character of unbroken moral preservation which the life and work of Jesus manifested in the world, gives a real content to His sinless perfection. It consists not in the impeccability of His human nature which, as the orthodox doctrine teaches, was taken out of the reach of inherited sin. This conception contains a contradiction in itself. An innate habit (*Beschaffenheit*) cannot be in itself moral. Something moral, however, must be understood by sinless perfection, if the words are to

mean what they say. . . . In itself it consists in the moral activity springing out of the personal will of the self", and Jesus became the sinlessly perfect man by means of real moral decisions in the face of temptation (Kaftan, *op. cit.*, S.S. 454 ff.).

Warschauer states the logical conclusion with great clearness. He says: "(Incapability of sin) were it proved that our Lord enjoyed it, would at one stroke deprive His character of all moral complexion and His life of all moral value for us. Indeed, 'sinlessness' is an almost misleading term as applied to a being incapable of sin. Such a being, it has been justly observed (Beeby, *Doctrinal Significance of a Miraculous Birth*), though artistically perfect, would be morally less perfect than many a sinner who hates sin and resists and yet only imperfectly overcomes" (*op. cit.*, p. 118).

Thus we are driven back from an identification of the goodness of Jesus with the goodness of God. His sinlessness was moral perfection in a necessarily human sense from which the elements of temptation, moral warfare, and victory are inseparable. The essence of His perfection is not found in an inability to sin, which is a negative and non-moral quality, but in His ability to conquer temptation. If the quality is to have any value at all, it must rest in the real ethical power of His personality. We must look for it in the steadiness of His will, the firmness of His living faith in God, and in the completely undivided unity of His character.

Section v.—JESUS' CONSCIOUSNESS OF SINLESSNESS.

Such a conclusion, however, takes us far away from the question of the young ruler and the reply of Jesus, and raises much greater issues than were raised on that occasion. Nothing that Jesus then said, however understood, can really settle the problem, altogether apart from the consideration that this passage is at best both isolated and negative. No amount of ingenuity can give it the force of a positive assertion, nor do anything better than show that it does not really deal with the major question of the sinlessness of Jesus.

And yet that question must be capable of being dealt with on historical grounds even if dogmatic considerations must eventually be entered upon. Thus we are well justified in asking whether the records do reveal Jesus as morally perfect, and, if so, in what sense. Our attention is then drawn to the following facts.

As presented to us in our sources, Jesus exhibits no trace of remorse. Now this feature is unusual and striking. For Jesus had an extraordinary sense of the holiness of God, of the urgent ethical quality of His will, and of His personal relations with mankind. So close and vivid was God to Jesus and so precious was He to Him that, as we have found, the consciousness of Sonship was the characteristic feature of His relation with God. There cannot have been anything else than an extreme sensibility to the stirrings of the divine Spirit and the leading of the divine will, and yet there is no trace of a consciousness of transgression, no sign of a confession of sin.

But, as is frequently pointed out, the holiest men are those most conscious of their short-comings when in God's presence. "Alas, I am undone!" cries Isaiah (vi. 5, Moffatt's translation), "man of unclean lips that I am, living among a people of unclean lips! I am undone!" Similarly St. Peter, because he is a sinful man, feels it dangerous to be in the presence of Jesus (Luke v. 8). Even at the end of his life St. Paul regards himself as the chief of sinners (1 Tim. i. 15). St. Augustine is oppressed with his sense of sin and reveals his soul in the *Confessions*. Bunyan, that greatest among the uncanonised saints, tells in the conclusion of *Grace Abounding* of the horrors and fears that pursued him on account of his sins, and gives a list of the seven dreadful iniquities into which he is constantly falling, iniquities which to less saintly persons would seem venial. Time fails to tell of the consciousness of Thomas à Kempis, Francis, Luther, Wesley, and the rest canonised and uncanonised. Enough to say that it would appear wherever sainthood has been ascribed, there a poignant sense of sin has been felt. And yet neither our records of the life of Jesus nor the extant recollections of those closest to Him reveal any sense of sin, or omissions, or remorse, or repentance, or of any consciousness of a cloud between Jesus and His God due to incompatibility of Spirit (cf. Mackintosh, 1914, pp. 35 ff.).

There can be no question that the argument from the sunny consciousness of Jesus of His relation with God, is of immense significance, and it can scarcely be overrated. On the other hand, it is not quite conclusive. For it cannot be forgotten that Jesus had also a vivid sense of God's compassion and forgiveness, and of His essential Fatherhood; and it must be admitted that in our own experience, one of the things which make fatherliness most real

and valuable is precisely a personal acquaintance with what the long-suffering forgiveness of a loving but slighted father means. No mere observation of it in others can have the same educative effect. Nothing else can give the same keenness to the insight into the nature of fatherly love, nor the same beauty of subsequent relations of mutual confidence and affection. Where a man has affronted his father in his youth and has come to realise the patient forbearance the parent exercised all along until he himself realised his wrong-doing, there, given the right character in the son, is to be found a depth and a verity of understanding he could not otherwise reach. Further, it is all the more likely that after such an experience the subsequent relation between parent and child will be entirely unmarred and of the highest kind.

The point is that the argument from the unclouded consciousness of Jesus in regard to His relation with the heavenly Father is not completely and finally cogent. It may, if pressed, appear possibly to operate in the other direction.

Another element to bear in mind is that, after all, our historical sources are not autographs of Jesus. They are for the most part anonymous records, and in no case is it anything like certain that they were actually written by personal disciples. They are thus primarily external. Almost everything that we know of the consciousness of Jesus is reached by inference. Even in the best of instances, e.g. in regard to the Messianic consciousness, or that of Sonship, we are at a disadvantage. But when it comes to such an extraordinarily delicate and intimate matter as the secret relations between Jesus and God, we stand afar off. We know Jesus frequently resorted to prayer, long and lonely nights were often passed in vigil, of whose nature we have only the slightest hint. Did He merely seek guidance, or was it not sometimes also strength? In Gethsemane He seems to have sought both (cf. Mark xiv. 36; Matt. xxvi. 42; and especially Luke xxii. 43). But seeking strength implies the sense of weakness of faith, and Bunyan finds in this weakness one of his sins (*Grace Abounding*, conclusion).

We are doubtless carrying our speculation to a fine point, and one feels a dread in going too far. Let us call a halt and count it sufficient to say that the argument for the sinlessness of Jesus, based upon the silence of the records, is only just as strong as all argument *e silentio*, and is far from sufficient for our purpose.

Moreover, it is not to be forgotten that all the records were produced, both as sources and in their present form, in the midst of communities which had already found their Lord in Jesus. He was confessedly either their Messiah or their Redeemer. He brought them to God, and He gave them life. He made them heirs of Eternity. The question of His moral perfection, therefore, simply did not arise. It was already a presupposition by the time they accepted the new faith. And the records were made for devotional and propaganda purposes. What is recorded is what, on the whole, was felt most vital to sustaining the faith or to aiding the missionary enterprise. It is, of course, quite false to suggest that any events whatsoever were deliberately suppressed; the naïveté no less than the self-harmony and the restraint of the records is a sufficient demurrer. Nevertheless, we cannot be sure that no incidents or words were omitted which might have given *us* material for forming judgments on other aspects of the character of our Lord.

Thus we may say that the argument for the sinlessness of Jesus, as developed so far, cannot be made to depend too closely upon the negative quality of the narratives of our sources.

Section vi.—ANALYSIS OF PASSAGES HELD TO IMPLY SIN.

Let us now proceed to examine them for their positive witness, but without reference to the Fourth Gospel. Objection has been taken to the conduct of Jesus under the following heads. (i) That in boyhood He showed a want of filial obedience or respect (Luke ii. 41 ff.). (ii) That when driving the buyers and sellers out of the temple He showed an excess of passion, or even that He was positively cruel to folk who, after all, were only following the custom permitted by the temple regulations (Mark xi. 17 and parallels). (iii) That in delivering the Gadarene demoniac He unwarrantably destroyed the property of others (Mark v. 1 ff. and parallels). (iv) That He treated the Syro-Phœnician woman with harshness and contempt (Mark vii. 26 ff.). (v) That he cursed a fig-tree because it bore no fruit out of season (Matt. xxi. 18 ff.). (vi) That on the cross ultimately His faith in God gave way, when He cried, "*Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani*" (Mark xv. 34 and parallels).

It is not needful to discuss these objections in great detail, and a few remarks on each must suffice.

On (i) we may say that the historicity of the event is far from certain (cf. Klostermann, 1919, S. 408, and the literature cited there), though opinion to-day seems to be gathering in its favour (e.g. Berguer, *op. cit.*, pp. 142 ff.). But in any case it is surely pushing all sane exegesis aside to read this passage in the sense suggested. It is not a witness to unfilial conduct.

On (ii) it must again be said that the historicity is none too certain. Lagrange (quoted Rawlinson, 1925, p. 155 f.) accepts the historicity and says it was "the fleecing of the people that Jesus seems to have especially condemned, as well as the resulting secularisation of the sacred precincts". If there is any truth at all in the parallels Lagrange cites, then Jesus would surely have committed a sin of omission had He done other than cleanse the temple.

On (iii) we may remark that this seems to be a particularly modern conception of sin. From a Jewish point of view, surely it would be a sin to keep swine! Moreover, nothing is said whether possibly the madman was their owner. Lastly, the historicity of the narrative is severely open to question, at least in detail (cf. Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, *a.l.*). There is undoubtedly a large element of *Volks Glaube* present, and the historical facts are not immediately apparent (Klostermann, 1907, S. 41).

In regard to (iv) once more it is sufficient to say that the exegesis offered is forced and fundamentally false. "The precise meaning of the story will depend upon the nuance with which it is read" (Rawlinson, *op. cit.*, p. 99, *a.l.*) but there is surely a certain play of wit here which is far from contempt.

(v) Falls out of observation as an unhistorical transformation of an actual event (cf. Wellhausen, 1914, *a.l.*; Klostermann, 1907, *a.l.*; Mark xiii. 28 f.; Dibelius, 1919, S. 101).

(vi) Offers the greatest foothold to the objections to the sinlessness of Jesus. Objections have been offered to its historicity, but its very offensiveness to Christian reverence is a witness to its authenticity. Schmiedel makes it one of his foundation-pillars (*E.B.*, *loc. cit.*). We must accept the words as historical. Discussions are lengthy and numerous in all the commentaries (the discussion of J. Weiss, *Das Älteste Evangelium*, 1903, S.S. 337 ff., should not be overlooked). The record in Mark has claim to authenticity, but no more than that in Luke xxiii. 46 ("Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit"). Even if we say with Klostermann (1907,

S. 141), "Even if authentic, we cannot say what Jesus meant by the words". It cannot be overlooked that the centurion, who all day had been watching Him die, said He died like a God (Mark xv. 39). Thus the incident, after all, offers no firm argument against the sinlessness of Jesus. Few, if any, positive conclusions can be drawn from it.

In concluding our examination of the passages cited in objection to the sinlessness of Jesus, we may say that nothing contained in them is of positive value. With the exception of the last, they are both trivial and debatable. Further, it is to be noted that, with the exception of the first, which is almost certainly of an unhistorical character, all occur in the Markan tradition, where, if at all, both on account of its date and of the style of the writer, we should expect witness of a positive character if there were any. The general effect of the inquiry is to raise our esteem for the character of Jesus.

Section vii.—THE MEANING OF HIS BAPTISM.

There is, however, just one further passage of a somewhat different order that we need to notice. It is that dealing with the baptism of Jesus. We are told that John baptised unto repentance and remission of sin. What, then, was in the mind of Jesus when He approached John for baptism?

Much, if not everything, will depend upon our understanding of the incident itself. This is divided into two parts, viz. (i) The actual baptism by John, of the historicity of which there can be no question, although several writers have tried to diminish its force by saying that Jesus only submitted in a formal manner, etc. (ii) The descent of the Holy Dove, and the Voice from Heaven, which, in any case, it seems best to understand as "The expression in symbolical form of an experience which came personally to our Lord" (Rawlinson, 1925, p. 10, note 6).

Our problem also divides itself into two parts.

(i) What was in the mind of Jesus when He sought baptism?

(ii) What was the nature and the effect of His baptismal experience?

We have naturally the greatest reluctance to say that Jesus came to John for baptism unto repentance and remission of sins, although there is no doubt that Jesus came and was baptised by him.

The clue to the matter is in the nature of the preaching and the baptism of John. He came preaching the approach of the Kingdom of Heaven (Matt. iii. 2 is explicit), as is shown in the nature of the quotations from Old Testament prophets, "Prepare the way of the Lord . . . all flesh shall see the salvation of God". "John takes from the prophets, in Luke (iii. verses 7-9) as well as in Matthew, not only their ethical, but also something of their eschatological teaching. The latter was also the starting-point of the expectations found in the current apocalypses. And John's baptism had an eschatological meaning as a preparation by which men could 'flee from the wrath to come'. Echoes of his words are sometimes heard from the Lord's lips (cf. verse 7 with xii. 34; xxiii. 33; verse 8 (*καρπός*) with vii, 16-20)" (cf. A. H. McNeile, 1915, p. 25). Thus John's baptism had a novel element. It was not merely an ablution of ceremonial impurities as in common Jewish practice, nor even of moral impurities. It is doubtful to what extent John would have been regarded as a prophet if he had *substituted* baptism for remission of sins in the place of the requirements of the established law with its specified offerings. That John should forgive sins even by a rite would have been likely to cause some offence to sensitive consciences, just as in the case of Jesus a little later on (cf. Mark ii. 5 ff.).

Thus we are compelled to hold that while John undoubtedly awakened a new consciousness of sin, and insisted upon a certain moral standard in his adherents, and while the rite he instituted contained a large element of the ablutionary idea, this does not by any means exhaust its significance. He preached the coming of the Kingdom, and those who joined him did so because they had come to share his expectation and would not have joined him had they not passed through such a *μεταβολή*. The novel thing about the baptism of John, and therefore the significant thing, is that it was a rite of initiation into a fellowship of believers. The initiation was accompanied by the idea of ablution as a sign of repentance from all classes and degrees of ceremonial and ethical impurity, if ever and wherever they might occur, which would render a person unfit for the new fellowship.

If the above statement represents the facts at all fairly, it is evident that Jesus could show only by baptism; that He too shared the faith of John otherwise He would have been but a secret

disciple. That Jesus may have had different views as to the nature of the coming Kingdom in no way affects the suggestion offered, for it is undoubted that the preaching of John was the historical preparation for the preaching of Jesus in both its eschatological and its ethical aspects.

But the point is that it is impossible to argue from the baptism of Jesus by John that Jesus had a sense of sin, but rather that He had a sense of His essential unity of faith with John. That Jesus should have sought baptism from the same hands and the same water as other proselytes tells us nothing about the state of Jesus' moral consciousness of defect, but it does indicate a consciousness of the call of God and of an accepted purpose in life.

Let us now pass on to the second part of the baptismal incident, where we are told of the dove and the voice from heaven. We shall frankly accept the view that this is a personal experience expressed in symbolic form. But a personal experience of what? The inquiries we have hitherto made in our sources leads us to dissent from the view that Jesus was simply confirmed in His consciousness of "His vocation to be Messiah and also that He was now equipped with power and authority for such a work" (McNeile, *op. cit.*, p. 11). There can be little doubt that what Mark understands here is not merely the point where Jesus was acknowledged to be Messiah, but rather where He received and heard His "call", where He definitely surrendered His life to the service of God (see *supra*, also Klostermann, 1907, S. 9, and Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 17).

Thus the whole point in His baptism is found in the self-surrender to what Jesus felt to be a divine summons, His consecration to His life's task, and His consciousness, thereby further developed, of His own personality. Had Jesus refused the baptism of John, we should have had cause to examine His spiritual quality. Because He sought it, we know more of His inner self, and what we know reveals Him with His face set towards His redeeming work. And at this stage we can add nothing further to our understanding of His soul. But what we do understand is enough to give Him spiritual authority among those whose hand is not yet put to the plough.

Summarising the position we have reached thus far, we may say that we have not yet found any grounds for impugning the

sinless consciousness of Jesus, although, on the other hand, we have found no very solid or extensive basis for building any real authority upon His uniqueness in this respect.

Section viii.—THE JEWISH STANDPOINT.

Let us, therefore, now attempt to deal with the subject from another angle. For if the evangelists and their sources are quite sure of the sinless perfection of Jesus, and if we ourselves can find no trace of moral imperfection in the consciousness of Jesus, still our sources do show us repeatedly and plainly that that was not the case with the Jewish religious authorities of the time. From their point of view Jesus was not only a sinner but one of a very grievous type. If we dissent from their view, and hold that Jesus was right and they were wrong, we shall have to produce our grounds for doing so. And this will take us to the roots of the authority of Jesus.

Jewish morality is easily underrated if one is confined to the picture contained in the Gospels. It should be remembered that, after all, Judaism represented the great tradition of the ethical preachers of Old Testament. No one can read, e.g., *Pirke Aboth* without realising something of the ethical loftiness enshrined in the religion at the time of our Lord. "Be strong as a leopard, swift as an eagle, quick as a stag, brave as a lion, to do the will of thy Father in Heaven" (ed. H. L. Strack, 1901, S. 46, verse 20a) is a phrase which will serve to indicate something of their ardour, their faith, and their moral altitude. It is no use attempting, as is strangely and unfairly done, e.g. by Bruce and many others, to maintain that Jewish morality "consisted in observing innumerable minute rules. . . . Scrupulosity, vanity, and contempt made up the current type of goodness as found in the Pharisaic character" (A. B. Bruce, 1893, p. 347). For these minute rules were probably no more minute nor more numerous than the minutiae of the forms of etiquette maintained to-day in good society, and it is doubtful whether they were more grievously felt amongst cultured Jews than the symbolism of "good form" in our own society. The "scrupulosity, vanity, and contempt" of the Jew was only a counterpart of our modern class-distinctions and their prejudices. The main difference in principle is that whereas our minutiae are purely social, of value only as etiquette, often antagonistic to

religion, and sometimes broken without prejudice to moral character, in the case of the Jews they were intimately connected with religion, and their non-observance was not only bad form, but positive sinful transgression, placing a man outside the pale of both human and divine society.

Now it was these men, trained in the moral school of the prophets, practised in the detailed observances of the divine etiquette, who condemned Jesus as a sinner. They accused Him of Sabbath breaking (Mark ii. 24; Luke xiii. 14), of blasphemy (Mark ii. 7; xiv. 64), of (ceremonial) uncleanness (Mark vii. 2 ff.), of condoning sin (Mark ii. 16, etc.), and what not more. There was probably much in His attitude to the Temple (cf. Mark xiv. 58), to the Scriptures (cf. Luke iv. 25-28), and the tradition generally (cf. Matt. v. 21 ff.) that gave them severe anxiety. Jesus seems to have found it necessary to protest that He came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to fulfil them (Matt. v. 17), which surely means that He was thought to have appeared to threaten them. But what He did in effect was to treat them quite differently from the Rabbinic or orthodox method. He divided the law and the tradition, nay, He divided the law itself. With a sure step He chose what was ethical and spiritual and separated it from what was merely formal and ceremonial. Whereas to the Jew all had been of equal spiritual worth, so that there was neither small nor great, but all were great, and all of the essence of the faith, Jesus found essential only what was truly ethical, having to do with the inner self in its immediate relation with God. All the rest He treated as relatively indifferent. This is not to say that He always left the remainder unobserved, for one can scarcely think that He always ate with unwashed hand or from uncleansed dishes! Rather He let such things, as He let the question of the Sabbath observance (Mark ii. 27), rest upon human convenience and need.

But which opinion was correct? Both were earnest and conscientious. Both parties were born of the same tradition and worshipped the same God, yet they were in some respects in startling contrast in their practical lives no less than in their ideals. Thus Jesus takes His stand upon *His own* reading of the law and the prophets, of the ways of God, and the needs of humanity. His independence, His fresh insight, His firm self-confidence, His forcefulness, and His energy of mind stand out from every page of

the authentic records. But He is alone and His interpretation of God, of the Scriptures, and of human nature is His own. In principle what could be more arbitrary?

On the other hand, His opponents represent the combined product of the law and the prophets as understood by generations of schools who had studied and loved them, and who had been instructed also by the harrowing experiences through which their people had passed in the preceding centuries. It is true that their understanding of "the law and the prophets" had a strong *ex parte* character, but there can be little question that in the circumstances they could do no other than condemn Jesus as a sinner. The overwhelming weight of instructed opinion was against Him. Was Jesus, then, ultimately in the wrong in taking His own line?

This is a problem that cannot be solved on conventional lines, nor by merely counting heads. The verdict lies at the bar of elevated but ordinary human insight, and finally at the bar of history. The first must be promulgated by an act of personal faith, the latter by the cumulative experience of men. And at this stage of the world's history one can say without fear that the ethical judgment and the spiritual discernment of Jesus have been amply endorsed. Rabbinic ethics and religion are, in principle, discredited. So indubitably, indeed, is this true that one may go further and say that if Jesus had not taken the stand He did, and, even at the expense of His life, as the event demanded, had not made good the position He held, He would have misled mankind, and in that sense He would have sinned.

If, however, we now ask how Jesus ever came to teach and live as He did, in the end we must say that He could only have taken the course He adopted on the basis of an unclouded understanding of and intimacy with God, and of a crystal-clear insight into His own soul and into that both of the prophets of the past and of humanity as such. In this most difficult of matters, it is nothing less than the bare truth that not a word Jesus uttered, not a position He adopted, and not a facet of human character He exhibited can be ignored to-day without moral peril, but are justified more completely with every passing year. And if this be true, we have here a cogent reason for holding the doctrine of His sinless perfection of character.

Section ix.—THE GREEK STANDPOINT

Strictly speaking, of course, the argument thus far deals only with the moral perfection of Jesus as contrasted with that prevailing in His day among His own people. While this may be sufficient for general purposes, still it is not quite final for determining the authority of Jesus as based upon the perfection of His moral consciousness. The world has had other teachers beside Jesus whose teachings in the broadest sense of the word have been of immense value, but which are in many respects out of harmony with those of our Lord. And, while Rabbinism is now dead, they are still active forces. Plato and Aristotle had their own ethical systems. The Buddha is revered and worshipped by almost countless millions. Have we any claims to submit that they are wrong, but that Jesus is right and should eventually entirely supersede them, and indeed any others past, present, or future?

The questions that have just been propounded are of immeasurable significance in all departments of human thought, whether religious, ethical, or metaphysical. They deal with the fundamental issue of the relation between truth and authority, an issue too large to be joined in the present instance, but to which reference will be found in the preparatory chapter on the Conception of Authority.

This is scarcely the place to discuss in detail the validity of Greek ethical thought, but its high value cannot be questioned. Much in Plato and still more in Aristotle has been fundamental to higher thought throughout the ages, nor can it be ignored to-day. The four Platonic virtues of Courage, Wisdom, Temperance, and Justice have much in common with Christian thought, but the abstract manner in which they are conceived makes them difficult to compare with the practical and experimental virtues enjoined by Jesus as recorded in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere. Certainly in Athens we are in a very different world from that of Galilee. The real value of the Greek virtues can perhaps only be rightly appreciated when we see how they actually work out in practical life and in concrete cases.

Too much weight need not be laid upon the failure of Plato to realise his ideal republic in Syracuse at the invitation of Dion (368 B.C.), for it may be that the philosopher had little executive ability. Nevertheless, it would appear that on their social side his

conceptions were unworkable, except possibly under conditions that did not and never could exist. The trouble was that it left out of account the actual facts of ordinary human nature. The ideal state was and could be, therefore, nothing more than a dream, and perhaps not even a beautiful one.

What the implications of his thoughts were for the individual person may perhaps best be seen in the developments given them by Aristotle. In the course of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (cf. D. P. Chase, 1877, book iv, especially chapters v-ix) he gives his well-known delineation of his ideal man with his admirable qualities, and also his strong contrasts as compared with the view to which Christian thought is accustomed. Thus it is small-minded not to grasp after one's real deserts, and to have too lowly an opinion of oneself has a deteriorating effect on the character (P. 9). The object of Great-mindedness (or the ideal character) is great honour, but he must not aim at this more than he ought, or from wrong sources. There is a right mean (P. 10). Meekness is a character that errs rather on the side of defect, and a man who labours under it is thought to have no tendency to avenge himself, which is a slavish thing (P. 11). And (the great-minded man) is by no means apt to make laments about things which cannot be helped or requests about those that are trivial. Again, he is the kind of man to acquire what is beautiful and unproductive rather than what is productive and profitable, this being rather the part of an independent man (P. 8).

He is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is ashamed to receive them; the former putting a man in a position of superiority, the latter in that of inferiority; accordingly he will greatly overpay any kindness done to him because the original actor will thus be laid under obligation and be in the position of the party benefited.

He will bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards people of middle station affably (P. 8). (Aristotle does not mention his attitude to the poor man or the helot.)

Also slow motion, deep-toned voice, and deliberate style of speech are thought to be characteristic of the great-minded man; for he who is earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry, nor he who esteems nothing great to be very intent; and sharp tones and quickness are the results of these moods (P. 8).

Even if we make every allowance for differences in national tradition, mode of thought, and literary style, we are compelled to admit that there is a wide difference and frequently a sharp contrast between the ideal of Aristotle and the ideal of Jesus. Nay, more, on several occasions he refers explicitly to some of the qualities praised by Jesus at a later stage and in another climate. But Aristotle condemns them roundly, e.g. compare, "To have too lowly an opinion of oneself has a deteriorating effect upon the character," with "Take the lowest room" or with "Blessed are the poor in Spirit". Or again, compare the contempt for the man who is not ready to avenge himself with the spirit in "Turn the other cheek also". In short, from the point of view of Aristotle, and apart from individual sentences, Jesus was wrong and He was also misleading. Nor is this point of view confined to Aristotle, but is developed by Nietzsche, and other philosophers of the Superman, who combine to regard Jesus as "the worst deceiver of the human race" enjoining a "slave-morality" unworthy of respect (cf. *Genealogy of Morals*, Essay i).

We may readily admit the wide difference between the ideal person of Aristotle and of Jesus, and we further grant that Sanday is substantially correct in saying that the peculiarly Christian virtues are all of the gentle, submissive, and retiring order. But such is the nature of the case, that we can refer judgment only to the general conscience of public opinion, however difficult to determine. We shall be safe in saying, however, that few will be attracted by the ideal of the Greek philosopher as compared with the number of those attracted by Jesus. Few will not notice a certain offensive artificiality and superciliousness in the Greek ideal. Most men will feel that if that were indeed what all should aim at, the outlook would not be very pleasing, and many of the practical social problems, whether of our own day and nation or of the human race in general, would be rendered more difficult of solution.

To put the matter in a somewhat different form: there is no commanding authority in Aristotle's conception of the ideal man. It does not compel personal respect. There is no quickening of the affections, no profound stirring of the will. One does not see how the human race would be better off if the "high-minded man" were incarnated in numerous cases. It remains nothing but an empty intellectualisation, not only unpleasant but impossible of realisation.

Section X.—THE PERSONAL EQUATION IN THE TEACHING OF JESUS.

But now, why is it that we have reached this judgment? We may anticipate our argument a little and say that it is because we have learned to know something better and we have learned it at the feet of Jesus. For, in contrast with the view we have just examined, we may note the following points in the conceptions of Jesus.

Taken in the broad sense of including what He Himself was, Jesus taught three distinctive things. Firstly, He not only spoke about certain ideals of conduct, but He exemplified them in Himself. He interprets in His own person what He means by His words. We are thus not dealing with something merely abstract, which may be regarded as the epitome of an ethic. We are dealing with One who was a man among men, and who spoke of human duty on the basis of a profound insight into human nature, with its woes, its hopes, and its needs.

The factor of an historic basis in a person who had once really so lived was of immense advantage in the early missionary propaganda, and it is just as effective to-day. "We would see Jesus" is not the expression merely of a few inquisitive strangers on a single far-off day; rather it represents the need all feel if they are really to understand and fully to appreciate the meaning of Christian spirituality. As we have often sought to demonstrate, the authority of Jesus during His lifetime was that of the reaction between His onlookers and His own personality as interpreting His teachings and His aims. And the tradition of that personality has never died down altogether within the community of Christian believers, but has been transmitted from age to age. There is a commanding experimental truth in the great saying of St Paul that the church is the body of which Christ is the head and the believers are the members (1 Cor. xii. 12, 27; Eph. i. 22, etc.).

This, then, is the first element of the teaching of our Lord. It is in the personal character of all ethical and all spiritual truth. It is communicated from soul to soul as much as it is transmitted by word and thought. Words, indeed, appear inadequate. It is the spirit which giveth life, although His words themselves appear as both spirit and life (John vi. 63). And there can be no doubt that

here we reach something of ultimate validity to the soul. For each man, his own personal experience, his own sense of the power or authority exerted upon him are final. "One thing I know, that whereas I was blind, now I see." Here is the ultimate answer to all questions regarding authority. It is essentially personal, and in such a way that it suggests that the very structure of the universe is personal. The authoritative finality of Jesus cannot be understood apart from this consideration, and, as our examination of the sources seemed to show, it constituted the great factor upon which Jesus consistently relied in the entire course of His ministry.

Section xi.—THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD.

The second characteristic of the teaching of Jesus is in regard to the nature of the Kingdom of God. In recent years a wealth of literature has grown up upon this question which is thus raised to a controversial issue. Opinion is sharply divided between those who hold that Jesus was completely eschatological in His expectation of the Kingdom and those who hold it was more spiritual. The former say He conceived it to be imminent and as a physico-superphysical entity. God would exercise immediate judgment and in full earnest. Then the end of the world would be ushered in. They say that because Jesus held this belief in the full seriousness of His great soul, He preached an ethic with great power and urgency, but specially adapted to the brief period before the catastrophic appearance of the Kingdom. His own part was, for the present, to prepare the people as well as possible, but at the coming of the Kingdom to assume the rôle of the Messiah and act as vicegerent of God (cf. Schweitzer, 1901, *passim*; 1921, *mult. loc.*, especially S.S. 390-443).

It is noticeable that it is specifically held that the ethic of Jesus is not and was never intended to be universal. It is warranted only in view of the urgent circumstances of the time, and it would be abrogated as soon as the Kingdom appeared, and give place to other norms of conduct. But thereby also it is implied that the ethic of Jesus is not, as such, fully applicable to our own times or, indeed, to any circumstances essentially different from those which Jesus mistakenly conceived to exist at the time when He entered upon His urgent ministry. Such universality as it may possess, then, would be due rather to the overruling providence of God, or else to the

plastic character of the teachings themselves, enabling them to be adapted to other times and climes.

The objections to the above striking and forceful theory are numerous and weighty. But those can be ruled out of court without the benefit of considerations which are put forward on the basis of the extensive damage which the theory would do to our reverence for the person of Jesus or to the universal validity of His ethical teaching. If the theory be true, we have no alternative to accepting it. We must then accommodate ourselves as best we can to the new orientation of Christian truth.

But is the theory valid? Does it give us an interpretation of the mind, ministry, and the teaching of Jesus which is substantially in accordance with the facts? The answer seems to be unquestionably in the negative. Indeed, as Streeter quietly suggests (*op. cit.*, p. 255, footnote), "Schweitzer's whole argument depends on the assumption that Matthew x is, word for word, an exact report of what was said at the time. The demonstration . . . given . . . that Matt. x. 5-23 is a late conflation of at least two sources, Mark and Q, would alone be a sufficient refutation of his argument". The fact appears to be undoubtedly that Schweitzer has misread his text and also forced his theory upon his mis-reading. Thus the nerve of his position is cut.

Moreover, the character of Jesus as portrayed on the basis of the eschatological passages, chiefly in Matthew x and Mark xiii (which latter is itself subject, on other grounds, to grave suspicion as to its unity and its authenticity), taken in isolation, is completely out of harmony with the strong consensus of the documentary sources as found in Q, Mark, M, and L. His deep insight into human nature, His quick, spontaneous sympathy, His large patience, His sublime calm, His lightness of touch, His charm are all either blurred or else downright incomprehensible. In other words, if the eschatological theory be sound, we have two incompatible pictures of Jesus or, rather, we have pictures of two persons each called Jesus of Nazareth. It is far simpler to assume that our main sources are substantially authentic and that the special pleading of Schweitzer and the eschatological school is historically unwarranted.

We must, therefore, turn our attention to the school of thought which holds the Kingdom of God as conceived by Jesus, to consist

really in a purely spiritual entity. It is the sphere of human experience in which God is really King. He rules, He alone exercises authority. His Kingdom consists in that fellowship of believing souls in which God's will is truly realised and His purposes accomplished. His Kingdom is not actually present, neither is it merely future. In a certain degree it is already actually realised, and yet in another sense it is always being more perfectly realised. It is found wherever a soul obeys the will of God in simple earnestness and steadfast faith (Matt. vi. 33), and more perfectly where a few are banded together in the spirit of Jesus (Matt. xviii. 20). In essence it depends upon the simple and immediate responsiveness between the individual soul and its Maker, and also between such souls as related to each other and to God. Where such responsiveness exists, there is to be found the Kingdom of God. It represents a problem, an ethical task, and a vital spiritual challenge which meet men along the whole course of their daily life (cf. A. Ritschl, 1903, S.S. 2 ff.). In a certain sense, therefore, it is a present entity.

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that it was conceived of more or less closely in connection with one of the traditional forms of apocalyptic expectation without precisely defining the time, and, indeed, with an explicit impossibility of defining the time (Mark xiii. 32). It was to arrive at the close of the age—whatever that may mean (Matt. xiii. 39)—but its coming is deferred until the gospel is made known to all mankind (Matt. xxiv. 14), although this consummation was expected within the lifetime of the present generation (Matt. xxiv. 34). Nevertheless it is quite explicit that the words of Jesus are more enduring than the world itself, and after the end of the latter the former will retain their force and their truth (Mark xiii. 31 and parallels, cf. Matt. v. 18; see also Strack-Billerbeck, 1922, S.S. 244 f.).

But, further, there are passages of apparently equal authenticity where the horizon is very much narrower. Jesus expects His *parousia* well within the lifetime of His onlookers (Mark ix. 1, “. . . many shall not taste death”), and, in fact, His messengers will not have finished their missionary task in Israel (Matt. x. 23). And this expectation of the nearness of the coming of the Kingdom seems to have formed an element integral to Jesus' view of the future.

Thus there are two strains of thought combined in the con-

ception of the actual consummation of the Kingdom of Heaven. The first is based upon the indestructible quality of the law, and of the unassailable timeless security of the God beneath (cf. Deut. xxxiii. 27), beyond (Ps. cxxxix. 9), and above (Isa. lv. 9, Ps. cxxxix. 8), and of the equal validity of the teachings of Jesus (Matt. xxiv. 35). But, superimposed is the view that a certain consummation will take place within a brief period, and will introduce the age that is to last for ever.

Now it is evident that these two strains of thought are by no means ultimately incompatible, but it is, nevertheless, a matter of considerable question to what extent the eschatological expectations, which appear to have become marked and almost extravagant in the early church in certain localities if not universally, may have influenced the literary form of the records that have reached us within the limits of the gospels. So marked was this influence that, as appears certain, the major part of the whole chapter, dedicated to this subject, has been introduced into one of our main sources as Mark xiii, and that not merely as an editorial addition but as a piece of the veritable teaching of Jesus (so Klostermann, 1907, S. 111). It is not possible for us at this stage to determine whether Jesus held any of these views, and if so, in what sense He held them.

For our special purpose, however, the solution of these questions is of secondary importance compared with the fact that, in any case, Jesus made the consummation dependent upon the preaching and, indeed, upon the acceptance of His gospel. His words *must* be preached before the end should come (Mark xiii. 10). The righteousness of God must first be sought before the Kingdom could be realised in its completeness (Matt. vi. 33). The point is not that the preaching of the gospel supplies merely the warning and the necessarily spiritual preparation for the coming of the Kingdom, but rather somewhat as follows. The fulness of the times is at hand. God is prepared to institute His Kingdom, but it is not of this world (John xviii. 36). What it means is, that God is really prepared to reign among men. That being so, the urgent question is whether men are really willing to be reconciled to God and to make the necessary changes in heart and life, so that the divine Kingdom can be instituted. In so far as individuals take the will of God in full earnest, God already reigns. Thus the preaching of the Kingdom is part of what makes the Kingdom possible, just

as guests are indispensable to a wedding feast (cf. Matt. xxii. 1 ff., especially verse 9). This fact makes the preaching of the Kingdom an urgent matter, for without preaching, and all that it implies, the Kingdom can never issue into fact. When the Kingdom does come it will certainly take many by surprise (Luke xvii. 31 ff.), but it cannot come at all except in so far as the truth is proclaimed (Luke x. 2; Matt. xiii. 8) and understood (Matt. vii. 24; xii. 50).

It seems little less than a perversion of the data to suggest that Jesus believed the Kingdom was imminent in any case, and that His message was principally a warning (Schweitzer, 1901, S. 15 f., etc.). In His view, rather, the ethic of His message was the prerequisite of the Kingdom, and the preaching of that ethic was the medium or instrument for creating in men the spirituality integral to the Kingdom. The Kingdom is already here when, and in so far as, the new spirituality is born in men, but it is still future in so far as many men remain untransformed, and the conversion of the world is, therefore, incomplete.

That this understanding of the nature of the Kingdom is correct is borne out by what we have already seen to be the nature of both the Messiahship and the Sonship of Jesus. It was His acting upon His insight or faith, and His personal discharge of the relevant function, that made Him conscious of being the true Messiah (cf. p. 215 *supra*) and that gave Him His unique sense of Sonship (cf. p. 238 *supra*). And in the same way to arouse in men the true relation with God and to create a group of believers enjoying that relationship itself, which is the function of preaching, that is, actually to bring the Kingdom into being. It means taking it by force (cf. Matt. xi. 12).

Complementary to all this is the fact that the earnest taking of God's will is at once an easier (Matt. xxiii. 4; Luke xi. 46) and a harder thing (Matt. v. 20) than was commonly understood and practised by the Pharisees and the Scribes. It is to be understood through and through as a matter of the heart (e.g. Matt. v. 28), of establishing the same kind of relations between man and man as exist or are sought between man and God (cf. Matt. v. 23 f., cf. especially 38-48, giving various practical injunctions leading up to "Be ye perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect"; Luke xi. 4, "Forgive . . . as we forgive"). The criterion of right conduct or

right aim is not to be found in the regulations of tradition, nor even in the law and the prophets taken in an external fashion, although these last can only be abrogated as they are fulfilled. Rather it is to be found in a proper understanding of human nature and its instincts, for "Whatever you would like men to do unto you, do just the same to them" (Matt. vii. 12; Luke vi. 31); and in learning to discern the truth for oneself by exercising one's private judgment (Luke xii. 54-56) or by joint consultation and decision¹ (Luke xii. 57 ff.).

The community of those who thus live and act are themselves the brothers and sisters and mother of Jesus (Mark iii. 34). They are of His family and kin, and there is the Kingdom in essence (Matt. xviii. 20).

But this independence of judgment, together with this genial relation between man and man, is precisely what rapidly produces an intelligent and profound faith in God. A wide and independent observation of nature and the seeking first of all the Kingdom, i.e. acting as if it were already an established fact, immediately bring ease from anxiety about one's person (Matt. vi. 27) or about the morrow (verse 30), for one sees that all things are in the hands of God and nothing escapes His sympathetic understanding (verse 32). God is King indeed, and He truly reigns in the heart.

Much more might well be added, but enough has been said to show that in the preaching of Jesus the taking of a certain attitude to life and to God is a necessary preparation to the coming of the Kingdom. Nay, more, it is the actualisation of the Kingdom itself. The Kingdom exists in so far as, on the one hand, a certain spirituality exists in and among men, and, on the other, as it is the gift of a gracious God waiting to present it to those ready and able to receive it (Luke xii. 31 f., "Only seek His realm. . . . Fear not, you little flock, for your Father is delighted to give you the realm").

In especial, Jesus does not make His own words into rules and regulations, nor even His own example into the criterion of life in any narrow sense. It is doubtful if the question, "What would Jesus do?" when answered in any manner as meaning the abrogation of one's own judgment in favour of that of another, even though it be our Lord's own, really represents the final norm. He strongly condemned those who bound chains upon proselytes

(Matt. xxiii. 4), and He urged men to open their eyes and exercise their own judgment (Matt. xvi. 3). Thus in the Oxyrynchus papyri we read what is undoubtedly an authentic saying of our Lord: "Jesus saith . . . The Kingdom of God is within you, and whosoever shall know himself shall find it. Strive, therefore, to know yourselves, and ye shall be aware that ye are sons of the Father."

Jesus awakens within us the deepest understanding of duty, and the profoundest conception of the meaning of life, and the noblest faith in God; but when thus awakened, it is our part as His followers just to live by the judgment which the sum-total of our experience has produced in us. We dare not shut down our inquiry or silence our conscience and blindly follow even His utterances or example. What He would have us do is hear His word, receive His spirit, accept His faith in God, and then learn to discern the face of the times for ourselves (cf. Herrmann, 1907, S.S. 29 ff.).

But this is religion with a forward look. It is independent of special times and conditions. It is plastic and self-adapting. The fellowship of persons who have accepted it constitutes a community naturally adapted to every age and race and clime, and calculated to elevate each individual to the highest reaches of his own spiritual perceptions, and, indeed, to cause them to expand into circles which otherwise never could have been anticipated. And that fellowship will likewise represent the community among men which will most nearly correspond to what each will long for, and what each really can attain. There do not seem to be any circumstances possible of conception, in which each man cannot exercise his own best judgment, nor any in which he can feel that in so doing he is shut out from the will of God, and thereby from the service of God.

In short, the Kingdom of God as preached by Jesus and the nature of human duty as required of all those who seek the Kingdom seem well within not merely the dreams and the desires, but the practice and the realisation of a workaday world. And each degree of its actualisation represents its own perfection while yet pointing to and preparing for a further stage in whatever adaptations new outer circumstances and further inner experience, with all the additional data then brought to bear, may seem to bring into the common fund. Thus the Kingdom of God preached by Jesus and illustrated in His person represents a conception of

practical ethico-spiritual perfection, beyond which it does not seem possible to reach.

Section xii.—THE REDEMPTIVE AND ULTIMATE ETHIC.

There is one further aspect of the teaching of Jesus upon which we must touch. For He is not concerned merely with the salvation of the individual by a right communion with God, nor yet with the realisation of a Kingdom of God in such individual persons and in their fellowship with one another. There is also the feature of the redemptive quality of the Higher Morality.

In one way, it is true, the concern of the individual for others is included in the conception of the Kingdom of God, but it is implicit rather than explicit when viewed from this standpoint. For the society of the Kingdom is possibly concerned only with the relationships of the subjects to each other. But it may be said with equal truth and appropriateness that the Kingdom of God is itself an aspect of the development of redemptive morality in the individual, and that both alike are aspects of the right relation of the individual to God. The redemptive morality inspired by Jesus has, however, as great a right to independent treatment as either of the others.

Briefly, what one meets in this aspect of the teaching of Jesus is that, apart altogether from questions of its ulterior value to ourselves, or to the realisation of the Kingdom of God, we owe a duty to our fellow-men. Thus, "Whoever forces you to go one mile, go two miles with him. Give to the man who begs from you, and turn not away from him who wants to borrow" (Matt. v. 41 f.), i.e. "Serve him at any cost to yourself". "Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you" (verse 44), i.e. the good and even the salvation of other people, even of those who have no human claim upon us, is nevertheless part of our human duty independently of consideration of the Kingdom, for "an unforgiving, grudge-bearing spirit is not simply a fault but also unutterably mean" (cf. Matt. xviii. 21-24 and 27-30).

Jesus was accused of consorting with publicans and sinners (Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 34), and His friendliness towards them was doubtless one of the causes contributing to the hostility of the Pharisees. But why was it that He followed the practice? Why did He choose to dine with Zacchæus rather than some person less

hated and despised? (Luke xix. 5). Why did He adopt the remarkable attitude to the adulterous woman (John viii. 1 ff.) and to the woman with the alabaster flask of perfume (Luke vii. 36 ff.)? There is only one answer. Jesus cannot have delighted in them as they were. But He was set on winning them. We can read of the effect recorded on Zacchæus, and we can imagine that the women just mentioned received from such a spirit as His their best chance of redeeming their lives. And in this connection we must understand the second part of the parable of the Prodigal Son and the redemptive attitude of the father as compared with the ethically justifiable conduct of the older son.

"This overflowing good will towards unfriendly (and unworthy) people is one of Jesus' unique contributions to the moral life, and He was aware of the fact. When He said, 'Ye have heard that it was said an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. . . . Ye have heard that it was said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy," but I say unto you love your enemies' (Matt. v. 38, 43 ff.), He was consciously contrasting Jewish sayings with His new commandment. When He said, 'If ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? Do not even the Gentiles the same?' He was definitely contrasting Græco-Roman morals with His own" (H. E. Fosdick, 1924, p. 22). It was thus no mere accident of a particularly sunny nature. It was also a definitely felt need to round out and make perfect the spiritual quality of human life. And He Himself acted upon it consistently right to the end. Thus He prays for Peter that his faith fail him not (Luke xxii. 31 f.), and there is a strongly authentic note in the final injunction to the same apostle: "Feed My lambs . . . be a shepherd to My sheep" (John xxi. 15 ff.). The prayer of forgiveness on the Cross is a supreme instance of the same quality.

Indeed, it is nothing less than the bare truth to say that the redemptive ethic of the Christian gospel is one of its unique features, for it is here that one sees the characteristic quality of Christian love. That love is more than an affection towards kindred spirits, or to other members of a fellowship. It is an earnest concern for the well-being also of the outsider (Luke xix. 10, ". . . to seek and to save *that which was lost*") and even for an enemy (Matt. v. 44). It is desire for another's good, no matter what that other's personal attitude to ourselves or the Kingdom,

and if need be, no matter at what cost to oneself (John xv. 13). Thus under the teaching and inspiration of Jesus, the disciple becomes himself a centre of redeeming love and a worker together with Christ. It is undoubtedly this noble quality which constituted the driving force of the Church. The early believers were rather drawn on by a newly awakened love of or concern for their fellows, than driven by fear of impending cataclysm. St. Paul becomes all things to all men that he might at least gain some (1 Cor. ix. 22), and one feels that he does less than justice to himself in saying that his aim is to secure his share in the gospel he preaches (verse 23). And the same motive is to-day no less one of the mainsprings of the foreign missionary enterprise.

Nor can one understand the Cross of Jesus apart from this consideration. Whatever else the Cross implied to Him, it implied that He was faithful to His gospel for the sake of the people. It was not merely concern for Himself or His Kingdom, nor for those who had believed in and followed Him in the course of His ministry, but also for the many who knew not what they did. Had He weakened, His disciples must inevitably have utterly and finally failed. If the truth was to be preserved, the truth by which men could live, the truth which made life worth living, then He must face the issue right through, come what may. And after-ages felt keenly this very aspect of the Crucifixion. It was for our sakes that though He was rich yet He became poor (2 Cor. viii. 9). The very unhistorical quality found in John's Gospel itself bears witness to the indelible impression upon believers that Jesus lived and ministered mainly for the sake of the people.

It is difficult to express in a few words all that this attitude of mind, exhibited so freely, so forcibly, and so tenderly by our Lord, and inculcated with such power in epigram and parable, has meant for mankind. Suffice to say that we gain the impression from it all that "a new humanity began on earth with Him" (Weinel, 1910, S. 82). We can fully agree with Strauss in holding that "with reference to all that bears upon the love of God and of our neighbour, upon purity of heart and upon the individual life, nothing can be added to the moral intuition which Jesus has left us." He has done "more to redeem and to soften mankind, than all the disquisitions of the philosophers and all the exhortation of moralists" (Lecky, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. pp. 8 f.).

And it is upon some such intuitions of the significance of His ministry that our estimate of the ultimate value of His teaching must rest.

The fact is that when we attempt to compare the simple but effective, practical idealism of Jesus with that of the great thinkers of antiquity, we feel we are dealing with incompatibles. We are comparing with cold and chiselled marble a man who breathes with a vital spirit. The classical symmetry and artistic balance of the former cannot weigh with the warmth and the reality of the latter. "In Him was life and that life was the light of men."

How, then, are we to estimate the ultimate meaning of the sinless perfection of our Lord? The Jews condemned Him as both wrong and misleading. Aristotle holds before us very widely different ideals of human character which cannot possibly be reconciled with those of Jesus. And it may be sufficient to say, in a single sentence, that the Buddha's negative attitude to life cannot be harmonised with the positive acceptance of Jesus, whatever may be said for the ethical loftiness of the former's views. But what is the root of our conviction of the ultimate superiority of Jesus, and on what grounds do we hold to His supreme sinless perfection?

Section xiii.—THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON WITH THE TEACHING.

It is precisely at this point that we find our last difficulty and also our ultimate solution of the problem of the nature of the sinlessness of Jesus. What we find is twofold. (i) The teaching of Jesus is not mere teaching, but is inseparable from its interpretation in His personality and in His life and death. There is no such thing as an adequate system of Jesus' theology or ethic. Christian principles, of which one hears much, are always different from and less than the real message and power of the gospel, which is a word plus an interpretation and the interpretation not left to the arbitrary *Gutdünken* of the individual inquirer, nor to the mercy of metaphysical analysis, necessary though such an analysis may afterwards prove to be. But the real significance of the gospel message itself goes beyond anything words can fully express. It can only be truly grasped when the system of thought as thus conveyed is accompanied by an immediate intuition of the living

Lord through the ethical operation of His actual person upon our own when engaged upon His truth. All these elements are essential, this voluntative movement, the play of the critical faculties, and the immediate operation of person on person.

But then (ii) the criterion of ethical conduct as thus enjoined, and of the ideal of faith and life as thus brought home, is none other than the entire self-consistency of Jesus *Himself* with all that He puts before us. The criterion of His sinless perfection is found just in what He Himself advances. He creates a new sensibility in us, a conscience that approves itself and its own standards. It carries its own authority in its harmony with our inner self, for "the human heart is naturally Christian". But then it adds daily to its authority by coming home as belonging to the ultimate structure of the moral universe. And it is because that refined and educated sensibility finds its greatest satisfaction and its highest joys in contemplating Him and the harmony of His whole life that we can do no other than call Him the sinlessly perfect One. Our apologetic consists simply in pointing to His person, His life, His consciousness, His aim, and His influence on those who have truly accepted Him as Lord. We can only say that in order for us to judge Him we cannot use any other standard than what He has set before us. Do we look for what a man should be? We look towards Him. Do we seek for an attitude towards God or to the world that we can wish universalised? We find it nowhere so perfectly or so satisfyingly as in Him. Do we seek to know what is the ideal relation between man and man, or what is the purpose of the whole of life and of the very world? We find no expressions that content us so well as those that gain their inspiration from Him.

Section xiv.—THE PERMANENT SOURCE OF ETHICAL INSPIRATION.

Of course, statements like these are not universally accepted, and, in the nature of things, perhaps under the very inspiration of the attitude of mind our Lord Himself adopted, we often depart from their track and make our own experiments. With what result? It is impossible to give an answer on the basis of collated results. But we can summarise the general impression made by observing the course of things within one's own experience, and also in the process of history in all degrees and scales. And we can seek the opinion of men of large outlook, profound knowledge,

and extensive human sympathy. Having then done our best, we may perhaps venture an opinion. Meantime, we may say it is our conviction that men are gradually approximating to the type of character which Jesus endorsed, and accepting the teaching He put forth, and this not by any outer compulsion of a mechanically conceived evolution, but rather because what is inconsistent therewith is found less satisfying. It leads to a poorer type of life than that which follows from the guidance of Jesus, who thus again proves to us His unique quality of perfection.

Similarly, we venture to hold that society reveals much the same features. As the ages pass by we can see that it sheds evil after evil and develops good after good, but what is shed as evil and developed as good has no other criterion than that already laid down in the ethic of Jesus. It is that ethic which interprets humanitarianism and that moulds the conception of "the right". While explicitly following only the dictates of such non-religious motives, nevertheless consciously and unconsciously, society approximates ever more closely and consciously to the words and teachings and leadership of Jesus. Thus it is in the self-consistency of His own person, and the harmony of His ideals with what human nature really needs in all its varying phases that we may find the sinless perfection of Jesus.

Section xv.—THE ADEQUATE IDEAL.

Nor is this quite all. For as the ages have passed by, new situations have constantly arisen and new problems have demanded new solutions—situations and problems simply undreamed of, and, indeed, totally impossible in the days of the ministry of Jesus in Palestine. But the ethic of Jesus knows no difference between new and old. It seems equally applicable to all. It is never found wanting. Its ideal but shines the clearer, and the power gained in personal adhesion to it is an ample dynamic.

Further, there have been occasions when new ethical and spiritual principles, however implicit they may be regarded, have needed enunciating. The right to freedom as against the justification of slavery; the claim of each child to at least elementary education and of every man to a living wage; the moral necessity to search heaven and earth and sea for facts—these are new principles not easily found even as implicit in the Gospels or the

rest of the New Testament. But they are one and all rightly regarded as Christian principles. For the fact is that in the heritage of the tradition of Jesus we have actually received a leadership in these enunciations. Greatly daring, one may say that if Jesus had precluded any of these advances He would have been wrong and to that extent not morally perfect. But all the ethical movements of the human spirit, both in the minutiae of the individual soul and on the broadest scale of the human race, can be interpreted in terms of Christian ethic. Nay, more, not only may all these movements be thus interpreted, but, when so interpreted, they themselves seem to receive fresh meaning. Their significance is expanded and enriched. The Christian interpretation is in itself the worthiest, and it gives the most scope for the developments that may lie beyond as far as the mind can reach. And this fact constitutes an unimpeachable witness to the supreme moral and sinless perfection of Jesus. We feel that every possible degree of certainty in matters affecting human conduct and the hope of the amelioration of the race is granted to us through Jesus of Nazareth. And that sense of confidence is the sequel to or the correlative of the authority which He exercises over us.

If it be objected that this conviction is, after all, purely subjective, we may perhaps best reply that this is true. But it is not arbitrary, and we need not be disturbed. For all validity and truth are founded upon a sense of satisfaction and of harmony, which are also individual experiences and judgments. A narrow conception of the human mind makes all inquiry and any certainty impossible, and renders human endeavour largely futile. "The spiritual satisfaction which is the token of truth must involve all the psychical factors in a working harmony, it acquires the response and the assent of the whole man. . . . The more fully the different elements support and supplement one another, the greater is the assurance of religious truth." (cf. Galloway, 1904, pp. 264 ff.). And it is because of our supreme and unalloyed satisfaction when in communion with the Risen Lord, and when surveying life, the world, and God in His way, that we call His authority ultimate. We may be wrong, but only the event can prove it.

Nor is this whole of experience an isolated fact, but it is linked up with and is partially built upon similar experiences and judgments in those men of the past and the present whose lives come

closest to our own. We find, in short, that the ethic of Jesus interprets ourselves, our experiences, and our needs to ourselves as we should like to do for ourselves if only we were good enough and wise enough. He fits our case completely. He seems to hold the key to our life. As the apostle said, "Our life is hid with Him in God". And that complete adaptation to our individual case is the only sign of the completely valid. The perfect expression of any entity is in its sphere the only universal of which we have any knowledge. It carries its own sanction and is the guarantee of its own finality. And that guarantee is what we find in the ethical authority which Jesus exercises over us. His authority is what we desire, what we need, what we rejoice in. It is what satisfies, uplifts, and inspires us, what enables us to express the last bit of our personality. And that is final. There is nothing more to say. Jesus exhausts the subject and opens out the path that leads to what lies beyond. In following Him, we pass from darkness into God's marvellous light, and in that light we experience once more the authority of His sinless perfection.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION

Section i.—THE RESPONSE OF FAITH.

ON what grounds, then, does Jesus exercise authority to-day in the normal Christian experience? We worship Him as Son of God, as the Second Person in the Trinity, as the Saviour of Mankind, as the Sinless Perfect Divine man. We may feel that because He is such all obedience is due to Him, to His recorded words, or to His ancient institutions such as the church, the priesthood, or the sacraments. But all such worship or obedience, however earnest and engrossing, and however awful, uplifting, and satisfying, is to be distinguished as outer, and in the best sense of the term uninspiring. It silences and overwhelms more than it liberates and inspires. Our own will and personality are engulfed and outflooded, rather than embraced by and unified with His. We lose ourselves more than we find ourselves. We are entailed in a system of faith rather than given the glorious liberty of the authentic children of God. In short, such authority whatever name it may bear, and whatever its sacred associations may be, is not the authority of a living Lord who has personally to do with us. In the last analysis it is not what we mean by the authority of Jesus. That authority is only to be found in the inmost experience of a believing soul.

If now, we may venture to enter here, what is it that we find? The question is far easier to ask than it is to answer, although the answer is within the consciousness of all those who have found their faith. It is found, first of all, in the sense of impact. The centres of our ethical consciousness are shaken. We find our spiritual references are being shifted. Moral wisdom and religious truth receive new clothing and new meaning. The hard things of the moral life such as self-abnegation, or the giving first place to the motive of love assume an unthought-of attraction. We begin to feel that we simply must revise our life, our conduct, and our ideals, and this with a sense of a newly discovered inner need which is far more effective than any outer compulsion. It flows, as it were, automatically from the fact of our contact with Him. The question of our inner character arises at once as part and

parcel of our experience, and it becomes urgent. We find ourselves arraigned in a way that only God can arraign us, for our experiences are paralleled and illumined most of all perhaps by the utterances of the great penitential Psalms. Not that our experience is necessarily only an experience of sin, but it is that of an imperative which demands a life higher, larger, worthier both in its references and in its practical expressions. We have a sense of a unification of our gifts, our aims, our tastes, and our ideals.

Like the apostles in the upper room, we find we do indeed receive power. We find ourselves able to see things, and to do things we had not noticed nor would have attempted before. Life and the world are transformed. Things once keenly desired lose their charm, others formerly neglected acquire a wonderful appeal. The will to follow the dictates of ethical love begins to dominate. What once was regarded as sacrifice is now often found to be an essential means of self-expression. Anything, indeed, is but waste except what expresses the will of Christ, or what leads into a closer intimacy with Him; but what does that is precious beyond expression.

Nor is this a shallow emotional satisfaction, for it corresponds with the severest demands of the ethical elements in human nature. None of these is unsatisfied, and many are far exceeded, in the fresh reaches of redemptive morality opened up in normal Christian experience. Love literally fulfils the law and goes beyond towards the second mile. There is an overplus which expresses itself in a unique inner exaltation. We are more than conquerors.

Section ii.—THE ULTIMATE SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY.

And even this is not adequate, for ethical satisfaction when complete cannot be merely individual nor subjective. It gains its concrete quality and its striking stable character from the identification of the authority of the Person operating upon us inwardly with the Jesus of Nazareth whose words and ministry are in a measure recorded in the Gospels. Those words and that ministry, then, come home to us in a unique manner. They act as a kind of written conscience. They search us. They assure us. They bring us back to the great fundamental

things, and yet they lift our eyes to the very horizon of the spirit of man. We are in the grip of an authority which we feel we can only neglect to our moral peril; and yet at the same time there is not a thought we receive nor an impulse aroused which is not of our own veriest self. Thus the voice of the historical record, the inner sanctions of the ethical and religious self, and the immediate influence of the Risen Lord unite into one authority with a power and an urgency of the highest conceivable order. Let him who can, say this is other than the power and the presence of Deity. As for us, it is sufficient to say, "Our life is hid with Christ in God" (Col. iii. 3).

And this is at once the experience of redemption, of justification, of atonement, of salvation. It is the gift of our communion with the Lord. He has done for us what only God can do, or rather, let us say that it is impossible for us to determine whether Jesus has done it and done it out of love, or whether God has done it and done it out of Grace. Nor does this indeterminability affect the issue spiritually, for it is all one. We know God through Christ, and we know Christ through God. If we call Him God, as Herrmann says, we but give Him His name. In all that concerns our spiritual life His authority and God's are the same. As Luther says in his great Commentary on Galatians, "But seeing Christ giveth grace, peace, and the Holy Ghost, delivereth from the power of the devil, from sin, and death, it is certain that He hath an infinite and divine power, equal in all points to the power of the Father. . . (These) are not the works of any creature but of the Divine Majesty alone . . . and seeing Paul doth attribute the self-same power of creating, and giving all these things unto Christ equally with the Father, it must needs follow that Christ is verily and naturally God. . . .

"He hath the divine works not of a creature, but of a Creator, therefore He giveth *grace* and *peace*, and to give them is to condemn sin and to tread the devil underfoot. . . . Seeing they are attributed unto Jesus, it must needs follow that He is verily God by nature" (English trans. by P. O., 1796, *a.l.*, i. 3, p. 35).

May we then approach the last question in regard to the authority of Jesus, and ask in what way He is the ultimate spiritual authority? But now, as is inevitable, we are carried to the limits, and even beyond the limits of personal experience. Once more

we must beware of all attempts, either from within or from without, unduly to stereotype the authority of Jesus in the form of the tradition of a word or a society, which would be but to hand ourselves over at last to unreality. Personal experience, as far as it goes, is our guide. It is true that one who is used to the important but secondary support of church, or tradition or scripture may feel this authority is too slender or delicate, and quite unable to bear the demands that will be made upon it. But as one becomes more accustomed to its purity and its grace one becomes more aware of its strength, until at length one may realise it as the only authority which has ultimate and effective ethical or religious power.

The type of authority revealed by our sources, in its apparent modernity, may seem remote from the mentality of antiquity. This, however, is only another way of saying that in religion Jesus is the Master. He deals with what is fundamental and essential to all ethically religious experience. The fact is that probably in *every* age Jesus has seemed modern, and when any development has taken place there has been a closer approximation to the new conception of His personal significance. He is always new, and when emphasis is placed upon the essentially Jewish, or ancient features in our Lord's thought, the probability is that undue pressure is placed upon certain aspects of the records. The authority of Jesus is that of person on living person, and that is always and essentially a present fact dating from to-day. The authority of Jesus, in so far as it is felt to be modern, authenticates itself to be the authority of the Lord of Life.

Let us then be content to say that just as we hold our trust in God on the same tenure as our trust in each other, so also we recognise the authority of Jesus by the intuitions springing from the same soil of immediate personal intercourse. If our Lord be not a living Lord, then our hope is in vain and we are of all men most pitiable, for the first need of the soul is not met—the need for a Master. Our faith is not merely an ethic nor a metaphysic, still less is it a psychology. It is essentially a personal reaction between the soul, its Saviour, and its Maker. Our religion becomes clearly incarnate in the person of its Founder. What it all may mean for us, in life and its interpretation, only the event can prove. Our part is to use fully the light and power He gives us now,

while we earnestly seek the broader day and the fuller inspiration which He is waiting to give. Meantime for us there is no alternative to the course we have chosen, nor do we need one. He has brought us our peace, and we are content to say, "In Him is life, and that life is the light of men".

BIBLIOGRAPHY

*of the more important works used, or to which references are made
in the text.*

- ALLEN, W. C. The Gospel according to St. Mark. 1915.
- ANGUS, S. The Mystery Religions and Christianity. 1925.
- ARISTOTLE. Nichomachean Ethics. English translation. By D. P. Chase.
Fourth edition. 1877.
- ATHANASIUS. On the Incarnation, the Greek Text. Ed. A. Robertson.
Fourth edition. 1910.
The Orations of St. Athanasius, Against the Arians. Anon. English
translation. Ancient and Modern Library of Theol. Lit. (No
date.)
- BALLARD, F. The Miracles of Unbelief. Fourth edition. 1902.
- BAUER, W. Das Johannesevangelium, in Handbuch zum Neuen Testa-
ment. 1925.
- BERGUER, G. Some Aspects of the Life of Jesus. English translation. 1923.
- BILLERBECK, P. (See under STRACK.)
- BOUSSET, W. Jesus. English translation. 1906.
- BRACE, C. L. Gesta Christi. Fourth edition. 1890.
- BUGGE, C. A. Die Haupt-Parabeln Jesu. 1903.
- BURKITT, F. C. The Earliest Sources for the Life of Jesus. 1910.
- CHAMBERLAIN, H. S. Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts.
Sixth edition. Two vols. 1909.
- CHARLES, R. H. Book of Enoch. 1893.
Religious Development between the Old Testament and the New
Testament. 1914.
- DALMAN, G. The Words of Jesus. English translation by D. M. Kay.
1902.
- DEISSMANN, A. D. Urchristentum u. d. unteren Schichten. Second edition.
1908.
Licht vom Osten. Second and Third editions. 1909.
The Religion of Christ and the Faith of Paul. 1923.
Paulus. Second edition. 1925.
- DENNEY, J. Jesus and the Gospel. 1908.
- DIBELIUS, M. Formgeschichte. 1919.
- ECKHART, Meister. Buch der göttlichen Tröstung. Ed. P. Strauch. 1922.
- Encyclopædia Biblica. 1914.

- FIEBIG, P. *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu im Lichte der Rabbinischen Gleichnisse.* 1912.
Joma; der Mischna Tractat, etc. 1905
Rabbinische Wundergeschichten des neutestamentlichen Zeitalters in rakalisiertem Text. 1911.
- FORREST, D. *The Authority of Christ.* Fourth edition. 1903.
The Christ of History and of Experience. Fourth edition. 1903.
- FORSYTH, P. T. *The Person and Place of Jesus Christ.* 1909.
The Principle of Authority. 1912.
- FOSDICK, H. E. *The Manhood of the Master.* Eighteenth edition. 1924.
- GALLOWAY, G. *Studies in the Philosophy of Religion.* 1904.
- GARVIE, A. E. *Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus.* 1907.
- GLOVER, T. R. *Progress in Religion to the Christian Era.* 1922.
The Jesus of History. 1922.
- GORE, C. *Belief in Christ.* 1922.
- HARNACK, A. *Sprüche und Reden Jesu.* 1907.
Sayings of Jesus. 1908.
- HAWKINS, J. C. *Horæ Synopticæ.* Second edition. 1909.
- HEADLAM, A. C. *The Life and Teachings of Jesus the Christ.* First edition. 1923.
- HERRMANN, W. *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott.* Fifth and sixth editions. 1908
The Communion of the Christian with God. Second English edition. 1906.
Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu. 1907.
- JAMES, WILLIAM. *The Varieties of Religious Experience.* 1902.
- JÜLICHER, A. *Die Gleichnisreden Jesu.* Vols. I and II. 1899.
Einleitung un das neue Testament. Third and fourth editions. 1901.
- KAFTAN, J. *Dogmatik.* Fifth and sixth editions. 1909.
- KLOSTERMANN, E. *Das Lukasevangelium (in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. von Hans Lietzmann).* 1919.
Markus (in Handbuch zum Neuen Testament. von Hans Lietzmann). 1907.
- LECKIE, J. H. *Authority in Religion.* 1909.
- LECKY, W. E. H. *History of European Morals.* Two vols. Third edition, revised. 1877.
- LÜTGERT, W. *Die Johannäische Christologie.* 1916.
- LUTHER, M. *A Commentary on the Galatians.* Anon. English translation. Initiated by P. O. Pub. Chester. 1796.

- MACKINTOSH, H. R. *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*. Third edition. 1914.
- MARTINEAU, J. *The Seat of Authority in Religion*. Fourth edition. 1898.
- MCGIFFERT, A. CUSHMAN. *The God of the Early Christians*. 1924.
- MCNEILE, A. H. *The Gospel According to St. Matthew*. 1915.
- MENZIES, A. *The Earliest Gospel*. 1901.
- MEYER, H. A. W. *Commentary on the New Testament*. English translation. Matthew. 1877.
Mark and Luke. 1880.
John. Third edition. 1908.
- MOFFATT, J. *The Theology of the Gospels*. 1912.
Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament. 1911.
- NAUMANN, F. *Gotteshilfe*. 1907.
- NEWMAN, J. H. *Grammar of Assent*. New impression. 1906.
- OTTO, R. *Idea of the Holy*. English translation. 1923.
- PEAKE, A. S. *One-volume Commentary*.
- RAWLINSON, A. E. J. *St. Mark, with Introduction, Commentary, and Additional Notes*. 1925.
- RENAN, E. *The Life of Jesus*. English translation. People's edition. 1888.
- SABATIER, A. *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*. 1904.
- SCHLEIERMACHER, F. *Christliche Glaube*. Fifth edition. 1861.
Über der Religion. Second edition. 1906.
- SCHWEITZER, A. *Das Messianitäts—und Leidens—geheimnis*. 1901.
Geschichte Leben-Jesu-Forschung. Second edition. 1921.
Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung. 1911.
- SCOTT, E. F. *The Kingdom and the Messiah*. Edinburgh. 1911.
- SIMPSON, P. CARNEGIE. *The Fact of Christ*. Popular edition.
- SMITH, W. ROBERTSON. *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church*. Edinburgh. 1881.
- SÖDEN, H. VON. *Hat Jesus gelebt?* 1910.
- STANTON, V. *The Gospels as Historical Documents*. Vols. II and III. 1910.
- STAPFER, E. *Jésus Christ*. Second edition. Three vols. 1896-8.
- STRACK, H. L., u. BILLERBECK, P. *Das Evangelium nach Matthäus erläutert aus Talmud u.s.w.* 1922.
Das Evangelium nach Markus. Lukas und Johannes und die Apostelgeschichte erläutert aus Talmud u.s.w. 1924.
Joma, der Mischnatractat "Versöhnungstag" herausgegeben von H. L. Strack. 1904.
Die Sprüche der Väter. Ed. H. L. Strack. 1901.

- STREETER, B. H. *The Four Gospels*. 1924.
- TEMPLE, W. *Christus Veritas*. 1924.
- TENANT, F. R. *Miracle and its Philosophical Presuppositions*. 1925.
- THEOLOGIA GERMANICA. Translated S. Wenkworth. 1854.
- UNDERWOOD, A. C. *Conversion: Christian and Non-Christian*. 1925.
- WARSCHAUER, J. *Jesus: Seven Questions*. 1908.
- WEINEL, H. *Die Gleichnisse Jesu*. Leipzig. 1910.
- WEISS, J. *Das Aelteste Evangelium*. 1903.
- WELLHAUSEN, J. *Das Evangelium Matthäus*. 1914.
- WENDLAND, P. *Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur*. Second and third editions und *Die urchristl. Literatur-formen*. Second and third editions, 1912.
- WENDT, H. H. *Die Apostelgeschichte*. Eighth auflage. 1899.
- WERNLE, P. *The Beginnings of Christianity*. English translation. 1903.
- WREDE, P. *Character u. Tendenz des Johannes-evangeliums*. 1903.

INDEX OF PRINCIPAL SCRIPTURE REFERENCES

(a) OLD TESTAMENT

GENESIS		ISAIAH	
iv. 24	85	vi. 1	126
xxviii. 10 f.	182	5	253
		9, 10	118
EXODUS		xxix. 13	117
xx. 12	117	liii.	106, 108, 118
DEUTERONOMY		12	164
v. 16	117	lv. 9	270
xxxiii. 27	270	lvi. 7	118
		lviii. 6	160, 215
I SAMUEL		lxi. 1 f.	160, 215
xvi. 7	226		
I KINGS		JEREMIAH	
xix. 5	116	i. 4 ff.	126
		vii. 11	118
I CHRONICLES		xi. 20	226
xxviii. 9	226	xvii. 10	226
		xx. 9	80
JOB			
ix. 8	97	EZEKIEL	
xxxviii. 16	97	i. 1	126
PSALMS			
xxii.	106	DANIEL	
xxii.	119	vii. 13 f.	62, 106, 119,
lxxxii. 6	232		
cxviii. 22	124	HOSEA	
cxix. 8	270	i. 10	232
9	270		
		AMOS	
		ii. 4	85
		vii. 14 f.	79

(b) NEW TESTAMENT

MATTHEW		MATTHEW—continued	
i. & ii.	49, 142, 143, 151	ii. 13 ff.	144, 151
i. 1	150	15	150, 151
16	150	18	151
16 ff.	69	23	151
17	48, 144, 150, 151	iii. 2	258
18	150	5, 7-12	120
18 ff.	144, 151	10-12	71
22	144	11	53
23	144	11, 12	75
ii. 1 ff.	144, 151	14, 15	142
2-10	145	17	92, 115, 126
6	151	iv. 1-11	59, 62, 72, 77, 96

MATTHEW—*continued*

iv. 7-10	147
11	116
12 ff.	121, 215
13-16	242
23-25	242
v.-vii.	113
v.	153
1	142
1-4	81
3	85
5	142
6	81, 85
7-10	142
8, 9	85
11, 12	81
13	172
14	142
16	140, 142
17	142, 240, 261
18	269
18 f.	98
19-24	142
20	271
21 ff.	261
23	204
23 f.	271
25 ff.	81, 204
27-31	138, 142
28	271
33	142
38	142, 275
38-48	192, 271
39 ff.	81, 84
41	142
41 f.	274
42	81
43	142
43 ff.	236, 237, 275
44	274, 275
44-48	81
48	237
vi. 1-8	142
14	204
14 f.	204
14-18	142
24	62
25-33	81
27	272
30	272
32	84, 237, 272
33	269, 270

MATTHEW—*continued*

vi. 34	142
vii. 1, 2	81
1-5	81
6	142
7-11	81
12	272
13 f.	81
15	142
16-18	81
19	142
20	142
21	61, 81
24	271
24-27	81, 173
28	131
29	152
37	113
viii.	113
1	142
1-4	113
5-13	74
6, 8	62
17, 18	142
20	65
27	112
29	92
ix. 1-8	131
8	113, 140
13	240
15	241
21	174
35	133
38	62
x.	147
1	133
2-6	142
5-23	268
7	71, 87
7 f.	75
8	142
9-11	133
14	94, 133
15	87
17-23	142
23	148, 269
24 f.	62
26-33	81
29	60
31	60
31 ff.	59
32	60, 65

MATTHEW—*continued*

x.	33	60
	34 f.	240
	41	142
	42	110
xi.	1	142
	2 ff.	69, 71, 87, 121, 193
	3	44
	4 ff.	74, 75
	12	271
	14 f.	142
	19	65, 274
	21 f.	75
	25	140
	27	58
	28	146
	28 f.	205
	28-30	142
xii.	1 ff.	147
	1-8	131
	5-7	142
	5 f.	145
	6	147
	8	145, 147
	9-14	132
	11	238
	18 ff.	150
	22-37	132
	27	42, 205
	28	75, 236
	32	65
	34	142
	34, 35	142
	38 f.	77
	38-42	122
	39 ff.	65
	40	149
	41 f.	77
	45 ff.	114
	50	203, 271
xiii.	1-9	172
	8	271
	10-13	133
	13	118
	14, 15	148
	17	153
	24-30	148, 172
	36-43	172
	36-52	148
	37, 41	148
	39	269

MATTHEW—*continued*

xiii.	45 f.	172
	57	121
	58	133
xiv.	1 f.	122
	28-31	142
	33	140, 189
	36	174
xv.	1-20	134
	12-13	142
	23 f.	142
	29-31	142
	31	140
xvi.	1-4	134
	3	273
	13	64, 103
	13 ff.	70
	13-23	97, 103, 107, 139
	14	122
	17-19	142
	18 f.	101, 147
	21	103
	22	147
	24-26	136
	27 f.	104
	28	104, 137, 148
xvii.	4	101
	6 f.	142
	9	105
	10 ff.	105, 118
	14-21	139
	20	139
	24-27	142
xviii.	1-5	137
	3	142
	4	142, 238
	6-9	137
	10	142, 145, 153
	11	148
	16-19	142
	20	142, 146, 269, 272
	21	84
	21-24	274
	22	204
	23-35	142
	27-30	274
	35	146
xix.	1-12	138
	10-12	142
	13 f.	127
	15	142
	16	117, 248

MATTHEW—*continued*

xix.	16-30	135
xx.	1-16	142, 172
	28	241
xxi.	1 ff.	271
	5	150
	1-11	110, 117, 123, 140
	9	271
	10 f.	124
	11	147, 152
	12 f.	118, 127
	14, 16 f.	142
	18 ff.	255
	23-27	125, 128
	28-31	142, 172
	31	153
	33-46	125, 129
	43	142, 153
	46	124, 152
xxii.	12-14	142
	15-22	135
	34-40	135
	39	62
	46	142
xxiii.		81
	1-3	142
	4	271, 273
	5, 8-11	142
	15-22	142
	16 ff.	77
	24	142
	30 ff.	108
	37	108
xxiv.	11-13	142
	14	269
	27	66
	27-37	105
	30 f.	119
	34	269
	35	270
	36-44	67
	37, 39	66
	42	142, 146
	44	65, 67
	45 f., 49 f.	62
xxv.	1-4	142
	5-10	142
	11-13	142
	14 ff.	173
	31	148
	31-46	142, 172
xxvi.	1-3	142

MATTHEW—*continued*

xxvi.	21-25	138
	26-29	95, 138
	30 f.	119
	36-46	98, 129
	42	254
	52-54	142
	56	119
	63 ff.	233
	75	159
xxvii.	3-10, 19	142
	24 f.	142
	52 f.	142
	54	232
	62-66	142
xxviii.	1-10	95
	2-4	142
	6	146
	8 ff.	142, 145
	9	142
	16-20	152
	17	142
	18	48

MARK

i.	3	100, 102
	4	52
	7 f.	53, 120
	9	52
	10 f.	126
	11	92, 115
	12 f.	96
	13	102, 115
	14	215
	14 ff.	215
	14, 15	120, 121
	21-28	107
	22	86, 111, 131, 152
	25	140
	27 f.	111, 113
	35	127
	40	131
	40-45	113
	44	100, 132
ii.	1-12	131
	5 ff.	233, 258
	7	114, 261
	9 ff.	76
	10	102, 116
	12	113, 140
	15-17	132
	16	261

MARK—continued		
ii.	17	240, 241
	18-22	132
	23-28	132
	24	261
	27	261
	28	102, 147
iii.	1-6	132
	11 f.	92, 140
	20-30	132
	22	139
	28 f.	133
	34	272
	35	237
iv.	1	47
	1-9	172, 173
	2	143
	9	133
	11, 12	133
	12	118
	33	133, 143
	40	236
	41	112
v.	1 ff.	255
	7	92
	18 f.	100
	20	112
	25 ff.	141
	43	100, 140
vi.	1-6	193
	4	121, 166
	5	114
	5 f.	133
	6-13	133
	8 f.	134
	10 f.	94
	13	134
	14 f.	122
	30-34	189
	34	216
	35 ff.	174
	45-viii. 26	49
	45	97
	50	127
	52	91, 116
vii.	1-13	134
	2 ff.	261
	4-16	117
	6 f.	117
	19	91
	26 ff.	255
	31-37	114

MARK—continued		
vii.	37	112
viii.	1-10	189
	7 f.	122
	11 ff.	134
	11, 12	122
	26	97
	22-26	114
	27	103, 140
	27-33	97, 103, 107, 139
	27 ff.	110
	29	103
	30	139
	31	103, 136
	34	137
	34-37	136
	35	104
	38	59, 60, 61, 104
	38-ix. 1	104
ix.	1	137, 148, 269
	5	101
	7	93, 140
	9	105
	12	118
	12 f.	105
	14-29	141, 139
	29	115
	31	105
	33-37	137
	41	110
	42	236
	42-48	137
x.	1-12	138
	13-16	127
	14	174, 203
	15	238
	17	117
	17 f.	248
	17-31	135
	21 ff.	117
	33	105
	33 f.	136
	45	105
	52	141
xi.	1-11	110, 117, 123, 140
	3	100
	9 f.	174
	11	124
	15-19	118, 127
	17	255
	22	141
	26	236

MARK—*continued*

xi.	27-33	128, 204, 125
xii.	1-12	125, 129
	13-17	135, 143
	28-34	135
	35 ff.	99, 101
	37	47, 214
xiii.		100, 111, 147, 148, 270
	10	270
	24-27	105
	26	119
	28 f.	256
	31	269
	32	93, 269
	33, 35	146
xiv.	9	203
	18-21	138
	21	105
	22-25	95, 138
	26 f.	119
	32-42	98
	35 f.	98
	36	254
	49	119
	58	261
	62	110
	62 f.	119
	64	261
	72	159
xv.	16-38	119
	32	110
	32-42	129
	34	255
	39	93, 140, 232, 257
xvi.	1-6	95
	19	102

LUKE

i.-ii.	49, 165, 175, 177
i.	1-4
	12-25
	26-38
	31-33
	32 f.
	35
	39-56
	43 ff.
	46-55
	57-79
	68-79
ii.	8-20

LUKE—*continued*

ii.	10 f.	162
	11	160
	25-35	165
	26	160, 162
	36-38	165
	41 ff.	255
iii.	1-2, 5	156
	3	120
	7	258
	7-9	258, 123
	10-15	156
	16	53
	16 f.	71, 120, 121
	18-20	156
	19 ff.	121
	21 f.	77
	22	92, 115, 126
	23	215
	28-38	156
	38	232
iv.	1-13	59, 62, 72, 77, 96
	13	116
	16 ff.	156, 164, 167, 175, 215, 240
	18-22	160
	21 f.	164
	25 ff.	175, 261
	31 f.	131
	36 f.	111, 113
	40	133
	41	177
	41b	156
	42	127
v.	1-11	156
	5	161
	8	83, 159, 206, 253
	12-16	113
	17	160, 176, 156
	17-26	131
	26	113, 140
	32	240
	39	156
vi.	1-5	132
	5	147, 159
	6-11	132
	12	156
	24-26	156, 168, 176
	31	272
	34	156, 168, 176
	35	236
	43-45	132

LUKE—*continued*

vi.	45	156, 168, 176
	46	61
vii.	1-10	74
	11-17	156, 176
	13	159
	16	140
	16-20	258
	18 ff.	69, 87, 71, 121
	22 ff.	74, 75, 193
	34	65, 274
	36 ff.	156, 168, 275
	47	204
viii.	1-3	156
	4-8	172
	9 f.	133
	10	118
	22	156
	24	161
	25	112
	28	92
	29	112
	43a	156
	45	156, 161
	51 ff.	156, 176
ix.	1-6	133
	2	71, 87
	5	94
	7 ff.	122
	18	103
	18 ff.	97, 103, 107, 139, 161
	19	122
	20	101, 103
	22	103
	23-25	136
	26	65
	26 f.	104
	27	137
	31-43a	139
	33	101, 161
	35	93
	38	65
	43	139
	46-48	137
	49	161
	51-56	76
	51-62	168
	61-62	156
x.		48
	1	156, 159
	2	271

LUKE—*continued*

x.	9	75, 71, 87
	11	71, 87
	12	87
	13 f.	75
	16-20	156
	17	75
	17-21	169
	20	165
	21	140
	22	58
	25-28	135, 169
	25-42	156
	25 ff.	176
	26	206
	29-36	173
	36	206
xi.	1	156
	4	271
	5-8	156, 173
	9 ff.	82
	14 ff.	75, 76, 132, 60
	15	76, 156
	16	77
	18	76, 156
	19	75
	20	75, 76
	21	156
	24	77
	27-32	156
	29 ff.	65, 77, 122, 169, 176
	32	122, 134
	36-38	156
	40	156, 176
	45, 53	156
	46	271
xii.	1	156
	7 ff.	59
	8	65
	10	65, 133
	11-21	156
	16-21	173
	22 ff.	82
	31 f.	272
	34	258
	34 ff.	82
	36-38	156
	37	133
	39 f.	67
	40	65

LUKE— <i>continued</i>			LUKE— <i>continued</i>		
xii.	41	156	xviii.	7, 8	162
	42	159		15-17	127
	47-50, 52	156		18	117, 248
	51	240		18-30	135
	54	134	xix.	1-10	170
	54-56	272		1-11	156
	54-57	156		5	275
	57 ff.	272		8	159
xiii.	1-9	169		9 f.	162
	1-17	156		10	216, 240, 275
	10-17	169		31	159
	13	140		28-38	110, 117, 123
	14	261		38	161
	15	159		40	236
	18 ff.	82		41-44	156
	22 f.	156		45-48	118, 127
	22-30	169		48	156
	25-27	156	xx.	1-8	125, 128
	30-33	156		9-19	128, 129
	35	62		16	156
xiv.	1 ff.	176		18	177
	1-10	156		20-26	135
	7-11	170	xxi.	25b, 26a	156
	12-15, 25	156		27	119
	28-33	156		34-36	156
xv.		48		36	162
	1, 3, 8-32	156	xxii.	4, 6, 8	156
	11 ff.	204		15-17	156
	12-32	173		15-20	95, 138
	20	204		21 ff.	138
xvi.	1-12, 14 f.	156		31 f.	48, 156, 159, 236, 275
	13	82		35-38	156, 170
	19-31	156		37	164
xvii.	1 ff.	87		39-46	98, 129
	1-2	137		43 f.	156, 177, 254
	2	156		47	164
	3, 4	84		51b-52a	156
	5	156, 159		61	159
	6	159	xxiii.	2, 4-16	156
	7-22	156		8	170
	11 ff.	176		27-31	156
	13	161		33	258
	15	140		40-43	156
	21	87		46, 48	156, 256
	24	66		47	93, 140
	25	156	xxiv.		165, 175, 177
	26 ff.	66		1-11	95
	28-32	156		3	160
	31 ff.	271		7-16	166
xviii.	1-14	156		12, 13	166
	6	159			

I. UKE—continued			
xxiv.	13 ff.	48, 163, 166, 228	164,
	19	167	
	25 f.	162	
	27	167	
	34	160	
	36-49	157, 164	
	46	162	
	50-53	166	

JOHN			
i.		181	
	1-49	83	
	4 f.	193, 196	
	12	184, 237	
	18	196	
	27-29	53	
	32 f.	187	
	41	184	
	47 ff.	186	
	48	184	
	49	178	
	51	182	
ii.		181	
	4, 9	184	
	11	186	
	21	184	
	23	186	
	25	184	
iii.		181	
	1 ff.	196	
	13 f.	182	
	14	184	
	16-18	193	
	16-35	179	
	17	193, 240	
iv.		180	
	1	180	
	7 ff.	195	
	11	180	
	15	180	
	19	180, 187, 189	
	25 f.	184	
	34	214, 238, 240	
	42	83, 184, 186, 191	
	44	189	
	46-54	186	
	49	180	
v.	7	180	
	17	185, 238	
	17-19	192	

JOHN—continued			
v.	19 f.	179, 185	
	24 f.	193	
	27	182	
vi.	2	186	
	14	187, 189	
	23	180	
	32 ff.	195	
	35	187	
	40	179	
	46 ff.	179	
	48	188	
	51, 55	188	
	52 ff., 60 ff.	191	
	53, 62	181	
	54	248	
	63	266	
	64, 70	184	
	68	180, 188, 191, 248	
vii.		181	
	26 f.	184	
	31	186, 187	
	37	188	
	40, 52	189, 190	
	41 f.	184	
viii.	1 ff.	275	
	11	180	
	12 ff.	192	
	14	192	
	15	192, 193	
	21-59	178	
	21 ff.	191	
	26	179	
	28	181	
	29	248	
	40	193	
	41	232	
	46	238	
ix.	1-41	186	
	4	240	
	17	189, 190	
	22	184	
	31, 33	187	
	35	181	
	36, 38	180	
		181	
x.	1 ff.	193, 195	
	10 f.	193, 241	
	11-29	193	
	24	184	
	25, 27, 37	193	
	19-29	193	

JOHN—continued

x.	28	248
	30 ff.	193, 239
xi.		181
	2, 13, 21	180
	4	184, 187
	11-14	184
	15	187
	25 ff.	179, 184
	27, 32, 39	180
xii.	23, 34	181
	28 ff.	187
	46 ff.	192, 193
xiii.	1, 38	184
	6, 9, 13 f.	180
	25, 36 f.	180
xiv.	1 ff.	195, 158
	5, 8, 22	180
	6, 17	195
xv.	1 ff.	193, 195
	13	276
xvi.		180
xvi.-xix.		181
xvii.		180
	3	248
	12	184
xviii.		180
	4	184
	36	270
	37	240, 241
xix.		180
	28	184
xx.		181
	2, 18, 20	180
	25	180
	28	180, 181
	30	184
	31	184, 195
xxi.		181
	1, 7	186
	7, 12, 20 f.	180
	15 ff.	180, 275
	25	184

ACTS

i.	1	220
	13, 15	226
	24, 26	226
ii.		43
	1 ff.	226, 227
	17 f., 25	226
	24	224

ACTS—continued

ii.	32	221, 226
	36	221
	38, 42 f.	226
	47	228
iii.	6	226
iv.	10	221, 222
	30	222
vi.	8 ff., 10	227
vii.	59	222
viii.	15 ff., 26 ff.	227
ix.	7	225, 228
	20	218
	28	222
x.	10	126
	14, 19	227
	44 ff.	227
	25 f.	232
xi.	26	219
xiii.	2, 4	227
	29 ff.	221
xiv.	8 ff.	43
	8-18	232
xvi.	6	227
xvii.	3	218
	11	164
	28	232
xix.	2 ff., 21	227
xx.	22 ff.	227
xxii.	9	225, 228
	10	227
xxvi.	8	218
	23	119, 218
	28	219

ROMANS

i.	1	227
viii.	10	246
	14, 16, 19	232
	21	207, 237
	37	223
xv.	3	69

I CORINTHIANS

i.	23	221
	25	218
iv.	15	237
vii.	25	206
viii.	5 f.	68
ix.	19 ff.	227
	22, 23	276
xi.	23 ff.	222

1 CORINTHIANS— <i>continued</i>		
xii.	12, 27	266
xiv.	1-19	229
	18	227
xv.	4-8	224

2 CORINTHIANS		
i.	21	223
iii.	17	207
v.	17	223
	21	237
viii.	9	276
xi.	17	206

GALATIANS		
ii.	2	224
	6 ff.	230
	14	224
	20	223
iii.	26	237

EPHESIANS		
i.	22	266
iii.	18 f.	223
v.	1	237

PHILIPPIANS		
i.	21	44, 223

PHILIPPIANS— <i>continued</i>		
i.	23	223
ii.	15	232
iv.	13	223

COLOSSIANS		
iii.	3	284

1 THESSALONIANS		
iv.	16 f.	106

2 THESSALONIANS		
i.	7	106

1 TIMOTHY		
i.	15	253

2 TIMOTHY		
i.	12	196

HEBREWS		
iv.	15	212, 246

1 JOHN		
iii.	1 f.	232

2 JOHN		
iii.	5	246



